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Chapter 1 Introduction to the Dissertation 
Over the past several decades, we have witnessed enormous growth in alliance activity 
(Anand & Khanna, 2000; Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2001; De Man & Duysters, 2005). Alliances 
seem to have established themselves as cornerstones for the competitive strategy of many 
firms, as they enable those firms to achieve objectives that otherwise would be difficult to 
realize. In spite of this unprecedented increase in alliance activity, strong empirical evidence 
indicates alliance performance has remained weak over the years (Harrigan, 1988; Judge & 
Dooley, 2006; Kogut, 1988a; Park & Ungson, 1997). To achieve superior alliance 
performance, firms need to overcome internal and external challenges by efficiently and 
effectively designing (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992) and managing (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) 
their relationships. Furthermore, firms need to resolve the difficulties surrounding joint value 
creation and overcome problems in appropriating their share of this realized value (Jap, 
2001a; Lavie, 2007). However, we show through a review of the alliance literature that 
researchers examining these issues produced fragmented, partial, and, in some instances, 
inconclusive findings. Therefore, the main aim of our research is to address these concerns 
and contribute to a comprehensive understanding of performance in an alliance context. 
 
To achieve this objective, we adopt a theoretically rich approach, in that we contend that 
previous alliance research adopting a single theoretical focus may have overlooked important 
explanations. That is, we contribute to a much needed and better understanding of the 
relationships among alliance structure, alliance process, and alliance performance by 
demonstrating that a reconciliation of the structure and process perspectives provides a more 
complete explanation of alliance performance. Furthermore, while drawing on the power, 
learning, and behavioral perspectives, we extend previous alliance research by showing that 
the simultaneous examination of the relationships among cooperation, competition, alliance 
performance and firm performance contributes to a finer-grained understanding.  
 
This first chapter introduces our research, and we organize it as follows. In Section 1.1, we 
present our definitions of a strategic alliance and performance. In Section 1.2, we elaborate on 
the empirical and theoretical motivation of this dissertation. Then, we develop our research 
framework and research questions in Section 1.3. In Section 1.4, we discuss the dissertation’s 
theoretical and managerial relevance, and we present the scope of the research in Section 1.5. 
We conclude this chapter with an outline of the book in Section 1.6.  
 
1.1 Definitions: Strategic Alliance and Alliance Performance  
We define a strategic alliance as a voluntary, long-term, contractual relationship between 
two firms to achieve mutual and individual objectives through the sharing of resources. Our 
definition corresponds with other definitions (Ariño, De la Torre, & Ring, 2001 p. 110; 
Gulati, 1995a p. 621; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002 p. 413) and has several implications. 
First, once engaged in an alliance, two partnering firms remain independent organizational 
entities connected through an alliance contract. Second, due to their intent to share and 
exchange resources, parties become interdependent (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
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As firms desire one another’s resources to achieve their individual objectives, goal attainment 
depends on firms working together toward some collective agenda (Eliashberg & Michie, 
1984). Third, due to these reciprocal financial and organizational relationships, uncertainty 
and vulnerability surround alliances. For instance, within alliances, parties need to develop 
joint business propositions, share control and management, accept overlapping roles and 
responsibilities, engage in adaptation through mutual cooperation, install internal and 
proactive monitoring mechanisms, and develop long-term incentive systems (Heide, 1994). 
Sharing of these tasks and activities creates uncertainty and vulnerability. Fourth, our 
definition implies that firms can dissolve a strategic alliance at a time convenient to them. For 
instance, a firm may terminate an alliance by itself when it has achieved its objectives, or both 
firms together may decide to end the alliance. In summary, our definition suggests that 
strategic alliances are transitional organizational forms established by two firms to achieve 
objectives that would otherwise be difficult to realize. 
 
In this study, we define alliance performance as the degree of accomplishment of the 
partners’ intentional and emergent objectives.1 Defining alliance performance is a difficult 
endeavor with many potential problems (Anderson, 1990; Ariño, 2003; Geringer & Hebert, 
1991; López-Navarro & Molina-Morales, 2002; Olk, 2002). To enable researchers to compare 
our research with past and future work, it is necessary to be explicit about three of these 
problems: (1) level of analysis, (2) process or outcome orientation, and (3) performance 
dimensions.  
 
First, our conceptual definition captures performance at the dyadic level. Researchers have 
proposed theoretical models and tested hypotheses with alliance performance while adopting 
different levels of analysis. Focusing on the firm as level of analysis, researchers used, for 
instance, stock market responses (Anand et al., 2000; Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002) and firm 
profitability (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994) as outcome variables. Several researchers 
adopted a portfolio perspective and aimed to provide explanations with respect to alliance 
portfolio performance (Heimeriks & Duysters, 2007), whereas other researchers adopted a 
network perspective (Elfring & Hulsink, 2003; Elfring, & Hulsink, 2007; Gulati, Nohria, & 
Zaheer, 2000). We focus on dyadic performance, which differs from the firm, portfolio, and 
network levels of analysis, because we capture performance with respect to both partner firms 
involved in the relationship. This conceptualization is consistent with our primary objective, 
which is to provide explanations of performance within an alliance context. Moreover, a 
dyadic perspective enables us to theorize and conduct tests of relationships among 
antecedents and alliance performance (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, we also focus on the 
relative performance firms derive through an alliance, which we refer to as firm performance 
imbalance. Consequently, a dyadic view enables us also to examine the relationships among 
cooperation, competition, alliance performance, and firm performances derived through the 
alliance (Hypotheses 2–4). 
                                                 
1 Here, our focus is on the conceptual definition. In Section 6.3, we present the operational definition. 
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Second, our definition captures performance outcomes rather than the performance of alliance 
processes (Kumar & Nti, 1998). For instance, previous alliance research captured 
performance with process-oriented concepts, such as relational norms, commitment, and trust 
(Büchel & Thuy, 2001; Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993; Cullen, Johnson, & Sakano, 2000). Other 
researchers adopted an outcome-orientation with variables such as joint goal attainment, 
alliance duration, and alliance termination (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, & Bell, 1997; 
Geringer et al., 1991; Park & Russo, 1996; Park et al., 1997; Parkhe, 1993a). We adopt an 
outcome orientation with a focus on goal attainment, asserting that firms enter relationships to 
achieve objectives. Post-formation processes are a means to support the realization of 
objectives, but they do not constitute a goal. We also acknowledge that firms with particular 
objectives during the formation stage may change or replace those with new objectives as the 
alliance unfolds (Ariño, 2003; Olk, 2002). 
 
Third, several researchers conceptualized alliance performance with a holistic approach (Kale 
et al., 2002; Kauser & Shaw, 2004; Yan et al., 2001), using process and outcome indicators to 
capture goal attainment across performance dimensions, spill-over effects, and overall 
satisfaction. Other researchers captured alliance performance by referring to specific 
performance dimensions, such as financial (Blankenburg Holm, Eriksson, & Johanson, 1999; 
Lambe, Spekman, & Hunt, 2002), learning (Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma, & Tihanyi, 2004; 
Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000), and strategic (Aulakh, Kotabe, & Sahay, 1996; Child & 
Yan, 2003). We conceptualize performance without making an explicit distinction among the 
various performance dimensions, as previous alliance research did not indicate the need to 
develop hypotheses with respect to each dimension (see Chapter 2 and 4). However, for our 
operational definition we capture performance with three distinct dimensions: financial, 
learning, and strategic (see §6.3), enabling us to contrast theoretical explanations. 
 
1.2 Empirical and Theoretical Motivation 
The strategic value of alliances is apparent in the context of rapidly growing and changing 
markets, global competition, network organizations, and dynamic, complex, expensive 
technologies (Contractor & Lorange, 2002). Firms view alliances, as instruments that they can 
deploy to achieve objectives that otherwise would be difficult to achieve (see Box 1.1). For 
instance, strategic alliances may reduce production and transaction costs (Hennart, 1988), 
provide a means to obtain, exchange, and harvest knowledge (Inkpen, 2000; Inkpen & Dinur, 
1998; Lubatkin, Florin, & Lane, 2001), shift external dependencies to the firm’s advantage 
(Pfeffer et al., 1978), reduce operational and strategic risks (Kogut, 1988b), help access 
valuable and complementary resources (Das & Teng, 2000b; Dyer & Singh, 1998), offer 
legitimacy and reputation effects (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Stuart, 2000), help the firm engage 
into group-to-group competition (Gimeno, 2004), and accelerate internal growth (Grant & 
Baden-Fuller, 2004). Thus, adopting collaborative strategies enables firms to focus on their 
core competences and develop competitive advantages (Dyer et al., 1998).  
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The importance of strategic partnerships is supported by empirical reports showing that the 
number of alliances used by firms during the past two decades has been continuously 
increasing. Kang and Sakai (2001) found that the number of alliances was six times as high in 
1999 than a decade earlier. Duysters, De Kok, and Vaandrager (1999) reported a similar 
exponential increase of strategic technology alliances during the period 1970 to 1996. Anand 
and Khanna (2000) reported that during 1990–1993, companies announced more than 9000 
alliances just in the U.S. manufacturing sector. On the basis of their research, Dyer, Kale, and 
Singh (2001) concluded that in 2001, the top 500 global business had an average of 60 major 
alliances each. De Man (2005) reported that within the period 1998 to 2002, high-tech 
companies announced a substantial number of strategic alliances, including those by IBM 
(168), Cisco (56), Eli Lilly (40), and Philips-EU (61). Another report indicated that 
multinational firms such as BP, Amoco, Dow Chemical, and Sony maintained more than 100 
alliances in their portfolios (Bamford & Ernst, 2003). Harbison and Pekar (1998) found that 
the percentage of annual revenue that the 1000 largest U.S. companies earned from alliances 
grew from less than 2 percent in 1980 to 19 percent by 1996 and was expected to grow to 35 
percent by 2002. Moreover, with respect to the future, survey research results indicated that 
managers consider strategic alliances primary growth vehicles (Schifrin, 2001). Together, 
these illustrations show that in the twenty-first century, firms are not likely to create value on 
a stand-alone basis (Contractor et al., 2002) and that the way business is conducted is based 
on partnerships (Castells, 2000). 
 
Paradoxically, the increased focus on and use of strategic alliances by firms is paralleled by 
empirical research indicating moderate to high alliance failure rates over the years (Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005; Kogut, 1988a; Pekár & Allio, 1994). More specifically, researchers 
reported failure rates as high as 70 percent (Harrigan, 1988). Franko (1971) and Killing 
(1983) reported, respectively, 24 percent and 30 percent premature alliance dissolutions. In 
another study, Porter (1987) considered 33 randomly chosen U.S. firms and disclosed a 
dissolution rate of 50.3 percent during the period 1950–1986. Spekman et al. (1996), as well 
as Kok and Wildeman (1997) and Dacin and Hitt (1997), found a failure rate of strategic 
alliances of approximately 60 percent. Park and Ungson (1997) investigated joint venture 
termination and found in a U.S.–Japanese sample a dissolution rate of 43 percent during 
1979–1995. De Man (2005) reported an average failure rate of 52 percent across a sample of 
140 European and U.S. firms. Together, these reports indicated that though firms consider 
alliances attractive alternatives to achieve their objectives, they are subject to failure and 
premature dissolution.  
 
From an empirical perspective, a clear need exists to study strategic alliances, because the 
necessity of achieving competitive advantage through partnerships is paralleled by high 
failure rates. As firms enter alliances, they face considerable challenges from external 
dynamics, including changing market conditions, industry dynamics, and new technological 
developments, as well as internal dynamics, such as strategic shifts, opportunistic behavior, or 
failures to comply with contract obligations. To achieve superior alliance performance, firms 
   5 
need to overcome these challenges by efficiently and effectively designing and managing 
their relationships. However, observing the high failure rates, it seems that firms are not 
sufficiently prepared to deal with these challenges.  
 
Box 1.1 Empirical Motivation: Two Business Illustrations 
Pixar–Disney Alliance (1991–2005): Pixar combines creative and technical artistry to create stories in the 
medium of computer animation and has been responsible for innovations in the application of computer graphics 
for filmmaking. Disney has a long history of developing, producing, and distributing animated films. In May 1991, 
Pixar entered into an alliance with Disney to produce three computer-animated films to be marketed by Disney. 
In February 1997, Pixar entered into another agreement (which superseded the first), whereby Pixar and Disney 
agreed to produce and distribute five feature-length motion pictures. The movies were Toy Story (1995), A Bug’s 
Life (1998), Toy Story 2 (1999), Monsters, Inc. (2001), Finding Nemo (2003), The Incredibles (2004), and Cars
(2005). Pixar and Disney agreed to: co-finance the production, co-own the pictures, co-brand the pictures, share 
equally in the profits, and share equally in the profits from related merchandise after recovery of all marketing 
and distribution costs, a distribution fee paid to Disney, and other fees and costs. Although financially very 
successful, the alliance was subject to tensions. The views of the two CEOs (i.e., Michael Eisner and Steve 
Jobs) clashed, profits were asymmetrically appropriated (i.e., 68–32 in favor of Disney), and bargaining power 
shifted (i.e., Pixar gained power). Despite the successes, in 2005 Pixar ended renegotiations with Disney. After 
fulfilling its contractual obligations, Pixar intended to retain full ownership of its future productions and, as of 
2006, began discussions with other distributors. However, in mid-2006, Disney acquired Pixar for approximately 
$7 billion.  
 
Takeda–Eli Lilly Alliance (1999–2006): Eli Lilly, a U.S.-based company, creates and delivers innovative 
medicines that enable people to live longer, healthier, and more active lives. Lilly's pipeline is the strongest in 
the pharmaceutical industry with numerous best-in-class products. Takeda, a Japanese firm, is a research-
based company with a focus on pharmaceuticals and one of the industry's leaders worldwide. In 1998, Takeda 
chose Eli Lilly as the co-promotion partner of its newly formed, U.S.-based company. As a part of the contractual 
agreement, Takeda's U.S. company co-promoted Lilly's select insulin product starting from sometime in 1999 
and received fees based on net sales of the products as compensation from Lilly. The alliance also covered the 
distribution of Takeda’s insulin sensitivity enhancer, ACTOS™. Takeda and Eli Lilly expended substantial efforts 
to overcome cultural barriers and exploit resources. They agreed to share costs and revenues equally. Since 
ACTOS became available in the United States in 1999, physicians have issued more than 3,512,000 
prescriptions. The alliance turned out to be success, and in December 2003, Eli Lilly and Takeda announced 
that they had signed an agreement for joint development and co-marketing of another diabetes medicine in the 
Japanese market. In 2006, Takeda acquired the joint venture, as agreed upon in the original agreement.  
 
Sources: Publicly available information, companies’ Web sites, and companies’ press releases. 
 
Implications for this study 
1. Firms design initial alliance structures that foster or hamper alliance success. Both alliances are 
characterized by synergetic resources, hybrid compensation structures, and safeguarding mechanisms. 
Together, these mutually supportive formation conditions contributed to the alliances’ strengths.  
2. Firms develop post-formation processes that foster or hamper alliance success. Whereas Takeda 
and Eli Lilly bridged cultural differences, working toward a healthy relationship, Pixar and Disney developed 
a hostile relationship. Alliance processes may stimulate/hamper parties’ willingness and ability to change.  
3. Firms need to find a balance between cooperation and competition. Both alliances are characterized 
by hybrid compensation, providing parties with incentives to contribute to achieving individual and joint 
objectives. The ex-ante distribution of anticipated rewards affects alliance development and outcomes. 
4. Superior alliance performance does not imply superior firm performance. Whereas in the Takeda–Eli 
Lilly alliance, each firm received equal profits, in the Pixar–Disney alliance, Disney received more profits 
than Pixar. Alliance success does not imply that partners receive equitable shares. 
 
Theoretical Motivation 
To date, academic research has produced a substantial body of knowledge to aid managers 
with answers to their question and problems. However, a comprehensive understanding still is 
lacking in alliance literature due to the partial, fragmented, and sometimes inconclusive 
findings. The alliance field is relatively fragmented and subject to disciplinary, theoretical, 
and topical diversity (Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997; Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995). For 
instance, alliance performance has emerged as an important topic within marketing (Dwyer, 
6 
Schurr, & Oh, 1987), international business (Buckley & Casson, 1988), and strategic 
management (Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988b). Within these various disciplinary fields, 
researchers have used a variety of theoretical perspectives, ranging from economic theories 
(e.g., transaction cost economics) to behavioral theories (i.e., relational governance) to explain 
performance (for overviews, see e.g. Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Child & Faulkner, 1998; 
Gulati, 1998; Osborn et al., 1997; Robson, Leonidou, & Katsikeas, 2002). Furthermore, 
researchers examined a variety of topics, such as alliance formation (Colombo, 2003; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Hagedoorn, Roijakkers, & Van Kranenburg, 2006), 
alliance management (Das & Teng, 2000a; Ireland et al., 2002), alliance development (Ariño 
& De la Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996; Ring et al., 1994; Zajac & Olsen, 1993), and alliance 
performance (Ariño, 2003; Geringer et al., 1991; López-Navarro et al., 2002).  
 
According to this body of knowledge, a plethora of factors can contribute to or inhibit the 
achievement of superior performance (Hoffmann & Schlosser, 2001; Robson et al., 2002; 
Spekman, Isabella, MacAvoy, & Forbes, 1996), including environmental dynamics (Kogut, 
1989l; Koza & Lewin, 1998), cultural distance (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996), alliance 
scope (Khanna, 1998; Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998), contractual design (Hagedoorn & 
Hesen, 2007; Mendi, 2005), governance form decisions (Sampson, 2004a), alliance instability 
(Das et al., 2000a; Yan, 1998), management control (Yan & Gray, 1994; Yan et al., 2001), 
relational aspects (Ariño et al., 2001), and learning processes (Inkpen, 2000; Lane, Salk, & 
Lyles, 2001). Confronted with this diversity, we need theory development and testing that 
focuses on the properties that distinguish strategic alliances from other organizational entities 
and that aims to align theoretical perspectives. Consistent with previous alliance research, we 
argue that (1) structure and process (Bell, Den Ouden, & Ziggers, 2006; Contractor, 2005; 
Hennart, 2006) and (2) cooperation and competition (Lavie, 2007; Ouchi, 1980; Tiessen & 
Linton, 2000) represent two themes that are relatively understudied but may advance 
understanding of performance in an alliance context. 
 
Structure and Process 
A comprehensive model reconciling structure and process explanations with respect to 
performance is currently lacking within the alliance literature but is much needed 
(Nooteboom, 2004; Sobrero & Schrader, 1998). A theoretical model that specifies 
relationships among alliance structure, alliance process, and alliance performance, while 
acknowledging the complexities surrounding alliances, would constitute a major contribution 
to alliance literature. For instance, Contractor (2005 p. 128) stated that “The two approaches, 
structure and process, inevitably go hand in hand, at both the pre-formation stage, as well as 
afterwards in the management of the alliance.” Building on our review of the literature (see 
Chapter 2), we posit that conceptual and empirical work to date provides sufficient insights to 
guide a reconciliation that can overcome the limitations and critiques pertaining to the 
structure and process perspectives. 
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Researchers adhering to the structure perspective have advocated that an efficient alliance 
structure curbs exchange hazards and therefore positively affects alliance performance (David 
& Han, 2004; Hennart, 2006). Initially, drawing on transaction cost economics logic 
(Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1981), the causes and consequences of various governance 
forms, such as equity and non-equity arrangements (Hennart, 1988; Pisano, 1989), were 
examined. More recently, researchers adopted broader conceptualizations of alliance structure 
and focused on contracts (Ariño & Reuer, 2004; Hagedoorn et al., 2007; Mendi, 2005) and 
interfirm characteristics resulting from partner selection (Douma, Bilderbeek, Idenburg, & 
Looise, 2000; Saxton, 1997). For instance, some researchers used game theory to develop a 
better understanding of the consequences of different pay-off structures (Parkhe, 1993a; Zeng 
& Chen, 2003), whereas others used a control perspective to examine the relationships among 
informal and formal control, and alliance performance (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006; Lui & 
Ngo, 2004; Luo, 2002a; Yan et al., 2001). Notwithstanding their valuable contributions, 
studies solely drawing on a structure perspective are not without critiques and limitations. 
 
Researchers using theories, such as transaction cost economics and game theory, focused on 
different aspects of an alliance structure, resulting in fragmentized and partial explanations 
with respect to alliance performance. For instance, though empirical studies demonstrated that 
firms design alliance structures consistent with transaction cost economics predictions (Gulati 
& Singh, 1998), performance implications are often inferred (Reuer & Ariño, 2002; Sampson, 
2004b). In addition, research contributing to the structure perspective often adopted a firm-
level perspective and thus failed to recognize the consequences of one-sided decisions on joint 
value creation (Madhok & Tallman, 1998; De Wulf & Odekerken-Schröder, 2001). Some 
academics also criticized the structure perspective for its overly deterministic nature (De 
Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004; De Wulf et al., 2001). That is, proponents of the structure 
perspective assumed that if unforeseen circumstances emerged, structural safeguards should 
be adequate to enable firms to deal with these contingencies. Refuting this form of 
determinism, researchers demonstrated that firms actually are quite successful in responding 
to new circumstances (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; Reuer & Ariño, 2002).  
 
Therefore, to advance theory development, proponents of the process perspective have argued 
that post-formation processes are critical to achieving superior alliance performance (Doz, 
1996; Ring et al., 1994; De Rond et al., 2004; Salk, 2005; Zajac et al., 1993). An alliance 
represents a purposeful entity, able to learn and adapt over time to changing circumstances 
(Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002). Moreover, alliances are long-term exchange relationships, 
which parties cannot fully specify in advance (Ring et al., 1994), because the costs to design 
an alliance structure that anticipates all possible future contingencies extend beyond the 
possible benefits of this design (Macneil, 1980). Post-formation processes entail continuous 
cycles of goal formulation, implementation, evaluation, and adaptation based on what the 
partner firms learn (Zajac et al., 1993). That is, parties’ willingness and ability to make 
modifications to the relationship mitigate concerns about inertial forces, which hamper 
alliance performance. 
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Although alliance process research redirected scholars’ attention from the structure 
perspective toward post-formation processes related to the “soft side” of alliances, the process 
perspective is not without critics (Contractor, 2005; Hennart, 2006). Alliance processes 
constitute a critical factor in explaining alliance performance (Doz & Hamel, 1998; Hamel, 
1991), but advocates of the process perspective may have overvalued the importance of post-
formation processes. That is, neglecting the arguments put forward by advocates of the 
structure perspective inhibited the development of a comprehensive theory of alliance 
performance. For instance, empirical research produced evidence that initial alliance 
conditions function as an architecture that imprints on post-formation processes (Doz, 1996; 
Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 1995; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). In summary, conceptual 
(Das & Teng, 2002; Kumar & Nti, 1998; Ring et al., 1994) and empirical (Ariño et al., 1998; 
Doz, 1996; De Rond et al., 2004) work examining post-formation processes made relevant 
contributions with respect to alliance performance. However, a thorough understanding of the 
relationship between alliance structure and post-formation processes is still lacking.  
 
Several conceptual and empirical studies aimed to address these limitations of the structure 
and process perspectives, and researchers aligned alliance structure and alliance process 
variables in their theoretical models to develop and test explanations of superior alliance 
performance. For instance, drawing on the relational governance, management control, 
organizational learning, and power perspectives, empirical studies incorporated relational 
variables into their hypotheses and examined simultaneously the impact of structure variables, 
such as contract completeness (Lee & Cavusgil, 2006; Luo, 2002a), management control 
(Aulakh et al., 1996; Ding, 1997), and non-recoverable investments (Jap, 1999; Jap & 
Anderson, 2003), on alliance performance. Other researchers adopted a holistic approach and 
examined relationships between various structure and process variables (Ariño et al., 1998; 
Doz, 1996; Jap, 1999; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). However, this stream of alliance literature is 
characterized by partial and difficult-to-compare insights, as researchers focused on different 
governance forms, adopted different conceptual and operational definitions, used different 
levels of analysis, and hypothesized different relationships between the variables of interest. 
 
To conclude, in addition to the empirical necessity to study alliances, we also observe that 
from a theoretical point of view, the need exists to better understand the relationships among 
alliance structure, alliance processes, and alliance performance. Neither the structure nor the 
process perspective alone provides sufficient insight into performance in an alliance context. 
Advocates of the structure perspective downplayed the function of post-formation processes, 
while proponents of the process perspective may have overvalued the role of alliance 
processes at the expense of alliance structure. In this dissertation, we build on prior alliance 
research, address existing concerns, and reconcile the structure and process perspectives to 
develop and test a theoretical model. 
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Cooperation and Competition 
Although early work on alliances acknowledged that the tension between cooperation and 
competition within temporary interorganizational exchange relationships is a distinctive 
property, compared with intra-organizational analysis (Buckley et al., 1988; Evan, 1965; 
Jarillo, 1988; Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Litwak & Hylton, 1962; West, 1959), to 
date, understanding of value creation and value appropriation remains limited. For instance, 
Zeng (2003, pp. 587-588) argued that “an overarching theoretical framework is needed to 
guide researchers in studying the complex interdependence between cooperation and 
competition.” More recently, Lavie (2007) suggested that to advance understanding of firm 
performance derived through an alliance, we must distinguish between value creation and 
value appropriation mechanisms. These illustrations underpinned our observation that we 
(still) need an in-depth understanding of cooperation and competition. However, we also 
observe that though extant research has been conducted, the empirical findings are difficult to 
compare and interpret due to the theoretical fragmentation and questionable assumptions.  
 
Drawing on the results of our literature review (see Chapter 4), we argue that, to the best of 
our knowledge, no theoretical perspective2 alone can provide a coherent set of explanations 
that incorporate value creation and appropriation mechanisms and simultaneously specify 
relationships between these mechanisms and the alliance and firm performances derived from 
the relationship. For instance, alliance researchers drawing on transaction cost economics 
(TCE) argued that the alignment between governance forms and transaction characteristics 
should lead to efficient exchanges between firms (Williamson, 1975). However, researchers 
using TCE logic approached the decision to cooperate from one side of a dyadic relationship 
(Weitz & Jap, 1995; De Wulf et al., 2001) and focused on cost minimization (i.e., 
appropriation) rather than value creation (Madhok et al., 1998; Weitz et al., 1995). Therefore, 
TCE explanations are limited. Researchers drawing on game theory argued that the pay-off 
structure determines parties’ decision-making process. That is, within an alliance setting, 
different pay-off structures stimulate either ex-post cooperation or competition between 
partner firms (Zeng et al., 2003). However, game theorists adopted a dilemma approach with 
respect to cooperation and competition and assumed that the pay-off structure is ex-ante 
known (Zeng et al., 2003) and that actors are hyper-rational (Sebenius, 1992); hence, game 
theory explanations only provided a partial understanding of cooperation and competition. We 
argue that to address and overcome such theoretical fragmentation, we need to develop a 
coherent theoretical model that specifies the relationships among cooperation, competition, 
alliance performance, and firm performance.  
                                                 
2 Alliance researchers have used various theoretical perspectives to examine the relationship between 
cooperation and competition within an alliance context, among which transaction cost economics (Gulati et al., 
1998; Parkhe, 1993a), game theory (Gulati, Khanna, & Nohria, 1994; Parkhe, 1993a; Song & Panayides, 2002; 
Zeng et al., 2003), the resource-based view (Barney & Arikan, 2001; Eisenhardt et al., 1996; Lavie, 2006), 
equity theory (Adams, 1965; Scheer, Kumar, & Steenkamp, 2003), organizational justice theory (Johnson, 
Korsgaard, & Sapienza, 2002; Kumar et al., 1998b; Luo, 2005), the power perspective (Blankenburg Holm et al., 
1999; Pfeffer et al., 1978), the learning perspective (Hamel, 1991; Holmqvist, 2003; Kumar et al., 1998b; 
Larsson et al., 1998; Lubatkin et al., 2001), and the behavioral perspective (Aulakh, Kotabe, & Sahay, 1996; 
Kauser & Shaw, 2004; Uzzi, 1996). 
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With respect to empirical research, the findings also have been relatively fragmented and 
inconclusive. For instance, to the best of our knowledge, only two alliance studies have 
presented empirical findings that included variables pertaining to cooperation, competition, 
alliance performance, and firm performance derived from the relationship (i.e., Child et al., 
2003; Yan et al., 2001). Other researchers adopted a dyadic level of analysis and examined 
the relationships among cooperation, competition, and alliance performance using variables 
such as power imbalance, conflict, partner fit, anticipated pay-off, trust, commitment, goal 
congruence, and bilateral investments (Bucklin et al., 1993; Demirbag & Mirza, 2000; Jap et 
al., 2003). Furthermore, adopting a focal firm perspective, researchers examined the 
relationships among cooperation, competition, and firm performance using variables such as a 
firm’s network resources, the firm’s relative bargaining power, normative contracting, and 
bilateral dependence (Buchanan, 1992; Lavie, 2007; Lusch & Brown, 1996). These examples 
illustrate that the different levels of analysis and different conceptualizations of cooperation 
and competition make the empirical findings difficult to compare.  
 
More important, we also conclude that a substantial amount of empirical research was built on 
implicit, yet questionable, assumptions. Researchers adopting a dyadic level of analysis 
implicitly assumed that efforts by firms to create value did not affect the degree to which 
firms were able to appropriate value. For instance, Judge and Dooley (2006) found that 
opportunistic behavior negatively related to alliance performance, and trustworthiness and 
contractual safeguards negatively affected opportunistic behavior. However, their research did 
not investigate whether opportunistically behaving firms appropriated value at the expense of 
their counterparts. In contrast, research focusing on the firm level of analysis assumed that 
efforts by firms to appropriate value did not affect the degree to which the firms could jointly 
create value. For instance, Chen (2004) found that a firm’s absorptive capacity and partner 
interaction (e.g., trust) positively influenced a firm’s learning performance, but he did not 
examine whether an imbalance in parties’ absorptive capacities negatively affected joint 
knowledge creation and exchange. 
 
From a theoretical point a view, the need exists to gain a better understanding of value 
creation and appropriation in an alliance context. Theoretical fragmentation and difficult-to-
compare empirical research create the need for a theoretical model that makes clear 
distinctions among value creation mechanisms, value appropriation mechanisms, alliance 
performance, and firm performance derived from an alliance. The theoretical model should 
specify the relationships between these variables, be built on a solid theoretical foundation, 
and contain empirically testable hypotheses. In this dissertation, we build on prior alliance 
research, address existing concerns, and align the power, learning, and behavioral 
perspectives to develop and test such a theoretical model. 
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1.3 Research Framework and Research Questions 
Confronted with empirical and theoretical motivations to study performance in an alliance 
context, we decided to transform the two research themes, structure–process and cooperation–
competition, into two research questions and organize them within one research framework 
(see Figure 1.1). One major advantage is that it enables us to develop a coherent set of 
explanations. In addition, it allows us to theorize on not only alliance performance but also the 
relationship between alliance performance and firm performance, while still acknowledging 
that antecedents that explain performance may pertain to different alliance development 
stages. Furthermore, our research framework enables us to reconcile and align various 
theoretical perspectives to increase its explanatory power with respect to performance. 
 
Figure 1.1 Research Framework 
 
We pose our two research questions against the background of three alliance development 
stages (Brouthers, Brouthers, & Harris, 1997; Das et al., 2002; Niederkofler, 1991). During 
the alliance formation stage, firms decide to form an alliance to achieve their objectives 
(Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006) and then select a partner (Dacin, Hitt, & Levitas, 1997), engage in 
negotiation (Rao & Schmidt, 1998), and formalize the initial alliance design (Ariño et al., 
2004). As the alliance becomes operational, parties need to direct their focus toward alliance 
management (Ireland et al., 2002). In this post-formation stage, parties make decisions with 
respect to building post-formation processes (Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006), which primarily 
pertain to relational (Ariño et al., 2001) and learning (Lubatkin et al., 2001) processes. 
Finally, as the alliance unfolds, firms assess their alliance with respect to equity (i.e., 
fairness), adaptability (i.e., flexibility), and efficiency (i.e., outcomes) (Ariño et al., 1998; 
Doz, 1996; Kumar & Nti, 1998). However, consistent with our definition of performance (see 
§1.1), we adopt an outcome orientation. 
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Research Question 1: Alliance Structure and Alliance Processes 
We argue that to develop a coherent set of explanations of alliance performance, we must 
reconcile the structure and process perspectives. That is, we postulate that coordination 
between two partnering firms constitutes a unique characteristic of alliances, because firms 
cannot rely on a price or hierarchical mechanisms to organize their exchange relationship 
(Dwyer et al., 1987; Ouchi, 1980). Consequently, firms depend on other coordination and 
enforcement mechanisms; we propose that structural coherence and relational adaptability 
may fulfill these functions (see Figure 1.1). Structural coherence is defined as the degree to 
which an initial alliance structure constitutes a constellation of mutually supportive structural 
safeguards, including governance form, contractual provisions, and interfirm characteristics 
(Dussauge & Garrette, 1995; Miller, 1986). Relational adaptability pertains to parties’ 
willingness and ability to make modifications to an ongoing relationship, without resorting to 
changes in the formalized alliance structure (Aulakh & Madhok, 2002; Doz, 1996; Hallen, 
Johanson, & Seyedmohamed, 1991; Heide & John, 1992). We draw on the structure 
perspective to understand why firms erect structural safeguards and how these safeguards 
protect the relationship against exchange hazards. In addition, we use the process perspective 
to understand why firms invest time and resources to build process safeguards and how these 
safeguards may foster relational adaptability. Building on these insights, the limitations of the 
structure and process perspectives, and recommendations of previous alliance studies 
(Contractor, 2005; Nooteboom, 2004; Sobrero et al., 1998), we contend that a reconciliation 
of structure and process explanations would increase understanding of the relationships 
among alliance structure, alliance processes, and alliance performance. Hence, our first 
research question:  
 
Research Question 1: What is the relationship among alliance structure (ex-ante), 
alliance processes (ex-post), and alliance performance? 
 
Research Question 2: Cooperation and Competition 
For the second research question, we argue that to develop a coherent set of explanations of 
performance in an alliance context, we must examine the relationships among cooperation, 
competition, and the performance trade-off (see Figure 1.1).3 We view cooperation as parties’ 
efforts directed toward implementing ex-ante and ex-post value creation conditions and 
processes (Das & Teng, 2003). Cooperation depicts firms’ decisions that result in efficient 
and effective alliance design and management (Robson et al., 2002), by minimizing 
transaction costs and maximizing value (Madhok, 2001; Madhok et al., 1998). Competition 
pertains to parties’ efforts directed toward value appropriation conditions and processes, with 
the goal of extracting value from the alliance, if necessary at the expense of counterparts.  
 
                                                 
3 Researchers have referred to the tension between cooperation and competition as the “joint venture 
management dilemma” (Schaan, 1988), the “fundamental problem of cooperation” (Ouchi, 1980), the “joint 
venture dilemma” (Tiessen et al., 2000), “co-opetition” (Brandenberger & Nalebuff, 1996), the “inter-
organizational learning dilemma” (Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998), the “cooperation dilemma” 
(Zeng et al., 2003), and the “cooperative dilemma” (Zeng, 2003). 
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It is important to note that whereas cooperation and competition refer to value creation and 
value appropriation mechanisms, alliance performance and firm performance refer to the 
degree to which parties have been able to create value jointly and appropriate a share of this 
realized value. We refer to this relationship between realized value and appropriated value as 
the performance trade-off.  
 
Past alliance research identified various mechanisms associated with cooperation and 
competition within alliances, such as bargaining power (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Pfeffer et al., 
1978), learning (Hamel, 1991; Larsson et al., 1998), and relational norms (Gouldner, 1960; 
Heide & John, 1992). Drawing on the power perspective, we argue that during the alliance 
formation stage, firms use bargaining power to design the alliance’s compensation structure, 
which in turn affects alliance performance and firm performance (Contractor & Ra, 2000; 
Hennart & Zeng, 2005). In addition, as the alliance unfolds, learning and relational processes 
may enable partner firms to create and appropriate value. That is, using a learning perspective, 
we propose that contingent on the learning conditions established by the partners (Larsson et 
al., 1998; Lubatkin et al., 2001), they are more or less able to realize mutual and individual 
performance objectives (Chen, 2004; Lane et al., 2001). Drawing on the behavioral 
perspective, we also propose that firms may develop interaction patterns (i.e., relational 
norms) that guide their behavior toward cooperation or competition (Gouldner, 1960). For 
instance, a firm may exploit a partner firm’s vulnerability by behaving opportunistically to 
extract additional rewards for itself (Wathne & Heide, 2000).  
 
We need a theoretical model that specifies the relationships among value creation 
mechanisms, value appropriation mechanisms, and the performance trade-off. Developing and 
testing such a model would answer calls made in previous alliance studies (Alvarez & Barney, 
2001; Tiessen et al., 2000; Zeng et al., 2003), should overcome the limitations present in 
empirical research, and can incorporate multiple value creation and appropriation 
mechanisms, as identified in prior research. Hence, our second research question: 
 
Research Question 2: What is the relationship among cooperation, competition, alliance 
performance, and firm performance derived from an alliance? 
 
1.4 Theoretical and Managerial Relevance 
By providing answers to our two research questions, we respond to calls for research on 
alliance performance (see e.g., Barringer et al., 2000; Dwyer et al., 1987; Gray & Wood, 
1991; Gulati, 1998; Osborn et al., 1997; Parkhe, 1993b; De Rond et al., 2004; Smith et al., 
1995; Wood & Gray, 1991). More specifically, we make two substantial theoretical 
contributions: (1) We propose and test a reconciliation of the structure and process 
perspectives, and (2) we conceptualize and empirically test three types of cooperation and 
competition trade-offs.  
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First, our research develops and tests one of the first theoretical models to specify the 
relationships among alliance structure, alliance process, and alliance performance. Drawing 
on the structure and process perspectives, we argue that superior alliance performance can be 
achieved in alliances when the parties establish an alliance structure that enables them to 
improve progressively on initial conditions by developing post-formation relational and 
learning processes. In contrast, unsuccessful alliances are characterized by an alliance 
structure that impedes post-formation processes, resulting in parties’ unwillingness and 
inability to make necessary adaptations. We develop a theoretical framework and conduct an 
empirical test to examine whether the relationship between structural coherence and alliance 
performance is (partially) mediated by relational adaptability. Therefore, notwithstanding the 
valuable contributions of previous alliance research on this topic (Ariño et al., 1998; 
Brouthers et al., 2006; Doz, 1996; Fryxell, Dooley, & Vryza, 2002), our research makes an 
important contribution: We demonstrate that a reconciliation of the structure and process 
perspectives provides a more complete explanation of alliance performance. 
 
Second, our research develops and tests an early theoretical model that specifies the trade-off 
between cooperation and competition and the consequences for alliance and firm 
performance. Drawing on management research, we develop a typology of trade-off types and 
apply it to the alliance context. Subsequently, we develop and test three types of cooperation 
and competition trade-offs. Drawing on the power perspective, we propose a set of hypotheses 
that depict a compensation trade-off. Building on the learning perspective, we hypothesize 
about the learning trade-off, and drawing on the behavioral perspective, we develop 
hypotheses representing the relational trade-off. Compared with previous alliance studies 
(Dyer et al., 1998; Jap, 2001a; Lavie, 2007), our research makes an important contribution: 
We show that aligning explanations with respect to cooperation (i.e., value creation) and 
competition (i.e., appropriation) provides a more complete understanding of the relationship 
between alliance performance and firm performance derived from the alliance. 
 
In addition to providing answers to our two research questions, our research makes four other 
relevant contributions. First, our research contributes to an improved understanding of 
performance as a multidimensional construct. Although we do not ex-ante theorize on the 
distinction among financial, learning, and strategic performance, our empirical findings 
suggest that this distinction is crucial. Second, our research is among the first to theorize 
about trade-offs. Confronted with a plethora of trade-off definitions, our research also 
presents a first attempt to develop a typology. We use this typology to develop and test our 
conceptualization of cooperation and competition trade-offs; our empirical findings suggest 
that different types of trade-offs exist within, and therefore perhaps outside, an alliance 
context. Third, we adopt the idea that aligning distinct theoretical perspectives provides an 
enriched understanding of alliance performance (Colombo, 2003; Kogut, 1988b; Nooteboom, 
2004; Osborn et al., 1997). Our empirical findings indicate that our theoretically rich 
approach increases explanatory power substantially with respect to performance in an alliance 
context. We conclude that theoretical integration represents a fruitful path for future alliance 
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research. Fourth, alliance research, and in particular cross-sectional alliance research, is 
subject to various methodological concerns (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993; Parkhe, 
1993b). Although it was not our primary aim to discuss and review research design choices, 
the dissertation provides a clear overview and possible solutions to address these concerns. 
 
Managerial Relevance 
The results of this study suggest several normative implications for managers of contractual 
alliances (see §10.3). First, our findings suggest that managers should make decisions with 
respect to alliance design and post-formation processes conditional on the alliance objectives. 
For instance, alliance structure is more critical with respect to financial objectives, alliance 
processes are more critical with respect to learning objectives, and alliance structure and 
alliance processes both directly and indirectly drive strategic performance. Second, we derive 
several managerial implications that can assist firms in dealing with cooperation and 
competition trade-offs as the alliance progresses from formation to termination. During the 
formation stage, parties must resolve a compensation trade-off, whereas during the post-
formation stage, they confront a learning trade-off. One important implication we derive is 
that firms, conditional on the alliance objectives, should pursue deals differently according to 
the specific cooperation and competition trade-offs. For instance, addressing the 
compensation trade-off is particularly relevant to realize financial outcomes, whereas the 
learning trade-off must be resolved to achieve learning and strategic outcomes. Third, we 
derive another important managerial implication that pertains to relational quality. Relational 
quality fulfills a double role, and conditional on the performance objective, firms may decide 
to invest more or less to build a high-quality relationship. In summary, the dissertation 
provides several clear guidelines for firms on how to use strategic alliances successfully as 
critical tool in their competitive arsenals. 
 
1.5 Research Scope  
Because we aim to develop a coherent theoretical model, we must delineate the scope of our 
research. Previous alliance research argued and demonstrated that different governance forms 
are subject to different dynamics (Ariño, 2003; Chen & Chen, 2003; Gulati et al., 1998; 
Hagedoorn et al., 2007; Inkpen, 2001). Therefore, we decided to focus on one type of 
governance form: contractual alliances. Our main argument for focusing on non-equity 
partnerships is that, compared with other governance forms such as equity partnerships, 
contractual alliances are increasing (Duysters & De Man, 2003; Duysters, Kok, & 
Vaandrager, 1999; Hagedoorn et al., 1994). In addition, from a theoretical perspective, 
researchers have argued that contractual alliances, compared with other governance types, are 
relatively understudied (Contractor, 2005; Inkpen, 2001). Our delineation of contractual 
alliances thus implies that market transactions, franchises, licenses, joint ventures, and 
mergers and acquisitions are outside our research scope. 
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We focus on contractual alliances with specific properties. Rather than examining one type of 
alliance, such as buyer–supplier, marketing, or research and development alliances, we 
investigate contractual alliances that share one common property: a certain degree of 
complexity due to their reciprocal relationships. That is, we only focus on contractual 
alliances with a long-term orientation to ensure that firms have been able to develop post-
formation processes. Furthermore, we only examine contractual alliances with multiple 
objectives, which may include financial, learning, or strategic objectives (Heide, 1994; Jap, 
2001a). Finally, we focus on contractual alliances in which partners, at least to a certain 
degree, need to exchange knowledge and information before they can achieve their alliance 
objectives (Lubatkin et al., 2001). Together, these characteristics enable us to develop and test 
hypotheses valid within a setting of complex contractual alliances. However, because of this 
delineation, our theoretical contributions are limited to this particular empirical setting.  
 
Finally, consistent with our definitions of strategic alliance and performance, we have adopted 
a dyadic level of analysis. When examining alliances, researchers may adopt different levels 
of analysis (Inkpen, 2001; Ritter & Gemünden, 2003). For instance, adopting a firm-level 
analysis, alliance performance research examined stock market reactions (Anand et al., 2000) 
and company profits (Hagedoorn et al., 1994), whereas other research focused on the alliance 
portfolio and network levels (Gemünden, Ritter, & Heydebreck, 1996; Gulati et al., 2000). 
Adopting a dyadic level has one main advantage. That is, theorizing and testing hypotheses at 
the dyadic level resolves the concerns in the alliance literature with respect to the level of 
analysis. By explicitly conceptualizing and operationalizing the variables of interest at the 
dyadic level, we can compare our findings with prior and future alliance research. 
Nonetheless, to avoid ambiguity and inconsistencies, we clearly explicate our arguments with 
respect to the level of analysis when developing our hypotheses. In addition, we discuss the 
consequences for our research design in Chapter 6.  
 
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation 
We structure the dissertation around three blocks (see Figure 1.2). The backbone of the 
dissertation consists of four chapters: Chapters 1, 6, 7, and 10. Chapter 1 provides the 
background to the dissertation and elaborates on the motivation, questions, and scope of this 
research. Because the empirical portion of our research is similar for each research question, 
we discuss all our research design decisions in one chapter. In Chapter 6, we elaborate on the 
pretest procedure, data collection methods, operational definitions, and data analysis 
techniques we use. Chapter 7 functions as a bridge between the hypotheses development, 
methodology, and empirical findings; in it, we discuss several statistical tests that we conduct 
to assess the quality of our data. For instance, we provide a summary of sample descriptives 
and examine the degree to which non-response bias and common method bias are present in 
our data. The dissertation ends with Chapter 10, in which we reflect on and discuss our 
findings, provide answers to our research questions, discuss the theoretical and managerial 
implications, address several limitations, and provide suggestions for further research. 
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The second and third blocks each consist of three chapters (left and right in Figure 1.2). With 
respect to the first research question, we present in Chapter 2 the results of a literature review, 
which functions as a guide for theory development. Subsequently, we present our theoretical 
model and Hypothesis 1 in Chapter 3, then the empirical results in Chapter 8. With respect to 
the second research question, we present in Chapter 4 the results of a literature review, and 
subsequently, we develop our theoretical model and Hypotheses 2–4 in Chapter 5. We 
elaborate on the empirical findings in Chapter 9. 
 
Figure 1.2 Structure of the Dissertation 
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Chapter 2 Structure, Process, and Alliance Performance 
Literature Review 
In this chapter, we review existing alliance literature with a focus on alliance structure, 
alliance processes, and alliance performance. The results of the literature review indicate that 
researchers drawing on the structure and process perspectives primarily have focused on 
specific aspects of alliances, such as contractual provisions and learning processes, which 
tended to hamper explanations of alliance performance. Building on our findings, we 
conclude that a better understanding of the relationship among alliance structure, alliance 
process, and alliance performance requires coherent conceptualizations of alliance structure 
and alliance processes. Hence, consistent with calls in previous alliance studies (Contractor, 
2005; Nooteboom, 2004; Sobrero et al., 1998), we conclude that a testable theoretical model 
that reconciles structure and process explanations with respect to alliance performance is 
necessary. 
 
We structure the chapter as follows. First, building on prior alliance research, we present our 
conceptualization of alliance structure and elaborate on three alliance structure dimensions: 
governance form, contractual provisions, and interfirm characteristics (§2.1). We use these 
three structure dimensions to review conceptual and empirical alliance performance studies. 
Second, in Section 2.2, we present our conceptualization of alliance processes and present two 
alliance process dimensions: relational processes and learning processes. We use these 
process dimensions to guide our review of conceptual and empirical alliance performance 
literature. Third, we present the results of our review of conceptual and empirical studies 
aimed at integrating structure and process perspectives. Fourth, this chapter ends with some 
conclusions and implications for theory development (§2.4). 
 
2.1 Structure Perspective: Conceptualization and Empirical Studies 
Researchers adhering to the structure perspective have advocated that an efficient alliance 
structure curbs exchange hazards and thus positively affects alliance performance (David et 
al., 2004; Hennart, 2006). Initially, alliance researchers focused on governance forms, such as 
equity and nonequity arrangements, because proponents of the structure perspective argued 
that the governance form would affect alliance performance (Hennart, 1988; Pisano, 1989). 
However, more recently, researchers adopted broader definitions of alliance structure 
(Contractor, 2005) to refer to contract design (Ariño et al., 2004; Hagedoorn et al., 2007; 
Mendi, 2005) and interfirm characteristics resulting from partner selection (Douma et al., 
2000; Dyer et al., 1998; Saxton, 1997). We adopt this broader view and we focus on three 
dimensions that together capture the outcomes of the decisions parties make with respect to 
establishing an alliance structure: (1) governance form (S1), (2) contractual provisions (S2), 
and (3) interfirm characteristics (S3). Figure 2.1 provides a graphical representation.  
 
20 
Governance Form (S1)4 
Researchers identified a broad range of organizational structures (i.e., governance forms) that 
constitute alliances, including equity joint ventures, contractual alliances, bilateral licensing 
arrangements, shared product development projects, minority equity relationships, and shared 
purchasing and manufacturing (Barringer et al., 2000; Child et al., 1998; Contractor & 
Lorange, 1988; Root, 1988). These governance forms commonly represent a formalized 
exchange relationship between two or more firms. However, to better understand the 
antecedents and consequences of decisions about governance forms, researchers argued that 
alliances actually represent a hybrid governance form on a “market–hierarchy” continuum 
(Borys & Jemison, 1989; Heide, 1994; Williamson, 1985).  
 
Figure 2.1 Three Alliance Structure Dimensions5 
 
According to Borys and Jemison (1989, p. 235), a hybrid governance form represents an 
organizational arrangement that uses resource and/or governance structures from more than 
one existing organization. Researchers focused on two major hybrid forms of interfirm 
collaborating: equity joint ventures and non-equity partnerships (Gulati et al., 1998; 
Hagedoorn et al., 2007). Joint ventures are quasi-hierarchical in nature (Gulati, 1998), in that 
the establishment of a new organizational entity between two independent parent companies 
embodies the creation of a hierarchy structure. Non-equity partnerships are “pure” hybrid 
forms (Williamson, 1985) that do not involve the creation of a new venture. The lack of 
ownership means this contractual alliance is characterized by alliance contracts that organize 
property rights and profit allocation schemes (Hagedoorn et al., 2007). Proponents of the 
structure perspective argued that in specific exchange conditions, a hybrid governance form is 
more efficient than a hierarchy or market transaction (Borys et al., 1989). That is, in such 
conditions, alliances are more effective in curbing exchange hazards (Ouchi, 1980). 
                                                 
4 Although the research scope is delineated to contractual alliances (see §1.5), we deem it necessary to include 
governance forms in our literature review, because this stream of research has produced relevant insights. 
 
5 Although previous research has demonstrated the associations among governance form, contractual provisions, 
and partner selection (Buvik & Reve 2001; Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2007), we argue that parties can make these 
choices independently (see §6.4 for methodological implications). 
S3: Interfirm Characteristics 
Characteristics between partner 
firms that decide to collaborate. For 
instance, partner fit and resource 
complementarity.  
S1: Governance Form
The formalized exchange structure 
as established by the partner firms. 
For instance, partners choose 
between an equity or non-equity 
governance form.  
S2: Contractual Provisions 
The terms of the alliance as 
formalized in an alliance contract. 
For instance, contractual clauses 
referring to compensation 
structure, resource contributions, 
and coordination mechanisms.  
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According to advocates of the structure perspective, the choice of governance form constitutes 
an important decision that directly affects alliance performance (David et al., 2004; Hennart, 
2006; Williamson, 1985). When a governance structure aligns with the characteristics 
surrounding the exchange, superior alliance performance results. That is, when the 
relationship unfolds according to expectations, efficient governance mitigates concerns about 
exchange hazards. Moreover, it pushes parties to fulfill their contractual obligations (Reuer & 
Ariño, 2002). If contingencies emerge, a governance form becomes inefficient, and premature 
dissolution is likely, because according to transaction cost economics advocates, inefficient 
alliances end before parties can intervene (Reuer & Ariño, 2002). However, though firms 
choose governance forms consistent with these theoretical arguments (Chen et al., 2003; 
Colombo, 2003; Gulati et al., 1998; Pisano, 1989), the performance implications of 
governance form decisions still have received relatively little attention (David et al., 2004; 
Sampson, 2004b).  
 
A few empirical studies explored the performance implications of governance forms but 
focused mainly on transaction costs (Barthelemy & Quelin, 2006; Buvik & Andersen, 2002; 
Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1999) or used firm-level performance indicators (Noordewier, John, & 
Nevin, 1990) rather than alliance performance indicators (Dussauge & Garrette, 1993; 
Dussauge et al., 1995; Sampson, 2004b). One exception is Sampson (2004b), who examined 
the implications of misaligned governance in R&D alliances and found that alliance 
governance selected according to transaction cost arguments improved alliance performance 
(i.e., innovation) substantially. In summary, though the market–hierarchy categorization 
received substantial conceptual support (Leiblein, 2003; Nooteboom, 2004) and researchers 
produced empirical support for governance form decisions (Chen et al., 2003; Colombo, 
2003; Gulati et al., 1998), the relationship between governance form and alliance performance 
remains poorly understood.  
 
Contractual Provisions (S2) 
According to the advocates of the structure perspective, the presence of an alliance contract 
increases the likelihood of superior alliance performance (Ariño et al., 2004), because 
contracts reduce the likelihood of exchange hazards, such as opportunistic behavior. 
Moreover, the purpose of a formal alliance contract is to institutionalize coordination and 
enable enforcement (Ring et al., 1992), which increases the likelihood that parties will fulfill 
their contractual duties. Contracts represent promises or obligations to perform particular 
actions in the future (Macneil, 1978) and function as risk allocation mechanisms that 
incorporate all relevant future contingencies and obligations (Hagedoorn et al., 2007).  
 
To achieve the objectives of coordination and enforcement, an alliance contract may include 
at least four terms (Barthelemy et al., 2006; Luo, 2002a). First, a contract should include 
terms pertaining to the rationale that underlies the alliance formation, such as goals, 
capitalization, and forms of contribution (Blodgett, 1991a; Jap, 2001a; Klein et al., 1978). 
Second, contractual terms should refer to specific aspects of daily alliance operation and 
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management, such as product development, marketing, and finance (Mohr & Spekman, 
1994). Third, the contractual terms should include certain aspects of alliance cooperation, 
such as the responsibilities of each partner and conflict resolution mechanisms (Bai, Tao, & 
Wu, 2004; Khanna, 1998; Oxley & Sampson, 2004). Fourth, the contract should address 
damage and termination procedures (Hagedoorn et al., 2007; Minehart & Neeman, 1999). 
Together, a coherent set of contractual provisions reduces the likelihood of exchange hazards, 
enables coordination and enforcement, and guides partner firms’ behavior closer to 
cooperation by providing formal rules and procedures to maintain their relationship. However, 
conceptual and, particularly, empirical research in this area is scarce (Contractor, 2005; 
Hagedoorn et al., 2007; Mayer & Argyres, 2004). Researchers who examined contractual 
provisions primarily explored only three areas: (1) contract standardization, (2) contract 
completeness and complexity, and (3) content of contractual provisions.  
 
Contract Standardization 
Alliance researchers investigated the conditions in which standard contracts rather than 
tailored contracts would be preferred, as well as their respective antecedents and 
consequences (see Vlaar, 2006 p. 139-160). Unlike tailor-made contracts, standard contracts 
appear relatively legitimate, robust, and easy to interpret, so they lower the effort required to 
design alliance contracts and increase the flexibility associated with interacting with a broad 
variety of partners. In addition, the use of standard contractual provisions reduces any 
problems pertaining to ambiguous interpretations of contractual clauses. However, 
formalizing a negotiation in standard contracts often demands negotiation strategies that do 
not contribute to the creation of shared expectations or joint sense making (Vlaar, Van den 
Bosch, & Volberda, 2007). In contrast, tailored contracts must meet the demands of a specific 
situation and thus stimulate involvement and flexibility (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). The 
negotiation process leading to a tailored contracts demands more resources and time, which 
indicates that parties are more likely to develop joint expectations through their more frequent 
interactions (Ariño et al., 2004). Although a few studies examined the relationship between 
contract standardization and alliance outcomes (Vlaar, 2006), to the best of our knowledge, no 
study has examined its relationship with alliance performance.  
 
Contract Completeness 
Alliance researchers also focused on the causes and consequences of contract completeness 
and contract complexity (see e.g., Barthelemy et al., 2006; Luo, 2002a; Reuer & Ariño, 2007). 
Contract completeness and complexity means that firms opt for higher levels of formal 
codification, which implies more contractual provisions and enforcement in an attempt to 
coordinate and control alliance activities. An incomplete contract may create ambiguity, 
which provides a breeding ground for exchange hazards (Luo, 2002a). However, contract 
completeness facilitates control at the expense of higher transaction costs (Williamson, 1985) 
and reduced flexibility (Luo, 2002a). Several empirical studies supported the relationship 
between contract completeness and different alliance outcomes (Barthelemy et al., 2006; 
Gong, Shenkar, Luo, & Nyaw, 2001; Lui et al., 2004; Shenkar & Zeira, 1992), but the 
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relationship with alliance performance remains understudied, with the exception of Barthemly 
and Quelin (2006), who offered an indirect measure for ex-post transaction costs and found 
that to restrict vendor opportunism (i.e., reduce ex-post costs), contracts would need to 
contain incentives and penalties, as well as pricing and monitoring clauses. 
 
Content of Contractual Provisions 
Researchers examining contract standardization and contract completeness contributed to the 
notion that alliance contracts are critical to achieve superior alliance performance. More 
specifically, they focused on the nature (i.e., standard or tailored) and scope (i.e., number and 
nature of contractual provisions) of the contract. However, their work did not elaborate on the 
relationship between the content of contractual provisions and alliance performance. 
Researchers commented on these approaches and argued that the content of contractual 
provisions may be important for better understanding alliance development and alliance 
performance (Reuer et al., 2007: Mendi, 2005). To guide this literature review, we distinguish 
three categories of contractual provisions: (1) compensation structure, (2) coordination 
mechanisms, and (3) safeguarding mechanisms.  
 
First, researchers argued that different compensation structures may have different 
consequences for alliance development and performance (Aulakh, 2001; Contractor et al., 
2000; Hennart, 1988; Mendi, 2005; Zeng et al., 2003). For instance, Hennart and Zeng (2005) 
argued that ex-ante sharing, such as lump-sum and advance payments, provides parties with 
strong incentives to engage in an alliance, but residual sharing mechanisms, such as royalties 
and transfer pricing, create mutual forbearance and commitment between parties as the 
alliance unfolds.6 Drawing on game theory, Zeng and Chen (2003) postulated that structural 
and motivational changes in an alliance’s pay-off structures affect the extent of cooperation 
between partner firms. Similarly drawing on game theory, Parkhe (1993a) examined the 
impact of pay-off structures and found that a structure characterized by mutual cooperation 
resulted in higher levels of alliance performance than one characterized by unilateral 
defection and cooperation. Although conceptual studies have addressed the advantages and 
disadvantages of different compensation structures with respect to reducing the likelihood of 
exchange hazards (Hennart et al., 2005), empirical work examining the relationship between 
compensation and alliance performance is scarce (Contractor, 2005).  
 
Second, with regard to coordination mechanisms, alliance research addressed the antecedents 
and consequences of coordination mechanisms, arguing that coordination mechanisms, such 
as management control, monitoring systems, conflict resolution techniques, and decision-
making (Lee, Chen, & Kao, 2003; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997; Pearce & Hatfield, 2002; Yan et 
al., 1994, 2001; Zhang & Li, 2001), reduce the likelihood of exchange hazards and thus relate 
directly to alliance performance (Yan et al., 2001). For instance, Yan and Gray (1994) argued 
that management control enables parties to monitor progress and direct actions toward 
                                                 
6 See Box 3.2 for a distinction between ex-ante sharing and residual sharing.  
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achieving common and individual objectives. Drawing on an information-processing 
perspective, Makhija and Ganesh (1997) argued that control reflects a purposeful, goal-
oriented activity that influences the acquisition, interpretation, and dissemination of 
information within an alliance. Information processing influences interpartner learning, so 
control affects alliance development and alliance performance. Wathne and Heide (2000) 
postulated that the presence of monitoring systems curbs opportunistic behavior, because the 
likelihood that deceitful behavior will be detected and punished accordingly increases. 
Coordination mechanisms also provide partners with the ability to institute policies and 
procedures that direct the alliance toward achieving its objectives. Despite substantial 
conceptual support for the relationship between coordination mechanisms and alliance 
performance, empirical research produced only inconclusive findings (Geringer & Hebert, 
1989; Glaister & Buckley, 1998a; Glaister, Husan, & Buckley, 2003; Yan et al., 1994). For 
instance, Glaister and Buckley (1998) found weak support for the relationship between 
dominant control and alliance performance (joint venture), and Glaister, Husan, and Buckley 
(2003) indicated autonomous joint ventures are more successful than joint ventures 
characterized by strong parental control. Furthermore, Lee, Chen, and Kao (2003) found that 
asymmetrical management control has no significant impact on JV profitability.  
 
Yan and Gray (1994) argued that the presence of inconclusive empirical findings could be 
attributed to a lack of proper theorizing (e.g., level of analysis, operational definitions) with 
respect to the relationship between coordination mechanisms and alliance performance In 
addition, empirical studies used different operational definitions of coordination mechanisms 
and alliance performance. For instance, some researchers captured coordination in terms of 
exercising influence and control (Aulakh et al., 1996; Child et al., 2003; Child & Yan, 1999; 
Kauser et al., 2004), whereas others measured it on the basis of decision-making rights (see 
e.g., Cullen, Johnson, & Sakano, 1995; Johnson, Cullen, & Sakano, 1996). Finally, with 
respect to alliance form, empirical findings are difficult to compare, because the majority of 
researchers examined JVs (see e.g., Glaister et al., 1998a; Zhang et al., 2001). In summary, 
we require a better understanding of the relationship between coordination mechanisms and 
alliance performance, particularly with respect to contractual alliances.  
 
Third, with respect to safeguarding mechanisms, researchers argued that contractual clauses 
focused on non-recoverable investments (Parkhe, 1993a), reducing alliance scope (Khanna, 
1998), and task specialization (Zeng & Hennart, 2002) affect alliance performance. Non-
recoverable investments are expenditures that are difficult (i.e., costly) to redeploy for 
alternative purposes. According to advocates of the structure perspective, mutual investments 
function as mutual hostages and curb opportunistic behavior (Klein et al., 1978). Therefore, 
the presence of this type of specialized investments positively affects alliance development 
and alliance performance (David et al., 2004). Researchers also argued that parties might 
decide to make unilateral non-recoverable investments, which can have negative or positive 
consequences. On the one hand, unilateral non-recoverable investments make one party 
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by its counterpart (Klein et al., 1978), but on the other 
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hand, they may signal commitment to maintaining the relationship (Gulati et al., 1994). 
Empirical research produced substantial support for the importance of non-recoverable 
investments (David et al., 2004) but also provided fragmented and inconclusive findings, 
often because they used different dependent variables, such as commitment (Anderson & 
Weitz, 1992), contractual safeguarding (Buvik et al., 2001; Reuer et al., 2007), and firm-level 
performance indicators (Dyer, 1997). Furthermore, to understand the relationship between 
non-recoverable investment and alliance performance, researchers included process variables 
into their analysis (see e.g., Parkhe, 1993a). We discuss these studies in Section 2.3. 
 
Reducing an alliance’s scope (Khanna, 1998) and designing an alliance with specialized tasks 
(Zeng et al., 2002) offer alternative safeguarding mechanisms that affect alliance 
performance. They differ from non-recoverable investments, in that parties use them to limit 
the amount of unwanted transfers of proprietary knowledge. Reducing the scope of the 
alliance means that parties purposefully take measures to decrease the overlap between 
individual firm markets and markets targeted by the alliance (Khanna et al., 1998). For 
instance, including an exclusivity provision for target markets increases parties’ incentives to 
contribute to achieving each other’s interests, but it reduces incentives to appropriate 
knowledge that is not part of the initial agreement. Similarly, task specialization impedes 
parties’ ability to appropriate knowledge,7 because it means that parties formally divide 
alliance activities. Therefore, there is minimal need for the parties to communicate or 
exchange knowledge and information. Thus, as parties focus on their designated tasks, their 
knowledge foundations remain differentiated (Grant et al., 2004). Although prior studies 
demonstrated the importance of alliance scope (Oxley et al., 2004; Pan, 1997) and task 
specialization (Reuer Zollo, & Singh, 2002), their impact on alliance performance has 
received little empirical support, beyond anecdotal or case-study evidence (see e.g., Doz, 
1996). With respect to safeguarding mechanisms, we conclude that substantial conceptual 
support is available to substantiate relationships among non-recoverable investments, alliance 
scope, task specialization, and alliance performance, but better empirical understanding about 
the impact of these different safeguarding mechanisms on alliance performance still is needed.  
 
Interfirm Characteristics (S3) 
We define interfirm characteristics as those properties of an exchange relationship that result 
from two firms engaging in collaboration. These structural properties might refer, for 
instance, to attributes such as partner fit (Douma et al., 2000), resource complementarity 
(Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001), market overlap (Khanna, 1998), or cultural 
distance (Barkema et al., 1996). To clarify the impact of interfirm characteristics, Parkhe 
(1991) distinguished between Type I and Type II diversity, such that Type I diversity 
positively affects alliance development and alliance performance, whereas Type II diversity 
inhibits the achievement of alliance objectives. Type I diversity deals with the reciprocal and 
                                                 
7 Researchers introduced similar conceptualizations as task specialization, such as the “black box” approach 
(Doz, 1996) and “cooperative specialization” (Zeng & Hennart 2002). 
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collective strengths between the alliance partners (Das et al., 2002; Parkhe, 1991), in that the 
differences between the parties actually facilitate the formation and development of the 
alliance. For instance, the presence of resource complementarity between the partners enables 
them to create synergy (Das et al., 2000b; Dyer et al., 1998; Harrison et al., 2001). In contrast, 
Type II diversity refers to differences that negatively influence the effective functioning of 
alliances, such as cultural distance and absence of partner fit, which impede the achievement 
of collective and, therefore, individual objectives (Barkema et al., 1996; Douma et al., 2000).  
 
Table 2.1 Alliance Structure and Alliance Performance: Empirical Studies 
Article S.a Theoryb Points of interest 
Dussauge & 
Garrette, 1995 
S1 – Based on an empirically based taxonomy; semistructured alliances have better 
economic performance than unstructured coproduction alliances.  
Glaister & 
Buckley, 1998 
S2 MC Weak support produced for the relationship between dominant management control 
and alliance performance (IJV). 
Glaister, Husan, & 
Buckley, 2003 
S2 MC Joint venture autonomy positively associated with alliance performance, but once 
performance deteriorates, parents get involved in decision-making and operations.  
Lee, Chen, & Kao, 2003 S2 MC An asymmetrical management control structure (i.e., operational control) has no 
significant impact on alliance performance (i.e., JV profitability). 
Mjoen & Tallman, 1997 S2 MC 
TCE 
Alliance performance (IJV) is directly influenced by bargaining power and indirectly 
influenced through control mechanisms (i.e., overall control, specific control). 
Parkhe, 1993a S2 TCE 
GT 
Non-recoverable investments positively influence alliance performance; transparency, 
time horizon, and interactions reduce the use of contractual safeguards. 
Parkhe, 1993b S2 GT Empirical findings indicate that a game-theoretic alliance structure positively affects 
alliance performance, but the impact of structure is contingent on partner nationality. 
Pearce & Hatfield, 2002 S2 RB Balanced resource responsibility structures associate more with improved alliance 
performance (JV) than self-resourcing or dominant responsibility structures.  
Zhang & Li, 2001 S2 MC Control designs (IJV) evolve over time from shared types toward autonomous types; 
the latter is associated with better alliance performance.  
Harrigan, 1988 S3 – Alliances are more successful (i.e., longevity) when partners have similar cultures, 
asset sizes, and venturing experience levels. 
Lambe, Spekman, & 
Hunt, 2002 
S3 RB Joint alliance competences are positively related to alliance performance, both 
directly and indirectly through resource complementarity and idiosyncratic resources. 
Child, 2002 S1 
S2 
MC Alliance performance (JV) derives from a combination of ownership, resourcing, and 
management factors; different combinations have a positive impact on performance. 
Sampson, 2004 S1 
S3 
TCE Established governance forms consistent with TCE logic improve alliance 
performance (i.e., innovation) compared with misaligned governance forms. 
Child & Yan, 2003 S2 
S3 
MC 
RB 
Alliance performance (JV) positively influenced by parties’ prior experience, resource 
quality, and shared control, but only in conditions of quality resourcing. 
Lane & Lubatkin, 1998 S2 
S3 
OL Knowledge similarity, management formalization, research centralization, 
compensation practices, and communities positively relate to learning performance  
a S. = alliance structure dimensions; S1 = governance form; S2 = contractual provisions; S3 = interfirm characteristics. 
b TCE = transaction cost economics; GT = game theory; OL = organization learning; RB = resource-based; MC = management 
control; – = eclectic perspective. 
 
Substantial support has been found for relationships between interfirm characteristics and 
alliance performance (Child et al., 2003; Lane et al., 1998; Sampson, 2004b), including 
Harrigan (1988), who found that alliances are more successful when partners have similar 
cultures, asset sizes, and experience with alliances. Other empirical findings also indicated 
that resource complementarity relates positively to alliance performance (Lambe et al., 2002; 
Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, & Aulakh, 2001). Thus, conceptual and empirical support 
exists for the relationship between various interfirm characteristics and alliance performance. 
But still lacking is an in-depth understanding, both theoretical and empirical, of how interfirm 
characteristics affect alliance performance together with variables that pertain to the other two 
structure dimensions, namely, governance form and contractual provisions.  
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Conclusions 
Researchers drawing on and contributing to the development of the structure perspective 
produced various valuable insights (Contractor, 2005), including a better understanding of the 
conditions in which parties choose a particular type of governance form to organize their 
exchange relationships efficiently. In addition, researchers produced a fine-grained conceptual 
understanding of contractual design choices with respect to compensation structure, 
coordination mechanisms, and safeguarding mechanisms. Finally, researchers examined a 
variety of interfirm characteristics and produced substantial conceptual and empirical support 
for the idea that interfirm characteristics directly affect, either positively or negatively, 
alliance development and alliance performance. However, despite these contributions, the 
structure perspective is not without its critics and limitations.  
 
First, the structure perspective was built by researchers drawing on a variety of theories, 
including TCE to examine antecedents and consequences of governance form decisions, game 
theory to understand pay-off structure consequences, and management control perspectives to 
recognize the relationship between coordination and alliance performance. Although each 
theory is subject to its own limitations (see Appendix 1), this theoretical diversity also means 
that alliance performance researchers have contributed to partial explanations. Moreover, this 
fragmentation supports the observation that we require a conceptualization of alliance 
structure that incorporates governance form, contractual provisions, and interfirm 
characteristics altogether. A few exemplary empirical studies incorporated variables 
pertaining to multiple structure dimensions to provide a better understanding about alliance 
performance (Child, 2002; Child et al., 2003; Lane et al., 1998; Sampson, 2004b). For 
instance, Child (2002) conducted a configurational analysis of JVs and found that different 
combinations of ownership, resourcing, and management factors had similarly positive 
impacts on alliance performance, and Lane and Lubatkin (1998) examined the simultaneous 
impact of basic knowledge similarity, lower management formalization, research 
centralization, compensation practices, and research communities on alliance performance. 
These studies provided a fruitful foundation for further theory development.  
 
Second, though empirical studies demonstrated that firms design alliance structures 
consistently with the structure perspective, alliance performance implications in terms of 
governance forms decisions were often inferred (Reuer & Ariño, 2002; Sampson, 2004b). 
Moreover, the majority of studies adopted a firm-level perspective and failed to recognize the 
consequences of one-sided decisions on alliance performance (Madhok et al., 1998; De Wulf 
et al., 2001). To best of our knowledge, no empirical study has tested hypotheses that 
specified relationships between compensation structure and alliance performance (Contractor, 
2005). Although substantial empirical research investigated coordination mechanisms, 
safeguarding mechanisms, and interfirm characteristics, its empirical findings tended to be 
fragmented and inconclusive. Hence, in addition to a comprehensive conceptualization of 
alliance structure, we need a testable theoretical model that incorporates the relationship 
between alliance structure and alliance performance to advance theory development.  
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Third, academics criticized the structure perspective for its overly deterministic nature (De 
Rond et al., 2004). Proponents of the structure perspective simply assumed that if unforeseen 
circumstances emerged, the alliance structure in place would be sufficient to manage those 
contingencies. If an alliance structure becomes misaligned with the exchange conditions, 
partners would prematurely end the relationship. Refuting this strong form of determinism, 
researchers adopting a process perspective showed that parties are quite successful in 
managing new circumstances (Dussauge et al., 2000; Reuer & Ariño, 2002). In other words, 
current researchers theorizing about and empirically testing the relationship between alliance 
structure and alliance process may consider alternative explanations (i.e., variables) put 
forward by advocates of the process perspective (Ring et al., 1994; Salk, 2005). Before we 
present the results of the literature review with respect to such studies (Section 2.3), we 
discuss conceptual and empirical studies that drew exclusively on the process perspective.  
 
2.2 Process Perspective: Conceptualization and Empirical Studies 
Proponents of the process perspective argued that post-formation processes are critical to 
alliance development and superior alliance performance (Doz, 1996; De Rond et al., 2004; 
Zajac et al., 1993). More specifically, they considered an alliance a purposeful entity, able to 
learn and adapt over time to changing circumstances. Thus, alliances are long-term exchange 
relationships that parties cannot fully specify in advance (Ring et al., 1994), because the costs 
to construct an alliance contract that anticipates all future contingencies do not outweigh the 
possible benefits (Macneil, 1980). Alliance processes refer to continuous cycles of goal 
formulation, implementation, evaluation, and adaptation based on lessons learned by the 
parties (Zajac et al., 1993). That is, parties’ willingness and ability to modify the relationship, 
without necessarily changing the initial alliance structure, mitigates concerns about exchange 
hazards. More important, adaptability enables parties to overcome inertia that may destabilize 
the alliance. We review this stream of literature with a focus on the relationship between 
alliance processes and alliance performance and identify two types of post-formation 
processes: (1) relational processes (P1) and (2) learning processes (P2). 
 
Relational Processes (P1) 
Relational processes constitute a critical ex-post alliance process, because they can foster or 
impede alliance performance. Moreover, they influence one party’s belief that the other party 
will or will not fulfill its contractual obligations and undertake actions beneficial to the 
alliance. Relational processes thus function as an informal guideline, in contrast to a formal 
contract, for how parties should interact (Macneil, 1980). This type of process refers to the 
quality of their relationship (Ariño et al., 2001). To better understand the relationship between 
relational processes and alliance performance, we build on prior alliance studies and 
distinguish between (1) cooperative relational processes (Ariño et al., 2001; Ring et al., 1994) 
and (2) competitive relational processes (Maitland, Bryson, & Van de Ven, 1985; Wathne et 
al., 2000).8 
                                                 
8 We elaborate on the antecedents of relational processes in Section 5.2. 
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Alliance researchers advocated for and demonstrated that building and initiating cooperative 
relational processes between partners is crucial to maintaining the alliance (Cullen et al., 
2000; Kale et al., 2000; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). Relational enforcement occurs as 
a result of partner interactions that promote relational norms of flexibility, solidarity, and 
information exchange (Lusch et al., 1996; Macneil, 1980). Flexibility facilitates adaptation to 
unforeseen contingencies, solidarity promotes joint problem solving, and information sharing 
facilitates problem solving and adaptation (Poppo et al., 2002). These relational norms 
promote cooperative processes (Heide & John, 1990; Zaheer et al., 1998; Zaheer et al., 1995), 
manifested in mutual bilateral trust, commitment, and respect (Ariño et al., 2001; Cullen et 
al., 2000; Muthusamy & White, 2005). The presence of cooperative processes stimulates 
collaboration, which operates as a self-enforcing safeguard (Ring et al., 1994) that allows the 
parties to work on the relationship and respond to problematic situations without continuously 
referring to an contract (Ariño et al., 1998).  
 
Figure 2.2 Two Alliance Process Dimensions9 
 
 
 
In contrast, competitive relational processes, which refer to partner interactions characterized 
by conflict and opportunistic behavior (Das et al., 2002), impede superior alliance 
performance. For instance, parties may have conflicts about the alliance strategy, the division 
of outcomes, or how to resolve day-to-day operational problems. The presence of conflict 
destabilizes the relationship, which negatively affects its development and hence its 
performance (Das et al., 2000a). Moreover, opportunistic behavior indicates that parties are 
seeking to gain for themselves at the expense of their counterparts (Williamson, 1985). This 
type of conduct can take many forms, such as misrepresenting abilities, shirking, withholding 
information, incomplete disclosure of information, expropriation of know-how, exploitation 
of partner-specific assets, or distorting information (Maitland et al., 1985; Wathne et al., 
2000). Partner firms that develop competitive relational processes thus hamper their alliance 
development and ultimately their alliance performance, because their efforts are directed 
toward achieving individual objectives at the expense of joint value creation.  
                                                 
9 Interdependence is assumed with respect to the process dimensions. In addition to the conceptual implications, 
this approach has implications for hypothesis testing (see §6.4).  
P1: Relational Processes
Partner firm interactions with regard to 
behavioral aspects of the relationship. For 
instance, relational processes pertain to 
trust, commitment, and opportunistic 
behavior.  
P2: Learning Processes  
Partner firm interactions with respect to the 
transfer, assessment, and assimilation of 
knowledge and information. For instance, 
learning processes pertain to learning 
capabilities and knowledge absorption 
= Relational and learning process dimensions are interrelated.  
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Most researchers reporting empirical findings with respect to relational processes focused on 
the causes and consequence of cooperative relational processes. However, empirical results 
pertaining to alliance performance are limited, because researchers used the outcomes of 
relational processes as the dependent variable (Heide, 1994; Heide & John, 1992), employed 
firm-level performance indicators (Kale et al., 2000; Lusch et al., 1996), or included a 
structure element into their analysis (see §2.3). Empirical studies that actually focused on the 
relationship between cooperative relational processes and alliance performance produced 
support for a positive relationship (Lee et al., 2006; Mohr et al., 1994 1049; Pearce, 2001; 
Yan et al., 2001); for instance, Mohr and Spekman (1994) found that relational commitment, 
trust, and conflict resolution positively affect alliance performance. Yan and Gray (2001) also 
indicated a relationship between the quality of the relationship and strategic performance. 
However, no empirical study focused on the relationship between competitive relational 
processes and alliance performance, without drawing on the structure perspective (see §2.3). 
Thus, conceptual and empirical support exists for a positive relationship between cooperative 
relational processes and alliance performance, but insights into the direct relationship between 
competitive processes and alliance performance are scarce.  
 
Learning Processes (P2) 
Learning within strategic alliances serves multiple purposes (Inkpen, 2002).10 In this context, 
learning may refer to knowledge and information transfer between partners that facilitates 
alliance management, such that firms learn about their alliance partners and how to interface 
and communicate with them (Cummings & Teng, 2003). However, learning also may refer to 
learning with and from alliance partners (Inkpen, 2002), which represents the reasons parties 
engage in an alliance (Kogut, 1988b). Moreover, it encompasses a type of learning in which 
partners develop jointly new competences (Holmqvist, 2003) and attempt to internalize that 
knowledge (Inkpen, 2000). Before a firm can exploit newly acquired knowledge, it must 
integrate that knowledge into its existing knowledge base (Holmqvist, 2003). For value 
creation in complex contractual alliances, both types of learning are required (Inkpen & 
Crossan, 1995; Kogut, 1988b; Mody, 1993), because learning processes foster mutual 
awareness about each party’s internal and external contexts. We elaborate on two types of 
learning processes: (1) knowledge transfer and (2) knowledge acquisition. 
 
First, knowledge transfer processes facilitate and stimulate the transfer of knowledge and 
information between partners (Inkpen, 2001; Inkpen et al., 1998). These learning processes 
refer to routines that the parties develop to share and exchange knowledge and information, 
such as document exchange, cultural training, job rotations, and joint management meetings 
(Cummings et al., 2003), all of which contribute to the willingness and ability to share 
information and communicate openly (Inkpen, 2000). Exchanging knowledge and information 
is important because it enables parties to reduce the costs associated with finding and 
                                                 
10 A huge amount of conceptual and empirical literature relates to (inter)organizational learning (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Holmqvist, 2003; Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Lubatkin, Florin, & Lane, 2001). It is beyond the 
scope of this study to review this literature; we delineate our review to work that examined alliance performance. 
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accessing different types of valuable knowledge, motivates them to participate and openly 
share valuable knowledge (while preventing undesirable spillovers), contributes to their 
awareness of individual interests, and teaches them how to make the alliance work (Berdrow 
& Lane, 2003; Doz, 1996; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). Therefore, knowledge transfer processes 
foster alliance performance. However, developing knowledge transfer processes is not 
sufficient for partner firms to assess and acquire knowledge through their relationship.  
 
Second, alliance researchers argued that parties should initiate knowledge acquisition 
processes to assess and absorb knowledge and information through their alliance (Inkpen, 
2000; Lubatkin et al., 2001). Moreover, they stated that a firm’s potential to acquire 
knowledge depends on several factors, including a firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen et al., 
1990; Jansen, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2005; Zahra & George, 2002), alliance structure 
(Grant et al., 2004; Zeng et al., 2002), and relational processes (Kale et al., 2000). Thus, a 
firm’s historically developed organizational routines influence its effectiveness in terms of 
assessing and acquiring knowledge and information (Dyer et al., 1998; Lane et al., 1998). 
However, to understand the relationship between knowledge acquisition processes and 
alliance performance, alliance researchers made a clear distinction between symmetrical 
learning and differential learning (Hamel, 1991; Kumar & Nti, 1998; Larsson et al., 1998). 
Specifically, researchers argued that symmetrical learning between partners directly affects 
alliance performance (Hamel, 1991), such that if two parties can assess and assimilate 
knowledge and information into their existing knowledge base equally, alliance development 
benefits, because each party has an incentive to invest in mutual learning and maintain the 
relationship (Larsson et al., 1998). In contrast, when two partner firms have different 
opportunities to obtain knowledge and information, it impedes superior alliance performance, 
because their differential learning increases the likelihood of learning races (Hamel, 1991). 
Such a learning race is detrimental to alliance continuation, because once a party has achieved 
its objectives, it lacks an incentive to maintain the relationship (Khanna et al., 1998), as does 
the exploited partner.  
 
Substantial empirical alliance research investigated learning within the context of alliances 
but examined learning at the firm level (Cummings et al., 2003; Holmqvist, 2004; Kale et al., 
2000), conducted case studies with a focus on interorganizational learning (Chai, 2003; 
Inkpen et al., 1998; Inkpen & Pien, 2006), or drew on the structure perspective (see §2.3). In 
contrast, several studies examined the relationship between learning processes and alliance 
performance (Beamish & Berdrow, 2003; Hamel, 1991), such as Beamish and Berdrow 
(2003), who examined various learning processes between parents of JVs and the JV. Their 
empirical findings indicated that knowledge transfer, transformation, and harvesting influence 
mutual learning outcomes, but JV learning is not related to performance within production-
based international joint ventures (IJVs). Hamel (1991) conducted nine case studies and found 
that firms differ with respect to their intent to learn, transparency, and receptivity to 
knowledge. These results indicate that differential learning between partners negatively 
affects alliance performance.  
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Table 2.2 Alliance Processes and Alliance Performance: Empirical Studies 
Article P.a Theoryb Point of interests 
Demirbag & Mirza, 2000 P1 BP Alliance performance (JV) is positively influenced by trust, commitment, and 
cooperation; conflicts are negatively related through different performance 
dimensions  
Pearce, 2001 P1 BP Interparent cooperation (i.e., flexibility and joint problem solving) positively 
influences alliance performance (JV) 
Yan & Gray, 2001 P1 BP 
 
The quality of the interpartner working relationship is positively related to the 
achievement of strategic objectives for both partners. 
Mohr & Spekman, 1994 P1 
P2 
BP Alliance performance drivers are commitment, coordination, and trust; 
communication quality and participation; and a problem solving conflict 
resolution technique 
Beamish & Berdrow, 2003 P2 
P3 
OL Learning processes—transfer, transformation, and harvesting—affect learning 
outcomes, but learning is not related to performance within production alliances 
Hamel, 1991 P2 
P3 
OL Not all partners are equally adept at learning, and learning asymmetry ignites 
learning races that impede alliance development and performance 
Inkpen & Pien, 2006 P1 
P2 
P3 
OL Alliance performance (i.e., learning objectives) is affected by collaborative and 
competitive partner firm interactions, such as social capital, tacit knowledge 
transfer, and differential absorptive capacities 
a P1 = relational processes, P2 = knowledge transfer processes; P3 = knowledge acquisition processes. 
b BP = behavioral perspective; OL = organization learning. 
 
In summary, conceptual support for the relationship between learning processes and alliance 
performance is substantial (Holmqvist, 2003; Kumar & Nti, 1998; Larsson et al., 1998; 
Lubatkin et al., 2001), but empirical support, beyond anecdotal or case-based insights, is 
scarce. Hence, with respect to learning processes, what we need is a coherent theoretical 
model of alliance performance that (1) distinguishes between knowledge transfer and 
knowledge acquisition, (2) explains symmetrical and differential learning, and (3) enables 
empirical testing of related hypotheses.  
 
Conclusions 
Alliance research drawing on the process perspective contributed many valuable insights into 
alliance development and alliance performance (Salk, 2005). Conceptual and empirical 
research examined various causes and consequences of relational and learning processes 
within alliances and thus provided substantial support for the positive relationship between 
cooperative relational process and alliance performance. In addition, research showed that 
learning processes are critical to superior alliance performance. Although these research 
efforts redirected attention from the structure perspective toward a more fine-grained 
understanding of ex-post processes related to the “soft side” of alliances, the process 
perspective is not without problems (Contractor, 2005; Hennart, 2006).  
 
Conceptual and empirical work reported insights into the causes and consequences of 
relational and learning processes, but it did not provide a strong understanding of the 
relationship between post-formation processes and alliance performance. Other than 
conceptual frameworks (Das et al., 2002; Kumar & Nti, 1998; Ring et al., 1994) and several 
case studies (Ariño et al., 1998; Doz, 1996; De Rond et al., 2004), large-scale empirical 
research on the performance consequences of alliance processes remains relatively scarce. 
Nonetheless, prior alliance research drawing on the behavioral perspective provided sufficient 
background to develop a testable theoretical model. Furthermore, though alliance processes 
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constitute a critical factor in explaining alliance performance (Doz et al., 1998; Hamel, 1991), 
advocates of the process perspective often overvalued its importance and neglected 
explanations pertaining to the structure perspective. Although it remains a question of whether 
alliance structure affects alliance performance—and if so, directly or indirectly—neglecting 
the structure perspective inhibits understanding. Empirical research already demonstrated that 
the initial conditions function as an architecture that imprints on partners’ learning processes 
(Doz, 1996). Therefore, to gain a better understanding of alliance performance, we also need a 
better understanding of the relationship between alliance structure and alliance process.  
 
2.3 Integrative Perspectives 
Several researchers aimed to develop an integrative perspective by drawing on the structure 
and process perspectives simultaneously. That is, researchers used different theoretical 
approaches, such as transaction cost economics, game theory, management control, relational 
governance, the behavioral perspective, and organizational learning to develop hypotheses, 
and yet the literature still lacks a coherent theoretical model. Mainly, because researchers 
theorizing about the relationship among alliance structure, alliance process, and alliance 
performance generally focused on particular aspects (Holmqvist, 2003; Lubatkin et al., 2001; 
Madhok et al., 1998; Makhija et al., 1997; Nooteboom, 2004). For instance, Lubatkin, Florin, 
and Lane (2001) proposed an evolutionary model in which successive learning cycles—
convergence, divergence, and reorientation—facilitate knowledge creation and innovation, 
but their analysis only implicitly included variables pertaining to the structure perspective. 
Makhija and Ganesh (1997) drew on resource-based, information-processing, and 
organizational learning theories to show how control processes affect interpartner learning. 
Yet the developed model, for instance, lacks insight on dissimilar learning intents and 
capabilities, and furthermore on how alliance structure may inhibit unequal learning. We thus 
may conclude that, researchers made valuable contributions but did not contribute a 
theoretical model reconciling the structure and processes perspectives.  
 
With respect to empirical testing, researchers drew on the structure and process perspectives 
to understand post-formation processes and their consequences but unfortunately often used 
firm-level performance indicators (Chen, 2004; Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Dyer, 1996; Jap & 
Ganesan, 2000; Kale et al., 2000; Lusch et al., 1996; Muthusamy et al., 2005; Saxton, 1997; 
Zaheer et al., 1998) or focused on dependent variables other than alliance performance, such 
as relational processes (Berthon, Pitt, Ewing, & Bakkeland, 2003). Consequently, these 
empirical findings contribute to explanations of firm performance and alliance development 
but do not directly advance theory development with respect to alliance performance. 
However, building on the results of our literature review, we identify four groups of studies 
that conceptualized and tested integrated theoretical models of alliance performance: (1) 
studies drawing on a relational governance perspective, (2) studies drawing on management 
control perspective, (3) studies drawing on organizational learning insights, and (4) studies 
adopting a holistic perspective.  
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Relational Governance 
Alliance researchers used a relational governance perspective (Macneil, 1978; Macneil, 1980) 
to provide more insight into the relationship among contractual safeguarding, relational 
safeguarding, and alliance performance. Whereas proponents of the classical contracting 
perspective focused on pure contractual enforcement (Hagedoorn et al., 2007; Macneil, 1978), 
advocates of the relational governance perspective argued that such enforcement is 
insufficient to achieve superior alliance performance. Because it is too costly to specify all 
possible contingencies in a contract, partners must rely on other types of enforcement, such as 
relational enforcement (Macneil, 1980). When exchanges are embedded within social 
relationships, such as alliances, relational enforcement reduces transaction costs (Noordewier 
et al., 1990). Through relational processes and the resulting reciprocal norms, relational 
governance functions to mitigate the exchange hazards targeted by formal contracts (Poppo et 
al., 2002). In addition, whereas contractual governance provides clearly articulated 
contractual terms, relational governance promotes relational norms of flexibility, solidarity, 
and continuance that are positively associated with relationship quality. However, the 
development and maintenance of relational governance may involve considerable costs in 
terms of time and resource allocations (Larson, 1992), which suggests that parties should 
invest in the development of relational mechanisms only when exchange hazards exist (Poppo 
et al., 2002). Overall, proponents of the relational governance perspective asserted that 
relational mechanisms operate as a self-enforcing safeguard that is effective and less costly 
than contractual governance (Lee et al., 2006).  
 
Also by drawing on a relational governance perspective, empirical studies examined whether 
the relationship between contractual governance and relational governance might best be 
characterized as complementary or substitutable (Aulakh et al., 1996; Judge et al., 2006; Lee 
et al., 2006; Lui et al., 2004; Luo, 2002a; Poppo et al., 2002). For instance, Poppo and Zenger 
(2002) found that customized contracts complemented by relational governance result in 
higher levels of alliance performance, and Luo (2002a) showed that contract completeness 
guides the course of operation, ex-post cooperation overcomes the limitations of contracts, 
and both independently and interactively drive alliance performance. These empirical studies 
offered the insight that the purposes of alliance contracts, coordination and enforcement, can 
be achieved through relational and contractual governance. However, with respect to 
contractual governance, researchers focused on contract completeness (i.e., number and 
nature of contractual provisions) while neglecting the actual content of the contractual 
provisions, which may be important drivers of alliance performance (Reuer et al., 2007). 
 
Management Control 
Another group of researchers proposed and tested conceptual frameworks to understand the 
relationships among management control, alliance processes, and alliance performance (Das 
& Teng, 1998; Makhija et al., 1997; Yan et al., 1994). Whereas relational governance 
researchers focus on contractual control (Blodgett, 1991a; Hagedoorn et al., 2007), these 
researchers using a management control perspective concentrate on coordination mechanisms. 
   35 
Advocates of this perspective posited that gaining management control over an alliance 
ensures that objectives would be actively pursued and enable the active monitoring and 
curbing of possible opportunism by partners (Yan et al., 2001). In addition, researchers argued 
that relationship quality and management control are two distinct, complementary, and 
supplementary avenues for generating cooperation. A high-quality relationship suggests that 
parties pursue mutually compatible interests rather than act opportunistically (Wathne et al., 
2000), which reduces the need for costly coordination. However, low levels of cooperation 
encourage parties to behave opportunistically, increasing the need for formal control. 
 
Empirical alliance performance studies drawing on a management control perspective also 
examined the relationships among management control, the quality of the relationship, and 
alliance performance (see e.g., Ding, 1997; Kauser et al., 2004; Yan et al., 1994). For 
instance, Yan and Gray (1994) noted that alliance performance is directly and interactively 
affected by informal and formal control, such as interfirm consensus, the absence of conflict, 
and the decision-making power of key personnel. Kauser and Shaw (2004) found strong 
support for relational processes but indicated that control mechanisms have a minimal impact 
on alliance performance. In contrast, Ding (1997) provided support that dominant control by 
one party relates positively to alliance performance, whereas conflict between parties relates 
negatives. Although empirical studies produced fragmented findings and primarily focused on 
JVs (see Child et al., 2003; Geringer et al., 1989; Yan et al., 1994, 2001), management control 
research supports our observation that we must examine alliance structure and processes 
simultaneously to provide coherent explanations of alliance performance.  
 
Organizational Learning 
Alliance researchers drew on an organizational learning perspective to examine knowledge 
transfer and acquisition processes, while also incorporating relational processes (see e.g., 
Lane et al., 2001; Lubatkin et al., 2001). With respect to theory development, researchers 
argued that interorganizational learning combined with socialization constitutes an important 
driver of alliance performance. For instance, Lubatkin, Florin, and Lance (2001) proposed a 
model focused on interfirm learning, in which the objective is knowledge creation, not 
knowledge acquisition or transfer. Their theoretical analysis included explanations of the 
relationship between socialization and learning. Kumar and Nti (1998) proposed a dynamic 
theory of alliances for examining outcome and process discrepancies that may emerge as the 
partners interact. Whereas outcome discrepancies refer to the ability of the partners to achieve 
their economic and learning objectives, process discrepancies relate to their satisfaction with 
the pattern of interaction. The degree to which the partners can realize their objectives 
depends on how they manage these outcome and process discrepancies. These conceptual 
contributions primarily focused on relational and learning processes, but it is unclear how 
post-formation learning processes relate to alliance design. Empirical studies drawing on this 
perspective focused on different antecedents of alliance performance. For instance, Dhanaraj, 
Lyles, Steensma, and Tihanyi (2004) found that tie strength, trust, and shared values and 
systems positively influence tacit knowledge transfer, which affects alliance performance 
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indirectly through the learning of explicit knowledge. Lane and Lubatkin (2001) also 
proposed and tested a comprehensive model on interfirm learning but examined, among other 
relationships, the impact of cultural compatibility, the relatedness of the parties’ business, and 
trust on knowledge learned from partners and JV performance. With respect to the 
relationship between interorganizational learning and alliance performance, both conceptual 
and empirical work thus supports our idea that aligning the structure and process perspectives 
would advance theory development.  
 
Table 2.3 Structure, Processes, and Alliance Performance: Empirical Studies 
Article S.a P.b Theoryc Point of interests 
Ding, 1997 S2 P1 MC Alliance performance (JV) is positively influenced by dominant management 
control (foreign partner), but conflicts between partners inhibit alliance 
performance 
Judge & Dooley, 2006 S2 P1 TCE Trustworthiness and contractual safeguards are negatively related to 
opportunistic behavior, which is negatively related to alliance performance 
Kauser & Shaw, 2004 S2 
 
P1 MC 
BP 
 
Behavioral characteristics, such as commitment and trust, are strongly related 
to alliance performance; organizational characteristics, such as formal control, 
are weakly related 
Lee & Cavusgil, 2006 S2 P1 RG Relational governance as opposed to contractual governance is more effective 
in strengthening and stabilizing the alliance and facilitating knowledge transfer  
Aulakh, Kotabe, & 
Sahay, 1996 
S2 P1 MC Relational norms and monitoring mechanism are determinants of trust and 
alliance performance in cross-border partnerships 
Luo, 2002 S2 P1 RG Contract completeness and cooperation drive international alliance performance 
(JV) independently and interactively 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002 S2 P1 RG Customized contracts complemented by relational governance result in higher 
levels of alliance performance 
Yan & Gray, 1994 S2 P1 MC Alliance performance (JV) is directly and interactively influenced by informal 
(e.g., trust, commitment) and formal (e.g., scope) control mechanisms 
Dhanaraj , Lyles, 
Steensma, & 
Tihanyi, 2004 
S2 P1 
P2 
OL Tie strength, trust, and shared values and systems positively influence tacit 
knowledge transfer, which affects alliance performance (JV) indirectly via 
learning of explicit knowledge 
Doz, 1996 S2 P2 
P3 
OL Failing alliances are incapable of overcoming design flaws, whereas successful 
alliances are evolutionary and capable of adapting alliance structures 
Ariño & de la Torre, 1998 S2 P1 
P2 
P3 
BP 
OL 
 
Alliances outcomes (i.e., performance, dissolution) result from continuous 
learning–action–reaction loops based on efficiency and equity assessments, 
mediated the quality of the working relationship 
Luo, 2005 S3 P1 BP Alliance profitability is high with high levels of shared perceptions of procedural 
justice, higher than with asymmetrical perceptions 
Sarkar, Echambadi, 
Cavusgil, & Aulakh, 2001 
S3 P1 BP 
RP 
 
Resource complementarity and compatibility in cultural and operational norms 
differently impact alliance performance both directly and indirectly through 
relational capital variables 
Tiessen & Linton, 2000 S3 P1 BP Partner compatibility is positively related to cooperation but not significantly 
related to competition; cooperation positively influences alliance performance 
Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001 S3 P1 
P2 
P3 
OL Alliance performance (JV) is positively related to knowledge application; 
knowledge understanding and assimilation are positively related to joint venture 
learning 
Fryxell , Dooley, & 
Vryza,  2002 
S2 
S3 
P1 MC Social control mechanisms and alliance performance relate positively. Formal 
control mechanisms and alliance performance are positively related in younger 
IJVs, but this relationship becomes negative in more mature IJVs  
Jap & Anderson, 2003 S2 
S3 
P1 BP Differential effects of trust, bilateral-specific investments, and goal congruence 
on alliance performance with high and low levels of opportunism 
Jap, 1999 S2 
S3 
P1 BP Goal congruence and trust positively affect coordination; complementary 
capabilities foster coordination and specialized investments. Joint coordination 
and investments positively impact profitability and competitive advantage 
Brouthers & 
Bamossy, 2006 
S1 
S2 
S3 
P1 BP  
MC 
 
Implementing post-formation processes to overcome limitations of ex-ante 
conditions (i.e., cultural, ownership, control) and stimulate trust positively affects 
alliance performance (JV) 
a S1 = governance form; S2 = contractual provisions; S3 = inter-firm characteristics. 
b P1 = relational processes, P2 = knowledge transfer processes; P3 = knowledge acquisition processes. 
c RG = relational governance; TCE = transaction cost economics; MC = management control; BP = behavioral perspective; 
c OL = organization learning; RP = resource perspective. 
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Holistic Approach 
Several empirical studies, primarily focusing on alliance development, adopted a 
comprehensive or holistic approach (Ariño et al., 1998; Brouthers et al., 2006; Doz, 1996; 
Fryxell et al., 2002; Jap, 1999). Instead of examining only one structure and one process 
dimension, these researchers aimed to propose a holistic description. Using an inductive case 
study design, Doz (1996) found that failing alliances could not overcome initial design flaws 
and were characterized by minimal learning processes, whereas successful alliances were 
highly evolutionary and able to adapt their initial conditions when necessary. In another case 
study, Ariño and De la Torre (1998) revealed that alliance performance is affected by 
learning–action–reaction loops between partners, which result in adaptations to the initial 
alliance structure, continuous knowledge transfers and knowledge acquisitions, and the 
building of high-quality relationships. Partner firms failing to initiate such learning cycles 
likely fail. In a longitudinal survey, Jap (1999) found that goal congruence and trust positively 
affect joint coordination, and complementary capabilities facilitate both coordination and non-
recoverable investments. In turn, these results indicated that coordination and non-recoverable 
investments positively influence the buyer–supplier’s profitability and competitive advantage. 
The results of these empirical studies therefore suggest that the relationship among alliance 
structure, alliance process, and alliance performance is more complex than often assumed.  
 
Conclusions 
Conceptual and empirical work contributing to an integrative perspective on alliance 
structure, alliance process, and alliance performance produced valuable knowledge. 
Researchers drawing on the relational governance perspective supported the hypothesis that 
contractual safeguards and relational safeguards drive alliance performance directly and 
interactively; those drawing on an organizational learning perspective found empirical support 
for a reinforcing relationship between relational and learning processes; and holistic studies 
produced evidence that structure and process elements are interrelated in their impact on 
alliance performance.  
 
Notwithstanding the relevance of these contributions, two observations are worth mentioning. 
First, we require a theoretical model that aligns the structure and process perspectives. 
Previously, conceptual and empirical studies focused on a variety of alliance structure and 
alliance process elements—some focused on joint ventures (Ding, 1997; Luo, 2002a; Yan et 
al., 1994) and other studies on contractual alliances (Jap, 1999; Jap et al., 2003; Judge et al., 
2006). Most empirical studies incorporated relational process into their explanations but also 
incorporated different structure variables, such as contract completeness (Lee et al., 2006; 
Luo, 2002a), management control (Aulakh et al., 1996; Ding, 1997), or non-recoverable 
investments (Jap, 1999; Jap et al., 2003). The few studies that adopted a holistic approach 
(Ariño et al., 1998; Child, 2002; Doz, 1996; Jap, 1999; Lane et al., 1998) provided valuable 
directions for theory development and testing. Second, as the results of the literature review 
indicate, empirical studies proposed and tested two types of theoretical models of alliance 
structure, alliance process, and alliance performance. On the one hand, those relying primarily 
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on a relational governance perspective tested hypotheses that specified alliance process 
variables as moderators (Lee et al., 2006; Luo, 2002a). For instance, Luo (2002a) used 
interaction models to examine whether contractual governance and relational governance 
substitute for or complement each other. On the other hand, empirical research specified 
alliance processes as mediators between alliance structure and alliance performance (Ariño et 
al., 1998; Doz, 1996; Poppo et al., 2002), such as when Doz (1996) concluded that initial 
alliance structure imprints the alliance processes, which in turn influence alliance 
performance. Moreover, Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, & Aulakh (2001) found that resource 
complementarity and partner firm compatibility with respect to cultural and operational norms 
affected alliance performance, both directly and indirectly through relational processes. 
However, a theoretical framework should be clear about the nature of the relationship 
between alliance structure and alliance process.  
 
2.4 Implications for Theory Development 
A comprehensive model providing structure and process explanations with respect to alliance 
performance is currently lacking within the alliance literature, despite frequent calls for one 
(Contractor, 2005; Nooteboom, 2004; Sobrero et al., 1998). The necessary theoretical model 
must depict the relationships among alliance structure, alliance process, and alliance 
performance while also acknowledging the complexities that surround alliance structure and 
alliance process. Researchers developing a theoretical model should aim to overcome the 
limitations and critiques of the structure and process perspectives. For instance, advocates of 
the structure perspective often downplayed alliance process functions, while proponents of the 
process perspective overvalued these functions at the expense of alliance structures. Because 
conceptual and empirical work has provided sufficient insight to guide theory development 
and testing, the next steps should include (1) developing a coherent conceptualization of 
alliance structure, (2) developing a coherent conceptualization of alliance processes, and (3) 
development of a coherent and testable theoretical model.  
  
During the alliance formation stage, parties make decisions and attempt to design an alliance 
structure that maximizes alliance performance by curbing exchange hazards while still 
enabling coordination and enforcement between partner firms. A theoretical model must 
account for the consequences of these decisions with respect to the three structure dimensions: 
(1) governance form, (2) contractual provisions, and (3) interfirm characteristics. As depicted 
in Figure 2.3, we build on our literature review and, in Chapter 3, develop a coherent 
conceptualization of alliance structure that accounts for governance form, contractual 
provisions, and safeguarding mechanisms. With respect to governance form, we focus on 
contractual alliances (see §1.5); for contractual provisions, we include compensation 
structure, coordination mechanisms, and safeguarding mechanisms. More specifically, we 
introduce six constructs (i.e., compensation integrativeness, compensation imbalance, shared 
decision-making, decision-making imbalance, total non-recoverable investments, and non-
recoverable investment imbalance) that together constitute the contractual foundation of an 
alliance. In addition, consistent with our definition of alliance structure, we present two 
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interfirm characteristics, partner fit and resource complementarity, which also represent two 
critical alliance formation conditions. Together, these constructs create what we call structural 
coherence, that is, the degree to which the initial alliance structure constitutes a constellation 
of mutually supportive structural safeguards. The gist of our argument holds that as the level 
of structural coherence increases, the risk of exchange hazards decreases, making it more 
likely that the partners will achieve superior alliance performance. 
 
Figure 2.3 Structure Perspective: From Dimensions to Constructs 
 
During the post-formation stage, parties interact and develop ex-post processes to build a 
relationship that maximizes alliance performance by curbing exchange hazards but again 
allows for coordination. Building on the results of our literature review, we argue that the 
theoretical model of alliance performance should incorporate two process dimensions: (1) 
relational processes and (2) learning processes (see Figure 2.4). With respect to relational 
processes, we distinguish between cooperative and competitive ex-post processes, which we 
capture with relational quality and opportunistic behavior constructs. For learning processes, 
we distinguish knowledge transfer processes from knowledge acquisition processes and argue 
that learning capabilities and absorption integrativeness reduce the risk of exchange hazards, 
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whereas absorption asymmetry increases their likelihood. Together, these variables constitute 
what we call relational adaptability, that is, the parties’ willingness and ability to modify the 
ongoing relationship without changing the initial alliance structure. With this argument, we 
posit that as the level of relational adaptability increases, the likelihood of exchange hazards 
decreases, so the parties are more likely to achieve superior alliance performance.  
 
Figure 2.4 Process Perspective: From Dimensions to Constructs 
 
 
Finally, any theoretical model that attempts to reconcile the structure and process perspectives 
must be clear about the relationship between alliance structure (i.e., structural coherence) and 
alliance process (i.e., relational adaptability). Our literature review indicates that researchers 
have adopted two approaches: moderation and mediation. The moderation approach suggests 
that the relationship between alliance structure and alliance performance depends on the 
extent to which partners developed post-formation processes, whereas the mediation approach 
implies that alliance processes function as an intervening mechanism between alliance 
structure and alliance performance. This distinction has significant conceptual and 
methodological consequences (see Box 3.4). Therefore, in Chapter 3, we hypothesize that 
relational adaptability functions as a mediating variable between structural coherence and 
alliance performance. That is, we propose a theoretical model and a testable hypothesis to 
address the concerns we have identified while simultaneously filling some knowledge gaps 
identified among existing alliance performance literature. 
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Chapter 3 Structure, Process, and Alliance Performance 
Theoretical Model 
In this chapter, we present Hypothesis 1, which states that the relationship between structural 
coherence and alliance performance is mediated by relational adaptability. Structural 
coherence refers to the degree to which the initial alliance structure constitutes a constellation 
of mutually supportive structural safeguards, whereas relational adaptability pertains to 
parties’ willingness and ability to make modifications to an ongoing relationship. In addition 
to a direct effect of structural coherence on alliance performance, the level of structural 
coherence directly influences the extent to which partners develop relational adaptability. In 
turn, a high level of relational adaptability positively affects alliance performance. The partial 
mediation hypothesis is embedded within a comprehensive theoretical model, which draws on 
the structure and process perspectives. We contend that a reconciliation of the two 
perspectives increases explanatory power with respect to alliance performance, as alignment 
of structure and process explanations more completely describes the complexity of alliances 
than either perspective alone (Contractor, 2005; Nooteboom, 2004; Zaheer et al., 1995).  
 
We organize this chapter as follows. Building on our conceptualization of alliance structure 
(see §2.1), we discuss the structure perspective’s key characteristics and elaborate on its 
assumptions, identify exchange hazards, and consider solutions to overcome exchange 
hazards (i.e., structural safeguards) in Section 3.1. Then, building on our conceptualization of 
the process perspective (see §2.2), we elaborate in Section 3.2 on the process perspective’s 
assumptions, exchange hazards and solutions, and process safeguards to reduce the likelihood 
of exchange hazards. In Section 3.3, we contrast the structure and process perspectives and 
address several issues, such as conflicting assumptions that must be resolved, before we 
present the partial mediation hypothesis in Section 3.4.  
 
3.1 Structure Perspective: Assumptions, Exchange Hazards, and Safeguards 
Alliance researchers drawing on a structure perspective argued that decisions with respect to 
alliance structure directly determine alliance performance (Hennart, 1988; Williamson, 1985). 
Consistent with this logic, we argue that as the level of structural coherence increases, the risk 
of exchange hazards diminishes, and hence, the likelihood of superior alliance performance 
increases. That is, under conditions of structural coherence, parties only need to fulfill their 
contractual obligations for the relationship to unfold according to expectations. If unforeseen 
contingencies emerge, an alliance structure provides sufficient leverage to overcome these 
challenges, or an alliance may become inefficient, resulting in a premature termination, 
because inefficient alliances likely end before partner firms can intervene (Reuer & Ariño, 
2002). To better understand this relationship between structural coherence and alliance 
performance, we first discuss the structure perspective’s assumptions, elaborate on exchange 
hazards, and discuss safeguards that parties can implement to overcome these exchange 
hazards. Table 3.1 presents an overview of the structure perspective’s key characteristics. 
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Structure Perspective: Assumptions and Implications 
Advocates of the structure perspective asserted that an efficient alliance structure reduces the 
likelihood of exchange hazards, which fosters superior alliance performance (David et al., 
2004; Hennart, 1988). This main premise recognizes that managers are capable, though to a 
limited extent (Simon, 1947), of looking ahead and recognizing contractual hazards and 
investment opportunities (Williamson, 1999). Managers react to this foresight by designing an 
alliance structure that mitigates exchange hazards and enables the full realization of future 
gains. The structure perspective is built based on three assumptions about human nature: (1) 
managers may act opportunistically, (2) managers are subject to bounded rationality, and (3) 
managers’ behavior is externally determined. 
 
First, the structure perspective builds on the assumption that managers are likely to act 
opportunistically when they are confronted with an opportunity to do so (Williamson, 1985). 
Opportunistic behavior refers to the extent to which parties seek gain for themselves at the 
expense of another (Maitland et al., 1985; Wathne et al., 2000; Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
Opportunistic behavior may include making hollow promises or window-dressing efforts, 
unresponsiveness, unreasonable demands (e.g., asking the other party to pay more than their 
fair share), misrepresenting abilities, expressing reluctance to fulfill a commitment, shirking, 
withholding information, incomplete disclosure of information, expropriation of know-how, 
exploitation of partner-specific assets, and distorting information (Jap, 2001b; Wathne et al., 
2000; Williamson, 1985). Advocates of the structure perspective did not assume that each 
manager behaves opportunistically but rather that, prior to an exchange, a person cannot have 
reliable information about the partner likelihood of opportunism (Gulati et al., 1998). 
Therefore, according to proponents of the structure perspective, opportunism (i.e., propensity 
to behave opportunistic) must be assumed as a basis for alliance structure decisions (Ghoshal, 
2005), because addressing opportunistic behavior ex-post is too costly (Williamson, 1975). 
Thus, when two parties engage in an exchange relationship, they should attempt to design an 
alliance structure that reduces the propensity for parties to behave opportunistically.  
 
Second, proponents of the structure perspective assumed that managers are subject to bounded 
rationality, which refers to the cognitive limitations humans, and thus alliance managers 
suffer in processing information (Simon, 1947, 1955). That is, it is expensive, both in time 
and resources, for managers to acquire and interpret information about the broader contracting 
environment (Leiblein, 2003). Despite even their best efforts to deal with complexity and 
unpredictability, managers remain limited in their ability to plan for the future and predict the 
various contingencies that may arise accurately (Nooteboom, 2004), which results in a need 
for formalization. However, limited information also may result in misaligned governance 
forms or incomplete contracts, because it is too costly for managers to negotiate and write 
claims that fully describe each party’s responsibilities and rights for all contingencies that 
reasonably could occur during the life of an alliance (Macneil, 1978). When new 
circumstances arise, a contract must specify in adaptation clauses how to deal with it 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2007), the parties engage in costly renegotiations (Reuer & Ariño, 2002), 
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or the alliance prematurely ends (Williamson, 1985). Therefore, the assumption of bounded 
rationality suggests that managers should design an alliance structure that, on the one hand, 
enables parties to deal with unforeseen circumstances and, on the other hand, reduces the 
likelihood of exchange hazards.  
 
Table 3.1 Structure Perspective’s Characteristics 
 Issue Description References 
Focus Alliance structure  Configuration of alliance formation conditions, 
which aim for legally organizing coordination, 
contractual enforcement, and safeguarding 
against exchange hazards. 
Hennart & Zeng, 2005; 
Williamson, 1985, Hennart, 
1988 
Assumptions Bounded rationality 
Opportunism 
Determinism 
 
Managers’ limited capacity to process 
information, likelihood to behave self-
interested with guile, and lack of discretion to 
make adaptations necessitate an alliance 
structure that curbs exchange hazards.  
Nooteboom, 2004; Reuer & 
Ariño, 2002; Williamson, 
1985; Williamson, 1999; 
Simon, 1947 
Exchange 
Hazards 
Opportunistic behavior 
- Hold-up 
- Free-riding 
- Shirking  
Appropriation and spill-over 
Goal conflict 
The vulnerabilities partner firms face in dealing 
with one another once the alliance is formed; 
parties are vulnerable to deceitful behavior, 
the extraction of benefits not part of the 
alliance contract, and conflicts about goals. 
Gulati & Singh, 1998; Klein, 
Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; 
Oxley, 1997; Wathne & 
Heide, 2000; Williamson, 
1985 
 
Structural 
Safeguards 
Partner selection 
Governance form 
Contractual provisions 
- Compensation structure 
- Coordination mechanisms 
- Safeguarding mechanisms 
Structural coherence: Degree to which the 
initial alliance structure constitutes a 
constellation of mutually supportive structural 
safeguards, including governance form, 
contractual provisions, and interfirm 
characteristics 
Douma et al., 2000; Gulati & 
Singh, 1998; Hagedoorn & 
Hesen, 2007; Macneil, 1978; 
Williamson, 1985 
 
Third, proponents of the structure perspective assumed a strong variant of determinism 
(Whittington, 1988), suggesting that managers’ behavior is determined by external stimuli. 
That is, managers can influence the future and its events, but their behavior depends on the 
present and past. Within the context of alliances, this assumption means that managers have 
little discretion (i.e., choice) with regard to how to respond to unforeseen circumstances after 
the alliance forms. Moreover, according to proponents of the structure perspective, past 
decisions with respect to alliance structure constrain future decisions. This lack of choice 
suggests that when circumstances change, parties cannot adapt their ongoing relationship to fit 
with new demands (Reuer & Ariño, 2002). Therefore, advocates of the structure perspective 
argued that an alliance structure should be capable of dealing with contingencies. For 
instance, alliance contracts should contain contingency clauses that provide parties with clear 
guidelines about how to deal with unforeseen events (Luo, 2002a). Together, the three 
assumptions of opportunism, bounded rationality, and determinism have one major 
implication: Managers should ex-ante design an alliance structure that reduces the likelihood 
that ex-post exchange hazards occur.  
 
Structure Perspective: Exchange Hazards 
Exchange hazards have been defined as the vulnerabilities partner firms face in dealing with 
each other (see Figure 3.1). One type of exchange hazards pertains to alliance formation. 
Before engaging in an exchange relationship, parties may misrepresent information to secure 
individual interests, a manifestation of an exchange hazard that economists refer to as adverse 
selection (Akerlof, 1970). The purpose of this precontractual opportunistic behavior is to 
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exploit asymmetric information about future performance (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993). 
However, we focus in this study on contractual alliances that already have been formed. 
Therefore, we focus on three types of ex-post exchange hazards: (1) moral hazard, (2) 
appropriation and spill-over, and (3) goal conflicts.  
 
Opportunistic Behavior 
Partner firms may exert low effort after they have agreed to engage into an exchange 
relationship, which is a moral hazard problem (Pauly, 1968). Parties engaging in such 
postcontractual behavior use the information asymmetry between the partner firms to exploit 
current performance. Moral hazard gets manifested through opportunistic behavior 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985). According to advocates of the structure perspective, opportunistic 
behavior, or even the likelihood that a party will behave opportunistically, represents an 
exchange hazard. Williamson (1976, p. 6) defined opportunistic behavior as “self-interested 
behavior with guile” and, in his later work (1985, p. 47), described guile as “lying, stealing, 
cheating, and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse.” 
An alliance structure should be designed to reduce the likelihood of various forms of 
opportunistic behavior, including (1) the hold-up problem, (2) shirking, and (3) free-riding.  
 
Figure 3.1 Structure Perspective: Types of Exchange Hazards 
 
 
Hold-up problems arise when one party exploits the other party’s dependence on the alliance 
(Williamson, 1985), which may result from the presence of assets and investments with a 
value specific to the relationship, which in turn creates incentives for opportunism (Klein et 
al., 1978; Williamson, 1975). If a party is tied to the alliance through specialized investments, 
it cannot dissolve the alliance without incurring a substantial loss, namely, the costs 
associated with the loss of non-recoverable investments (Klein et al., 1978). In such 
conditions of unbalanced dependence, the dominant partner can exploit its bargaining power 
advantage to extract additional concessions from its counterpart (see Box 3.1). For instance, a 
party can use its bargaining power to coerce its partner into accepting a new, more 
advantageous financial arrangement and thus increase its return on investment at the expense 
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of the other party. When a firm makes non-recoverable investments in an alliance and thereby 
becomes increasingly dependent on its partner, it loses some of its bargaining power and may 
fall victim to opportunistic behavior by its partner.  
 
Shirking refers to situations in which one party avoids its obligations and contracted duties 
(Wathne et al., 2000), which can increase that party’s short-term rewards through, for 
example, an immediate cost saving, though it also imposes costs on the alliance and 
jeopardizes long-term value creation (Wathne et al., 2000). Consider an example in which a 
local partner fails to comply with a foreign partner’s quality standards with regard to a newly 
developed product. From the local partner’s perspective, shirking produces an immediate 
benefit in the form of cost savings. However, in the long-term, business opportunities from 
the alliance might be lost as customers become dissatisfied, decreasing the alliance’s future 
revenues. Breaching contracts may increase one party’s rewards, but it also damages alliance 
performance. For instance, violating an exclusivity agreement could generate additional 
revenue for one party while also imposing additional monitoring costs on the partner firm. 
 
Box 3.1 Illustration of the Hold-Up Problem 
The fate of Anamartic, a small British high-technology firm, provides an excellent example of the 
hold-up risk: Anamartic developed a component that was customized to work in Tandem’s 
computers, using proprietary technology and a memory component purchased from Fujitsu. 
Eventually, Anamartic went bankrupt when the price for memory components dropped significantly 
but Fujitsu refused to lower its prices as well. Fujitsu could maintain its price level because 
contractually, it was Anamartic’s sole supplier of memory components.  
 
Source: Garnsey & Wilkinson (1994) 
 
Free-riding arises when one party fails to fulfill its obligations to supply the right inputs to its 
partner (Hennart et al., 2005). If parties contractually agree to share inputs and outputs, 
assuming a failure to supply the agreed amount or quality of resources to the alliance is 
difficult to detect, then a party that fails to provide its share will reap additional benefits. 
Imagine one party devotes fewer working hours (i.e., staff) to an R&D alliance, but because 
the laboratory is in-house, the partner firm cannot detect this free-riding behavior easily. The 
likelihood of free-riding behavior therefore needs to be curbed through safeguarding 
mechanisms for two reasons. First, if a party engages in this type of behavior, the long-term 
value creation potential of the alliance cannot be realized, because prerequisite resources are 
not available. Second, to address ex-post free-riding, parties may need to install costly 
monitoring mechanisms, and these expenditures negatively affect alliance performance. In 
summary, to achieve superior alliance performance, parties must design an alliance structure 
that reduces the likelihood of hold-up problems, shirking, and free-riding. 
 
Appropriation and Spill-over Concerns 
After an alliance has been formed, parties may have concerns about the appropriation of 
benefits and spill-over (Gulati et al., 1998; Khanna et al., 1998; Oxley, 1997). Appropriation 
refers to a party’s concern about its ability to capture a fair share of the common benefits 
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created through the alliance (Gulati et al., 1998 p. 788); spill-over refers to the transfer of 
knowledge from one partner to another with the aim to exploit it in activities not part of the 
initial agreement (Ariño, 2003; Parkhe, 1993a). Both appropriation and spill-over constitute 
exchange hazards, because with appropriation, a party may not receive its anticipated benefits, 
whereas spill-over may cause a party to lose valuable knowledge to a partner.  
 
Appropriation concerns originate from the presence of behavioral uncertainty, combined with 
the difficulties of specifying intellectual property rights, as well as the challenges of 
contractual monitoring and enforcement (Oxley, 1997). Uncertainties associated with future 
performance and problems in observing partners’ contributions aggravate the potential that a 
party does not receive its anticipated share of benefits. The presence of a knowledge 
component in an alliance raises additional appropriation concerns (Gulati et al., 1998), 
because knowledge is difficult to bound, monitor, and codify. These particular characteristics 
of knowledge hinder knowledge transfer between the partners (Chen, 2004), which increases 
appropriation concerns. Then these concerns become further aggravated when tacit 
knowledge is involved. Tacit knowledge, defined by Polanyi (1962) as knowledge that is non-
verbalizable, intuitive, and unarticulated, innately entails ambiguity, which makes it difficult 
for parties to assess the value of knowledge accurately (Contractor, 2001). Furthermore, 
knowledge ambiguity raises knowledge transfer barriers (Simonin, 1999). Therefore, parties 
need to make decisions with respect to alliance designs that aim to reduce appropriation 
concerns about various performance objectives.  
 
Spill-over is a specific type of appropriation, such that parties transfer what they have learned 
from their partner to other activities outside the alliance (Khanna et al., 1998; Zeng et al., 
2002). The consequences of spill-over amplify when partner firms are (potential) competitors 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000). If a competitor appropriates knowledge through an alliance, it 
may improve its competitive advantage relative to the partner firm, because the acquired 
knowledge augments this firm’s core competences or weakens its partner’s core assets. Thus, 
a spill-over occurs when a party acquires knowledge through the alliances, and its counterpart 
cannot prevent the use of this knowledge for activities that are not part of the initial 
agreement. For instance, knowledge usage cannot be protected adequately by law as a result 
of insufficient patenting processes (Oxley, 1999). Thus, parties must design an alliance 
structure that reduces the risk of spill-over.  
 
Goal Conflicts 
As an alliance develops, the likelihood of goal conflicts between partner firms may increase 
as a result of internal and external dynamics (Yan & Zeng, 1999). Goal conflicts constitute an 
exchange hazard, because incompatible or misaligned goals reduce incentives for parties to 
cooperate and contribute to achieving the other’s objectives (Eliashberg et al., 1984). Unlike 
the other two types of exchange hazards, goal conflicts do not necessarily pertain to the 
division of contribution and rewards. That is, whereas opportunistic behavior deals with the 
deceitful extraction of benefits and appropriation and spill-over refer to the division of 
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benefits between the partners, goal conflicts may arise regarding the long-term strategy of the 
alliance, day-to-day operations, product quality specifications, the use of technological 
expertise, or the use of conflict resolution mechanisms. As goal incompatibility between 
parties increases, the likelihood of conflicts increases as well (Douma et al., 2000), which in 
turn reinforces alliance instability. Hence, goal conflicts constitute an ex-post exchange 
hazard, whose likelihood should be reduced through choices with respect to the alliance 
structure (Eliashberg et al., 1984; Hennart et al., 2005).  
 
Structural Safeguards against Exchange Hazards 
During the alliance formation stage, parties erect structural safeguards to secure their 
individual interests and protect their relationship against exchange hazards (Contractor, 2005). 
These structural safeguards provide, at minimum cost, the control necessary for parties to 
believe that engaging in the alliance will benefit them (Dyer, 1997; Williamson, 1985). 
Advocates of the structure perspective have argued that structural safeguards reduce the 
likelihood of exchange hazards, whereas the absence of exchange hazards positively 
contributes to the likelihood of superior alliance performance. That is, an alliance structure 
should align parties’ interests by creating an incentive structure that stimulates the creation of 
long-term gains through cooperation while reducing short-term gains from competition 
(Wathne et al., 2000).11 We introduce structural coherence as a factor that can represent the 
extent to which parties have succeeded in designing adequate alliance structures.  
 
We define structural coherence as the degree to which the initial alliance structure 
constitutes a constellation of mutually supportive structural safeguards, including governance 
form, contractual provisions, and interfirm characteristics (Dussauge et al., 1995; Miller, 
1986). This definition has two implications. First, it implies that decisions with respect to 
governance form, the scope and content of alliance contracts, and partner selection influence 
the extent to which parties are protected against exchange hazards. For example, researchers 
demonstrated that equity arrangements outperform non-equity arrangements with respect to 
reducing the likelihood of exchange hazards (Gulati et al., 1998), but other researchers argued 
that decisions with respect to contractual design and partner selection affect the likelihood of 
exchange hazards (Hagedoorn et al., 2007). Second, this definition of structural coherence 
implies that decisions with respect to governance form, contractual provisions, and partner 
selection can be mutually supportive and form a coherent configuration (Hennart et al., 2005). 
To the extent that this configuration becomes more coherent, it becomes similar to a unitary 
organizational entity (i.e., quasi-hierarchy). For example, parties may agree about hybrid 
compensation structures, share decision-making rights, or commit themselves to non-
recoverable investments, which in combination create a set of reciprocal relationships 
between parties. Developing this type of reciprocal relationship contributes to the degree of 
structural coherence, which decreases the likelihood of exchange hazards (see Figure 3.2).  
 
                                                 
11 See Chapters 4 and 5 for an in-depth discussion of the relationship between cooperation and competition.  
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In this study, we focus on contractual alliances (see §1.5), which implies that with respect to 
theory development, we do not have to consider the governance form. Previous research 
demonstrated that equity agreements are more likely to reduce exchange hazards and provide 
stronger incentives for parties to cooperate compared with non-equity agreements (Colombo, 
2003; Hennart, 1988). However, non-equity agreements provide parties with a flexible 
governance form that is relatively easy to establish and terminate, though it offers less 
protection against exchange hazards (Gulati et al., 1998), because of the lack of hierarchical 
control through ownership (Nooteboom, 2004). As a consequence, contractual alliances incite 
parties to resort to a substantial range of other structural safeguards (Hagedoorn et al., 2007; 
Heide, 1994). We argue that the level of structural coherence is influenced by four types of 
structural safeguards, resulting from the decisions firms make during the alliance formation 
stage: (1) interfirm characteristics, (2) compensation structure, (3) coordination mechanisms, 
and (4) safeguarding mechanisms.  
 
Figure 3.2 Structure Perspective: Main Logic 
 
Interfirm Characteristics 
After a firm has decided to engage in an alliance, selecting an appropriate partner represents 
the next step (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000). Partner selection involves the 
acts undertaken to identify potential exchange partners and assess their intentions (Gulati, 
1995a). The main aim during this phase is to proactively solve any potential governance 
problems (Wathne & Heide, 2004). Thus, the most straightforward way to manage exchange 
hazards is to select partners that are a priori not opportunistically inclined and inherently 
cooperative for a particular task (Wathne et al., 2000). Although careful partner selection 
solves the adverse selection problem, ex-post exchange hazards still may prevail. Parties 
therefore must select partners that decrease the probability of opportunism, limit the risk of 
appropriation and spill-over, and attenuate the likelihood of goal conflicts.  
 
Various interfirm characteristics affect the likelihood of exchange hazards, including national 
cultural differences (Barkema et al., 1997), overlap between partners’ markets (Khanna, 
1998), overlap between partners’ technologies (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1998), the 
extent to which partners are competitors (Bengtsson et al., 2000), degree of alliance 
capabilities shared between the partners (Lambe et al., 2002), and prior experience with each 
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other (Gulati, 1995b). Building on previous alliance research (Douma et al., 2000; Harrison et 
al., 2001; Hitt et al., 2000; Saxton, 1997), we focus on two specific interfirm characteristics, 
(1) partner fit and (2) resource complementarity, supported by two arguments. First, partner 
fit and resource complementarity represent, respectively, Type II and Type I diversity 
(Parkhe, 1991). Second, partner fit and resource complementarity have received substantial 
conceptual and empirical support with respect to their importance as alliance formation 
conditions (Harrigan, 1988; Kale et al., 2000; Lambe et al., 2002; Mowery, Oxley, & 
Silverman, 1996; Park et al., 1997; Parkhe, 1993a; Saxton, 1997; Shenkar & Li, 1999). 
 
Partner fit is the extent to which interfirm characteristics, such as strategic, cultural, 
organizational, and operational features are compatible at the formation stage (Douma et al., 
2000; Park et al., 1997;  Saxton, 1997). Partner fit represents Type II diversity (Parkhe, 1991), 
so if a difference between interfirm characteristics exists, it has a negative effect on alliance 
outcomes. For instance, if parties have diverging views about future industry developments, it 
likely will cause conflicts during alliance negotiation; similarly, parties with different 
organizational cultures likely experience difficulties during communication and decision-
making (Pangarkar & Klein, 2001; Sirmon & Lane, 2004). Saxton (1997) distinguished 
between strategic and organization fit and demonstrated that partners with similar 
organizational attributes, such as customers, manufacturing capabilities, and other 
organizational processes, are more likely to enjoy synergies. Fit determines the extent to 
which organizations can get along and realize anticipated synergies that are critical to the 
alliance’s success (Douma et al., 2000).  
 
The propensity for opportunistic behavior declines when parties form an alliance marked by 
compatible firm characteristics, because partner fit contributes to a high-quality relationship 
(Gulati, 1995b; Saxton, 1997). Selecting partners that attribute similar strategic importance to 
the alliance reduces the likelihood of opportunistic behavior and increases cooperation 
(Pfeffer et al., 1978). Compatible cultures and organizational and operational systems also 
reduce incentives to act opportunistically and inhibit shirking and free-riding, because this 
compatibility reduces a firm’s uncertainty about its partner’s intentions, interests, or 
competences (Douma et al., 2000). Appropriation and spill-over concerns also can be 
remedied by careful partner selection. For instance, choosing high-fit partners increases the 
likelihood that a party can detect the unwanted transfer of proprietary knowledge, which 
discourages parties from doing it. Finally, goal conflicts are reduced by careful partner 
selection, determined by similar objectives and similar strategies (Hennart et al., 2005), 
because partner fit fosters cooperation even as it enables parties to develop a shared vision, 
assess the extent to which alliance strategies are compatible, and evaluate the added value for 
their individual businesses (Douma et al., 2000). The presence of partner fit further creates a 
perception that what is beneficial for the counterpart also is in the best interest of the firm 
(Jap, 1999). In summary, partner fit constitutes a structural safeguard that contributes 
positively to an alliance’s structural coherence.  
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Resource complementarity is defined as the extent to which the joint use of distinct sets of 
resources yields a higher total return than the sum of returns that could be earned if each set of 
resources were used independently (Chi, 1994; Dyer et al., 1998). This definition implies that 
alliances offer a viable option to a firm if it does not possess the entire bundle of resources 
and capabilities it needs to sustain earned rents in a particular domain of activity or lacks the 
capability to develop them competitively (Madhok et al., 1998; Mowery et al., 1998). 
Selecting a partner that contributes to the firms’ Type I diversity is essential to alliance 
formation (Parkhe, 1991). For instance, Toys ‘R Us, wanting to expand into Japan at the 
beginning of the 1990s, engaged in a joint venture with McDonald’s Japan. McDonald’s 
bought the real estate for the toy company, which then made space for a McDonald’s outlet. 
Because neither firm intended to enter the other’s industry, each could benefit fully from their 
complementary resources (Hennart et al., 2005). In addition, because resource 
complementarity between partners increases the value creation potential of an alliance (Dyer 
et al., 1998), it also constitutes a structural safeguard against exchange hazards.  
 
Moreover, resource complementarity between partners provides strong incentives to continue 
and maintain a relationship (Nakamura, Shaver, & Yeung, 1996). When parties align valuable 
resources, they may create synergetic outcomes that otherwise would be difficult to achieve 
(Dyer et al., 1998). Lambe, Spekman, and Hunt (2002) presented empirical findings 
indicating that resource complementarity enables parties to develop an idiosyncratic resource 
foundation, which thus fosters joint value creation. In this sense, resource complementarity 
reduces the risk of opportunistic behavior and goal conflicts, because the long-term value 
creation likely outweighs the short-term rewards. However, resource complementarity also 
may increase risk appropriation and spill-over. Partnering firms that contribute 
complementary resources confront a tempting opportunity to obtain valuable new resources 
possessed by their counterparts. The extent to which appropriation and spill-over occurs 
therefore depends on other structural safeguards, such as sufficient compensation (Hennart et 
al., 2005), shared decision-making (Yan et al., 2001), and the presence of non-recoverable 
investments (Williamson, 1985). Nonetheless, resource complementarity constitutes a 
structural safeguard that relates positively to structural coherence.  
 
Compensation Structure 
One provision of an alliance contract pertains to the compensation structure between the 
parties (Ariño et al., 2004). A compensation structure depicts, on the one hand, the rewards 
parties can expect, such as profits, royalties, or intellectual property, and, on the other hand, 
the contributions those parties are expected to make, including payments, provision of raw 
materials, and know-how (Contractor et al., 2000). As its basic premise, a compensation 
structure aligns parties’ individual interests by creating an incentive foundation that ensures 
long-term gains from cooperative behavior exceed the short-term payoff of opportunistic 
behavior (Wathne et al., 2000). An adequate compensation structure provides incentives for 
the parties to continue a relationship while also reducing the likelihood of exchange hazards.  
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Box 3.2 Types of Compensation 
Ex-Ante Sharing 
Parties can enter an alliance with a contract that focuses on ex-ante sharing. This type of contract 
specifies each party’s compensation before the alliance is implemented. For instance, lump-sum 
payments might be part of the prospective compensation structure and provide an immediate and 
certain return to the partner that receives them. Similarly, royalty fees are agreed upon ex-ante and 
typically are a percentage of sales. An advantage of ex-ante sharing through lump-sum fees or 
royalties is that even if ex-post profits are zero, rewards might be appropriated by the parties. 
However, an ex-ante contract presupposes that the partners are capable of specifying a priori the 
anticipated benefits and agreeing beforehand on the compensation structure. The parties assume 
that ex-post measurement is easy and that if a disparity emerges between ex-ante anticipations and 
ex-post realization, renegotiation provides them with an easy way to stabilize the alliance.  
 
Residual Sharing 
Another type of compensation focuses on ex-post sharing. A residual sharing contract is appropriate 
when it is difficult to specify ex-ante the desired performance, parties cannot ex-post measure 
performance, or enforcing the contract proves difficult. With regard to an alliance, two parties might 
opt to share costs and revenues or include trade of raw materials, components, or finished products 
(a dividend compensation structure is not applicable, because no equity is involved). Residual 
sharing has as its main advantage the alignment of incentives for parties to perform, because parties 
are promised a share of the anticipated benefits. Thus, if an alliance becomes a commercial success 
in later years, a party’s rewards are not constrained by fixed payments or royalty percentages. In 
contrast to an ex-ante contract, residual sharing contracts are less sensitive to contingencies, so the 
need to renegotiate contractual terms decreases. With a residual sharing contract, parties’ rewards 
depend on the profits of the alliance, not their specific contributions.  
 
Hybrid Compensation 
Many alliances are not organized according to just ex-ante sharing or just residual sharing but rather 
exhibit a hybrid compensation structure. In alliances with a technology component in particular, a 
hybrid compensation structure is appropriate. Whenever tacit knowledge is part of the agreement, 
the issue of information asymmetry emerges to favor the knowledge holder, because this type of 
knowledge implies increased difficulty in valuing and describing that knowledge. Residual sharing 
overcomes this problem, because residual contracts are less sensitive to all kinds of unforeseen 
circumstances than are ex-ante contracts. However, ex-ante sharing provides strong incentives for 
parties to engage in an alliance, even if future rewards are uncertain. If ex-ante sharing is 
complemented with residual sharing, the parties have strong incentives to maintain the relationship, 
because rewards depend on the extent to which the alliance is successful. 
 
Sources:  Contractor & Ra (2000); Gulati & Singh (1998); Hennart (1988); Hennart & Zeng (2005) 
 
Compensation structures can take a variety of forms, including lump-sum fees, royalties, cost-
revenue sharing, keeping own profits, and transfer pricing (Aulakh, 2001; Contractor et al., 
2000; Mendi, 2005). Each compensation form has different properties. For instance, lump-
sum payments typically are paid at the start of the agreement (i.e., ex-ante), whereas cost-
revenue sharing typically gets settled after implementation (i.e., ex-post). Box 3.2 describes 
how parties might choose from a variety of compensation methods, including ex-ante sharing, 
residual sharing, and hybrid forms. During the formation stage, parties must make decisions 
about these compensation forms. Contingent on external and internal conditions, parties may 
design different compensation configurations, which implies each established alliance is 
likely characterized by its own specific compensation structure to match the alliance 
formation contingencies. To address this heterogeneity across alliance contracts, we introduce 
two constructs that capture parties’ negotiation outcomes with respect to an alliance’s 
compensation structure: (1) compensation integrativeness and (2) compensation imbalance.  
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Compensation integrativeness12 is defined as the combination of parties’ anticipated 
benefits as formalized in the alliance contract, regardless of whether parties’ anticipated 
compensations are balanced or imbalanced (Blodgett, 1991b; Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1998; 
Kersten, 2001; Lax et al., 1986; Thompson, 1990). A high level of compensation 
integrativeness means that the parties have formalized a compensation structure that 
maximizes the value creation potential of the alliance. So, the parties’ compensation will be 
Pareto optimal if there does not exist some other feasible solution or set of solutions that 
would improve the utility of one or both parties without harming either party (Thompson, 
1990). More specifically, compensation integrativeness means that parties have agreed on a 
reward/contribution ratio that outweighs the alternative organizational forms that could have 
been adopted to achieve each party’s objectives (Blodgett, 1991b; Madhok et al., 1998). A 
high level of compensation integrativeness suggests that partners perceive their compensation 
as consistent with their initial expectations (Thompson, 1990). Parties likely expect a 
sufficiently high return on their investment, for instance, through a combination of advance 
payments, royalties, and claims on intellectual property; at the same time, their resource 
contributions receive valuation that conforms to their expectations.  
 
Drawing on equity theory (Adams, 1965), we contend that as the level of compensation 
integrativeness increases, parties’ long-term orientation toward the relationship increases, 
because the adopted compensation structure guides parties’ behavior toward achieving long-
term collective interests and forgoing short-term individual interests (Contractor et al., 2000). 
Equity theorists have argued that a party evaluates an ongoing relationship by assessing its 
own inputs and the outputs it receives in return, relative to what the other party contributes to 
and receives from the relationship (Adams, 1965). With respect to compensation, a party 
experiences equity when it perceives that the rewards it and its partner receive are 
proportional to their respective contributions. Perceived equity promotes cooperation, because 
each firm compares the immediate gain from cheating with the possible sacrifice of future 
gains that may result from violating the agreement (Parkhe, 1993a). Through expectations of 
reciprocity and the association of anticipated gains from mutual cooperation, the future casts a 
shadow back on the present and affects partner firm efforts (Heide & Miner, 1992). Broken 
promises in the present decrease cooperation in the future, whereas a party fulfilling its 
contractual obligations can anticipate compliance by its partner. Compensation 
integrativeness thus stimulates long-term cooperation by providing incentives to the parties to 
pursue individual yet compatible interests, which reduces the likelihood of opportunistic 
behavior, appropriation and spill-over, and goal conflicts. That is, a compensation structure 
that promises to fulfill individual partner firms’ objectives reduces opportunistic behavior, as 
such short-term, self-interested behavior would damage the possibility of the parties’ long-
term rewards. For instance, royalties reduce the probability of opportunistic behavior because 
they link ex-post payments to present value creation, which is not the case if compensation 
gets paid upfront (Mendi, 2005). Similarly, the likelihood of shirking, exploiting a hold-up 
                                                 
12 We discuss in Section 5.1 the antecedents of compensation integrativeness and compensation imbalance.  
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situation, appropriation and spill-over concerns, and goal conflicts decline through 
compensation integrativeness. In summary, compensation integrativeness constitutes a 
structural safeguard that positively contributes to an alliance’s structural coherence. 
 
In contrast, if an alliance contract is characterized by compensation imbalance,13 the risk of 
exchange hazards increases. Compensation imbalance is defined as the asymmetry between 
each party’s anticipated benefits as formalized in the alliance contract (Blodgett, 1991b; 
Greenhalgh et al., 1998; Kersten, 2001; Lax et al., 1986; Thompson, 1990), such as when one 
party exploits its power advantage and seeks to maximize its individual gain at the expense of 
its partner (Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996). In this case, the partners have formalized an 
incentive structure that primarily, but not necessarily completely, favors one party. For 
example, a party may receive an exceptionally large advance payment, negotiate a better 
transfer price, or receive a higher valuation for its intangible resource contribution relative to 
its counterpart. The presence of compensation imbalance suggests that one party has been 
able to increase its expected return on investment relative to the return on investment of its 
counterpart, which increases the likelihood of exchange hazards.  
 
A particular argument from equity theory supports our assertion that compensation imbalance 
increases the likelihood of exchange hazards. When the outcome–input ratios are unequal, 
inequity is created, so one firm will respond negatively, whether that inequity is positive or 
negative (Adams, 1965). Positive inequity leads to guilt because the benefiting party is not 
pulling its weight or is receiving disproportionately great outcomes, whereas negative 
inequity leads to hostility because the party feels disadvantaged (Scheer et al., 2003). 
Compensation imbalance pushes parties to secure their individual interests in the short term at 
the expense of long-term gains, which destabilizes the alliance (Das et al., 2000a). A party 
anticipating a relatively lower return on investment than its counterpart may perceive the 
distribution of rewards as unfair, which increases the likelihood of opportunistic conduct 
(Wathne et al., 2000). In contrast, the party with sufficient compensation anticipates this 
opportunism and therefore engages in preemptive opportunistic behavior. Consider a party 
that makes a lump-sum payment in exchange for expertise knowledge; if it has paid too much, 
it may engage in shirking as the alliance develops to increase its compensation, while the 
knowledge-supplying partner simultaneously engages in free-riding behavior (Contractor et 
al., 2000). Similarly, the likelihood of appropriation and spill-over concerns increases as the 
level of compensation imbalance increases, because parties seek to rebalance the perceived 
inequity through the transfer of knowledge and information that is not part of the initial 
agreement. A party that anticipates fewer rewards than its counterpart will receive is more 
likely to protect its valuable knowledge to compensate for possible losses. Hence, a higher 
level of compensation imbalance affects an alliance’s level of structural coherence negatively. 
                                                 
13 We distinguish compensation integrativeness from compensation imbalance, suggesting a conceptual and 
operational distinction between the two constructs. Whereas compensation integrativeness refers to the 
combination of parties’ perception, compensation imbalance refers to the difference. This approach, which also 
applies to decision-making, non-recoverable investments, absorption, and performance, builds on prior research 
(see e.g. Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005) and is further explained in Box 4.2 and Section 6.3. 
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Coordination Mechanisms 
Parties install coordination mechanisms to decrease the likelihood that exchange hazards will 
emerge, because these safeguards reduce information asymmetry between the partners. To the 
extent that information asymmetry between parties exists in a relationship, a party may act 
opportunistically, appropriate knowledge, and exploit goal conflicts to its advantage. 
Coordination mechanisms, such as decision-making (Glaister et al., 2003), exercising 
influence (Pearce, 2001), monitoring (Wathne et al., 2000), and management control (Mjoen 
et al., 1997), help parties mimic hierarchical control. Quasi-hierarchical control reduces 
parties’ vulnerability to exchange hazards and enables them to protect individual interests 
(Gulati et al., 1998). During the alliance formation stage, parties can decide to use various 
coordination mechanisms, each of which varies in its effectiveness in terms of curbing 
exchange hazards (Wathne et al., 2000). A simple contractual arrangement may suffice when 
the information to be transferred is precise and highly explicit, such as a license agreement. 
But as the alliance becomes more complex and the likelihood of exchange hazards increases, 
other formal coordination mechanisms may be more appropriate, including structural 
grouping, departmentalization, planning and budgeting mechanisms, performance evaluations, 
and the creation of team and task forces (Makhija et al., 1997). A party with decision-making 
rights has formal authority to execute such management tasks, so we focus on decision-
making (Glaister et al., 2003; Pearce, 1997) and argue that it constitutes an important 
structural safeguard. However, whereas shared decision-making between firms curbs 
exchange hazards, a decision-making imbalance increases the risk of exchange hazards.  
 
Shared decision-making entails both parties’ formalized formal authority over alliance 
activities (i.e., decision-making rights), regardless of whether parties’ decision-making is 
balanced or imbalanced (Cullen et al., 1995; Johnson et al., 1996; Subramani & Venkatraman, 
2003; Yan et al., 2001). If a firm has decision-making rights, it can make decisions about 
planning, executing, and monitoring alliance activities (Geringer et al., 1989; Yan et al., 
2001). Parties aim to gain control within alliances, because formal authority provides them 
with the power to influence the direction of the alliance. Sharing decision-making rights 
between parties reduces information asymmetry, because relevant information pertaining to 
the alliance’s progress, the counterpart’s behavior, and the extent to which objectives have 
been achieved gets routed back to each party. Thus, obtaining decision-making rights is one 
way to ensure that the firm’s strategic objectives remain actively pursued. As the level of 
shared decision-making between the parties increases, it should protect them against exchange 
hazards (Wathne et al., 2000). Shared decision-making further signifies that parties have 
committed to each other’s interests and increases the likelihood of recognizing deceitful 
behavior (Saxton, 1997). From a behavioral perspective, shared decision-making places 
uncomfortable social pressure on the parties and thereby increases compliance (Wathne et al., 
2000). When parties share decision-making rights, they can install monitoring mechanisms 
and thus increase the pressure to comply with the contractual obligations. From an economic 
perspective, shared decision-making increases partners’ ability to detect opportunism and 
ultimately match rewards and sanctions appropriately to the partner’s behavior (Wathne et al., 
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2000). By signaling the implementation of efficient and effective information processing 
mechanisms, shared decision-making rights stimulates parties to communicate more 
intensively across a wide variety of issues, which may enable them to understand each other 
better. Because each firm has access to relevant information about its partner, shared decision-
making reduces the likelihood of opportunistic behavior, as well as the involuntary transfer of 
proprietary assets (Makhija et al., 1997), and helps partners detect premature goal divergence 
(Wathne et al., 2000). Greater transparency between the parties, understanding, 
acknowledgement, and acceptance of the other’s interests reduce the likelihood of 
appropriation, spill-over, and goal conflicts. 
 
Parties also may formalize their decision-making rights asymmetrically—what we refer to as 
a decision-making imbalance, or as the asymmetry in each party’s formal authority over 
alliance activities (Bucklin et al., 1993; Child et al., 2003; Child et al., 1999; Steensma & 
Lyles, 2000). Drawing on a management control perspective, researchers postulated that 
dominant control positively affects alliance performance (Geringer et al., 1989; Makhija et al., 
1997). Killing (1983) showed that dominant control by one partner in a joint venture leads to 
more success, because dominant control approximates a unitary firm. Geringer and Hebert 
(1989) also stated that control over alliance activities helps protect a party from the risk of 
prematurely exposing its technological or other proprietary assets to other partners, and 
However, most research with respect to decision-making has focused on joint ventures, which 
are governed through ownership (Child et al., 2003; Zhang et al., 2001). In contrast to these 
insights, we contend that within contractual alliances, decision-making becomes more critical 
because of the absence of ownership arrangement; thus, a formalized decision-making 
imbalance likely negatively affects alliance development. A decision-making imbalance in an 
alliance contributes to the creation of information asymmetry, such that one party has more 
information about the alliance’s progress and performance compared to its counterpart, 
enabling it to exploit this information advantage. For instance, it could behave 
opportunistically and withhold information, use its information to cover up its shirking and 
free-riding activities, or use the information advantage to appropriate knowledge that was not 
part of the initial agreement. The vulnerable party, with its diminished decision-making 
rights, grows less committed to maintaining the alliance and may engage in opportunistic 
behavior to reduce the information gap. Dominant decision-making further damages a party’s 
willingness to contribute to what it regards as an unequal partnership, in which its own goals 
do not receive due weight (Child et al., 2003). In summary, a decision-making imbalance 
negatively contributes to an alliance’s structural coherence. 
 
Safeguarding Mechanisms 
Consistent with past alliance research (Buvik et al., 2002; Combs et al., 1999; Dyer, 1996; 
Dyer, 1997; Jap, 1999; Jap et al., 2003; Parkhe, 1993a; Zaheer et al., 1995), we contend that 
non-recoverable investments constitute a safeguarding mechanism, as they support a given 
alliance and cannot be redeployed easily to another alliance without some sacrifice in the 
productivity of the assets or cost to adapt them to a new context (Williamson, 1975). 
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Specialized expenditures are tailored to the alliance (Jap et al., 2003) and difficult, if not 
impossible, to use in other alliances without substantial cost (Inkpen & Madhok, 2001). 
Unlike generic resource contributions, non-recoverable investments loose value or create an 
economic loss if the alliance terminates prematurely (Jap et al., 2003). Non-recoverable 
investments can be either tangible, such as development of customized machinery, a mutual 
information system, or specialized facilities, or intangible, including tailor-made training, 
specialized technology, or the allocation of specialized staff (Anderson et al., 1992; Dyer, 
1996; Jap et al., 2003). Williamson (1985) stated that non-recoverable investments stabilize 
exchange relationships, because they function as mutual hostages that reduce the likelihood of 
exchange hazards (Dwyer et al., 1987). However, they also can destabilize the relationship if 
only one party makes such expenditures (Klein et al., 1978). Therefore, we distinguish 
between (1) total non-recoverable investments and (2) non-recoverable investment imbalance.  
 
Total non-recoverable investments refer to both parties’ formalized commitment to make 
specialized, tailored, and difficult to redeploy expenditures, regardless of whether parties’ 
non-recoverable investments are balanced or imbalanced (Buvik et al., 2001; Jap et al., 2003; 
Williamson, 1985). When parties commit themselves to make such specialized investments, 
they offer a credible pledge (Anderson et al., 1992; Gulati et al., 1994) and a signal that each 
is willing to shoulder its portion of the risks (Ouchi, 1980). The joint commitment to non-
recoverable investments stimulates cooperation (Dyer, 1996); as Zaheer and Venkatraman 
(1995) found, reciprocal investments relate positively to developing joint activities in the 
domain of new product launches. Hence, once formalized in an alliance contract, non-
recoverable investments serve as mutual hostages that curb the likelihood of exchange 
hazards (Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Anderson et al., 1992). More specifically, during the 
alliance formation stage, parties can create a mutual hostage situation by committing 
themselves to non-recoverable investments (Williamson, 1985), which create exit barriers and 
increase switching costs and thereby curb opportunistic behavior (Jap et al., 2003). Engaging 
in defective behavior and risking the dissolution of the alliance conflicts with the long-term 
interests of each party—namely, losing their investments (Parkhe, 1993a). In addition, if two 
parties commit themselves to make such investments ex-ante, they both signal they are keen 
to develop a long-term relationship (Jap et al., 2003), which reduces concerns about 
appropriation and spill-over. Non-recoverable investments further shift parties’ focus to 
cooperation and create incentives to maintain and continue the relationship until they recoup 
the value of the investments (Jap, 1999), which gives the parties greater incentives to resolve 
goal conflicts quickly. Thus, total non-recoverable investments constitute a structural 
safeguard that contributes positively to an alliance’s structural coherence. 
 
In contrast, non-recoverable investment imbalance negatively affects structural coherence, 
and its presence increases the likelihood of exchange hazards. We define non-recoverable 
investment imbalance as the asymmetry between parties’ commitment to making specialized, 
tailored, and difficult to redeploy expenditures (Klein et al., 1978). If only one party agrees to 
make non-recoverable investments, it provides the other party with a potential opportunity to 
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reap the benefits of these investments unfairly (i.e., hold-up problem). As the level of one-
sided non-recoverable investments increases, quasi-rents (i.e., the difference between earnings 
and opportunity costs) ensue and may be subject to hold-up (see Box 3.1). Non-recoverable 
investment imbalance also increases the likelihood of shirking and free-riding, because the 
committed party is tied to the alliance, so the counterpart has no reason not to shirk or free-
ride, knowing its partner cannot retaliate without damaging its own interests. A lack of 
incentives to cooperate in turn increases appropriation and spill-over concerns, as well as the 
propensity for goal conflict. Thus, non-recoverable imbalance negatively contributes to an 
alliance’s structural coherence. 
 
Figure 3.3 Structural Safeguards and Structural Coherence 
 
Notes: The focus here is exclusively on contractual alliances; hence, governance form is not considered a formative factor of 
structural coherence. We do not formulate hypotheses for the relationships among structural safeguards and structural 
coherence, as we test Hypothesis 1 with a second-order factor model (see §6.4). 
 
Conclusion 
In this section, we have argued that firms can use different types of structural safeguards to 
protect themselves against the likelihood of ex-post exchange hazards. More specifically, we 
introduced four types of structural safeguards that together form the structural coherence of an 
alliance (see Figure 3.3). First, through careful partner selection, parties can design alliances 
with interfirm characteristics that contribute to an alliance’s structural coherence. Alliances 
with high partner fit and complementary resources enjoy better protection against exchange 
hazards compared with alliances with low partner fit and misaligned resources. Second, 
parties must determine the alliance’s compensation structure, in which effort they should seek 
a balance between each partner’s individual objectives. Whereas a formalized compensation 
structure characterized by compensation integrativeness contributes positively to structural 
Compensation Structure 
 
Structural 
Coherence
Interfirm Characteristics 
Coordination Mechanisms Safeguarding Mechanisms 
Compensation Integrativeness (+) 
Compensation Imbalance (–) 
Shared Decision-Making (+) 
Decision-Making Imbalance (–) 
Total Non-Recoverable 
Investments (+) 
Non-Recoverable 
Investment Imbalance (–) 
Resource Complementarity (+) 
Partner Fit (+) 
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coherence, compensation imbalance has a negative impact. Third, parties need to make 
choices about decision-making rights and agree which partner has formal authority to make 
decisions about which alliance activities. Sharing decision-making rights contributes to 
structural coherence, whereas decision-making imbalance undermines it. Fourth, parties must 
specify the nature and extent of non-recoverable investments. If both parties commit 
themselves, these investments function as a mutual hostage, which increases the level of 
structural coherence. In contrast, non-recoverable investment imbalance creates hold-up 
problems, which contribute negatively to the level of structural coherence.  
 
3.2 Process Perspective: Assumptions, Exchange Hazards, and Safeguards 
Drawing on the process perspective,14 we contend that alliance processes are critical drivers 
of alliance performance (De Rond et al., 2004; Salk, 2005). We view alliances as purposeful 
entities that can learn and adapt to changing circumstances to improve alliance performance 
(Zajac et al., 1993). Adaptability is critical to superior alliance performance (Doz, 1996), 
because this ex-post flexibility can overcome the limitations and inertial forces associated 
with an alliance structure. For instance, if unforeseen events that parties cannot address by 
falling back on contractual provisions (e.g., contingency clauses) emerge, alliance processes, 
such as relational and learning processes, foster the search for effective and efficient solutions 
without costly or time-consuming contractual renegotiations. In this sense, effective alliances 
are those in which parties constantly adapt their relationship, driving them to higher levels of 
efficiency, rather than those in which parties fulfill only their contractual obligations (Doz, 
1996). To better understand the process perspective, we first discuss its assumptions, 
elaborate on ex-post exchange hazards, and then introduce process safeguards that parties can 
build to overcome exchange hazards. Table 3.2 presents an overview of the process 
perspective’s key characteristics.  
 
Table 3.2 Process Perspective’s Characteristics  
 Issue Description References 
Focus Alliance process 
 
The nature, sequence, and order of 
activities and events to which an 
alliance is subject once formed 
De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004; 
Salk, 2005 
 
Assumptions Bounded rationality 
Self-interest 
Choice 
 
Managers have limited capacity to 
process information, managers act 
out of self-interest, and their 
discretion to make ex-post 
adaptations enables them to make 
modifications 
Nooteboom, 2004; De Rond & 
Bouchikhi, 2004 
 
Exchange 
Hazard 
Inertia 
 
The vulnerabilities partner firms face 
in dealing with each other. Parties 
are vulnerable to inertial forces 
Doz, 1996; Ariño, De la Torre, & 
Ring, 2001; Ariño and De la 
Torre, 1998 ; Yan, 1998 
 
Process 
Safeguards 
Relational processes 
Knowledge transfer processes 
Knowledge acquisition processes 
Relational adaptability: The 
parties’ willingness and ability to 
make modifications to the ongoing 
relationship without changing the 
initial alliance structure 
Aulakh & Madhok, 2002; Doz, 
1996; Hallen, Johanson, & 
Seyedmohamed, 1991; Heide & 
John, 1992 
 
                                                 
14 We adopt the process perspective to underpin our hypothesis, however with respect to hypothesis testing we 
use outcomes variables (i.e., manifestations) of post-formation processes. 
   59 
The Process Perspective: Assumptions and Implications 
Advocates of the process perspective have argued that alliance processes are critical to 
achieve superior alliance performance, because these ex-post processes enable parties to 
overcome inertial forces. This basic premise of the process perspective builds on three 
assumptions: (1) managers are subject to bounded rationality, (2) managers act out of self-
interest, and (3) managers have choice.  
 
Due to bounded rationality, it is difficult for managers to acquire and interpret information 
about one another or about changing external conditions (Simon, 1947). Despite their best 
efforts to deal with complexity and unpredictability, managers are limited in their ability to 
plan for the future or accurately predict various contingencies that may arise (Nooteboom, 
2004). As a consequence, alliances cannot be specified fully in advance, so an ongoing 
relationship may need to adapt to unforeseen future contingencies. However, due to 
managers’ limited capacity to process information, parties must go through an iterative 
sequence of goal formulation, implementation, modification, and evaluation (Zajac et al., 
1993). Superior alliance performance depends not only on fulfilling contractual obligations 
but also, and even more importantly, on the extent to which parties are willing and able to 
adapt their relationship. Advocates of the process perspective also assume that managers 
behave out of self-interest, pursue individual objectives, and initiate actions that secure their 
individual interests as the alliance unfolds. An important implication of this assumption is that 
during the post-formation stage, parties likely respond to unforeseen changes by protecting 
their individual interests. Moreover, parties’ willingness and ability to implement changes 
depends on their partners’ willingness and ability to make adaptations. Hence, from a process 
perspective, alliance processes are critical to enable parties to find appropriate solutions. In 
contrast to the structure perspective’s strong deterministic nature, advocates of the process 
perspective assumed that managers have discretion in their responses to various external 
pressures (De Rond et al., 2004). Although internal and external dynamics present managers 
with unforeseen circumstances, managers can modify an ongoing relationship to fit with new 
demands (Doz, 1996; De Rond et al., 2004). Moreover, managers have a choice and can make 
changes to an alliance to hold premature termination at bay (Ariño et al., 1998; Dussauge et 
al., 2000; Reuer & Ariño, 2002). From a process perspective, the choice assumption implies 
that effective and efficient alliances are dynamic organizational entities that evolve over time.  
 
Therefore, from a process perspective, the three assumptions of bounded rationality, self-
interest, and choice have a major implication. In addition to the exchange hazards associated 
with the structure perspective, opportunistic behavior, appropriation and spill-over concerns, 
and goal conflicts, inertial forces constitute a fourth ex-post exchange hazard. To overcome 
inertia, safeguards other than the structural safeguards are required. That is, parties need to 
develop process safeguards that enable them to make adaptations to ongoing relationships 
whenever necessary (Das et al., 2002). More specifically, proponents of the process 
perspective have emphasized the importance of relational and learning processes to mitigate 
concerns about inertial forces (Gulati, Lawrence, & Puranam, 2005). 
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The Process Perspective: Exchange Hazard and Process Safeguards 
Advocates of the process perspective further argued that inertia constitutes a threat to alliance 
development and alliance performance (Ariño et al., 1998; Doz, 1996). Inertia refers to a 
situation in which a party expresses some resistance or disinclination to adapt to internal or 
external dynamics (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). In the context of alliances, inertial forces 
impede the adjustments necessary to match new situations (Doz, 1996; Gulati et al., 2005). 
Unforeseen events may induce the need for change, but inertial forces inhibit the partner 
firms’ capacity to make those changes (see Box 3.3). For instance, parties might be locked 
into a repeated mode of interaction, with little learning, which prompts greater frustration for 
both partners with regard to their interactions and lack of progress (Doz, 1996). To maximize 
alliance performance, parties should initiate post-formation processes (i.e., process 
safeguards) that reduce the likelihood of inertial forces (Brouthers et al., 2006).  
 
Box 3.3 Adaptation versus Inertial Forces 
 Adaptation Inertial Forces 
External Environment 
The alliance’s broader environment might drive the need for 
change. For instance, an alliance’s industry and political 
environment may change. Governments may shift foreign 
direct investment policies, or competitors may introduce new 
technologies that force parties to make changes.  
The alliance’s broader environment might contribute to inertial 
forces. Governments may raise legal and other barriers to 
exit or entry markets. Also, a firm’s legitimacy in an 
environment may create inertia.  
Firm Factors 
Firm factors might drive the need for change. For instance, 
internal reorganizations, a shift in corporate strategy, a shift in 
resource needs, and change in the board of directors may fuel 
modifications.  
Firm factors might contribute to inertia. For instance, existing 
alliances with other firms, lack of necessary resources, 
internal political games, and administrative policies and 
procedures may create inertia.  
Alliance Attributes 
Causes endogenous to the alliance might drive the need for 
change. For instance, alliance performance might be below 
initial expectations, partners may update their expectations, the 
governance form may appear inefficient, and differential 
learning may fuel the need for adaptation. 
Causes endogenous to the alliance might create inertial 
forces. For instance, sunk costs due to non-recoverable 
investments in technology, machinery, and personnel; the 
dynamics of political coalitions (e.g., alliance management); 
and lack of partner interactions contribute to inertia.  
Sources:  Blodgett, (1992); Inkpen & Beamish (1997); Khanna 
(1998); Reuer & Ariño (2002); Shortell & Zajac 
(1988); Wathne & Heide (2000) 
Sources:  Das & Teng (2000a); Hannan & Freeman (1984); 
Li & Rowley (2002); Yan (1998) 
 
During the alliance post-formation stage, parties may implement “process safeguards” to 
secure their individual interests. These process safeguards develop an alliance context in 
which parties become aware of a need to change and are capable of implementing the 
necessary adaptations. Process safeguards help overcome the inertial forces that are typical to 
an alliance. Similar to structural safeguards, process safeguards aim to direct the behavior of 
parties toward actions that promote individual interests while also securing mutual 
cooperation. Confronted with the high probability that the alliance will evolve differently 
from initial expectations (Reuer Zollo, & Singh, 2002), parties need to build process 
safeguards that enable them to efficiently and effectively implement the needed adaptations. 
In this study, we introduce relational adaptability as a factor that represents the extent to 
which parties develop process safeguards. 
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We define relational adaptability as the parties’ willingness and ability to make 
modifications to the ongoing relationship, without changing the initial alliance structure 
(Aulakh et al., 2002; Doz, 1996; Hallen et al., 1991; Heide & John, 1992). It pertains to the 
willingness and ability of those parties to be flexible in conducting the relationship, above and 
beyond the constraints posed by alliance design, should that prove necessary (Heide, 1994). 
Relational adaptability causes parties to treat the relationship as an adjustable framework, in 
which they have bilateral expectations that changes will occur to redress imbalances in the 
relationship if either party is adversely affected by changing circumstances (Subramani et al., 
2003). Moreover, parties are willing to make these adaptations without resorting to expensive 
and time-consuming contractual renegotiations (Heide, 1994; Young, Sapienza, & Baumer, 
2003). Drawing on the process perspective (see Figure 3.4), we argue that parties may 
develop process safeguards that improve their relational adaptability. In turn, relational 
adaptability helps them overcome inertial forces and other exchange hazards, contributing to 
alliance stability. Alliance stability fosters superior alliance performance; thus, relational 
adaptability contributes to parties’ joint value creation. Next, we discuss three types of 
process safeguards parties may develop: (1) relational processes, (2) knowledge transfer 
processes, and (3) knowledge acquisition processes.  
 
Figure 3.4 Process Perspective: Main Logic 
 
Relational Processes 
Relational processes refer to the quality of the relationship between the partner firms. From a 
sociological perspective, the relationship building process usually consists of several stages of 
negotiation, commitment, and execution that get repeated sequentially (Ring et al., 1994). 
Parties going through these interactive stages develop relational norms, which guide partner 
firm behavior. Gouldner (1960) argued that relational norms are the basis for stable 
relationships. Relational norms call for parties to help those whose actions have benefited 
them and respond in kind to those who have damaged their interests. Building on this insight, 
we distinguish between two “manifestations” of relational processes: (1) relational quality and 
(2) opportunistic behavior.  
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Relational quality15 is the extent to which parties feel comfortable, are willing to rely on trust 
in dealing with another, and are committed to the relationship (Ariño et al., 2001; Kumar, 
Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995a). It results from partner interactions directed toward mutual 
cooperation (Ariño et al., 2001; Cullen et al., 2000) and is manifested, for instance, by the 
creation of trust, bilateral commitment, and mutual respect, as well as the absence of conflicts 
between the partners. Trust reflects the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party, based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2006), 
irrespective of its ability to monitor or control the other party. Commitment is an expectation 
that behavior will be directed toward relationship maintenance, placing a high value on the 
joint relationship (Gundlach et al., 1995) A high level of relational quality ensures that issues 
that arise in the course of the relationship will be treated as joint concerns.  
  
Parties engaged in an alliance with relational quality are willing to overcome inertial forces. It 
enables partner firms to implement necessary adjustments to the alliance (Doz, 1996) , 
rebalancing the alliance system, such that parties can be confident that any changes are in 
their interests (Ariño et al., 1998). Relational processes promote norms of flexibility, 
solidarity, and information exchange (Macneil, 1980). Flexibility facilitates adaptation to 
unforeseen contingencies, whereas solidarity promotes joint problem solving, and information 
sharing facilitates problem solutions and adaptation (Poppo et al., 2002). A good relationship 
suggests that information exchange is transparent and that partners actively provide useful 
information to each other (Heide & John, 1992). It also eases decision-making and allows 
parties to make modifications to all aspects of the exchange, consistent with their mutual 
interests (Dwyer et al., 1987). Thus, relational quality constitutes a process safeguard that 
relates positively to relational adaptability.  
 
In addition, relational quality decreases the likelihood of opportunistic behavior, appropriation 
and spill-over concerns, and goal conflicts. Trust and commitment stimulate parties’ efforts 
toward achieving mutual interests (Cullen et al., 2000) and therefore reduce the likelihood of 
opportunistic behavior. A good relationship also eliminates costly contracts and coordination 
mechanisms, because its presence reduces the need to monitor parties’ behavior (Dyer, 1997; 
Luo, 2002a; Macneil, 1980). Relational quality directs the focus of parties to mutual 
beneficial strategies and reduces appropriation and spill-over concerns, as a good relationship 
provides parties with confidence that they will receive their fair share of rewards (Ariño et al., 
1998) and protects them against the unwanted transfer of proprietary knowledge (Kale et al., 
2000). Having a good relationship, parties are more likely to discuss and resolve potential 
tensions between them, so relational quality attenuates concerns about goal conflicts (Ariño et 
al., 1998). Finally, relational quality shifts parties’ focus from self-centered behaviors toward 
behaviors that foster unity through common responsibilities. It operates as a self-enforcing 
safeguard, which reduces the likelihood of exchange hazards. 
                                                 
15 We discuss in Section 5.3 the antecedents of relational quality and opportunistic behavior.  
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In contrast, partner firm interactions may be characterized by opportunistic behavior,16 or a 
party’s active attempts to increase its benefits from the relationship, at the expense of its 
counterpart. Opportunistic behavior pertains to an extraction of benefits that is explicitly or 
implicitly prohibited within the relationship (Ping, 1993). For instance, lying, stealing, 
cheating, and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse 
the partner illustrate opportunistic behavior. Parties that focus primarily on their individual 
interests are less likely to be flexible and accommodate modifications to the relationship 
(Wathne et al., 2000), because changes to the ongoing relationship could adversely affect their 
individual interests. Therefore, when parties build a behavioral interaction pattern 
characterized by opportunistic behavior, their relational adaptability is negatively affected.  
 
Knowledge Transfer Processes 
Knowledge transfer processes pertain to the routines that enable the exchange of knowledge 
and information (Inkpen et al., 1995). Knowledge transfer processes are critical, because once 
the alliance forms, partners must learn about other competences and interests. Parties must 
become aware of discrepancies in each other’s knowledge foundations (Inkpen et al., 1995) 
and institutionalize practices and procedures to facilitate their knowledge and information 
exchange (Simonin, 1999). When partners develop such routines, they increase transparency 
(Hamel, 1991), which eases knowledge and information exchange (Heiman & Nickerson, 
2004). Furthermore, transfer processes improve managers’ assessments of their partner firm’s 
capabilities, because they diminish uncertainty and ambiguity (Simonin, 1999). We argue that 
knowledge transfer processes are accelerated by building learning capabilities.  
 
We define learning capabilities as the extent to which the partner firms create a regular and 
repeatable pattern of routines that support knowledge and information transfer (Chai, 2003; 
Dyer et al., 2000; Dyer et al., 1998; Hamel, 1991). As the relationship unfolds and parties 
develop and deploy learning capabilities, knowledge and information may be exchanged more 
easily (Simonin, 1999). As partners discover each other in collaboration, they recognize how 
differences in their structure, processes, and routines may need to be overcome or even 
constructively combined to make cooperation more efficient (Doz, 1996). Learning 
capabilities enable parties to exchange information, resulting in joint sense-making processes 
(Tsoukas, 1996). For instance, parties may scan the alliance’s environment and discuss which 
responsive actions would be appropriate to address changing circumstances. Learning 
capabilities further enable parties to adapt organizational routines to work more efficiently 
(Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002), improve the parties’ task definition (Doz, 1996), and educate 
partners about the quality of the initial alliance design and how to make it more effective 
(Doz, 1996). Thus, learning capabilities involve the process of learning rather than the content 
of learning (Inkpen et al., 1995), and their presence allows partners to revisit and revise their 
expectations and gain a deeper understanding of their counterparts (Ariño et al., 1998).  
                                                 
16 Whereas proponents of the structure perspective assumed that managers may act opportunistically if 
confronted with an opportunity (see §3.1), advocates of the process perspective view argued that opportunistic 
behavior could be considered an outcome of relational processes. We elaborate on this distinction in Section 3.3. 
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In removing information processing barriers between parties, learning capabilities increase the 
level of relational adaptability for two reasons. First, learning capabilities foster relationship 
openness, which captures the extent to which parties are willing and able to share information 
and communicate openly (Inkpen, 2000). Extensive communication between partners 
contributes to a meaningful and timely sharing of information (Anderson et al., 1990); for 
example, transferring staff, setting up joint teams, and developing best-practice guidelines 
represent knowledge transfer mechanisms that contribute to the quality, variety, and amount 
of information shared between partners (Chai, 2003). Relational openness helps parties learn 
about how to work with each other and increases awareness about individual interests. This 
increased awareness positively affects transparency between the partners, which contributes to 
a learning climate that eases the implementation of adaptations to the ongoing relationship.  
 
Second, learning capabilities reduce the difficulties that surround the transfer of tacit 
knowledge (Simonin, 1999). Because tacit knowledge is context specific, it is difficult to 
formalize and communicate (Nonaka, 1994; Polanyi, 1962), and because it is “sticky,” the 
incremental cost of transferring knowledge to a specific location in a form usable by a given 
party is high. Learning capabilities help parties acquire the other party’s subjective viewpoint 
and develop a common language. Thus, learning capabilities contribute to awareness, which 
increases parties’ willingness and ability to make modifications. Therefore, relational quality 
constitutes a process safeguard that relates positively to relational adaptability.  
 
In addition to reducing the risk of inertial forces, learning capabilities decrease the likelihood 
of opportunistic behavior, appropriation and spill-over concerns, and goal conflicts. As 
uncertainty about the knowledge to be created grows, so does the risk of opportunism 
(Lubatkin et al., 2001). Learning capabilities constitute an informal feedback mechanism that 
provides partners with signals about each other’s conduct. They ease the transport and 
interpretation of knowledge and information exchange, which motivates parties to participate 
and openly share valuable knowledge. Mutual knowledge and information sharing increases 
the risk of detection of opportunistic behavior and thereby prevents undesirable spillovers to 
partners, prevents free-riding behavior, and reduces the costs associated with formal conflict 
resolution (Dyer et al., 2000; Hamel, 1991). In summary, knowledge transfer processes, as 
manifested by learning capabilities, constitute an important process safeguard that relates 
positively to parties’ relational adaptability.  
 
Knowledge Acquisition Processes 
Knowledge acquisition processes enable partner firms to assess and absorb knowledge 
through the alliance (Berdrow et al., 2003; Holmqvist, 2003; Martin & Salomon, 2003). 
Whereas knowledge transfer processes facilitate mutual learning and remove information 
exchange barriers (i.e., process of learning), knowledge acquisition processes pertain to each 
party’s capability to evaluate and acquire knowledge to which it has been exposed through the 
alliance (i.e., content of learning). A firm’s ability to assess and acquire knowledge is 
contingent on its absorptive capacity (Cohen et al., 1990; Zahra et al., 2002), its partner firm’s 
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absorptive capacity (Dyer et al., 1998; Lane et al., 1998), decisions with respect to alliance 
structure (Gulati et al., 1998; Zeng et al., 2002), and the nature of the knowledge exchanged 
(Chen, 2004; Simonin, 1999). Together, these factors influence the nature and extent of 
knowledge flows between partners (Martin et al., 2003), which are important to exchange, 
integrate, and create knowledge (Lubatkin et al., 2001). Consistent with prior research, we 
make a distinction between partners that possess similar abilities in terms of assessing and 
acquiring knowledge and those in which partners possess dissimilar abilities (Hamel, 1991; 
Larsson et al., 1998). To address this distinction, we propose two constructs: (1) absorption 
integrativeness and (2) absorption imbalance.  
 
Absorption integrativeness17 is defined as the combination of both party’s ability to assess 
and acquire knowledge to which they are exposed through their relationship, regardless of 
whether parties’ capabilities are balanced or imbalanced (Dyer et al., 1998; Lane et al., 1998). 
Absorption integrativeness enables parties to assess the value of new knowledge and integrate 
that new knowledge into their existing knowledge base (Larsson et al., 1998; Lubatkin et al., 
2001), because the parties likely have established a knowledge interface between them 
(Inkpen et al., 2006). A high-quality knowledge connection creates the potential for parties to 
evaluate each other’s competencies, strengths, and weaknesses (Zahra et al., 2002). Moreover, 
parties can work toward their individual performance objectives at a similar pace, because 
they are equally capable of participating in knowledge flows. Therefore, parties are more 
likely to be flexible and cooperative if modifications to the ongoing relationship are needed.  
 
A high level of absorption integrativeness also reduces the likelihood of inertia, because it 
enables parties to assess and acquire knowledge in an effective and efficient manner. More 
specifically, absorption integrativeness fosters reciprocal learning between partners, which 
entails knowledge creation, blended knowledge, colearning, and joint discovery and requires 
that both partners willingly disclose valuable aspects of their knowledge (Lubatkin et al., 
2001). This transparency between partners eases learning about the other (Inkpen et al., 1995), 
new knowledge (Inkpen et al., 1998), and how to assimilate new knowledge (Inkpen, 2000). 
In other words, a high level of absorption integrativeness stimulates a deeper and broader 
understanding of the partner’s interests, which increases parties’ propensity to make necessary 
changes (Doz, 1996).  
 
The likelihood of other exchange hazards is reduced as well. Opportunism decreases, because 
parties with similar learning paces are fully aware of the other’s competences and interests 
(Hamel, 1991), can more easily detect deceitful behavior, and can be confident that the other 
party is committed to the alliance until both parties finish learning (Khanna et al., 1998). 
Appropriation and spill-over concerns decline because each party is equally able to assess and 
acquire knowledge. Furthermore, unwanted transfer of know-how can be detected easily, and 
partner firms can immediately retaliate by assimilating protected know-how themselves. 
                                                 
17 We discuss in Section 5.2 the antecedents of absorption integrativeness and absorption imbalance.  
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Attenuated goal conflicts also result because high levels of absorption integrativeness make 
partners quickly aware of diverging interests. In summary, absorption integrativeness 
constitutes an important process safeguard against various types of exchange hazards.  
 
In contrast, absorption imbalance refers to the asymmetry between each party’s ability to 
assess and acquire knowledge to which it is exposed through the alliance (Dyer et al., 1998; 
Kumar & Nti, 1998; Larsson et al., 1998). Absorption imbalance reverberates with Hamel’s 
(1991) notion of learning races. In learning races, an individually rational party pursues a 
maximum share of knowledge while protecting its own core competences (Kale et al., 2000). 
Differences in parties’ absorptive capacity (Dyer et al., 1998), alliance structure (Zeng et al., 
2002), or nature of knowledge to be exchanged (Simonin, 1999) create differential potentials 
to assess and acquire knowledge relative to the partner firm. Differential learning suggests 
that one party may appropriate knowledge at a faster pace than its counterpart (Inkpen et al., 
2006), which creates information asymmetry. The faster learning partner obtains know-how 
pertaining to its partner firm’s interests, competences, and progress, whereas the slower 
learning partner lacks similar information. As a consequence, the dominant party can exploit 
its learning advantage at the expense of its counterpart and thereby achieve its performance 
objectives at a quicker pace.  
 
A high level of absorption imbalance, as perceived by the partners, increases the risk of 
inertial forces, because differential learning reduces parties’ willingness and ability to make 
necessary modifications to the relationship. Hamel (1991) found in an empirical study that 
differential learning between partners impeded alliance development and reduced parties’ 
willingness and ability to cooperate. A party with a potential to learn faster than its 
counterpart has no reason to make adaptations to an ongoing relationship, and a slower 
learning party likely cannot make those necessary adaptations. Moreover, a faster learning 
party has no incentives to foster a transparent knowledge interface (Hamel, 1991), nor does it 
benefit from frequent partner interactions, particularly when the knowledge to be acquired is 
clearly specified (Lubatkin et al., 2001). In contrast, a slower learner cannot make changes to 
the alliance without support from its faster learning counterpart. The faster learning partner 
eventually may become insensitive to the interests of a slower learning firm, perhaps even 
blaming it for its inability to capitalize on alliance-generated knowledge. Hence, an alliance 
characterized by an absorption imbalance likely is subject to inertial forces, because that 
imbalance negatively affects relational adaptability.  
 
The likelihood of other types of exchange hazards also increases with absorption imbalance. 
Differential learning creates information processing barriers, which may increase the 
likelihood of opportunistic behavior, appropriation and spill-over concerns, and goal conflict. 
If one partner chooses to share its knowledge openly, the other partner might act 
opportunistically, which then activates retaliatory behaviors by the exploited partner (Inkpen 
et al., 1997). After the faster learning party finishes learning, its incentives to maintain the 
alliance disappear. Moreover, it may engage in opportunistic behavior to extract additional 
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rewards from the alliance. Appropriation and spill-over concerns increase, because the faster 
learning party can exploit its assimilated knowledge to improve its competences, thereby 
weakening the competences of its counterpart (Khanna, 1998), which in turn contributes to 
goal conflicts. Inkpen and Pien (2006) conducted a case study of a Chinese–Singaporean 
alliance and found that competitive learning between the partners negatively related to mutual 
collaboration. In summary, the presence of an absorption imbalance destabilizes the 
relationship and negatively contributes to parties’ relational adaptability.  
 
Conclusion 
As the alliance unfolds, parties can develop three types of process safeguards that contribute 
to the level of relational adaptability (see Figure 3.5). First, relational processes contribute to 
parties’ willingness to make necessary adaptations to the ongoing relationship. For instance, a 
high-quality relationship gives parties the confidence that they will accommodate each other’s 
interests if problems arise. In contrast, a relationship characterized by opportunistic behavior 
attenuates parties’ incentives to be flexible. Second, knowledge transfer processes affect 
parties’ willingness and ability to overcome inertia. For instance, developing learning 
capabilities eases knowledge and information exchange, which provides parties with the 
necessary know-how about their partner’s objectives (i.e., mutual sense-making). Third, 
knowledge acquisition processes can foster or impede parties’ ability to make adaptations to 
the ongoing relationship. Absorption integrativeness enables parties to gain a better 
understanding about what needs to be adapted, whereas an absorption imbalance impedes 
their willingness and ability to make necessary modifications. 
 
Figure 3.5 Process Safeguards and Relational Adaptability 
 
Note: We do not formulate hypotheses for the relationships among process safeguards and relational adaptability, as we test 
Hypothesis 1 with a second-order factor model (see §6.4). 
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3.3 Structure and Process Perspectives: Closing the Loop 
If alliance researchers investigate either the structural or the process perspective as a one-
dimensional dichotomy or in isolation, the resultant emphasis on either alliance structure or 
alliance process tends to ignore that both structure and process dimensions exist 
simultaneously in dyadic relationships (Contractor, 2005; Hennart et al., 2005). Advocates of 
the structure perspective have neglected the need to incorporate post-formation processes into 
their explanations of alliance performance, and proponents of the process perspective should 
have incorporated insights from the structure perspective into their explanations. To 
understand alliance performance, we contend that we must reconcile the two perspectives and 
thereby increase the explanatory power of alliance performance, because combining structural 
and process dimensions describes the complexity of alliances better than either the structure 
or process dimension alone. However, melding these perspectives also requires a better 
understanding of their differences and similarities (see Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3 Structure and Process Perspectives: A Comparision 
 Structure Perspective Process Perspective 
Focus Alliance structure  Alliance process 
Alliance Developmental Stage Formation stage Post-formation stage 
Rationale Efficiency  Adaptability  
Contingencies Static: anticipated  Dynamic: unforeseen  
Assumptions Bounded rationality 
Opportunism 
Determinism 
Bounded rationality 
Self-interest 
Choice 
Exchange Hazards Opportunistic behavior  
Appropriation and spill-over concerns 
Goal conflicts 
Inertia 
 
 
Safeguards Structural coherence 
- Governance form 
- Contractual provisions 
- Interfirm characteristics 
Relational adaptability 
- Relational processes 
- Knowledge transfer processes 
- Knowledge acquisition processes 
 
Proponents of the structure perspective focused on decisions about alliance structure and 
argued that an efficient governance form, accompanied by supportive contractual provisions, 
and interfirm characteristics are sufficient to achieve superior alliance performance. An 
alliance characterized by a high level of structural coherence thus is less prone to exchange 
hazards. If unforeseen events arise, parties can fall back on their contractual agreement to deal 
with the new circumstances. In contrast, advocates of the process perspective focused on post-
formation processes and argued that relational and learning processes are sufficient to achieve 
superior alliance performance. Post-formation processes enable parties to decide on 
adaptations that overcome inertial forces, such as those due to the limitations of an alliance 
structure. Whereas the structure perspective involves efficiency, the process perspective 
focuses on adaptability as a rationale for parties’ behavior.  
 
Advocates of both perspectives depended on the bounded rationality assumption. For 
example, managers are limited in their capacity to process information. According to 
proponents of the structure processes, this bounded rationality leads to costly and time-
consuming contractual (re)negotiations, whereas proponents of the process perspective argued 
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that bounded rationality leads to repetitive learning cycles between the partners. These 
diverging implications are not at conflict, and their implications are complementary, because 
ex-post learning cycles overcome the limitations of initial alliance design. To develop our 
hypothesis, we also adopt the assumption that managers act out of self-interest, but not 
necessarily with guile, if confronted with an opportunity. We consider opportunistic behavior 
one of many possible outcomes pertaining to the partner firm’s behavioral pattern (Ghoshal et 
al., 1996); trust and commitment also could emerge as the relationship unfolds. Opportunistic 
behavior is considered a likelihood that should be curbed by implementing safeguard 
mechanisms, whether structural or process (John, 1984; Wathne et al., 2000). Thus, while 
rejecting the strongest form of the self-interest (see Figure 3.6), we accept that firms must 
create alliance structures and develop alliance processes that secure interests and provide 
sufficient incentives to cooperate. In summary, we adopt from the structure perspective the 
idea that parties are expected to obey rules and from the process perspective the idea that 
parties keep promises.  
 
Figure 3.6 Self-interest Continuum 
 
  
 
 
With respect to the assumption of managers’ choice, proponents of the structure and process 
perspectives have held diverging views. Advocates of the structure perspective assumed that 
external pressures determine managers’ behavior, whereas proponents of the process 
perspective assumed managers have a certain degree of choice. The process perspective’s 
assumption of choice corresponds to the view adopted in this study. That is, we assume that 
managers have a direct influence on the future and its events, without being constrained by 
path dependencies created in the past. More specifically, parties can create different 
configurations in their alliance structures, and each configuration can be equally efficient. 
However, we also believe that parties have a choice with respect to developing post-formation 
processes, which they may use to overcome the limitations and constraints of previous 
alliance design decisions.  
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Together, the assumptions—managers are subject to bounded rationality, managers act out of 
self-interest, and managers can make choices—enable us to derive three implications with 
respect to reconciling the structure and process perspectives. First, parties seek to achieve 
individual objectives, before and after engaging in an alliance. However, various exchange 
hazards, such as opportunistic behavior, appropriation and spill-over, goal conflicts, and 
inertial forces, may prevent them from achieving their performance objectives. Second, 
parties have at their discretion both structural and process safeguarding mechanisms to reduce 
the likelihood of these exchange hazards. Ex-ante structural safeguards, such as governance 
form, contractual provisions, and interfirm characteristics resulting from partner selection, 
combined with ex-post process safeguards, such as relational processes, knowledge transfer 
processes, and knowledge acquisition processes, may foster or hamper the risk of exchange 
hazards. Third, to achieve superior alliance performance, parties must implement 
safeguarding mechanisms, but because decisions about alliance structure and alliance process 
are interrelated, we contend that structure and process cannot be examined in isolation. 
Building on these insights, we develop Hypothesis 1 in the next section.  
 
3.4 Hypothesis 1: The Meditation Hypothesis 
In the preceding sections, we elaborated on the structure and process perspectives. We 
developed a theoretical foundation and identified constructs that constitute structural 
coherence and relational adaptability. In this section, we present a mediation hypothesis, 
which states that the relationship between structural coherence and alliance performance is 
partially mediated by relational adaptability. To substantiate this hypothesis, we first discuss 
the three direct relationships between (1) structural coherence and alliance performance, (2) 
structural coherence and relational adaptability, and (3) relational adaptability and alliance 
performance, before discussing the mediation model (see Figure 3.7). 
 
Direct Effect: Structural Coherence Æ Alliance Performance 
Structural coherence relates positively and directly to alliance performance, because as the 
level of structural coherence increases, the likelihood of exchange hazards declines. The 
anticipated absence of exchange hazards contributes to parties’ willingness to fulfill 
contractual obligations, and when fulfilled, superior alliance performance results. In Section 
3.1, we elaborated on the relationships between the four structural safeguards, structural 
coherence, and exchange hazards. Next, we briefly repeat the gist of our argument to better 
explain the relationship between structural coherence and alliance performance.  
 
Drawing on the structure perspective, we argue that during the formation stage, the most 
straightforward way to reduce the risk of exchange hazards and achieve superior alliance 
performance is to select partners a priori that are not opportunistically inclined or inherently 
competitive (Wathne et al., 2000). That is, we argue that two interfirm characteristics, partner 
fit and resource complementarity, positively contribute to an alliance’s structural coherence. 
Partner fit enables parties to cooperate efficiently and effectively (Saxton, 1997), whereas 
resource complementarity provides parties with incentives to sacrifice their short-term 
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individual goals to achieve long-term value creation (Madhok et al., 1998). In addition, during 
the alliance formation stage, parties can formalize their agreements in an alliance contract. 
The content of three contractual provisions is particularly relevant in terms of reducing the 
risk of exchange hazards. First, an alliance’s compensation structure constitutes an important 
structural safeguard against exchange hazards, because if efficiently designed, it provides 
parties with strong incentives to engage in and maintain a relationship. Second, the division of 
decision-making rights across the partners provides an important structural safeguard. Sharing 
decision-making rights gives parties a feedback mechanism that enables them to monitor each 
other’s conduct and thereby reduce the risk of exchange hazards. Third, the content of 
contractual provisions may refer to the amount and nature of non-recoverable investments. 
Non-recoverable investments function as mutual hostages and curb opportunistic and other 
types of self-interested behaviors. Thus, in addition to partner selection, when parties design 
mutually supportive contractual provisions, they have strong incentives to fulfill their 
contractual obligations, which then results in superior alliance performance.  
 
Figure 3.7 Hypothesis 1: The Mediation Model 
 
Empirical research provides support for the hypothesis that structural coherence positively 
relates to alliance performance (Child et al., 2003; Harrigan, 1988; Jap, 1999; Jap et al., 2003; 
Park et al., 1997; Parkhe, 1993c; Parkhe, 1993a; Pothukuchi, Damanpour, Choi, Chen, & 
Park, 2002; Sampson, 2004b). Harrigan (1988) found that strategic direction asymmetries 
between partner firms and relatedness with the joint venture related negatively to alliance 
performance. Child (2002) found that joint venture performance emerged from 
complementary resource contributions, in combination with other management factors. 
Parkhe (1993a) examined the impact of pay-off structures (i.e., compensation) and found that 
a pay-off structure characterized by mutual cooperation resulted in higher levels of alliance 
performance than did pay-off structures characterized by unilateral defection and unilateral 
cooperation. Child and Yan (2003) found that shared decision-making related positively to 
alliance performance, though only with high-quality resourcing. Within a marketing channel 
setting, Jap and Anderson (2003) found a positive and significant relationship between mutual 
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non-recoverable investments and four alliance performance dimensions: evaluation of 
counterpart performance, competitive advantage, joint profits, and continuity expectations. 
Thus, extant conceptual and empirical support confirms the direct relationship between 
structural coherence and alliance performance.  
 
Direct Effect: Relational Adaptability Æ Alliance Performance 
Relational adaptability is positively and directly related to alliance performance, because as 
the level of relational adaptability increases by parties initiating relational and learning 
processes, the risk of various types of exchange hazards, including inertia, declines. In Section 
3.2, we elaborated on the relationships between the three process safeguards, relational 
adaptability, and exchange hazards. Next, we briefly repeat the essence of our argument to 
clarify the relationship between relational adaptability and alliance performance. An alliance 
characterized by a high-quality relationship is more likely to achieve its performance 
objectives. Recall that an alliance with high levels of relational quality is characterized by 
trust, commitment, and the absence of conflicts (Ariño et al., 2001; Kauser et al., 2004), and 
partners have confidence in the other’s reliability and integrity (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). It 
facilitates the effective functioning of the alliance on a day-to-day basis, enables organizations 
to gather high-quality information about the other, reduces ex-post contracting costs caused 
by information asymmetries, and creates strong disincentives for opportunistic behavior 
(Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1996). Opportunistic behavior negatively influences alliance 
performance; such short-term, deceitful behavior undermines long-term value creation 
(Wathne et al., 2000). When parties develop cooperative rather than competitive relational 
processes, they have strong incentives to implement necessary adaptations to the ongoing 
relationship, which likely results in superior alliance performance. We also argue that learning 
processes, such as knowledge transfer and knowledge acquisition, foster relational 
adaptability, which reduces the risk of exchange hazards and thereby positively affects 
alliance performance. Irrespective of alliance objectives, in the type of contractual alliances 
we examine, partners must exchange, leverage, and create knowledge and information to 
achieve their goals (Beamish et al., 2003; Holmqvist, 2003). Knowledge transfer enables 
parties to communicate openly and exchange information, resulting in mutual awareness. In 
addition, knowledge acquisition facilitates or impedes parties’ ability to assess and acquire 
knowledge. On the one hand, learning in absorption integrativeness conditions enables parties 
to obtain knowledge and information at a similar pace, which provides strong incentives to 
cooperate. On the other hand, learning under absorption imbalance incites a learning race, 
which reinforces parties’ propensity to achieve their objectives through competition. 
 
Extant empirical research supported the positive relationship between relational adaptability 
and alliance performance (Cullen et al., 2000; Kale et al., 2000; Lui et al., 2004; Luo, 2005; 
Parkhe, 1993a; Zaheer et al., 1998). For instance, examining Turkish–Foreign joint ventures, 
Demirbag and Mirza (2000) found that alliance performance was positively influenced by 
trust, commitment, and cooperation but negatively influenced by conflicts. Pearce (2001) 
found that cooperation—that is, flexibility and joint problem solving—influenced alliance 
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performance positively. Yan and Gray (2001) produced support for their hypothesis that the 
quality of the relationship related positively to the achievement of strategic objectives. Other 
studies have reported a negative relationship between opportunistic behavior and alliance 
performance (Jap et al., 2003; Judge et al., 2006). For example, Inkpen and Pien (2006) found 
in a case study that the transfer of tacit knowledge influenced alliance performance positively, 
whereas differential learning inhibited the achievement of learning objectives. Beamish and 
Berdrow (2003) found that knowledge transfer and acquisition processes related positively to 
joint learning. In summary, conceptual and empirical research supports the direct relationship 
between relational adaptability and alliance performance.  
 
Direct Effect: Structural Coherence Æ Relational Adaptability 
In addition to the direct relationships between structural coherence and alliance performance 
and relational adaptability and alliance performance, we hypothesize that structural coherence 
relates positively and directly to relational adaptability. As the level of structural coherence 
increases, parties establish formation conditions providing them with incentives and 
possibilities to exchange information, enabling them to build relational and learning 
processes. Such cooperative post-formation processes positively affect parties’ willingness 
and ability to make adaptations to an ongoing relationship. 
 
With respect to interfirm characteristics, the selection of partners directly affects the 
development of relational adaptability. For instance, partner fit reduces conflict and 
contributes to the development of trust and commitment by enabling information exchange 
(Saxton, 1997). The presence of partner fit also suggests that partners can implement 
knowledge transfer and acquisition processes through their compatible organizational and 
cultural aspects (Lane et al., 1998). With resource complementarity, partners can achieve 
objectives that otherwise would have been difficult to obtain. According to Sarkar, 
Echambadi, Cavusgil, and Aulakh (2001), parties need to engage in learning processes to 
exploit these synergies, which means that complementary resource strengths must be explored 
and understood before they can lead to higher levels of alliance performance (Lambe et al., 
2002). Moreover, though parties may have created a synergetic resource foundation, they 
likely cannot capture those benefits if they are not willing or able to make changes. It is 
precisely the anticipation of future value that provides them with the incentives to behave 
flexibly. In sum, partner choice affects parties’ willingness and ability to make modifications.  
 
With respect to contractual provisions, an alliance contract functions as the architecture that 
guides alliance development by providing incentives to cooperate (Contractor et al., 2000). 
An alliance contract with mutually supportive provisions suggests that parties can anticipate 
sufficient compensation, have sufficient influence over alliance activities, and have 
implemented sufficient safeguards against exchange hazards, after the alliance becomes 
operational. A configuration with mutually supportive structural safeguards also enhances 
behavioral transparency and promotes cooperation between the partners. For instance, a high 
level of compensation integrativeness guides parties’ efforts toward helping each other 
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achieve individual objectives (Parkhe, 1993c). Parties frequently interact and likely build a 
high-quality relationship. In addition, an adequate incentive system stimulates parties to 
initiate knowledge transfer and acquisition processes (Lane et al., 1998). Shared decision-
making also fosters partner interaction, resulting in relational and learning processes. For 
instance, sharing decision-making rights with respect to new product development implies 
that parties can exercise equal influence on the tasks at hand, contributing to trust and 
commitment building. The promise to make total non-recoverable investments also functions 
as a signal that partners are willing to make the relationship work (Gulati et al., 1994). 
 
In contrast, compensation imbalance, a decision-making imbalance, or a non-recoverable 
investment imbalance hampers the development of relational and learning processes. A 
compensation imbalance incites parties to behave opportunistically to extract additional 
benefits (Contractor et al., 2000), a decision-making imbalance impedes the development of 
mutual learning processes because parties do not need to interact (Makhija et al., 1997), and a 
non-recoverable investment imbalance creates hold-up problems (Klein et al., 1978). Thus, 
decisions with respect to alliance structure directly influence alliance development, as well as 
parties’ willingness and ability to make necessary modifications to the ongoing relationship.  
 
Extant empirical research supported the hypothesis that structural coherence constitutes an 
architecture that affects post-formation processes (Anderson et al., 1989; Buvik et al., 2001; 
Dahlstrom et al., 1999; Heide et al., 1990; Jap, 2001a; Kelly, Schaan, & Joncas, 2002; Lusch 
et al., 1996; Moxon, Roehl, & Truitt, 1988; Oxley et al., 2004; Zaheer et al., 1995; Zeng, 
2003). Kelly, Schaan, and Joncas (2002) found that compensation structures must be designed 
carefully to avoid ex-post problems with relationship quality. Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) 
found that an alliance structure characterized by formalized procedures reduce the risk of ex-
post opportunistic behavior. Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) indicated that the degree of 
quasi-integration between buyers and supplier positively relates to joint action. Gundlach 
(1995) revealed that firms making smaller non-recoverable investments than their partners 
tend to act opportunistically in the relationship. Jap (2001) found that the creation of 
idiosyncratic resources between the partners positively influences relational quality, whereas 
complex compensation structures (i.e., equity sharing) negatively affect it. In summary, 
supported by conceptual and empirical research, we hypothesize that structural coherence 
relates positively to relational adaptability.  
 
Mediation Effect 
Building on conceptual and empirical insights pertaining to three direct relationships—(1) 
structural coherence directly influences alliance performance, (2), relational adaptability 
directly influences alliance performance, and (3) structural coherence directly influences 
relational adaptability—we hypothesize that relational adaptability partially mediates the 
relationship between structural coherence and alliance performance. In Box 3.4, we 
summarize our arguments for why we propose a mediation model rather than a moderation 
model. 
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Box 3.4 Mediation and Moderation 
A mediation model seeks to identify and explicate the intervening mechanism that underlies a 
relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable by including a third 
explanatory variable, known as a mediator variable. For instance, the relationship between ex-ante 
formation conditions and alliance performance may be mediated by ex-post learning processes. 
Phrased in statistical terms, mediation refers to the covariance relationships among three variables 
and indicates that the mediating variable accounts for a significant amount of the shared variance 
between the independent variable and dependent variable.  
 
A moderation model seeks to identify and explicate the impact a third variable has on the direction 
and/or strength of the relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable. A 
moderator variable specifies when or in what conditions an independent variable influences a 
dependent variable. For instance, the relationship between contract completeness and alliance 
performance may be moderated by the level of trust. Phrased in statistical terms, moderation 
pertains to the statistical interaction between two independent variables for predicting a dependent 
variable.  
 
Mediation and moderation models are similar in that they are criterion specific (i.e., models include a 
dependent variable) and contain (at least) three variables: an independent variable, a dependent 
variable, and a mediation or moderation variable. However, they differ in four other aspects. First, 
whereas mediation models focus on intervening mechanisms, moderation models focus on 
interaction mechanisms. Second, whereas a mediating variable should be conceptualized on the 
same level of analysis, a moderating variable can be conceptualized at a different (i.e., higher level of 
analysis). Third, whereas an independent variable precedes a mediation variable, a moderating 
variable can precede or follow an independent variable.  
 
Implications for this Study 
We propose and test a medium-term theoretical model, as we assume that alliances in our data have 
not yet been subjected to substantial reorganizations. Building on this assumption, we argue that the 
relationship between structural coherence and alliance performance is mediated by relational 
adaptability. More specifically: 
• Relational adaptability functions as an intervening mechanism between structural coherence 
and alliance performance, because the formation conditions directly influence post-formation 
processes, 
• Decisions with respect to alliance structure precede the development of post-formation 
processes. In addition, parties make these decisions independently from ex-post decisions,  
• Structural coherence, relational adaptability, and alliance performance are conceptualized at 
the same level of analysis: the alliance level. 
 
Sources: Baron & Kenny (1986); Drazin & Van de Ven (1985); Heide (1994); Venkatraman (1989)
 
Drawing on the structure and process perspectives, our main argument posits that aligning 
structure and process explanations describes the complexity of alliances better than either the 
structure or process perspective alone. That is, structural coherence guides partner towards 
realizing their objectives, as it reduce the risk of exchange hazards, such as opportunistic 
behavior, appropriation and spill-over concerns, and goal conflicts. In addition, a high level of 
structural coherence stimulates the development of relational adaptability, because the parties 
have designed an alliance structure with strong incentives to make the alliance work. That is, 
structural coherence functions as an architecture that provides incentives to develop post-
formation processes. Moreover, relational adaptability reduces the likelihood of inertial forces 
and simultaneously functions as a safeguard against other ex-post exchange hazards. If 
present, relational adaptability overcomes the limitations of an alliance structure. Although 
structural safeguards are designed to handle contingencies, they are costly, time consuming, 
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and unreliable, so a sole reliance on structural safeguards may burden the administrative 
organization and increase inertial forces in the system. As such, in a long-term relationship, 
relational adaptability is more efficient and effective in redirecting parties’ behavior toward 
achieving their performance objectives. Together, these arguments suggest that the 
relationship between structural coherence and alliance performance is to some degree 
mediated by relational adaptability. 
 
Empirical studies support a partial mediation hypothesis (Ariño et al., 1998; Aulakh et al., 
1996; Brouthers et al., 2006; Doz, 1996; Jap et al., 2000; Judge et al., 2006; Lane et al., 2001; 
Tiessen et al., 2000). For instance, Doz (1996) found that failing alliances were highly 
inertial, with little ex-post learning processes, whereas successful alliances were highly 
evolutionary. Jap (1999) examined the relationship between structural factors, such as goal 
congruence and complementary resources, on a buyer–supplier relationship’s profitability and 
competitive advantage and found that factors such as ex-post coordination efforts and non-
recoverable investments mediated the relationship between initial conditions and alliance 
performance. According to Judge and Dooley (2006), trustworthiness and contractual 
safeguards were negatively related to opportunistic behavior, which in turn was negatively 
related to alliance performance. Aulakh, Kotabe, and Sahay (1996) further found that 
relational norms and monitoring mechanism were determinants of trust and that higher levels 
of trust positively influenced alliance performance within cross-border partnerships.  
 
In summary, we hypothesize that superior alliance performance is achieved in those alliances 
in which parties establish an alliance structure that enables them to improve progressively on 
initial formation conditions by developing relational and learning processes. Unsuccessful 
alliances instead are characterized by an alliance structure that impedes the initiation of post-
formation processes, resulting in parties’ unwillingness and inability to make necessary 
adaptations. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: The relationship between structural coherence and alliance performance is 
partially mediated by relational adaptability. That is: 
a. Structural coherence relates positively to alliance performance, 
b. Relational adaptability relates positively to alliance performance,  
c. Structural coherence relates positively to relational adaptability.  
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Chapter 4 Cooperation and Competition Trade-Off 
Literature Review 
In this chapter, we argue that firms forming and managing strategic alliances confront a 
cooperation and competition trade-off. This particular type of trade-off is characterized by 
two distinctive properties. First, due to resource scarcity, partner firms must decide how much 
effort to spend on cooperation (i.e., value-creation mechanisms) and how much effort to 
spend on competition (i.e., value-appropriation mechanisms).18 Second, decision-making in 
an alliance context depicts a strong trade-off, which implies a negative association between 
alliance performance and the difference in individual firm performances. Departing from this 
conceptualization, we present the results of a review of alliance literature and conclude that 
researchers have produced partial and limited insights. Important reasons for inadequate 
theory development are that researchers have focused on different levels of analysis and used 
a variety of theoretical perspectives, conceptual definitions, and operational indicators to 
capture cooperation and competition. We also observe that the majority of performance 
research builds on the implicit but questionable assumptions that alliance performance and 
firm performance are either unrelated or positively associated. Addressing these knowledge 
gaps, we argue that a need exists for a testable theoretical model that incorporates the 
relationships among cooperation, competition, alliance performance, and firm performance.  
 
We organize the chapter as follows. We present in Section 4.1 our conceptualization of a 
trade-off. In Section 4.2, we apply this conceptualization to the context of alliances and 
introduce the cooperation and competition trade-off. We use this latter conceptualization to 
assess theoretical perspectives (§4.3.) and empirical studies (§4.4). Finally, in Section 4.5, we 
discuss implications for theory development.  
 
4.1 Trade-Offs 
Management researchers introduced a variety of conceptual and operational trade-off 
definitions (see Box 4.1), which makes it difficult to find a coherent procedure to identify a 
trade-off decision-making situation (Berry & Lowery, 1990). Nonetheless, building on prior 
conceptual and empirical research, we contend that a trade-off is distinct from alternative 
views of decision-making under the conditions of two opposing forces, including puzzle, 
dilemma, and paradox (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; De Wit & Meyer, 2004). As depicted in 
Figure 4.1, a puzzle represents a problem with one optimal solution. Puzzles can be complex 
and difficult to analyze, but there is always one best way of solving them. In contrast, a 
dilemma is a problem situation with only two possible solutions, neither of which is logically 
the best. Dilemmas confront problem solvers with difficult either–or choices, each with its 
own advantages and disadvantages, but neither clearly superior to the other. Trade-offs and 
paradoxes represent problem situations in which there are many possible solutions.  
 
                                                 
18 We distinguish among value-creation mechanisms (i.e., cooperation), value-appropriation mechanisms (i.e., 
competition), created value (i.e., alliance performance), and appropriated value (firm performance).  
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Box 4.1 Trade-Offs and Management Research 
The notion of trade-offs permeates management research. However, researchers used different 
conceptual and operational definitions. Some researchers viewed trade-offs as a tension between 
resource categories under conditions of scarcity. That is, a decision maker needs to allocate scarce 
resources to particular activities, knowing that a suboptimal resource allocation may have detrimental 
consequences. For instance, researchers examined government budget allocations and proposed 
and tested trade-offs with regard to defence and welfare spending (Pryor, 1968; Russett, 1969) and 
controllable and uncontrollable government expenditures (Kamlet & Mowery, 1987). In addition,
management researchers examined trade-offs involving a firm’s positioning strategies (Porter, 1996), 
value creation and value appropriation capabilities (Mizik & Jacobson, 2002), static and dynamic 
efficiency (Ghemawat & Costa, 1993), and the relationship between exploration and exploitation 
strategies (Benner & Tushman, 2003; He & Wong, 2004). Other researchers examined 
consequences of the decision-making and viewed trade-offs as a tension between outcome 
variables. For example, researchers investigated trade-offs between financial and marketing 
performance (Furrer, Alexandre, & Sudharshan, 2007), dimensions of manufacturing performance 
(Swink & Zsidisin, 2006), and a firm’s profitability and market share (Armstrong & Green, 2007). 
 
Implications for this Study 
This fragmentation of views about what a trade-off is, has several implications for this study: 
 A need exists for a coherent conceptualization of a trade-off. This conceptualization should 
recognize that (1) resource scarcity forces firms to allocate resources, and (2) resource allocation 
decisions may differentially affect various performance objectives (i.e., outcome variables). 
 We can use this typology of trade-offs and apply it to the context of strategic alliances, enabling 
us to better understand the relationships among cooperation, competition, alliance performance, 
and firm performance. 
 
A paradox is a problem situation in which two seemingly contradictory, or even mutually 
exclusive, forces appear to be true at the same time (De Wit et al., 2004). A problem that is a 
paradox has no real solution. Rather, resolving a paradox requires decisions that aim to 
achieve one of many possible creative reconciliations of the two opposing forces, as there is 
no logical way to integrate the two opposites into an internally consistent understanding 
(Poole et al., 1989). A decision maker seeks a temporary solution to cope with the paradox, 
without arriving at a definitive solution. Thus, the solution to a problem situation occurs 
through creative reconciliation and thinking out of the box rather than seeking a balance 
between two opposing forces, as is the case in a trade-off situation (De Wit et al., 2004). To 
better understand the distinction between the three trade-off types, we first elaborate on (1) 
decision-making under resource scarcity and (2) decision-making consequences. See Table 
4.1 for an overview of trade-off properties. 
 
Condition 1: Decision-Making under Conditions of Scarcity 
Firms make decisions on the allocation of resources while these resources are scarce. The 
choice to designate resources to a particular activity (i.e., resource category) affects the 
amount of resources allocated to another activity, such that resource allocation to one activity 
comes at the expense of the other. Resource categories may refer to financial expenditures 
(Berry et al., 1990), transaction-specific investments (Swink et al., 2006), or resources needed 
to implement specific strategies (Furrer et al., 2007). For instance, Boyer and Lewis (2002) 
examined plant managers’ choices with regard to investments in competitive priorities and 
found that a focus on costs as a competitive strategy negatively relates to flexibility, whereas 
a focus on delivery negatively affects quality and flexibility. Scarcity across resources implies 
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that a firm cannot attain multiple goals at the same time and must consider opportunity costs 
when making decisions. Resources may have alternative uses, and allocation decisions affect 
their value-creation potential. For example, due to resource scarcity, a manufacturing firm 
cannot maximize production quality and production efficiency simultaneously (Swink et al., 
2006). Production managers need to consider this trade-off and decide on the production 
strategy that will result in a balance between quality and production efficiency. In summary, 
resource limitations force a firm to make decisions with respect to the objectives it wants to 
achieve.  
 
Figure 4.1 Four Views of Decision-Making Situations 
 
Condition 2: Decision-Making Consequences 
Decision-making under conditions of resource scarcity suggests that the solution a firm adopts 
can have different consequences. That is, the direction and magnitude of the relationship 
between one resource category and an objective (A or B) differs from the relationship with 
another resource category and an objective (A or B). For instance, Furrer, Alexandre, and 
Sudharshan (2007) found that strategies to achieve superior marketing performance or 
superior financial performance vary depending on a firm’s resource configuration. Within a 
buyer–supplier setting, Swink and Zsidisin (2006) found empirical support for a performance 
trade-off hypothesis; their empirical results indicated that various levels of focused 
commitment strategies had different impacts on multiple manufacturing performance 
dimensions, including quality and profitability. Mizik and Jacobson (2002) found that if firms 
operate in stable technology markets and make a shift toward value appropriation at the 
expense of value creation, it negatively affects their stock market return. In contrast, in 
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markets that are more dynamic, a shift between value creation and appropriation positively 
affects stock market returns. These empirical studies illustrated that the relationship between 
traded-off resource categories and outcome variables can vary in magnitude and direction. 
More specifically, contingent on the relationship between the trade-off solution (i.e., a balance 
between two resource categories) and objectives, we propose three different types of trade-
offs: (1) weak, (2) moderate, and (3) strong.  
 
We define a weak trade-off as a problem situation in which a decision maker confronts a 
necessity to seek a balance between expenditures with respect to two resource categories, but 
directing efforts to maximize the level of one outcome variable does not inhibit the 
achievement of the other objective. If a firm allocates resources to achieve a maximum 
performance level with regard to one particular objective, another performance objective can 
still be achieved, though not to its full extent. For instance, Furrer, Alexandre, and 
Sudharshan (2007) found that firms adopting a generalist strategy, in contrast to more focused 
strategies, are more likely to achieve higher levels of marketing performance and financial 
performance. Thus, though resource scarcity forces firms to allocate resources across 
activities, they can achieve multiple objectives simultaneously, because the weak trade-off 
type is characterized by a positive relationship between two outcome variables. 
 
Table 4.1 Trade-Off Properties and Types 
Conditions Description Empirical Illustrations 
Decision-making 
- Resource Scarcity  
 
The choice of resource level for 
one category affects the amount 
of resources allocated to 
another category, such that 
allocation in one category 
comes at expense of the other. 
 Choices between budgetary expenditures (Berry et al., 1990) 
 Choices between focus on value-creation capability or value-
appropriation capability (Mizik et al., 2002) 
 Choices between resource configurations (Furrer et al., 2007) 
 Choices between competitive priorities (Boyer & Lewis, 2002) 
 
Decision-making 
- Consequences 
 
The impact of one resource 
category on outcome variable A 
or B is different from the impact 
of another resource category on 
outcome variable A or B.  
 Focused commitment strategy has a different impact on various 
supplier performance dimensions (Swink et al., 2006) 
 Distinct resource configurations have different impacts on 
financial and marketing performance (Furrer et al., 2007) 
Trade-off type 
Weak:  
 
 
Moderate:  
 
 
Strong: 
 
 
A positive relationship between 
two outcome variables A and B. 
 
No relationship between two 
outcome variables A and B. 
 
A negative relationship between 
two outcome variables A and B. 
 
 Positive relationship between a firm’s financial and marketing 
performance (Furrer et al., 2007) 
 
 No significant correlations between outcome variables, such as 
costs and profitability (Swink et al., 2006) 
 
 Negative associations between market share and profitability 
(Armstrong et al., 2007) and cost efficiency and flexibility (Boyer 
et al., 2002) 
 
In contrast to a weak trade-off, we define a moderate trade-off as a problem situation in which 
two outcome variables are unrelated. Resource allocation decisions differentially affect 
multiple outcome variables, but the outcome variables themselves are independent. For 
instance, Swink and Zsidisin (2006) found that the level of a focused commitment strategy 
with suppliers relates in a curvilinear fashion to operational outcomes such as cost 
performance, quality, and profitability. However, empirical results also indicated that several 
outcome pairs, such as cost performance and delivery, cost performance and profitability, and 
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profitability and delivery, were not significantly associated. These findings indicate that when 
firms allocate resources to achieve a particular objective, those decisions do not necessarily 
affect, positively or negatively, the extent to which a firm achieves another objective. That is, 
a firm can direct its efforts toward maximizing the level for one outcome variable, but the 
consequences with respect to the level of another outcome variable cannot be ex-ante 
predicted. 
 
We define the strong trade-off type as a problem situation in which firms are confronted with 
not only resource allocation decisions under conditions of scarcity but also with the notion 
that maximizing the level of one outcome variable relates inversely to the outcome level of 
another variable. That is, two outcome variables are negatively associated. Boyer and Lewis 
(2002) found that plant managers were incapable of improving cost efficiency without 
incurring negative consequences with respect to flexibility. The empirical results also 
indicated negative associations between other outcome variables, such as flexibility and 
delivery reliability and quality and delivery reliability. Armstrong and Green (2007) 
conducted a review of empirical studies examining the consequences of firms pursuing 
competitor-oriented strategies and noted that firms that increase profitability also experience a 
decrease in market share. Hence, a strong trade-off type implies that if a firm aims to 
maximize the level of one particular objective, it should simultaneously anticipate an adverse 
effect on the level of another objective.  
 
4.2 Cooperation and Competition Trade-Off: Conceptualization 
We use this trade-off typology to develop a specific type of trade-off, namely, cooperation 
and competition in an alliance context. Building on the trade-off properties (i.e., decision-
making under conditions of resource scarcity and decision-making consequences), we argue 
that decision-making in an alliance represents a strong type of trade-off. Firms involved in an 
alliance must make resource allocation decisions with respect to their cooperative and 
competitive efforts, in which they seek a balance, because the extent to which parties achieve 
their individual objectives (i.e., appropriate value) depends on the degree to which they 
succeed in jointly creating value in the first place. Moreover, we postulate that a negative 
association exists between alliance performance and the difference between individual firm 
performances.19 
 
Before we present our conceptualization of the cooperation and competition trade-off, we 
briefly elaborate on our assumptions about human nature (see §3.3) with respect to resolving 
trade-off problems. First, we assume that managers act out of self-interest, which implies that 
if confronted with a decision, they will seek a solution that fits with their individual 
objectives. Second, we assume that managers aim to maximize outcomes, such that if they 
confront a decision and must consider multiple objectives, they hope to maximize each single 
                                                 
19 Recall that we formulate our hypotheses at the alliance level (see §1.5). Hence, we do not aim at explaining 
individual firm performance but rather focus on the relationship between partner firm’s individual performances. 
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objective. However, resource scarcity will force them to make resource allocation decisions. 
Third, managers have the freedom to choose and allocate resources without being constrained 
by external pressures. Building on these three assumptions, we propose our conceptualization 
of the cooperation and competition trade-off.  
 
Condition 1: Decision-Making under Condition of Scarcity 
Alliances involve a series of decisions by parties with regard to how much effort they should 
spend on cooperation and how much they should spend on competition (Jap, 2001a). The 
main goal of a party involved in an alliance is to achieve its individual objectives, because 
from a firm perspective, an alliance is a valuable option as long as it yields superior value 
compared with alternate organizational forms (Madhok et al., 1998). However, to achieve 
individual objectives, the partner firms must cooperate and interactively aim for collective 
objectives (Das et al., 2000b). Firms engage in an alliance to expand the size of their joint 
benefits and give each party a share of an incrementally greater joint outcome that they could 
not have generated alone (Jap, 1999). Due to opportunity costs (i.e., the cost of passing up the 
next best choice when making a decision), parties cannot invest infinitely in an alliance. 
Increasing expenditures in either cooperation or competition makes alternative organizational 
forms more attractive. Consequently, when confronted with resource scarcity, parties need to 
balance between their efforts directed at cooperation and those directed at competition. 
 
Cooperation between parties engaged in an alliance means that the parties attempt to 
implement value-creating conditions and processes (Das et al., 2003). It therefore reflects 
decisions that have resulted in efficient alliance structures (Williamson, 1985) and effective 
alliance management (Ireland et al., 2002), because they have minimized transaction costs and 
maximized value (Madhok, 2001; Madhok et al., 1998). For instance, parties may decide on 
compensation structures that provide strong incentives for each party to cooperate (Contractor 
et al., 2000), develop alliance structures and processes that enable reciprocal learning 
(Lubatkin et al., 2001), and allocate resources to develop trustworthiness among the partners 
(Ariño et al., 2001; Ring et al., 1994). However, parties engaged in an alliance cannot direct 
their efforts solely toward cooperation (i.e., behave altruistically), because they must consider 
their individual objectives as well (Larsson et al., 1998). Whereas cooperation represents 
parties’ efforts with regard to value-creation mechanisms, competition depicts their efforts to 
secure value appropriation. Value appropriation refers their efforts to extract value from the 
alliance (if necessary, at the expense of the partner firm). A party thus may use its bargaining 
power to negotiate more profits, use a learning advantage to appropriate newly created 
knowledge (Lane et al., 2001), or exploit a vulnerable partner by behaving opportunistically 
(Wathne et al., 2000). From a firm perspective, directing efforts toward value appropriation 
mechanisms is rational, because an alliance is desirable as long as its value outweighs that of 
alternative organizational forms (Madhok et al., 1998). However, if parties solely focus on 
achieving their individual objectives, the rationale behind the alliance would diminish 
quickly, because the parties stop putting efforts into value creation conditions and processes 
(Jap, 2001a). In Box 4.2, we present an illustration of this trade-off. 
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Box 4.2 Illustration of a Trade-Off between Cooperation and Competition 
We use a dyadic level conceptualization of cooperation and competition, such that cooperation 
captures a party’s efforts to collaborate, and competition captures its efforts to secure individual 
interests. We define mutual cooperation at the dyadic level as the combination of parties’ efforts for 
value creation and define competition imbalance as the difference between each firm’s efforts 
spent on value appropriation. We postulate that mutual cooperation and competition imbalance 
require simultaneous consideration to produce an exhaustive theoretical portrayal. The matrix below 
illustrates this point. Given three levels of efforts spent on cooperation or competition by each firm, 
each quadrant shows the amount of mutual cooperation and the competition imbalance at the dyadic 
level. The unshaded quadrants depict dyads characterized by various levels of mutual cooperation 
and competition imbalance, and the shaded quadrants depict dyads with an absence of competition 
imbalance. Above the diagonal, competition imbalance favors firm A; below the diagonal, it favors 
firm B. Although equal levels of competition characterize the dyads in the shaded quadrants, 
different levels of mutual cooperation distinguish them. For instance, quadrants 1 and 9 on the 
shaded diagonal are competition balanced, but the dyad in quadrant 1 is characterized by a higher 
level of cooperation. As illustrated in quadrant 5 and 7, each dyad is characterized by a similar 
amount of cooperation; however, with respect to competition imbalance, they differ. In quadrant 5, 
firms A and B have balanced their cooperative and competitive efforts; in quadrant 7, firm A has 
allocated resources to cooperation, while firm B has allocated its resources to competition.  
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 (1) 
Firm A (6, 0) 
Firm B (6, 0) 
Mutual cooperation:  12 
Competition imbalance: 0 
(2) 
Firm A (3, 3) 
Firm B (6, 0) 
Mutual cooperation:  9 
Competition imbalance: 3 
(3) 
Firm A (0, 6) 
Firm B (6, 0) 
Mutual cooperation:  6 
Competition imbalance: 6 
 (4) 
Firm A (6, 0) 
Firm B (3, 3) 
Mutual cooperation:  9 
Competition imbalance: 3 
(5) 
Firm A (3, 3) 
Firm B (3, 3) 
Mutual cooperation:  6 
Competition imbalance: 0 
(6) 
Firm A (0, 6) 
Firm B (3, 3) 
Mutual cooperation:  3 
Competition imbalance: 3 
 (7) 
Firm A (6, 0) 
Firm B (0, 6) 
Mutual cooperation:  6 
Competition imbalance: 6 
(8) 
Firm A (3, 3) 
Firm B (0, 6) 
Mutual cooperation:  3 
Competition imbalance: 3 
(9) 
Firm A (0, 6) 
Firm B (0, 6) 
Mutual cooperation:  0 
Competition imbalance: 0 
 
Implications for this Study 
This illustration highlights three important points: 
 Cooperation and competition must be considered at the dyadic level by taking into account 
each firm’s efforts toward cooperation and competition.  
 As the alliance unfolds, parties may shift between cooperative and competitive efforts, which 
directly affect mutual cooperation and competition imbalance at the dyadic level.  
 Configurations (i.e., trade-off solutions) may influence alliance development and alliance 
performance differently.  
 
Sources: Casciaro & Piskorski (2005); Ouchi (1980); Parkhe (1993a)
 
Condition 2: Decision-Making Consequences 
With respect to the trade-off types (i.e., weak, moderate, and strong), we argue that the 
cooperation and competition represents a strong type. At the dyadic level, cooperation and 
competition inversely affect two outcome variables: alliance performance and firm 
performance imbalance. Moreover, in an alliance context, alliance performance and firm 
performance imbalance are negatively associated. We present our arguments in support of 
these claims next.  
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Firm performance is a function of alliance performance and a firm’s share of alliance 
performance.20 In Section 1.1, we defined alliance performance as the degree of 
accomplishment of both parties’ intentional and emergent objectives. Firm performance thus 
refers to the degree to which a party has achieved its objectives through the alliance. For 
instance, two parties may have formed an alliance to generate profits, and when successful, 
each party receives a share of these joint profits. Depending on the level of alliance 
performance and a firm’s claim on this alliance performance, firms may achieve different 
levels of performance. The difference between their performance levels is what we refer to as 
“firm performance imbalance.” The level of firm performance imbalance is high if one party 
appropriates more benefits (e.g., profits) from the alliance than its counterpart, whereas if two 
parties obtain an equal amount of benefits, the level of firm performance imbalance is zero.  
 
Cooperation between partners relates positively to alliance performance but negatively to firm 
performance imbalance. Alliance performance is positively influenced by cooperation, 
because parties focus their efforts on developing value-creation conditions and processes (Das 
et al., 2003; Dyer et al., 1998). For instance, partner firms may contribute complementary 
resources (Das et al., 2000b), agree to make nonrecoverable investments (Madhok et al., 
1998), initiate reciprocal learning processes (Cummings et al., 2003; Lubatkin et al., 2001), or 
initiate activities that contribute to a high-quality relationship (Ariño et al., 1998). In addition, 
cooperation between partners reduces the likelihood of differences in their performances. 
When parties combine their efforts to facilitate cooperation, they are less concerned with 
alternative efforts to increase value appropriation. This lack of competition does not imply 
that the parties do not appropriate value but rather that each party receives equitable benefits 
through the alliance. That is, mutual cooperation reduces the likelihood that one party 
appropriates substantially more value at the expense of its counterpart.  
 
In contrast, competition between two parties negatively influences alliance performance and 
positively influences the level of firm performance imbalance. When parties engage in 
competition, they expend efforts to maximize their individual performance. For instance, a 
party may allocate resources to exploit a power advantage (Lax et al., 1986), develop 
activities to exploit its absorptive capacity and act on a learning advantage (Hamel, 1991), or 
engage in opportunistic behavior to extract additional benefits (Wathne et al., 2000). When 
parties direct their efforts toward value-appropriation mechanisms, the resulting alliance 
environment prompts them to allocate insufficient resources to value-creation conditions and 
processes (Jap, 1999). As a consequence, they undermine the long-term value creation of the 
alliance, and when one party successfully exploits the opportunity to appropriate value at the 
expense of its counterpart, the imbalance between firms’ performance levels results. 
 
 
                                                 
20 We only focus on common benefits. That is, alliance performance refers to jointly created value at the dyadic 
level, whereas firm performance pertains to a firm’s share of this created value. As a consequence, when we 
refer to firm performance, we do not include other types of benefits a firm could derive from the relationship, 
such as stock market returns or net spill-over effects (i.e., private benefits). 
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The strong cooperation and competition trade-off suggests that the relationship between 
alliance performance and firm performance imbalance must be negative. Two arguments 
support this assertion. First, a party can increase firm performance by increasing its share of 
alliance performance, namely, shifting its efforts toward competition and increasing its claim 
on alliance performance. For instance, a party, whether ex-ante or ex-post, might use its 
bargaining power to (re)negotiate additional benefits (Lax et al., 1986). Regardless of the 
decisions by the counterpart with respect to cooperation and competition, this shift toward 
competitive efforts reduces the level of cooperation and creates a competition imbalance (e.g., 
in Box 4.2, movement from quadrant 5 to quadrant 6). Consequently, the combined 
investments in value-creation conditions and processes decreases, which negatively affects 
alliance performance. However, when a party exploits a value-appropriation mechanism to its 
advantage, it likely increases its performance level, at the expense of the performance of its 
counterpart. Hence, a party’s shift in effort from cooperation to competition negatively affects 
alliance performance but positively affects firm performance imbalance.  
 
Figure 4.2 Cooperation and Competition Trade-Off: A Conceptualization 
 
Second, a party can increase its performance by redirecting effort toward cooperation and 
increasing alliance performance. Regardless of the decisions by a counterpart in terms of 
cooperation and competition, a shift toward cooperation by one partner increases combined 
investment in value-creation mechanisms, though it also creates a competition imbalance 
(e.g., in Box 4.2, from quadrant 5 to quadrant 2). Through this shift toward cooperation, 
alliance performance likely increases, which, given each firm’s share of that alliance 
performance, should lead to an increase in firm performance. However, consistent with the 
proposed trade-off logic, greater efforts spent on cooperation come at the expense of efforts 
for competition. Therefore, the party places less emphasis on securing individual benefits, so 
its counterpart may appropriate a relatively larger share. From the individual firm perspective, 
this behavior is rational as long as the increase in alliance performance outweighs any 
possible loss due to a relatively smaller share of benefits. In an alliance context, the trade-off 
between cooperation and competition is best depicted as a strong trade-off (see Figure 4.2).  
 
 
Resource Scarcity 
“Strike a Balance” 
Strong Type of Trade-off 
 “Negative association” 
Alliance 
Performance 
Firm Performance 
Imbalance 
+ 
+ 
– 
– 
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Cooperation 
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In summary, our conceptualization of the cooperation and competition trade-off is determined 
by two properties. First, in conditions of resource scarcity, parties make decisions about how 
much effort to spend on cooperation and how much on competition. Second, the combination 
of parties’ cooperation and competition decisions adversely affects alliance performance and 
firm performance imbalance. That is, we argue that a negative association between alliance 
performance and firm performance imbalance exists, suggesting a strong trade-off type. In the 
next two sections, we use our conceptualization of the cooperation and competition trade-off 
to review theoretical perspectives and empirical alliance research, on which basis we develop 
guidelines for theory development.  
 
4.3 Cooperation and Competition Trade-Off: Theoretical Perspectives 
Researchers have examined cooperation and competition in an alliance context using a variety 
of theoretical perspectives, including transaction cost economics (Gulati et al., 1998; Parkhe, 
1993a), game theory (Gulati et al., 1994; Parkhe, 1993a; Song et al., 2002; Zeng et al., 2003), 
the resource-based view (Barney et al., 2001; Eisenhardt et al., 1996), equity theory (Adams, 
1965; Scheer et al., 2003), organizational justice theory (Johnson et al., 2002; Kumar et al., 
1995b; Luo, 2005), power perspective (Blankenburg Holm et al., 1999; Pfeffer et al., 1978), 
the learning perspective (Hamel, 1991; Holmqvist, 2003; Larsson et al., 1998; Lubatkin et al., 
2001), and behavioral perspectives (Aulakh et al., 1996; Cullen et al., 2000; Ganesan, 1994; 
Kauser et al., 2004; Uzzi, 1996).21 To assess the extent to which each theoretical perspective 
has contributed to a better understanding of the relationships among cooperation, competition, 
alliance performance, and firm performance, we examine the extent to which each theoretical 
perspective fits with our conceptualization of the cooperation and competition trade-off. We 
conclude that the power, learning, and behavioral perspectives provide relevant and 
complementary insights, but the other theoretical perspectives provide only supportive 
explanations or hamper our understanding due to their conceptual limitations. See Table 4.2 
for an overview. 
 
Alliance researchers who drew on transaction cost economics (TCE) argued that an alignment 
between the governance form and transaction characteristics should lead to efficient 
exchanges between firms (Williamson, 1975). Within the context of alliances, cooperation 
refers to one firm’s decision to establish a governance form that minimizes its transaction 
costs (i.e., value appropriation), and an efficient governance form curbs ex-ante and ex-post 
exchange hazards, such as adverse selection and moral hazard (Williamson, 1985). Although 
TCE researchers produced valuable findings with respect to the rationales for alliance 
formation (Chen et al., 2003; Gulati et al., 1998; Pisano, 1989), for our conceptualization of 
the cooperation and competition trade-off, TCE logic contains several limitations. First, 
researchers drawing on TCE primarily focused on governance form decisions (David et al., 
2004) rather than providing explanations for superior alliance performance (Sampson, 2004b). 
                                                 
21 In Appendix 1, we present a brief review—characteristics and critiques—of each theoretical perspective.  
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That is, TCE theorists’ focus on non-recoverable investments and their ability to reduce 
transaction costs failed to recognize the potential value generated by these investments 
(Madhok et al., 1998; Weitz et al., 1995). Second, researchers using TCE logic approached 
cooperation decisions from only one side of a dyadic relationship. That is, if two firms agree 
to establish a particular governance form, the chosen governance form is not necessarily 
efficient with respect to all parties involved (Weitz et al., 1995; De Wulf et al., 2001). Third, 
in terms of competitive factors, researchers assumed that firms behave opportunistically rather 
than including opportunism as a variable (Ghoshal et al., 1996). Thus, TCE explanations have 
limited explanatory power when it comes to the cooperation and competition trade-off.  
 
Table 4.2 Cooperation and Competition: Theoretical Perspectives 
 Cooperation & 
Competition 
Focus Points of Interest 
Transaction 
Cost Economics 
- Value appropriation by 
cost minimization 
 
- Governance form 
- Efficiency 
Limited explanatory power, due to focus on 
transaction costs, one-sided firm perspective, 
and assumption of opportunism 
Game 
Theory 
 
- Cooperation  
- Defection 
 
- Strategic decision- 
making 
- Optimal strategy 
Limited explanatory power, due to dilemma 
perspective, pay-off structure ex-ante known, 
and assumption of hyper-rationality 
Resource- 
Based View 
- Value creation by joint 
resource alignment 
 
- Resource configurations
- Competitive advantage 
Moderate explanatory power, due to focus on 
value creation, but no explanations with 
respect to value appropriation 
Equity 
Theory  
- Equity 
- Inequity 
 
- Decision-making 
- Exchange relationship 
 
Supportive explanations, due to focus on firm 
behavior, but no explanations provided with 
respect to mechanisms 
Organizational 
Justice Theory 
- Distributive justice 
- Procedural justice 
 
- Decision-making 
- Exchange relationship 
Supportive explanations, due to focus on firm 
behavior, but no explanations provided with 
respect to mechanisms 
Power 
Perspective 
 
- Mutual dependence 
- Power imbalance 
- Bargaining power 
 
Substantial explanatory power, due to 
explanations with respect to consequences of 
value creation and appropriation mechanism 
Learning 
Perspective 
- Knowledge creation 
- Knowledge acquisition 
 
- Learning 
 
Substantial explanatory power, due to 
explanations with respect to consequences of 
value creation and appropriation mechanism  
Behavioral 
Perspective 
- Quality relationship 
- Opportunistic behavior 
- Relational norms 
 
Substantial explanatory power, due to 
explanations with respect to consequences of 
value creation and appropriation mechanism  
 
Game theory researchers argued instead that the pay-off structure determines parties’ 
decision-making process. Within an alliance setting, different pay-off structures may 
stimulate either ex-post cooperation or competition between partner firms (Zeng et al., 2003). 
Zeng and Chen (2003) argued that structural and motivational changes in an alliance’s pay-off 
structure directly affect parties’ inclination to cooperate. Researchers drawing on game theory 
contributed valuable insights into pay-off structures, learning, and cooperation (see e.g., 
Gulati et al., 1994; Parkhe, 1993a; Zeng, 2003), but for our conceptualization of the 
cooperation and competition trade-off, the theory has several limitations. First, game theorists 
adopted a dilemma approach toward cooperation and competition, such that parties decide 
either to cooperate or to defect (i.e., compete) rather than seeking a balance between 
cooperative and competitive forces. Second, they assumed that a pay-off structure is ex-ante 
known by the partner firms (Zeng et al., 2003), which suggests that parties have complete 
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information about future benefits and conflicts with our view that alliances are dynamic 
entities surrounded by uncertainty. Third, game theorists assumed that managers are hyper-
rational (Sebenius, 1992); in this study, we assume that managers are subject to bounded 
rationality. Thus, the explicit focus on decision-making and the limitations make game 
theoretic approaches inadequate to explain the cooperation and competition trade-off.  
 
Alliance researchers using the resource-based view (RBV) argued that resource alignment 
between two parties enables them to achieve superior alliance performance (Das et al., 
2000b); in this sense, RBV theorists considered alliances a strategy used to access the other 
firm’s resources to achieve otherwise unavailable competitive advantages and values 
(Eisenhardt et al., 1996). When a firm does not possess the entire bundle of resources and 
capabilities it needs, markets cannot bundle the required resources, and alternatives to attain 
resources are too costly, the firm engages in an alliance (Madhok et al., 1998). The RBV 
offers important insight compared with theories such as TCE or industrial organization 
economics (Combs et al., 1999; Das et al., 2000b; Dyer et al., 1998) by focusing on analyses 
of the specific resources possessed by a firm. Yet again though, for our conceptualization of 
the cooperation and competition trade-off, the RBV contains a major limitation. Previous 
RBV theorists did not provide any explanations with respect to value appropriation (Alvarez 
et al., 2001; Coff, 1999) and focused instead on the relationship between parties’ resource 
configurations and value creation, with the implicit assumption that the party with the 
valuable and scarce resources appropriates synergetic benefits (Blodgett, 1991b). To address 
this concern, researchers used the bargaining power perspective to understand value 
appropriation (Coff, 1999; Dyer et al., 1998). Although alliance researchers drawing on the 
RBV produced relevant insights into alliance formation and performance (see e.g., Combs et 
al., 1999; Eisenhardt et al., 1996; Lambe et al., 2002), with respect to the cooperation and 
competition trade-off, RBV explanations have only moderate explanatory power.  
 
Researchers using equity theory (Adams, 1965) or organizational justice theory (Deutsch, 
1985; Greenberg, 1987) argued that parties’ perceptions of cooperation and competition—that 
is, (in)equity, (in)justice, or (un)fairness—affect the partners’ behavior. First, equity theory 
argued that partner firms become unmotivated if they perceive their inputs to be greater than 
the outputs (Ariño et al., 1998; Scheer et al., 2003). Scheer, Kumar, and Steenkamp (2003) 
found that Dutch automobile dealers reacted adversely to positive and negative inequities in 
their relationships with their automobile suppliers. Second, organizational justice theory 
focused on distributive and procedural justice, with the argument that unfairness in the 
division of benefits and decision-making influences partner firms’ behavior (Johnson et al., 
2002; Kumar et al., 1995b). Luo (2005) found that alliance profitability is higher at high 
levels of shared perceptions of procedural justice, particularly higher than that prompted by 
asymmetrical perceptions of procedural justice. Nonetheless, with respect to our 
conceptualization of the cooperation and competition trade-off, these theoretical perspectives 
possess several limitations, the most prominent of which is their focus on perceptions (i.e., 
assessments) of partner firm behavior rather than on value creation and appropriation 
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mechanisms. That is, their explanations centered on partner firm behavior in response to 
(in)equity (see e.g., Ariño et al., 1998) rather than on alliance performance consequences (see 
Luo, 2005 for an exception). Alliance researchers drawing on the equity theory and 
organizational justice theory produced relevant insights with respect to alliance development 
(see e.g., Husted & Folger, 2004; Johnson et al., 2002), but when it comes to the cooperation 
and competition trade-off, their explanations offered only supportive explanatory power. 
 
In contrast, three theoretical perspectives actually may contribute to a better understanding of 
our conceptualization of the cooperation and competition trade-off. Proponents of the power 
perspective, the learning perspective, and the behavioral perspective commonly viewed 
cooperation and competition as properties of the relationship between two parties rather than 
as attributes of each individual firm. Proponents of the power perspective considered power a 
relational characteristic, advocates of the learning perspective argued interorganizational 
learning is a dyadic property, and researchers drawing on the behavioral perspective posited 
that partner firm interactions develop into relational patterns of behavior. As a complement to 
this shared emphasis, each perspective presented distinct value creation and appropriation 
mechanisms.22 
 
Advocates of the power perspective argued that bargaining power functions as a cooperative 
and competitive mechanism within alliances (Blodgett, 1991b; Doz et al., 1998; Lax et al., 
1986). That is, the nature of the power relationship enables parties to implement value 
creation and value appropriation conditions and processes (Pfeffer et al., 1978). If parties are 
mutually dependent (i.e., equal level of bargaining power), the power relationship provides 
strong incentives for each partner to contribute actively to the achievement of the other’s 
objectives (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer et al., 1978). However, if one party has a bargaining 
power advantage, it can extract additional value from the alliance at the expense of its 
counterpart (Blodgett, 1991b). Initially, parties use bargaining power during the alliance 
formation stage to negotiate about alliance design and contractual provisions (Blodgett, 
1991a; Blodgett, 1991b). In addition, during the post-formation stage, parties may renegotiate 
these initial contractual agreements in response to shifts in their bargaining power caused by 
external changes or learning (Inkpen et al., 1997). Proponents of the power perspective thus 
put forward several insightful explanations for the cooperation and competition trade-off, 
though these explanations are constrained to the use of bargaining power.  
 
Alliance researchers used the learning perspective to clarify the relationship between 
cooperation and competition (Hamel, 1991; Inkpen et al., 1995; Kumar & Nti, 1998). 
According to advocates of the learning perspective, parties should balance their knowledge 
creation and knowledge appropriation efforts (Larsson et al., 1998). If parties have an equal 
opportunity to assess and acquire knowledge through the alliance, cooperation results 
(Lubatkin et al., 2001), which enables those parties to achieve their performance objectives. In 
                                                 
22 In Chapter 5, we discuss the power, learning, and behavioral perspectives in depth.  
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contrast, if parties have an unequal opportunity to learn, a learning race may be ignited 
(Hamel, 1991), which hampers superior alliance performance. In summary, advocates of the 
learning perspective developed insightful explanations with respect to the cooperation and 
competition trade-off, but these explanations were limited to interorganizational learning. 
 
Proponents of a behavioral perspective argued that partner interactions constitute a 
mechanism that, on the one hand, contributes to a cooperative working climate but, on the 
other hand, can create a competitive climate (Ariño et al., 1998; Aulakh et al., 1996; Cullen et 
al., 2000; Ganesan, 1994; Kauser et al., 2004). Parties can direct their efforts toward building 
a high-quality relationship (Ariño et al., 2001) or engage in repetitive patterns of opportunistic 
behavior (Wathne et al., 2000). Specifically, parties might build cooperative relational norms, 
which develop trust and thus make parties act in a manner consistent with their partner’s 
interests (Ring et al., 1994). However, relational norms also could develop into behavioral 
guidelines that stimulate competitive behaviors. For instance, opportunistic behavior enables a 
firm to extract additional value from the alliance by purposefully misleading its partner firm. 
Opportunistic behavior differs from bargaining power and knowledge absorption, because the 
party intentionally deceives its partner to extract benefits. A high-quality relationship 
increases the likelihood of mutual knowledge creation and attenuates conflicts, which may 
result from parties’ efforts to exploit or prevent exploitation in response to a bargaining power 
imbalance. In summary, proponents of the behavioral perspective offered insightful 
explanations for the cooperation and competition trade-off. However, these explanations are 
constrained to partner firm behaviors. 
 
To conclude, alliance researchers used a variety of theoretical perspectives to provide a better 
understanding of cooperation and competition within an alliance context. However, the 
majority of these theoretical perspectives suffered limitations that inhibit current 
understanding. Hence, we conclude that a theoretical gap exists in the alliance literature, 
centered on the persistent lack of a coherent theoretical model. However, proponents of three 
theoretical perspectives—power, learning, and behavioral—put forward explanations that 
appear promising with respect to theory development. More specifically, the three 
perspectives enable us to theorize about the cooperation and competition trade-off while 
addressing issues pertaining to various value creation and appropriation mechanisms 
(i.e., bargaining power, learning, and relational norms).  
 
4.4 Cooperation and Competition Trade-off: Empirical Studies 
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical alliance study explicitly has examined the 
cooperation and competition trade-off. Specifically, no study examined simultaneously the 
relationship between cooperation and competition, the impact of cooperation and competition 
on alliance performance and firm performance (imbalance), and the relationship between 
alliance performance and firm performance (imbalance). To provide a better understanding of 
these relationships, we present the results of a review of studies that empirically tested 
theoretical models that focused on particular aspects of the cooperation and competition trade-
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off. That is, we discuss studies that incorporated (1) cooperative factors, competitive factors, 
alliance performance, and firm performance; (2) cooperative factors, competitive factors, and 
alliance performance; and (3) cooperative factors, competitive factors, and firm performance. 
  
Empirical Studies: Alliance Performance and Firm Performance 
Two alliance studies presented empirical findings that contribute to a better understanding of 
the cooperation and competition trade-off (i.e., Child et al., 2003; Yan et al., 2001). However, 
the results of these studies are difficult to compare, because the researchers drew on different 
theoretical insights and used different definitions and dimensions to refer to alliance 
performance and firm performance. More important, neither study had an objective to 
conceptualize or test the cooperation and competition trade-off.  
 
Study 1: Yan and Gray (2001) 
Drawing on the power and behavioral perspectives, Yan and Gray (2001) tested a model of 
management control with a sample of 90 U.S.–China manufacturing joint ventures. The 
results indicated that relative bargaining power influences management control and that the 
level of operational control exercised by one partner over the alliance has a positive impact on 
the extent to which this partner achieves its strategic objectives. In addition, the findings 
indicated that the quality of the interpartner working relationship relates positively to the 
achievement of strategic objectives for both partners. Yan and Gray (2001) concluded that 
these empirical findings suggest competitive and cooperative dynamics occur simultaneously 
within alliances. 
 
If confronted with the conceptualization of the cooperation and competition trade-off, the 
findings provide only a partial explanation. First, though their model incorporated factors 
representing cooperation (e.g., relational quality) and competition (e.g., management control), 
the relationships were not part of the study’s empirical test, and their correlation matrix 
provided inconclusive support for a trade-off between cooperative and competitive factors. 
For instance, Yan and Gray (2001) reported a significant negative correlation between 
“perception of consensus” and dominant structural control (r = -.268, p < .05), which suggests 
that relational quality and management control trade off. However, they also reported a 
positive and significant correlation between “perception of consensus” and strategic control 
(r = .229, p < .05). These positive and negative associations provide, at best, partial insights, 
because these factors capture different outcomes of decision-making processes. Second, the 
empirical tests of the relationships among cooperation, competition, alliance performance, and 
firm performance deviated from the conceptualization. Whereas we argue that these 
relationships should be examined simultaneously, Yan and Gray (2001) examined them in 
isolation. For instance, they found through path analysis that dominant operational control 
(i.e., competition) positively affects the dominant firm’s performance; they used regression 
analysis, to find support for their hypothesis that the quality of the relationship (i.e., 
cooperation) positively influences alliance performance. Third, Yan and Gray (2001) did not 
explicitly examine the relationship between alliance performance and each firm’s individual 
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performance. We examine their correlation matrix, which reported a negative, insignificant 
correlation (r = -.179, p > .05) between alliance performance and the difference between each 
firm’s performance. Although the direction of the correlation supports our assertion with 
respect to a strong trade-off, its lack of significance actually implies a moderate trade-off. Yan 
and Gray’s (2001) findings thus provide partial support for the conceptualization of the 
cooperation and competition trade-off.  
 
Study 2: Child and Yan (2003) 
In another study of 67 international joint ventures between Chinese firms and foreign firms, 
Child and Yan (2003) examined the relationships among management control, resource 
contributions, alliance performance (i.e., economic system performance), and firm 
performance (i.e., party’s goal achievement). Their empirical results indicated that partners’ 
combined experience with alliances and the quality of resource provisions positively affect 
joint venture performance, whereas dominant foreign control negatively relates to alliance 
performance. In addition, the results indicated that dominant control by the foreign partner 
negatively affects the firm performance of the local partner (i.e., Chinese firm), and dominant 
control does not affect foreign firm performance. With regard to the conceptualization of the 
cooperation and competition trade-off, two findings are particularly relevant. First, though the 
statistical tests incorporated factors representing cooperation and competition, the study’s 
objective was to examine the relationships between these factors. Therefore, the findings 
indicated that cooperative factors, such as partners’ combined experience or high-quality 
resources, positively relate to alliance performance, whereas relative foreign control (i.e., 
competition) relates negatively to it. However, we cannot achieve an in-depth understanding 
of the relationship between cooperative and competitive factors through the reported findings, 
because Child and Yan (2003) did not report these correlations. Second, Child and Yan 
(2003) examined each partner firm’s individual performance and joint venture performance. 
Their correlation matrix showed positive correlations among Chinese parent goals, foreign 
parent goals, and joint venture performance, which suggest that higher levels of alliance 
performance benefit all partners involved in an alliance. However, Child and Yan (2003) did 
not report any comparisons of the partner firms, so we cannot draw any conclusions about the 
type of trade-off. The results thus partially support the conceptualization of the cooperation 
and competition trade-off. 
 
Although neither Yan and Gray’s (2001) nor Child and Yan’s (2003) study explicitly 
conceptualized or tested the cooperation and competition trade-off, the empirical findings 
revealed some important insights. The findings contributed to a better understanding of the 
relationship between cooperative and competitive factors, though a limited one. The empirical 
results indicated that cooperation and competition affect both alliance performance and firm 
performance, albeit differently. Finally, the empirical findings with respect to the type of 
trade-off were inconclusive and therefore warrant further investigation. 
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Table 4.3 Cooperation and Competition: Empirical Studies 
Articles Perspective Cpa Cm AP FP Points of Interest
Child & Yan, 2003 Control 
Behavioral 
x x x x Dominant control negatively influences alliance performance and firm 
performance, whereas joint experience and high quality resourcing relate 
positively. Firm and alliance performance are positively associated 
Yan & Gray, 2001 Power 
Behavioral 
x x x x Imbalanced control positively influences relative firm performance; 
consensus positively influences alliance performance. Alliance and 
relative firm performance are negatively but not significantly correlated 
Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993 Power 
Behavioral 
x x x  Empirical results indicate that power imbalance, managerial imbalance, 
and conflict relate negatively to perceived effectiveness, whereas pay-off 
and partner fit are positively related 
Demirbag & Mirza, 2000 Behavioral x x x  Cooperation (e.g., trust and commitment) is positively related to joint 
venture performance, but conflicts (e.g., division of benefits and control) 
are negatively related 
Jap & Anderson, 2003 
 
Behavioral x x x  Empirical results indicate that the relationship between goal congruence, 
trust, and bilateral investments and alliance performance is moderated 
by the level of ex-post opportunism 
Judge & Dooley, 2006 Behavioral x x x  Opportunism negatively relates to alliance outcomes; trustworthiness 
and contractual safeguards negatively affect opportunistic behavior 
Luo, 2005 Behavioral x x x  Alliance performance is positively affected by shared procedural justice, 
and shared procedural justice is more important than asymmetrical 
perceived procedural justice is 
Ramaseshan & Loo, 1998 Power 
Behavioral 
x x x  A good relationship positively influences alliance effectiveness; power 
imbalance and dysfunctional conflicts are negatively related 
Tiessen & Linton, 2000 Behavioral x x x  Cooperation positively influences alliance performance, but competition 
is not significantly related. Results also indicate a negative association 
between cooperation and competition 
Blankenburg Holm, 
Eriksson, & Johanson, 1999 
Dependence x  x  Empirical results indicate a positive relationship between mutual 
dependence and alliance performance (i.e., value creation) 
Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004 Learning 
Behavioral 
x  x  A positive relationship exists between relational embeddedness and 
knowledge transfer; explicit knowledge transfer positively relates to 
alliance performance 
Lane & Lubatkin, 1998 Learning x  x  Positive relationships exist between relative absorptive capacity and 
alliance learning performance 
Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001 Learning 
Behavioral 
x  x  Trust positively influences a JV’s financial and strategic performance; the 
JV’s relative absorptive capacity relates positively to learning 
Luo, 2002 Behavioral  x  x  A positive relationship between trust and performance is moderated by 
risk sharing, market uncertainty, interdependence, and commitment 
Buchanan, 1992 Dependence x x  x Dependence symmetry positively relates to a firm’s financial 
performance objectives, as does dependence asymmetry 
Chen, 2004 Learning  
Behavioral 
x x  x A firm’s absorptive capacity and partner interaction (e.g., trust) positively 
influence a firm’s learning performance 
Cummings & Teng, 2003 Learning x x  x Knowledge and norm distance negatively influence knowledge transfer, 
whereas knowledge transfer activities are positively related  
Lavie, 2007 Dependence x x  x Complementary network resources foster a firm’s market performance, 
but relative bargaining constrains a firm’s appropriation capacity 
Lusch & Brown, 1996 Dependence x x  x Bilateral dependence positively influences normative contracting, which 
in turn affects firm performance positively. Firm performance is positively 
impacted by an alliance with a weaker partner 
Malhotra, Gosain, & 
El Sawy, 2005 
Learning x   x Mutually managing absorptive capacity positively influences a firm’s 
learning and operational performance 
Kale, Singh, &  
Perlmutter, 2000 
Behavioral 
Learning 
x   x Relational capital positively relates to a firm’s learning performance and 
also protects against unwanted knowledge transfer 
Kotabe, Martin, &  
Domoto, 2003 
Behavioral 
Learning 
x   x Relational assets positively moderate the relationship between higher-
level technology transfer and a supplier’s operational performance 
Simonin, 1997 Learning 
Behavioral 
x   x Collaborative know-how (selection, negotiation, management, and 
termination) relates positively to a firm’s tangible and intangible benefits  
Cool & Henderson, 1998 Dependence  x  x The dependence of a seller on a buyer or supplier negatively influences 
the seller’s profitability (weak/moderate effects) 
Hamel, 1991 Learning  x  x Empirical results indicate that firms are differently adept at interpartner 
learning and that learning asymmetries alter relative bargaining power 
Miles, Preece, & 
Baetz, 1999 
Dependence  x  x Being dependent on a larger partner firm hampers SME’s to realize their 
financial performance objectives 
Parkhe, 1993. Behavioral  x  x Opportunistic behavior by a partner firm negatively influences a focal 
firm’s performance 
Simonin, 1999 Learning  x  x A firm’s learning capacity and collaborative know-how positively 
moderate the relationship between knowledge ambiguity and learning 
a Cp = Cooperation; Cm = Competition; AP = Alliance Performance; FP = Firm Performance. 
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Empirical Studies: Alliance Performance 
Several alliance researchers examined the relationships among cooperation, competition, and 
alliance performance. These studies did not attempt to conceptualize or test a cooperation and 
competition trade-off, but the empirical findings provided, in some instances, indirect support 
for the conceptualization (see e.g., Bucklin et al., 1993; Demirbag et al., 2000; Jap et al., 
2003; Luo, 2005; Ramaseshan & Loo, 1998; Tiessen et al., 2000). Drawing on power and 
behavioral perspectives, studies within the marketing channel context produced evidence 
regarding the trade-off between cooperation and competition and supported a positive 
relationship between cooperation and alliance performance, as well as a negative relationship 
between competition and alliance performance. Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) found that a 
power imbalance (i.e., competition) between partners could be reduced through interfirm 
cooperation at the formation stage, in which context cooperation referred to issues such as 
formalizing exit barriers, agreeing on exclusivity, agreeing about financial incentives, and 
making transaction-specific investments. In addition, empirical results indicated that power 
imbalances, managerial imbalances, and conflict related negatively to alliance effectiveness, 
whereas anticipated positive pay-off and partner fit had positive impacts on alliance 
effectiveness. Similar results with regard to alliance performance appeared in Ramaseshan 
and Loo (1998), who focused on the quality of the working relationship (positive impact), 
dysfunctional conflicts (negative impact), and power imbalances (negative impact). 
Unfortunately, these authors did not report a correlation matrix, so we cannot draw any 
conclusions about the relationship between cooperative and competitive factors.  
 
Other alliance studies focused on behavioral aspects of the relationship. For instance, Jap and 
Anderson (2003) reported negative significant correlations between opportunism and bilateral 
idiosyncratic investments, goal congruence, and trust, which suggests a trade-off between 
cooperation and competition. The findings also indicated that the relationship between trust 
(i.e., cooperation) and alliance performance is stronger for lower levels of ex-post 
opportunism compared with higher levels (i.e., competition). Tiessen and Linton (2000) found 
that interfirm cooperation positively affects joint venture performance. Although they 
discovered a strong negative correlation between cooperation and competition, suggesting a 
trade-off, competition had no statistically significant impact on joint venture performance. 
Empirical studies provided support for the assertion that cooperation and competition relate 
negatively; cooperation positively and competition negatively relates to alliance performance.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, no alliance study explicitly investigated the relationship 
between competition and alliance performance in isolation; however substantial research 
examined the relationship between cooperative factors and alliance performance (for reviews, 
see Gulati, 1998; Inkpen, 2001; Olk, 2002; Robson et al., 2002). Although it is beyond the 
scope of this study to review such alliance literature, we think it useful to discuss a few 
exemplary studies. For instance, drawing on the power perspective, Blankenburg, Holm, 
Eriksson, and Johanson (1999) found a positive relationship between the mutual dependence 
between partner firms and value creation within a supplier business network setting. Drawing 
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on the behavioral and learning perspectives, Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma, and Tihani (2004) 
revealed support for their hypothesis that the positive impact of relational embeddedness on 
alliance performance is mediated by the degree of knowledge transfer between partners. Lane, 
Salk, and Lyles (2001) produced empirical evidence that trust positively influences a joint 
venture’s (JV) financial and strategic performance, and relative absorptive capacity positively 
influences a JV’s learning performance. Empirical work showed that mutual dependence (see 
e.g., Blankenburg Holm et al., 1999; Ganesan, 1994), a good working relationship (see e.g., 
Ariño et al., 1998; Aulakh et al., 1996; Luo, 2002b; Zaheer et al., 1998), and mutual 
knowledge and information exchange (see e.g., Dyer et al., 2000; Inkpen et al., 1997; Lane et 
al., 1998; Simonin, 1999) positively relate to alliance performance.  
 
Alliance researchers who have examined alliance performance acknowledged that firms 
engaged in an alliance need to divide their efforts between cooperation and competition. 
Moreover, they produced support for positive relationships between cooperative factors and 
alliance performance and reported negative relationships between competitive factors and 
alliance performance. However, these findings should be interpreted with caution, as 
hypotheses are built on an implicit and questionable assumption, namely, that efforts 
beneficial to the alliance are also beneficial to individual firms. That is, they assumed alliance 
performance and individual firm performance relate positively, which would suggest firms 
confront a moderate trade-off. This assumption conflicts with the proposition that firms 
participating in an alliance actually face a strong type of trade-off. Therefore, an important 
implication is that the direction of the relationship between alliance performance and firm 
performance should be hypothesized and tested, rather than simply assumed. 
 
Empirical Studies: Firm Performance 
A substantial subset of alliance research has focused on individual firm performance but 
neglected to examine the relationship between parties’ performance. This approach deviates 
from our conceptualization, because researchers implicitly assumed that cooperative and 
competitive factors, which contribute to the focal firm’s performance, also foster or impede 
alliance performance and the partner firm’s performance. Nonetheless, these empirical studies 
contributed to a better understanding of the cooperation and competition trade-off.  
 
Researchers drawing on a power perspective found that cooperation between partners 
positively relates to firm performance, whereas competitive factors impede it. Lusch and 
Brown (1996) examined the dependency structure between wholesalers and their major 
suppliers and found that bilateral dependence leads to normative contracting, which relates 
positively to wholesaler performance. In addition, empirical results indicated that supplier 
dependence has a positive indirect effect, through normative contracting, on the wholesaler’s 
performance level. Buchanan (1992) found that high levels of interdependence between a 
buyer and supplier positively relate to the buyer’s performance, though dependence on a 
supplier also positively affects buyer performance. One explanation for this finding indicates 
that the value generated by an externally acquired resource outweighs a possible cost related 
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to the supplier’s dominant bargaining position. Finally, Lavie (2007) found that 
complementary network resources contribute to a focal firm’s market performance, whereas 
the relative bargaining power of partners constrains a firm’s appropriation capacity.  
 
Researchers drawing on learning and behavioral perspectives also produced empirical support 
for the relationships among cooperation, competition, and firm performance. For instance, 
Chen (2004) found that a firm’s absorptive capacity and partner interaction (e.g., trust) relate 
positively to a firm’s learning performance. Cummings and Teng (2003) reported findings 
that indicate knowledge and norm distance between partners negatively influence firm 
performance, whereas transfer activities positively affect knowledge exchange. These 
empirical studies have demonstrated that parties direct their efforts toward cooperation and 
competition and that the examined factors have inverse relationships with firm performance.  
 
A few studies examined the relationships among cooperation, competition, and firm 
performance in isolation. For instance, drawing on the power perspective, Miles, Preece, and 
Baetz (1999) found that if a small- to medium-sized enterprise (SME) depends on a larger 
counterpart, its financial performance decreases. Cool and Henderson (1998) found that the 
dependence of a seller on a buyer or supplier negatively influences the seller’s financial 
performance. Using the learning perspective, Hamel (1991) indicated that firms may have 
different (i.e., unequal) abilities to appropriate learning benefits, and Parkhe (1993a) found 
that opportunistic behavior by a partner firm negatively relates to the focal firm’s 
performance. These studies have demonstrated that value appropriation mechanisms 
positively relate to firm performance. Furthermore, other studies found that cooperative 
factors positively relate to firm performance. For instance, using a behavioral perspective, 
Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter (2000) found that relational capital influences a firm’s learning 
performance and protects against unwanted knowledge spill-over. In a study on Japanese and 
U.S. automotive suppliers, Kotabe, Martin, and Domoto (2003) offered empirical support for 
the hypothesis that relational assets moderate the relationship between high-order technology 
transfer and a supplier’s operational performance. Simonin (1999) found that a firm’s learning 
capacity facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge, and Malhotra, Gosain, and El Sawy (2005) 
showed that higher levels of mutual absorptive capacity positively influence a firm’s learning 
and operational performance. We therefore conclude that substantial empirical support exists 
for the proposition that cooperative and competitive factors influence firm performance.  
 
In summary, researchers who examined the relationships of cooperation, competition, and 
firm performance have produced indirect support for the conceptualization of the cooperation 
and competition trade-off. That is, they reported relationships between cooperative factors 
(i.e., positive), competitive factors (i.e., negative), and firm performance, but they built on the 
implicit assumption that individual firm performance and alliance performance are either 
unrelated or positively associated. This implicit assumption deviates from our assertion that 
parties confront a strong type of trade-off. Therefore, for further theory development and 
testing, we formulate the relationship between alliance and firm performance as a hypothesis. 
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4.5 Implications for Theory Development 
Although cooperative and competitive dynamics are tied inherently to strategic alliances 
(Evan, 1965; Litwak et al., 1962; Ouchi, 1980), theory development and empirical testing 
with respect to the cooperation and competition trade-off has been relatively scarce. When we 
consider the proposed conceptualization of a cooperation and competition trade-off, along 
with the theoretical perspectives and empirical studies available, we reach three conclusions.  
 
First, the variety of theoretical perspectives and associated conceptual definitions have made a 
coherent conceptualization of cooperation and competition impossible. In addition, theoretical 
perspectives, such as TCE, game theory, and the RBV, possess conceptual limitations that 
hamper our understanding of the cooperation and competition trade-off. For instance, 
researchers drawing on TCE logic provided a better understanding of the conditions in which 
a firm will choose a particular type of governance form to organize an exchange relationship, 
but their explanations were constrained to the firm perspective. Using game theory, 
researchers produced a clearer picture of the relationship between pay-off structure and 
parties’ decision-making, but with respect to cooperation and competition, this work built 
solely on a dilemma approach. Despite some limitations, the power, learning, and behavioral 
perspectives offer explanations that advance our understanding of the cooperation and 
competition trade-off. The three theoretical perspectives share the notion that parties make 
decisions with respect to the efforts they will spend on cooperation and competition. In 
addition, researchers have identified distinct value creation and appropriation mechanisms. 
Drawing on the power perspective, researchers addressed cooperation and competition 
through bargaining power; adherents of the learning perspective focused on learning; and 
proponents of the behavioral perspective focused on relational norms. However, the 
antecedents of these value creation and appropriation mechanisms remain unclear, as does 
their relationship with alliance performance and firm performance. We believe that the power, 
learning, and behavioral perspectives provide fruitful grounds for further theorizing on the 
cooperation and competition trade-off.  
 
Furthermore, empirical research supported the explanations provided by the power, learning, 
and behavioral perspectives. As shown in Table 4.3, most empirical studies drew on one or 
more of the three theoretical perspectives to explain alliance and firm performance. For 
instance, researchers who examined learning in an alliance context drew on the learning and 
behavioral perspectives (see e.g., Chen, 2004; Kale et al., 2000; Kotabe et al., 2003), and 
other researchers drew on power and behavioral perspectives to examine management control 
in alliances (see e.g., Bucklin et al., 1993; Yan et al., 2001). In other words, empirical 
research substantiated our conclusion that the power, learning, and behavioral perspectives 
may function as appropriate building blocks for theory development. However, consistent 
with empirical findings (see e.g., Child et al., 2003; Luo, 2005), we also suggest that to 
understand the nature of the cooperation and competition trade-off, we may use equity theory 
and the resource-based view for theory development. 
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Third, the results of the literature review indicate that with only two exceptions (i.e., Child et 
al., 2003; Yan et al., 2001), empirical alliance research examined alliance and firm 
performance in isolation, assuming alliance decision-making represents a weak or moderate 
trade-off. That is, researchers implicitly assumed that benefits to the alliance also benefit, or at 
least do not damage, individual firm interests, and vice versa. However, as discussed in 
Section 4.2, a party’s competitive efforts to increase individual performance may succeed or 
may negatively affect value creation. This implicit assumption, on which extant empirical 
alliance research builds, deviates from the conceptualization of the cooperation and 
competition trade-off. We postulate that to advance theory development with respect to 
alliance performance, the relationships among cooperation, competition, alliance performance 
and firm performance must be examined simultaneously. Thus, though existing conceptual 
(see e.g., Kumar & Nti, 1998; Larsson et al., 1998) and empirical (see e.g., Child et al., 2003; 
Demirbag et al., 2000; Yan et al., 2001) work certainly contains some limitations, prior 
research also has provided a strong foundation from which to develop a set of hypotheses.  
 
Figure 4.3 Cooperation and Competition: From Conceptualization to Hypotheses 
 
 
To address these conclusions—the need for a theoretical model with testable hypotheses—we 
note that in addition to existing insights, the conceptualization of the cooperation and 
competition trade-off provides guidance to advanced theory development (see Figure 4.3). 
Drawing on the power perspective, we argue that bargaining power constitutes a value 
creation and appropriation mechanism that results in a compensation trade-off. According to 
the learning perspective, learning depicts a value creation and appropriation mechanism that 
results in a learning trade-off; finally, our reading of the behavioral perspective leads us to 
argue that relational norms constitute a value creation and appropriation mechanism that 
results in a relational trade-off. In summary, each type of cooperation and competition trade-
off advances understanding about alliance performance and responds to our conclusions with 
respect to the literature review. That is, the compensation, learning, and relational trade-offs 
(1) draw on our conceptualization of the cooperation and competition trade-off, (2) build off 
of a solid theoretical foundation, and (3) are empirically testable.  
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Chapter 5 Cooperation and Competition Trade-Off 
Theoretical Model 
Building on the results of the literature review presented in Chapter 4, we develop in this 
chapter three types of cooperation and competition trade-offs: (1) the compensation trade-off, 
(2) the learning trade-off, and (3) the relational trade-off. First, we draw on the power 
perspective and argue that during the alliance formation stage, partners use bargaining power 
to resolve a compensation trade-off. To test this trade-off, we develop six hypotheses that 
relate compensation integrativeness, compensation imbalance, alliance performance, and firm 
performance imbalance. Second, drawing on the learning perspective, we argue that during 
the post-formation stage, firms must resolve the learning trade-off to achieve their 
performance objectives. To provide a test of this learning trade-off, we develop another set of 
six hypotheses entailing the relationships among absorption integrativeness, absorption 
imbalance, alliance performance, and firm performance imbalance. Third, drawing on the 
behavioral perspective, we argue that as the alliance unfolds, relational norms guide partner 
firm behavior toward cooperation and competition. To provide a test of what we call the 
relational trade-off, we introduce six hypotheses relating relational quality, opportunistic 
behavior, alliance performance, and firm performance imbalance.  
 
With respect to each cooperation and competition trade-off, we discuss the theoretical 
foundation, elaborate on the sources and consequences of the value creation and appropriation 
mechanisms, and develop hypotheses. That is, in Section 5.1, we present the compensation 
trade-off. In Section 5.2, we introduce the learning trade-off, and in Section 5.3, we develop 
the relational trade-off. We conclude the chapter with conclusions in Section 5.4.  
 
5.1 Hypothesis 2: The Compensation Trade-Off  
In this section, we present a set of six hypotheses that together depict the first cooperation and 
competition trade-off, namely, the compensation trade-off. Drawing on the power perspective, 
we argue that during the alliance formation stage, firms must resolve the compensation trade-
off to achieve individual performance objectives. We also argue that compensation 
integrativeness and compensation imbalance represent the outcomes of negotiation strategies 
with respect to parties’ anticipated compensation. Consistent with cooperation and 
competition trade-off (see §4.2), we hypothesize that compensation integrativeness and 
compensation imbalance are inversely related to alliance performance and firm performance 
imbalance. However, before we introduce the hypotheses, we discuss the power perspective to 
recognize the causes and consequences of bargaining power in alliance negotiations.  
 
The Power Perspective 
Researchers drawing on the power perspective have concentrated their efforts on the causes 
and consequences of the relative dependence of actors on one another and argued that this 
relative dependence equals the inverse of the power relationship between actors (Blau, 1964; 
Cook & Emerson, 1978; Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer et al., 1978). That is, actor A has power over 
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actor B to the extent that actor B perceives itself as more dependent on actor A than actor A 
perceives it to be on actor B (Wolfe & McGinn, 2005). This view of power implies that 
actors, such as managers, departments, and firms, do not possess power but that power rather 
is a relational and perceptual phenomenon. For instance, Emerson (1962) contributed to the 
development of social exchange theory and argued that power cannot be examined in isolation 
but must be understood relative to the power of both parties. Introducing the resource 
dependence theory, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) proposed that firms seek to reduce 
uncertainty and manage dependence on their external environment by purposefully increasing 
power over their relationships while reducing their own dependence. Advocates of bilateral 
deterrence theory argued that when two actors have equal power, higher levels of coercive 
capability reduce competitive behavior (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Lawler, Ford, & Blegen, 
1988). Proponents of the bargaining power theory and negotiation analysis also argued that 
the relative power between actors influences their use of negotiation strategies (Kersten, 2001; 
Lax et al., 1986; Sebenius, 1992). These perspectives on power share two premises: 
(1) When two actors, A and B, engage in a relationship, they establish a power 
relationship that influences the configuration and outcomes of an exchange 
relationship; 
(2) If an actor A has power over an actor B, it likely uses this power to pursue its 
individual objectives, if necessary at the expense of actor B.  
 
In this study, we apply these two premises to the alliance negotiation context. We postulate 
that when two parties form an alliance, they establish a power relationship, which directly 
affects the configuration and outcomes of the relationship through the actors’ choice of 
negotiation strategies (Lax et al., 1986). That is, firms involved in an alliance negotiation use 
their bargaining power to pursue individual objectives (Blodgett, 1991b; Hamel, 1991). 
Through hostile negotiation strategies, firms may extract additional benefits or optimize their 
resource contribution relative to their counterparts. Thus, bargaining power functions as a 
value appropriation mechanism. However, as firms form alliances to achieve objectives that 
otherwise would be difficult or even impossible to achieve (e.g., too costly), they also need to 
contribute to the achievement of their counterparts’ objectives. To address mutual interests, 
parties may also adopt conciliatory negotiation strategies that enable them to exploit a mixed-
motive negotiation (Kersten, 2001). Mixed-motive negotiation refers to a situation in which a 
negotiation outcome between parties has “integrative” potential (Sebenius, 1992); thus, prior 
to the negotiation, no clear conception of possible outcomes exist, but definitive outcomes 
offer value to each party, beyond what each could have achieved individually (Sebenius, 
1992). In turn, conditional on the nature of the power relationship, bargaining power may also 
function as an ex-ante value creation mechanism. To gain a better understanding of the role 
bargaining power plays during alliance negotiation, we elaborate on (1) the sources of 
bargaining power, (2) bargaining power as a value creation and value appropriation 
mechanism, and (3) manifestations of bargaining power use. Figure 5.1 provides a graphical 
representation.  
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Sources and Mechanism: Bargaining Power 
Advocates of the power perspective argued that a party’s bargaining power originates from 
three sources: (1) the exchange context, (2) resources, and (3) negotiation tactics (Kim, 
Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005; Lax et al., 1986; Pfeffer et al., 1978; Thompson, 1990). The first 
source of power refers to the availability of alternatives that a firm has to pursue its individual 
objectives (Yan et al., 1994). A firm’s power relative to another party increases if the number 
of alternatives to attract desired resources increases (Pfeffer et al., 1978). For instance, a 
firm’s relative power increases if that firm can carry out its threat to ally with another firm or 
develop a desired resource in house. In contrast, a firm is highly dependent on another when 
the potential partner possesses desired resources that the focal firm cannot easily obtain 
otherwise (Emerson, 1962). Market imperfections and the indivisibility of resources represent 
barriers to resource acquisition. Thus, a firm gains a bargaining power advantage when it has 
more alternatives available than its counterpart does to achieve individual objectives.  
 
Figure 5.1 Power Perspective: Sources, Mechanism, and Manifestation 
 
 
A second source of power originates from the possession or control of resources exchanged 
between partner firms (Blodgett, 1991b). That is, a firm gains a bargaining power advantage 
when it possesses or controls valuable resources that are needed by another firm (Pfeffer et 
al., 1978). According to the resource-based theory, valuable, rare, non-imitable, and non-
substitutable resources are critical for achieving competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). 
Resources with these characteristics are often tacit and intangible in nature (Das et al., 2000b; 
Furrer, Sudharshan, & Thomas, 2001). Blodgett (1991b) argued that resources with a high 
degree of tacitness provide a party with a bargaining power advantage, because it is difficult 
for potential partners to determine ex-ante the value of those tacit resources. Thus, as the 
tacitness of the desired resources increases, a firm’s relative bargaining power decreases. 
These first two sources of bargaining power build on the notion that firms are not self-
sufficient entities (Heide, 1994; Pfeffer et al., 1978), and this lack of self-sufficiency creates 
power relationships with external parties (Emerson, 1962).  
 
=  The three sources affect the relative bargaining power of the partners directly and interactively; therefore, bargaining
power is an alliance-level property. 
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In contrast, the third source of bargaining power originates directly from negotiation tactics 
(Kim et al., 2005; Lax et al., 1986). A negotiator assesses the power relationship and decides 
to deploy negotiation tactics in an effort to change the power relationship to its advantage 
(Kim et al., 2005; Lawler, 1992). Basically, this change can occur through four tactics: (1) 
improve the quality of the counterpart’s “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” 
(BATNA), (2) decrease the quality of the counterpart’s BATNA, (3) decrease the valuation of 
the counterpart’s contribution, or (4) increase the counterpart’s valuation of the focal firm’s 
contribution (Emerson, 1962; Kim et al., 2005; Pfeffer et al., 1978). That is, to shift relative 
bargaining power, a firm can decrease its dependence on its counterpart (i.e., 1 and 3) or 
increase its counterpart’s dependence on it (i.e., 2 and 4). Parties can use a variety of 
negotiation instruments to achieve this objective (Lax et al., 1986). For example, through 
communication and persuasion, a negotiator may coerce the other party to accept a 
compensation structure that conflicts with its interests. A firm might also present information 
in such a manner that it looks like a win–win situation for all parties. Furthermore, a party 
may derive power because it possesses specialized knowledge or information that the other 
party does not. Identification with a charismatic person or a negotiator’s skill in building good 
personal relationships may also function as influence tactics, as can advocacy of normative 
conformity (i.e., claiming that one’s position is correct, legitimate, or principled).  
 
Together, exchange context, resources, and negotiation tactics provide a party with a level of 
bargaining power relative to its counterpart, which it may use to negotiate a variety of topics, 
such as the scope, nature, and content of contractual provisions. We focus on partners’ 
compensation, because the use of bargaining power directly affects each party’s anticipated 
rewards and contributions, as formalized in an alliance contract (Blodgett, 1991b). That is, 
exercising bargaining power functions as a value creation and value appropriation mechanism 
that directs parties’ efforts toward the use of conciliatory and hostile negotiation strategies 
(Lax et al., 1986). If used effectively, bargaining power enables parties to formalize a 
compensation structure characterized by a balance between individual and mutual interests. 
More specifically, building on the insights of the power perspective, we propose that:23  
(1) An equal level of bargaining power between two parties increases parties’ likelihood 
to use conciliatory negotiation strategies and decreases their likelihood to use hostile 
negotiation strategies, resulting in compensation integrativeness (i.e., cooperation); 
(2) A bargaining power imbalance increases parties’ likelihood to use hostile negotiation 
strategies and reduces their likelihood to use conciliatory negotiation strategies, 
resulting in compensation imbalance (i.e., competition).  
 
Manifestation: Cooperation 
Compensation integrativeness refers to the combination of parties’ anticipated benefits as 
formalized in the alliance contract, regardless of whether parties’ anticipated compensations 
are balanced or imbalanced (see §3.1). A high level of compensation integrativeness means 
                                                 
23 To present a parsimonious framework, we neglect the distinction among potential power, perceived power, 
and power use. We assume that parties use a bargaining power advantage to pursue their individual objectives. 
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that firms have formalized a compensation structure that maximizes the value creation 
potential of the alliance. Compensation integrativeness is Pareto optimal if there does not 
exist some other feasible solution that would improve the utility of one or both parties while 
not hurting either party (Thompson, 1990). This type of negotiation outcome results when 
firms choose negotiation strategies that bargaining and negotiation literature characterize as 
conciliatory and integrative (see e.g., Lawler, 1992; Lax et al., 1986; Thompson, 1990). 
 
A conciliatory negotiation strategy enables parties to develop win–win solutions, achieve 
value creation, and create synergies beyond what would have been possible alone (Jap, 1999; 
Lax et al., 1986; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). When, during the alliance negotiation, parties adopt a 
problem-solving orientation, they likely identify similarities in their interests and develop 
common objectives (Ariño et al., 2004). Transparency between partners and the speed and 
reliability with which partners learn about each other’s actions results in proposals and 
counterproposals, discussions about the workability of solutions, and efforts to uncover 
mutual interests (Olekalns et al., 1996; Parkhe, 1993a). To overcome potentially incompatible 
interests, parties seek settlements that are better for all parties involved (Lax et al., 1986). 
Compensation integrativeness requires flexibility among parties and a willingness to think 
outside the box to discover efficient compensation structures (Sebenius, 1992). Consistent 
with prior research on bargaining power and negotiations (see e.g., Kim et al., 2005; Lawler, 
1992), we argue that parties are more likely to adopt conciliatory negotiation strategies than 
hostile negotiation strategies in conditions of equal bargaining power.  
 
Equal bargaining power refers to a situation in which partner firms can exercise a similar 
amount of influence to achieve their individual objectives (Lax et al., 1986). Two arguments 
support the proposition that equal levels of bargaining power increase the use of conciliatory 
negotiation strategies (Lawler, 1992). First, according to power dependence theory (Emerson, 
1962), a low level of equal bargaining power between firms (i.e., parties have few other 
options available) increases the opportunity costs of concluding the negotiation without an 
agreement. Withdrawal from the alliance negotiation or refusal to provide benefits increases 
the counterpart’s opportunity costs of staying in the relationship by reducing the difference 
between the benefit obtained from within the alliance and the prospective benefit from an 
alternative. A low level of equal bargaining power also increases the stakes of reaching a 
reasonable and mutually beneficial conclusion with respect to an alliance’s compensation 
structure (Lawler, 1992). 
 
Second, drawing on bilateral deterrence theory,24 a high level of equal bargaining power 
reduces tensions between parties, because a party’s desire to engage in conflicts with its 
counterpart becomes attenuated out of fear of retaliation and attack (Kumar, Scheer, & 
                                                 
24 Advocates of conflict spiral theory proposed an alternative explanation (Lawler, 1992). If the power capability 
of two parties increases, they are more tempted to use their power and therefore more likely to use competitive 
and hostile negotiation strategies. However, we do not use this theory, because empirical support for the 
hypothesis is weak (Lawler, Ford, & Blegen, 1988). 
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Steenkamp, 1995b). It is unlikely that one party will coerce its counterpart to accept a 
settlement that conflicts with this party’s individual interests. As each party’s bargaining 
power increases, retaliation becomes a greater threat for both partners, because each partner 
possesses sufficient power to damage the other party. When parties have equal yet substantial 
levels of bargaining power, exercising it likely results in a loss for both parties (Lawler, 
1992). In summary, when the power relationship between two parties is balanced, the 
likelihood that parties use conciliatory negotiation strategies to accommodate each other’s 
objectives increases, which in turn fosters compensation integrativeness. 
 
Manifestation: Competition 
A compensation imbalance refers to the asymmetry between each party’s anticipated benefits 
as formalized in the alliance contract (see §3.1) and implies that the partners have formalized 
a compensation structure in which one party can expect to extract more benefits from the 
alliance relative to its counterpart. An imbalance in firms’ reward/contribution ratio may 
occur when a party exploits a power advantage and seeks to maximize its individual gain at 
the expense of its partner (Olekalns et al., 1996). For instance, a party may receive an 
exceptionally large advance payment, negotiate a better transfer price, or obtain a higher 
valuation for its intangible resource contribution relative to its counterpart. This type of 
outcome results when firms choose negotiation strategies that bargaining and negotiation 
literature characterize as hostile and distributive (see e.g., Lawler, 1992; Lax et al., 1986). 
 
Parties adopting a hostile negotiation strategy focus on securing their individual interests, 
appropriating value through the alliance, and sharing the pie (Jap, 2001a). This type of 
negotiation is characterized by reduced information exchange between partners, greater 
commitment to individual interests, and increased hostility toward each other (Lax et al., 
1986). The exchange of information becomes crucial, because parties are concerned with 
maximizing the amount of information they receive while also minimizing the amount of 
information they give (Wolfe et al., 2005). The sole aim of parties is to direct efforts toward 
formalizing a compensation structure that enables them to appropriate future benefits. 
Consistent with prior research on bargaining and negotiation (Kim et al., 2005; Lawler, 1992), 
we postulate that parties are more likely to adopt hostile negotiation strategies in conditions of 
bargaining power imbalance.  
 
If bargaining power imbalance is present between firms, one party has relatively more power 
than its counterpart (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer et al., 1978). Consistent with the power 
perspective’s second premise, parties likely use this power advantage to secure their own 
performance objectives by claiming additional compensation, if necessary at the expense of 
its counterpart (Lawler, 1992). Consistent with bilateral deterrence theory (Lawler et al., 
1988), we argue that as the power relationship becomes more imbalanced, the dominant party 
has fewer incentives to avoid conflict, because it knows the suppressed firm cannot retaliate 
easily. However, the suppressed party does not necessarily respond submissively, because it 
expects exploitation by the dominant firm. Drawing on power-distance theory (Mulder, 1977), 
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we argue that in an alliance context, the perceived power gap between two firms must be 
relatively small, because otherwise, firms would prematurely terminate the alliance 
negotiation. Moreover, if a suppressed firm perceives a small power gap, it will engage in 
preemptive competitive behavior (i.e., hostile negotiation strategies) in an attempt to reduce 
the gap (Kumar et al., 1995b). To the extent that a suppressed firm acts to reduce the gap, the 
dominant firm will attempt to maintain that same power gap. In summary, asymmetrical 
bargaining power between firms directs their efforts toward the use of hostile negotiation 
strategies, which in turn increase the likelihood of a compensation imbalance.  
 
The Compensation Trade-Off 
Drawing on the power perspective, the first cooperation and competition trade-off we 
introduce is the compensation trade-off. Consistent with the conceptualization (see §4.2), we 
hypothesize that compensation integrativeness positively relates to alliance performance and 
negatively relates to firm performance imbalances. In contrast, compensation imbalance 
should relate negatively to alliance performance but have a positive impact on firm 
performance imbalance.25 As depicted in Figure 5.2, we also hypothesize that compensation 
integrativeness negatively associates with compensation imbalance and that alliance 
performance negatively associates with firm performance imbalance (i.e., Hypothesis 2f). 
Here, we do not elaborate on the latter relationship, because in Section 4.2, we already 
provided support for this relationship. Here, we discuss the five remaining hypotheses, 2a–e. 
 
Figure 5.2 Hypothesis 2: Compensation Trade-Off 
 
H2a: Compensation Integrativeness and Compensation Imbalance 
We hypothesize that compensation integrativeness and compensation imbalance are 
negatively associated, which in turn implies that when firms formalize a compensation 
structure that is Pareto optimal (i.e., integrative), it is less likely that one firm can extract 
additional compensation at the expense of its counterpart. The reasons for this negative 
association are straightforward. To achieve a high level of compensation integrativeness 
efficiently and effectively, parties direct efforts, such as resources and time, toward deploying 
conciliatory negotiation strategies. Parties that create openness, build transparency, engage in 
mutual information exchange, and stimulate joint problem solving are more likely to achieve 
                                                 
25 We focus on the relationships among the constructs, as defined previously: compensation integrativeness 
(§3.1), compensation imbalance (§3.1), alliance performance (§1.1), and firm performance imbalance (§4.2).  
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aligned interests and therefore optimal reward/contribution ratios for each partner. Moreover, 
parties’ use of conciliatory negotiation strategies contributes to value creation beyond that 
which would have been impossible individually. Hence, because parties can anticipate 
benefits beyond their initial expectations, it is less likely that they will negotiate and formalize 
a compensation imbalance. In contrast, hostile negotiation strategies come at the expense of 
achieving a Pareto optimal solution and involve withholding information and distorting 
information to secure and protect individual interests (Kersten, 2001). The presence of a 
power imbalance may drive parties to use hostile negotiation strategies (Kim et al., 2005), and 
if one party succeeds in coercing its partner into accepting a disadvantageous deal, a 
compensation imbalance results. However, the definitive negotiated and formalized outcome 
likely is less efficient than it could have been if the parties had adopted conciliatory strategies 
and sought more optimal negotiation solutions. Hence, we hypothesize a negative association 
between compensation integrativeness and compensation imbalance.  
 
H2b and H2c: Alliance Performance 
Compensation integrativeness is expected to positively affect alliance performance, whereas 
compensation imbalance should negatively relate. Compensation integrativeness provides 
parties with strong incentives to make the alliance work, because each party anticipates 
benefits that outweigh investments (Parkhe, 1993a). A compensation structure that promises 
to fulfill the individual partner firms’ objectives reduces the likelihood of ex-post exchange 
hazards, because short-term, self-interested behavior damages the possibility of long-term 
value creation. For instance, royalties reduce the probability of premature termination, 
because such residual profit sharing links payments to the actual performance of the alliance 
(Contractor et al., 2000). Compensation integrativeness also contributes to alliance stability, 
because a satisfactory incentive system guides parties’ behavior toward reducing the negative 
consequences of destabilizing forces, such as goal conflicts (Hennart et al., 2005). 
Compensation integrativeness also promotes behavioral transparency and openness in an 
alliance (Parkhe, 1993a), and stable alliances are more likely to produce superior alliance 
performance levels than are unstable alliances (Yan et al., 1999). 
 
A compensation imbalance negatively relates to alliance performance because it increases the 
likelihood of exchange hazards (Contractor et al., 2000), which undermines alliance 
performance. Compensation imbalance also provides parties with incentives to direct ex-post 
conduct toward achieving individual objectives. That is, the likelihood of opportunistic 
behavior increases, because a partner firm may perceive that it has not been sufficiently 
compensated for its efforts (Wathne et al., 2000). For instance, a lump-sum payment in 
exchange for expertise is subject to the risk of overpayment, as a result of the difficulties 
associated with knowledge valuation (Contractor, 2001). If the partner perceives 
overpayment, the danger of its subsequent shirking and free-riding behavior increases 
(Contractor et al., 2000), because it wants to increase its return on investment and has no 
guarantees that its counterpart will comply with contractual obligations. That is, the 
knowledge-supplying partner may withhold information, breach contractual clauses, or 
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threaten to seek for alternative strategies to achieve its objectives. However, the party that 
receives the advance payment anticipates such opportunistic behavior and therefore may 
engage in preemptive actions, such as shirking and free-riding. The presence of a 
compensation imbalance therefore increases the likelihood that parties do not fulfill their 
contractual obligations, which undermines alliance performance.  
 
Although conceptual studies aimed to provide a better understanding of an alliance’s 
compensation structure (see e.g., Aulakh, 2001; Contractor et al., 2000; Hennart et al., 2005), 
empirical research on the relationship between compensation structure and alliance 
performance remains relatively scarce (Contractor, 2005). One exception is Parkhe’s (1993a) 
study, which found that a pay-off structure characterized by mutual cooperation resulted in 
higher levels of alliance performance than did pay-off structures characterized by unilateral 
defection and unilateral cooperation. In addition, Contractor and Ra (2000) concluded, on the 
basis of a simulation study, that firms that set up hybrid compensation structures reduced their 
ex-post risks, increased mutual commitment, and made the alliance more difficult to dissolve. 
These findings support the positive relationship between alliance performance and 
compensation integrativeness and its negative relationship with compensation imbalance.  
 
H2d and H2e: Firm Performance Imbalance 
We hypothesize that compensation integrativeness relates negatively to firm performance 
imbalance, whereas a compensation imbalance relates positively. A high level of 
compensation integrativeness attenuates firm performance imbalance, because parties 
formalize a compensation structure that enables each to achieve its performance objectives. 
An integrative negotiation outcome therefore implies that the parties have found a settlement 
that maximizes the perceived value creation potential of the alliance. In addition, neither party 
believes it can improve on its bargain without hindering its individual objectives, because 
demanding additional compensation would reduce the value creation potential of the alliance. 
For instance, parties may agree to use a combination of ex-ante sharing and residual sharing 
(Hennart et al., 2005), which provides them with strong incentives to fulfill their contractual 
obligations (Contractor et al., 2000). If parties comply with their contractual obligations, they 
should obtain their anticipated performance objectives. Therefore, we hypothesize that an 
alliance characterized by compensation integrativeness is less likely to produce differences in 
individual firm performances. 
 
In contrast, compensation imbalance relates positively to firm performance imbalance, 
because a party that has exploited a bargaining power advantage and coerced its counterpart 
to comply with its demands is also more likely to achieve its individual objectives at the 
expense of its partner firm. When a party receives an advance payment, it may already have 
achieved its financial objectives, even before the alliance is operational. If parties fulfill their 
contractual obligations—contribute resources and divide benefits according to their initial 
agreement—any difference between their ex-ante reward/contribution ratios probably leads to 
a difference in the degree to which they achieve their performance objectives. Moreover, a 
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compensation imbalance increases the risk of opportunistic behavior, which destabilizes an 
alliance. Consequently, a firm may act on this opportunity and realize its goals at the expense 
of its counterpart. With respect to the relationships among compensation integrativeness, 
compensation imbalance, and firm performance imbalance, empirical alliance research is, to 
the best of our knowledge, absent.  
 
When firms direct their alliance negotiation efforts toward establishing compensation 
structures that are integrative, both parties have much to gain, because this type of negotiation 
outcome increases alliance stability, which in turn leads to higher alliance performance. In 
addition, compensation integrativeness reduces the difference between individual firm 
performance levels. In contrast, if a compensation structure reflects an imbalance in the 
divisions of contribution and rewards, one party has too much to lose. For example, if a party 
demands a lump-sum payment or a higher royalty fee as additional compensation, it may 
undermine long-term value creation, which eventually means the parties appropriate less 
value than would have been possible. Although a compensation imbalance increases the 
likelihood that one party achieves its objectives, it also increases the likelihood of ex-post 
exchange hazards, which undermine long-term alliance performance. These predictions are 
consistent with the cooperation and competition trade-off; therefore, we hypothesize  
 
H2: During the alliance formation stage, partner firms are confronted with a 
compensation trade-off, in which:  
a. Compensation integrativeness and compensation imbalance are negatively 
associated, 
b. Compensation integrativeness relates positively to alliance performance,  
c. Compensation imbalance relates negatively to alliance performance,  
d. Compensation integrativeness relates negatively to firm performance imbalance, 
e. Compensation imbalance relates positively to firm performance imbalance, and 
f. Alliance performance and firm performance imbalance are negatively associated. 
 
5.2 Hypothesis 3: The Learning Trade-Off 
In this section, we present a set of six hypotheses that together represent the second 
cooperation and competition trade-off, namely, the learning trade-off. Drawing on the 
learning perspective, we argue that during the post-alliance formation stage, firms need to 
resolve the learning trade-off to achieve their performance objectives. We also postulate that 
absorption integrativeness and absorption imbalance, respectively, represent the cooperative 
and competitive manifestations of parties’ use of integrative and distributive learning 
strategies. More specifically, consistent the cooperation and competition trade-off (see §4.2), 
we hypothesize about the relationships among absorption integrativeness, absorption 
imbalance, alliance performance, and firm performance imbalance. Before presenting the 
hypotheses, we elaborate the learning perspective. 
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Learning Perspective 
Researchers have approached the relationship between learning and alliances from multiple 
perspectives, including firms’ capability to manage alliances (Kale et al., 2002; Simonin, 
1997), ability to stimulate knowledge transfer (Inkpen et al., 1998), capacity to create new 
knowledge (Holmqvist, 2003), and capability to acquire knowledge through the alliance 
(Hamel, 1991). The first two types of learning focus on conditions that facilitate the transfer 
of knowledge, whereas the latter two focus on parties’ rationales for entering an alliance, that 
is, knowledge creation and acquisition. With respect to the cooperation and competition trade-
off, we focus on knowledge creation and acquisition.  
 
To achieve their performance objectives, partners must internalize, at least to a certain degree, 
newly created knowledge or knowledge possessed by the partners (Lubatkin et al., 2001). For 
instance, to launch a new product successfully, gain market share, and obtain profits, parties 
should first learn with and from one another. As a result of this view of learning, we consider 
knowledge creation and acquisition as relational phenomena (Holmqvist, 2003). That is, the 
extent to which parties can assess and absorb knowledge and information depends on the 
nature of their learning relationship with their partners (Lane et al., 1998; Lane et al., 2001; 
Larsson et al., 1998; Lubatkin et al., 2001; Muthusamy et al., 2005). More specifically, our 
view on learning builds on two premises: 
(1) When two actors, A and B, engage in a relationship, they establish a learning 
relationship that influences the development and outcomes of the exchange 
relationship; 
(2) If actor A relative to actor B has a learning advantage, it likely uses this learning 
advantage to pursue individual objectives, if necessary at the expense of actor B. 
 
We apply these two premises to the context of alliances and suggest that when two parties are 
engaged in an alliance, they establish a learning relationship that directly influences the 
development and outcomes of the alliance (Doz, 1996). In alliances with multiple objectives, 
developing a learning relationship represents a prerequisite that facilitates knowledge 
exchange, because the achievement of individual performance objectives, whether financial, 
learning, or strategic, likely varies according to the degree of mutual learning.26 Moreover, we 
argue that the learning between partners functions as a value creation and value appropriation 
mechanism. Because learning in alliances represents a mixed-motive situation, it has 
integrative potential (Lubatkin et al., 2001), which means that prior to their learning 
endeavors, parties have no clear conception of possible learning outcomes, but their joint 
learning enables them to create value beyond what they could have individually. As the 
alliance unfolds, parties learn about each other and about the problem at hand and therefore 
seek solutions that match their individual and collective interests. However, if confronted with 
                                                 
26 Most researchers drawing on organizational learning literature focused on the relationship between parties’ 
ability to appropriate knowledge through the alliance and the degree to which parties achieve their learning 
objectives (see e.g., Hamel, 1991; Kumar et al., 1998b; Larsson et al., 1998). In contrast, we argue that learning 
constitutes a value creation and appropriation mechanism that may affect, for example, financial and strategic 
objectives, in addition to learning objectives. 
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an opportunity, a party is likely to exploit its existing learning advantage to pursue its own 
performance objectives, if necessary at the expense of its counterpart (Larsson et al., 1998). 
To better understand the antecedents and consequences of learning in alliances, we elaborate 
on (1) the sources of learning, (2) learning as a value creation and value appropriation 
mechanism, and (3) manifestations of learning. Figure 5.3 depicts a graphical representation. 
 
Sources and Mechanism: Learning 
Building on alliance research that drew on the learning perspective, we identify three sources 
of partners’ abilities to learn: (1) a party’s absorptive capacity, (2) joint decisions with regard 
to alliance structure, and (3) the nature of the knowledge exchanged. First, building on the 
work of Cohen and Levinthal (1990), alliance researchers focused on a firm’s absorptive 
capacity as a mechanism to obtain knowledge (Lane et al., 1998; Lane et al., 2001; Larsson et 
al., 1998). A firm’s absorptive capacity refers to the set of organizational routines and 
processes that enable the firm to assess and acquire external knowledge (Van den Bosch, 
Volberda, & de Boer, 1999; Zahra et al., 2002). It results from a prolonged process of 
investments and knowledge accumulation within the firm (Mowery et al., 1996; Zahra et al., 
2002), which makes it a characteristic of a firm, shaped over many years in an incremental 
way (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Absorptive capacity also pertains to firm characteristics, such 
as the motivational orientation toward learning, resource allocation, quality of human assets, 
organizational culture, and incentive structure (Chen, 2004; Dyer et al., 1998; Inkpen et al., 
1998; Lane et al., 2001). This view of absorptive capacity relates to Hamel’s (1991) concepts 
of receptivity and transparency, or a firm’s ability to both absorb and provide knowledge 
through an alliance.  
 
Figure 5.3 Learning Perspective: Sources, Mechanism, and Manifestation 
 
 
Second, a firm’s ability to assess and absorb knowledge may originate from the partners’ 
alliance structure decisions. An alliance structure may hamper or reinforce parties’ exposure 
to knowledge made available through the relationship (Oxley et al., 2004). For example, a 
structure that stimulates partner interaction, increases transparency, and enhances openness 
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contributes to the parties’ ability to engage in interorganizational learning (Doz, 1996; Hamel, 
1991). However, parties can also purposefully design alliance activities to reduce each party’s 
potential to assess and absorb knowledge (Grant et al., 2004), perhaps to prevent unwanted 
acquisition of knowledge by competitors (Khanna, 1998; Oxley et al., 2004), reduce the need 
for knowledge transfer and acquisition (Zeng et al., 2002), or divide specialized tasks (Doz, 
1996). For instance, if two firms form a marketing and distribution alliance, they may be more 
successful if they exchange market know-how, but they also might decide to specialize certain 
distribution activities to prevent any involuntarily knowledge transfers. The aim of this type 
of decision is to maintain the possibility of knowledge exchange, which is necessary to 
achieve individual objectives, while also controlling knowledge flows to protect proprietary 
know-how and avoid unintended leakage (Doz, 1996; Zeng et al., 2002).  
 
Third, the nature of the knowledge exchanged affects each party’s ability to assess and 
acquire knowledge (Simonin, 1999). As the ambiguity of knowledge increases, it becomes 
more difficult for another firm to absorb it (Kotabe et al., 2003). The level of knowledge 
ambiguity differs for explicit and tacit knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992), because explicit 
knowledge is easily codifiable and can be absorbed without loss of integrity (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995). Examples of explicit or codified knowledge include checklists, blueprints, 
and operation manuals. In contrast, tacit knowledge involves knowledge that is sticky, 
complex, and difficult to codify, such as market, managerial, or technological know-how. 
Tacit knowledge is more resistant to appropriation both within and across firms (Szulanski, 
1996), because its acquisition requires the active involvement of the providing party. 
Empirical alliance studies produced support for the inhibiting nature of knowledge ambiguity 
on interorganizational learning (Chen, 2004; Kotabe et al., 2003; Simonin, 1999). Simonin 
(1999) found that knowledge ambiguity related negatively to knowledge transfer and was 
caused by factors such as tacitness (negative), complexity (positive), and organizational 
distance (positive). If the knowledge exchanged in an alliance is more tacit in nature, the 
firms’ potential to assess and assimilate knowledge becomes hampered, especially if the 
partners do not take additional measures to facilitate its transfer. 
 
Together, firms’ absorptive capacity, the alliance structure, and the nature of knowledge 
exchanged constitute the sources of partners’ abilities to assess and acquire knowledge. That 
is, a party’s potential to learn through the relationship depends on its counterpart. Even 
though parties may jointly design an alliance structure and agree to exchange various types of 
knowledge, learning remains relative and distinct for each alliance (Dyer et al., 1998; Lane et 
al., 1998), because firms likely have developed different absorptive capacities (Kumar & Nti,  
1998). A different opportunity to learn may affect parties’ choice of ex-post learning 
strategies, so that learning potential probably functions as a mechanism that directs parties’ 
efforts toward the use of integrative and distributive learning strategies (Larsson et al., 1998). 
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In turn, learning strategies affect parties’ ability to assess and acquire knowledge through the 
alliance.27 Building on these insights, we propose that 
(1) A perceived equal opportunity to learn increases parties’ likelihood to use integrative 
learning strategies and decreases their likelihood to use distributive learning 
strategies, which results in a higher level of absorption integrativeness; 
(2) A perceived imbalance in opportunity to learn increases parties’ likelihood to use 
distributive learning strategies and reduces their likelihood to use integrative learning 
strategies, which results in a higher level of absorption imbalance. 
 
Manifestation: Cooperation 
Absorption integrativeness refers to the combination of each party’s ability to assess and 
acquire the knowledge it is exposed to through the alliance, regardless of whether their 
abilities are balanced or imbalanced (see §3.2). A high level of absorption integrativeness 
implies that all parties have little difficulty assessing the value and relevance of new 
knowledge (Inkpen et al., 1998) or assimilating this knowledge into their existing knowledge 
stores (Inkpen, 2000). Absorption integrativeness also reinforces joint information processing, 
which allows parties to evaluate each other’s competencies, strengths, and weaknesses. 
Furthermore, information exchange facilitates the integration of new knowledge within a 
firm’s existing knowledge base, which in turn contributes to future joint knowledge creation 
(Lubatkin et al., 2001). Moreover, absorption integrativeness implies that parties can 
overcome learning barriers (Larsson et al., 1998) and embrace transparency and receptivity 
(Hamel, 1991). We argue that the use of integrative learning strategies represents an efficient 
and effective course of action to achieve absorption integrativeness (Larsson et al., 1998). 
 
Integrative learning strategies enable parties to create and exchange knowledge throughout the 
relationship (Larsson et al., 1998). Thus, integrative learning might be viewed as the 
collective creation and acquisition of knowledge among partners, which extends beyond that 
which would have been possible individually and would not have occurred without interactive 
learning synergies (Larsson et al., 1998). By associating collaborative and reciprocal learning, 
integrative learning causes parties to behave cooperatively and resolve problems jointly to 
enable their knowledge creation and exchange (Lubatkin et al., 2001). In turn, it implies that 
parties are transparent, possess a willingness and ability to share knowledge, and are receptive 
to absorbing knowledge (Hamel, 1991). Parties that adopt integrative learning strategies work 
closely together to facilitate the transfer of not only explicit knowledge but also context-
specific embedded knowledge (Larsson et al., 1998). We argue that partners likely adopt 
integrative learning strategies if they perceive an equal opportunity to learn. 
 
With an equal opportunity to learn, both partners have a similar possibility of assessing and 
acquiring knowledge and information through the alliance. Two arguments support this 
                                                 
27 We are aware that more fine-grained typologies interorganizational learning strategies exist (Larsson et al., 
1998). However, for our purpose, namely, conceptualizing and testing the learning trade-off, the distinction 
between integrative and distributive learning strategies is sufficiently fine-grained to develop hypotheses. 
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proposition. First, drawing on absorptive capacity literature, we argue that an equal 
opportunity to learn reinforces the likelihood of knowledge and information exchange 
between partners (Kumar & Nti, 1998), which in turn contributes to alliance stability and 
allows parties to discover their mutual interests. Mutual awareness about interests steers the 
alliance toward its objectives (Doz, 1996) and also reduces tensions and creates commitment, 
because a party experiences less desire to engage in conflicts that could damage long-term 
value creation (i.e., shadow of future). Therefore, if parties perceive that they have equal 
opportunities to learn, they are more likely to adopt integrative learning strategies. 
Furthermore, drawing on insights pertaining to reciprocal learning in alliances (Lubatkin et 
al., 2001), we argue that a perceived equal opportunity to learn reinforces the use of 
integrative learning strategies. Reciprocal learning increases the likelihood of knowledge 
creation, and because all parties are equally involved in the new knowledge creation, strong 
incentives to continue learning exist. Moreover, without reciprocal learning, parties likely 
have difficulty achieving their performance objectives (Holmqvist, 2003). For example, if 
parties want to introduce a new product, they must first exchange knowledge, such as product 
specifications, to attain success in their new product development and launch. Thus, a 
commonality of interests, which increases parties’ likelihood to use integrative learning 
strategies, which itself leads to absorption integrativeness, grows strongest when the partners 
perceive equal opportunities with respect to learning in the alliance.  
 
Manifestation: Competition 
Absorption imbalance refers to an asymmetry between parties’ ability to assess and acquire 
knowledge they are exposed to through the alliance (see §3.2). A high level of absorption 
imbalance implies that one party possesses a learning advantage relative to its counterpart. 
That is, a party with a learning advantage can assess and absorb knowledge in the alliance 
faster than its counterpart (Hamel, 1991). Absorption imbalance contributes to information 
asymmetries between the partners and hampers their ability to evaluate each other’s interests 
and competencies. Furthermore, an absorption imbalance enables a party to integrate 
knowledge into its existing knowledge base while its counterpart has difficulties learning. The 
presence of an absorption imbalance suggests that parties have established learning barriers, 
which provides one party with a learning advantage.  
 
If parties perceive an unequal opportunity to learn, they are more likely to adopt distributive 
learning strategies, which means they focus on securing their individual interests, protecting 
their proprietary knowledge, appropriating learning benefits, and sharing the pie (Hamel, 
1991). Distributive learning (i.e., competitive oriented) is characterized by reduced 
information exchanges between the partners, increased commitment to individual interests, 
and increased hostility toward the partner (Larsson et al., 1998). Therefore, it also implies 
parties are not willing or able to share knowledge; instead, they attempt to extract a maximal 
amount of knowledge from the relationship. That is, the sole aim of parties is to extract 
knowledge and information from the alliance, which enables them to achieve their individual 
performance objectives.  
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A perceived difference in parties’ opportunity to learn suggests that one party can exploit its 
learning advantage. Drawing on learning race literature, we argue that when confronted with a 
situation of differential learning, parties likely use distributive learning strategies (Hamel, 
1991; Larsson et al., 1998). A party with a learning advantage has fewer incentives to avoid 
conflicts with its counterpart, because it knows that its partner cannot retaliate by increasing 
its learning pace. However, the party with the learning disadvantage does not necessarily react 
submissively, because it may expect exploitation by the faster learner and therefore engages 
in preemptive competitive behavior (Larsson et al., 1998). For example, it could try to slow 
down the partner by maintaining critical information and protecting valuable knowledge, 
which would prompt a competitive learning strategy. To the extent that a slow learner acts to 
reduce a learning gap, the fast learner tries to maintain the gap. However, in an alliance 
context, the perceived learning gap between two firms should be relatively small; otherwise, 
firms would terminate the relationship prematurely (Khanna et al., 1998). If a suppressed firm 
perceives a small learning gap, it will engage in preemptive competitive behavior to reduce 
the gap. In summary, a perceived difference in partners’ ability to learn directs their efforts 
toward the use of distributive learning strategies, which increase the likelihood of an 
absorption imbalance. 
 
The Learning Trade-Off 
Drawing on the learning perspective, the second cooperation and competition trade-off we 
propose is the learning trade-off. Consistent with the conceptualization (see §4.2), we 
hypothesize that absorption integrativeness relates positively to alliance performance and 
negatively to firm performance imbalance. In contrast, we hypothesize that absorption 
imbalance relates negatively to alliance performance but positively to firm performance 
imbalance.28 As we show in Figure 5.4, we also hypothesize that absorption integrativeness 
and absorption imbalance are negatively associated. We do not elaborate on Hypothesis 3f, 
which pertains to the negative association between alliance performance and firm 
performance imbalance, because we have discussed it elsewhere (see §4.2). However, we 
discuss the five remaining relationships, Hypotheses 3a–e. 
 
Figure 5.4 Hypothesis 3: Learning Trade-Off 
 
 
                                                 
28 We focus on the relationships among the constructs, as defined previously: absorption integrativeness (§3.2), 
absorption asymmetry (§3.2), alliance performance (§1.2), and firm performance imbalance (§4.2) 
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H3a: Absorption Integrativeness and Absorption Imbalance 
We hypothesize that absorption integrativeness and absorption imbalance are negatively 
associated. Absorption integrativeness refers to a situation in which parties engaged in an 
alliance are equally able to assess and acquire knowledge and information. In this condition, it 
is less likely that one firm can develop a learning advantage at the expense of its counterpart. 
The reasons for the negative association are straightforward: To achieve a high level of 
absorption integrativeness, parties may direct their efforts, such as resources and time, toward 
the deployment of integrative learning strategies. Integrative learning strategies enable them 
to maximize transparency and receptivity, fostering the creation and transfer of knowledge 
and information between them. As a consequence, parties become more aware of their mutual 
interests and envision alternative value creation opportunities. Hence, using integrative 
learning strategies contributes to future joint value creation. Because parties likely anticipate 
additional benefits, they probably do not develop an absorption imbalance.  
 
In contrast, a focus on distributive learning strategies comes at the expense of absorption 
integrativeness. With distributive learning strategies, parties protect their knowledge and 
information from unwanted transfer and attempt to gain desired knowledge and information. 
It is individually rational for parties to pursue distributive learning strategies, because 
possessing a learning advantage enables them to pursue performance objectives actively. If 
one party succeeds in creating a learning advantage, perhaps because of its superior 
absorptive capacity, an absorption imbalance may result. However, the level of absorption 
integrativeness may be lower than it would have been if the parties adopted integrative 
learning strategies. That is, integrative and distributive learning strategies are interdependent, 
and as such, competitive efforts to win at the expense of others can detract and disturb any 
efforts to produce a better joint outcome (Larsson et al., 1998). Ariño and De la Torre (1998) 
examined a North American–French alliance and found support for this delicate balance. 
After initial mutual collaboration, the joint venture became imbalanced when one partner 
started to compete more, forcing its counterpart to become more reluctant about providing 
further access to its knowledge. Building on these insights, we hypothesize a negative 
association between absorption integrativeness and absorption imbalance.  
 
H3b and H3c: Alliance Performance 
Absorption integrativeness should positively affect alliance performance, but absorption 
imbalance likely relates negatively to it. Absorption integrativeness provides parties with 
strong incentives to make the alliance work, because reciprocal learning enables them to 
achieve their performance objectives. Absorption integrativeness reduces the likelihood that 
parties engage in short-term, self-interested behavior. For instance, opportunistic behavior 
declines, because parties with similar learning paces remain aware of each other’s 
competencies and interests (Hamel, 1991) and confident that each party is committed to the 
alliance, at least until both parties finish learning (Khanna et al., 1998). Absorption 
integrativeness also contributes to the detection of unwanted transfers of know-how, so parties 
can immediate retaliate by assimilating protected know-how themselves. In addition, 
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absorption integrativeness reduces the likelihood of inertia, because it enables parties to learn 
in an effective and efficient manner, which increases their ability and willingness to make 
necessary adjustments to the ongoing relationship (Doz, 1996). In other words, absorption 
integrativeness offers mutual awareness, stability, and adaptability in the relationship, which 
induce superior alliance performance. Absorption imbalance negatively influences alliance 
performance, because in learning races, a party pursues a maximum share of knowledge while 
protecting its own assets (Kale et al., 2000). When individually rational firms enter an alliance 
with unequal opportunities associated with assessing and acquiring knowledge and do not 
take measures to balance each party’s learning ability, the party with a learning advantage 
appropriates knowledge faster (Kumar & Nti, 1998). That is, this party can process the 
information necessary to recognize and assimilate the knowledge it gains. Moreover, this 
party may withhold information critical to the other party to exploit its learning advantage, 
which hampers joint value creation. The presence of information-processing barriers between 
the partners invites them to behave opportunistically, and this type of behavior destabilizes an 
alliance. Consequently, we predict a negative relationship between absorption imbalance and 
alliance performance. 
 
Empirical research has supported the Hypotheses 3b and 3c, stating that absorption 
integrativeness positively influences alliance performance (Beamish et al., 2003; Dhanaraj, 
Lyles, Steensma, & Tihanyi, 2004; Inkpen et al., 1995; Lane et al., 2001) and that absorption 
imbalance negatively influences alliance performance (see e.g., Ariño et al., 1998; Hamel, 
1991; Inkpen et al., 2006). For instance, Lane, Salk, and Lyles (2001) found that 
understanding and assimilating a partner’s knowledge has a positive impact on the creation of 
learning benefits. Beamish and Berdrow (2003) revealed that knowledge transfer and 
acquisition processes related positively to joint learning. Hamel (1991) examined nine 
international strategic alliances and found that firms engaged in a relationship were not 
equally able of acquiring knowledge and that the presence of an imbalance destabilized the 
relationship. These findings were also supported by a case study conducted by Ariño and De 
la Torre (1998), who discovered that alliance performance declined when one of the partners 
adopted a competitive learning strategy. Finally, Inkpen and Pien (2006) found in another 
case study that alliance performance was positively influenced by the transfer of tacit 
knowledge, whereas differential learning inhibited the achievement of learning objectives. 
 
H3d and H3e: Firm Performance Imbalance 
We hypothesize that absorption integrativeness relates negatively to firm performance 
imbalance, whereas absorption imbalance relates positively. Absorption integrativeness 
provides parties with strong incentives to make the alliance work, and though it is rational for 
a party to pursue individual objectives, absorption integrativeness implies that the parties have 
established a learning relationship that fosters mutual learning. That is, neither party believes 
it can act on its learning advantage without hurting joint value creation and, therefore, its 
long-term individual objectives. When parties align their absorptive capacities through 
alliance design, they experience strong incentives to collaborate, because their mutual 
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learning enables the parties to achieve their performance goals. Consequently, we hypothesize 
that an alliance characterized by absorption integrativeness is less likely to produce 
differences in individual firm performance. In contrast, an absorption imbalance should 
positively influence firm performance imbalance. Because firms have differential learning 
paces, one firm should internalize knowledge more easily and quickly than its partner does. 
Hamel (1991) found that firms behaving as good partners, with high transparency and 
collaborative intent (i.e., learning disadvantage), tended to be exploited by partners with a 
learning advantage that engaged in lower transparency and more competitive intent. An 
absorption imbalance creates information-processing barriers, likely to be exploited by the 
faster learning party to pursue its own objectives. One-sided knowledge transfer enables a 
party to steer alliance activities toward its individual goals. A firm appropriating particular 
technological know-how may use it to optimize its resource contribution and increase its 
return on investment. In contrast, insufficient knowledge transfer to the slower learning 
partner impedes its ability to achieve its individual objectives, because it lacks the information 
to direct alliance activities to benefit its interests. In addition, a firm with a learning advantage 
may become insensitive to the interests of the firm with a learning disadvantage, perhaps 
blaming or denigrating the latter for its inability to capitalize on alliance-generated 
knowledge. Therefore, we hypothesize a positive relationship between absorption imbalance 
and firm performance imbalance. 
 
In summary, when partner firms direct efforts toward achieving absorption integrativeness, 
both parties have much to gain through increased alliance stability and commitment, which 
leads to improved alliance performance. In addition, these cooperative efforts reduce 
differences in individual firm performance. In contrast, if an alliance is characterized by an 
absorption imbalance, parties have much to loose. An absorption imbalance increases the 
likelihood that one party achieves its objectives, but it also reinforces ex-post exchange 
hazards, which undermine long-term value creation. These predictions are consistent with the 
conceptualization of a cooperation and competition trade-off; therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
H3:  During the post-alliance formation stage, partner firms are confronted with the 
learning trade-off, such that: 
a. Absorption integrativeness and absorption imbalance are negatively associated, 
b. A higher level of absorption integrativeness relates positively to alliance 
performance,  
c. A higher level of absorption imbalance relates negatively to alliance performance,  
d. A higher level of absorption integrativeness relates negatively to firm performance 
imbalance, 
e. A higher level of absorption imbalance relates positively to firm performance 
imbalance, and 
f. Alliance performance and firm performance imbalance are negatively associated. 
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5.3 Hypothesis 4: The Relational Trade-Off 
In this section, we present a set of six hypotheses that together depict the third type of 
cooperation and competition trade-off, namely, the relational trade-off. Drawing on the 
behavioral perspective, we argue that during the post-alliance formation stage, firms need to 
resolve the relational trade-off to achieve their individual performance objectives. We also 
argue that relational quality and opportunistic behavior, respectively, represent the 
manifestations of cooperative- and competitive-oriented relational norms. We hypothesize 
about the relationships among relational quality, opportunistic behavior, alliance performance, 
and firm performance imbalance. Before we introduce the relational trade-off, we elaborate 
on the behavioral perspective to define the causes and consequences of relational norms.  
 
The Behavioral Perspective 
Researchers drawing on the behavioral perspective in an alliance context focused on the 
causes and consequences of partner firm interactions (Aulakh et al., 1996; Cullen et al., 2000; 
Kauser et al., 2004; Uzzi, 1996). Alliances evolve through an accumulation of behaviors that 
create a set of social relations between the parties (Granovetter, 1985). That is, interactions 
are not individual firm behaviors but rather continuous patterns of behavioral responses 
between parties. To understand partner firm behavior, existing research adopted different 
perspectives. For instance, Gouldner (1960) introduced the notion of relational norms and 
argued that the norm of reciprocity is the basis of stable relationships. The reciprocity norm 
states that an actor should help those whose actions have benefited it and also respond in kind 
to those whose actions are damaging its interests. MacNeil (1980) argued that alliances 
involve exchanges between two parties that cannot be completely specified a priori by formal 
contract; therefore, formal governance mechanisms must be complemented by relational 
governance mechanisms. Other advocates of the behavioral perspective have examined topics 
pertaining to partner firm behavior, such as trust and commitment (Aulakh et al., 1996; Cullen 
et al., 2000), opportunistic behavior (Jap et al., 2003; Judge et al., 2006; Parkhe, 1993a), and 
procedural and distributive justice (Kumar et al., 1995a; Luo, 2005). Although these studies 
focused on distinct behavioral aspects of a relationship, they shared the conception that firm 
behavior in an exchange relationship is a relational phenomenon. Building on this insight, we 
contend that:  
(1) When two actors engage in a relationship, they build relational norms, which 
influence the development and outcomes of an exchange relationship; 
(2) Relational norms guide actors’ behavior toward cooperation and competition. 
 
We apply these two premises to alliances to suggest that when two parties engage in an 
alliance, their behavioral interaction pattern directly influences the alliance’s development and 
outcomes. More specifically, we postulate that parties develop relational norms that guide 
their behavior as the alliance unfolds (Gouldner, 1960). Relational norms represent 
expectations about behavior that partner firms share (Heide & John, 1992), related to implicit 
guidelines such as flexibility, solidarity, information exchange, and continuity expectations 
(Kumar et al., 1995a). Flexibility facilitates adaptation to unforeseen contingencies, solidarity 
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promotes joint problem solving, and information sharing facilitates both problem solving and 
adaptation (Poppo et al., 2002). Although parties can build relationships with long-term 
orientations, characterized by cooperative behavior or parties, they may also develop an 
interaction pattern with a short-term focus characterized by competitive behavior. Therefore, 
because relational norms can be either cooperative or competitive oriented, they function as 
ex-post value creation and value appropriation mechanisms. To comprehend the causes and 
consequences of relational norms (see Figure 5.5), we discuss three topics: (1) the sources of 
relational norms, (2) relational norms as value creation and value appropriation mechanisms, 
and (3) manifestations of relational norms. 
  
Sources and Mechanism: Relational Norms 
Proponents of the behavioral perspective have argued that relational norms emerge from three 
sources: (1) partner firms’ history with each other, (2) current partner firms’ interaction, and 
(3) decisions about alliance structures (Berthon et al., 2003; Gouldner, 1960). The first source 
for relational norm building, the partner firms’ history, refers to their prior collaborations. 
Researchers have shown that prior relationships increase the likelihood that a firm engages in 
a new alliance with the same partner (Gulati, 1995a). By engaging in multiple alliances over 
time, these partners develop a set of routines that provide guidelines for how partners should 
interact. By developing a form of mutual understanding, partners smooth their interaction 
patterns and help mitigate any coordination, conflict resolution, or information processing 
problems (Zollo et al., 2002), which enhances the quality of the relationship. Past 
relationships thus function as a social signal about a party’s future intentions and reduce the 
likelihood of exchange hazards. Hence, partner firms’ history functions as source of relational 
norm development in an existing alliance.  
 
Figure 5.5 Behavioral Perspective: Sources, Mechanism, and Manifestation  
 
 
A second source of relational norms originates from partner firm interactions as they form and 
manage the alliance. Whereas past interactions in previous collaborations indicate current 
firm behavior, current firm interactions directly affect the development of relational norms. 
Sources Mechanism Manifestations 
Relational 
Norms 
Alliance 
 Structure 
Partner Firms’ 
Interaction 
Partner 
Firms’History Relational Quality 
Opportunistic 
Behavior 
Alliance level 
Alliance level 
Alliance level 
Alliance level 
Alliance level 
Alliance level 
=  The three sources affect the development of relational norms between the partners directly and interactively, which
implies that relational norms are an alliance-level property. 
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Advocates of the behavioral perspective have argued that repeated partner interactions and the 
social content embedded in those interactions enables partners to build relational norms 
(Gouldner, 1960). For instance, parties develop cooperative relational norms if they become 
aware that the immediate gain from competitive behavior does not outweigh the profits of 
collaboration (Parkhe, 1993a), such as when the possible loss of future gains that may result 
from violating the agreement does not exceed the future gains from cooperation. Whereas 
broken promises (i.e., not fulfilling contractual obligations) decrease the likelihood of future 
cooperative behavior, kept promises increase cooperative behavior. In other words, partner 
firm interactions directly affect the development of relational norms.  
 
Alliance researchers also have argued and demonstrated that an alliance structure directly 
influences the development of relational norms (Brouthers et al., 2006; Fryxell et al., 2002; 
Heide & John, 1992). From a behavioral perspective, the aim of an alliance structure is to 
stimulate cooperative relational norms and curb competitive relational norms. If coordination 
costs to curb the likelihood of opportunistic behavior are high, parties choose governance 
modes that reduce these costs (Gulati et al., 1998). Furthermore, parties may agree to install 
monitoring mechanisms to hinder the development of competitive relational norms (Lubatkin 
et al., 2001; Wathne et al., 2000) and design compensation structures that provide incentives 
for parties to build cooperative relational norms (Contractor et al., 2000). 
 
Together, partner firms’ history, current partner firm behavior, and alliance structure directly 
and interactively affect the development of relational norms. Whereas past and current 
behaviors represent strong informal signals about how parties should behave, an alliance 
structure constitutes a formal mechanism that directs partner firm behavior. Consistent with 
the behavioral perspective’s first and second premise, we argue that relational norms guide 
parties’ behavior in an ongoing relationship and function as a value creation and appropriation 
mechanism. More specifically, we propose that:  
(1) Cooperative relational norms guide parties’ behavior toward building relational 
quality; 
(2) Competitive relational norms guide parties’ behavior toward opportunistic behavior.  
 
Manifestation: Cooperation 
Relational quality is the extent to which partner firms feel comfortable, are willing to rely on 
trust in dealings with each other, and are committed to the relationship (see §3.2). A high 
level of relational quality implies that partner firms’ interactions are directed toward long-
term value creation and willingness to sacrifice short-term gains (Ariño et al., 2001). This 
type of cooperative behavior implies trust, commitment, and continuity expectations (Gulati et 
al., 1994; Krishnan et al., 2006; Ring et al., 1994). The presence of relational quality also 
contributes to value creation, because it enables transaction cost savings, allows for capability 
improvement, and increases flexibility (Gulati, 1995b; Luo, 2002b). Moreover, relational 
quality operates as a self-enforcing safeguard that is a more effective, less costly alternative to 
either contracts or vertical integration (Hill, 1990; Poppo et al., 2002).  
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The presence of cooperative relational norms, which pertain to firm behaviors that focus on 
flexibility, information sharing, continuity, and solidarity, positively influences the 
development of relational quality. As cooperative norms evolve, the threat of 
misunderstanding, cultural clashes, and other conflicts, which might initially have been 
present as a result of the differences in the partners’ institutional values or routines, become 
mitigated or resolved (Lubatkin et al., 2001). For example, continuity expectations refer to the 
mutual recognition that the relationship will continue in the future. As partners develop this 
norm, they achieve a level of satisfaction with the alliance and are less likely to look for 
alternative partners (Dwyer et al., 1987). Continuity expectations thus extend the time horizon 
for mutual benefits and prompt partners to refuse short-term gains in the interest of the long-
term viability of the relationship, which contributes to a high-quality relationship (Aulakh et 
al., 1996). The norm of flexibility creates a stock of goodwill that also positively affects the 
quality of the relationship. Timely information sharing in an alliance similarly fosters a high-
quality relationship because communication helps resolve conflicts and disputes and aligns 
perceptions and expectations (Morgan et al., 1994). For instance, in an empirical study on 
cross-border market partnerships, Aulakh, Kotabe, and Sahay (1996) found that bilateral 
norms of continuity expectations, flexibility, and information exchange led to higher levels of 
trust. Thus, cooperative relational norms, which enable parties to balance their interests, 
contribute to the development of high-quality relationships.  
 
Manifestation: Competition 
In contrast with relational quality, opportunistic behavior refers to a party’s response that 
takes the form of an intention to increase its benefits from the relationship in ways that are 
explicitly or implicitly prohibited (see §3.2). Deceitful and other types of damaging behavior, 
such as lying, stealing, and cheating, represent examples of opportunistic behavior 
(Williamson, 1985). The aim of opportunistic behavior is to extract benefits from the alliance, 
though it differs from exercising bargaining power and acting on a learning advantage: It 
purposefully attempts to deceive the other partner, while simultaneously protecting and 
securing individual objectives (Parkhe, 1993a; Wathne et al., 2000). Parties are more likely to 
behave opportunistically if they develop competitive relational norms (Ariño et al., 1998), or 
implicit guidelines that guide behavior toward fulfilling individual interests. For instance, 
opportunistic behavior occurs if parties develop interaction patterns characterized by an 
unwillingness to adapt the ongoing relationship, a lack of solidarity, and a disinclination to 
share information. Imagine two parties working together on a new product development 
project, for which knowledge sharing is essential. At the start of the alliance, the parties trust 
each other and frequently engage in joint problem solving. That is, they develop cooperative 
relational norms that promote trust, respect, and commitment. However, one party, perhaps 
because of some external developments, becomes reluctant to share valuable information, and 
its counterpart responds with its own reluctance. If this pattern repeats over time, competitive 
conduct becomes the norm, and these competitive norms stimulate a greater focus on short-
term gains. Consequently, the presence of competitive relational norms likely reinforces a 
negative behavior spiral between the parties, as manifested by opportunistic behavior. 
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The Relational Trade-Off 
Drawing on the behavioral perspective, we present the relational trade-off. In contrast with the 
compensation trade-off but similar to the learning trade-off, parties confront the relational 
trade-off during the post-alliance formation stage. Consistent with the conceptualization of the 
cooperation and competition trade-off, we argue that relational quality positively relates to 
alliance performance and negatively relates to firm performance imbalance. Opportunistic 
behavior negatively relates to alliance performance but has a positive impact on firm 
performance imbalance.29 As portrayed in Figure 5.6, we hypothesize that, respectively, 
relational quality and opportunistic behavior and alliance performance and firm performance 
imbalance are negatively associated. We present Hypotheses 4a–e but not Hypothesis 4f, 
because we have already discussed this relationship (see §4.2).  
 
Figure 5.6 Hypothesis 4: Relational Trade-Off 
 
 
H4a: Relational Quality and Opportunistic Behavior 
We hypothesize that relational quality and opportunistic behavior are negatively associated. 
Relational quality means that parties demonstrate their willingness to contribute to the 
achievement of each other’s objectives, whereas opportunistic behavior implies parties’ 
actions indicate they aim to achieve individual objectives, if necessary, deceitfully and at the 
expense of the partner firm (Das et al., 1998). When the quality of the relationship is high, a 
firm does not need to fear its partner, because the relational norms signal that all partners are 
willing to maintain and continue the relationship (Ganesan, 1994). When trust and 
commitment characterize an alliance, a party also does not need to fear opportunistic behavior 
(McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003), because it can depend on its counterpart to refrain from 
this type of deceitful behavior (Ariño et al., 1998).  
 
A high-quality relationship signals to parties that neither is likely to engage in opportunistic 
behavior to achieve its individual objectives, knowing that this conduct would damage long-
term value creation. As trust, commitment, and mutual respect grow, the motivation for 
opportunistic behavior declines (Aulakh et al., 1996). Empirical research produced support for 
the hypothesis of a negative association between relational quality and opportunism (Carson 
et al., 2006; Gundlach et al., 1995; Wu, Sinkovics, Cavusgil, & Roath, 2007). Gundlach 
                                                 
29 We focus on the relationships among the constructs, as defined previously: relational quality (§3.2), 
opportunistic behavior (§3.2), alliance performance (§1.1), and firm performance imbalance (§4.2). 
Alliance 
Performance 
Firm Performance 
Imbalance 
Opportunistic 
Behavior 
Relational 
Quality  
H4a: – 
H4b: + 
H4e: + 
H4c: – 
H4d: – 
H4f: – 
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(1995) found that opportunistic behavior related inversely to commitment, and in a study on 
manufacturer–distributor relationships, Wu, Sinkovics, Cavusgil, and Roath (2007) indicated 
that trust was the only effective way to curtail distributor opportunism.  
 
H4b and H4c: Alliance Performance 
We hypothesize that relational quality positively affects alliance performance, but 
opportunistic behavior negatively affects it. An alliance with high levels of relational quality 
consists of trust, commitment, and the absence of conflicts (Ariño et al., 2001; Kauser et al., 
2004), so parties have confidence in the reliability and integrity of their partners (Morgan et 
al., 1994). Drawing on the behavioral perspective, alliance researchers have pointed to the 
multiple advantages of a good relationship. A high-quality relationship between the partners 
facilitates the effective functioning of the alliance on a day-to-day basis and accelerates 
actions that may be essential for responding to changes in the competitive and economic 
environment (Ariño et al., 2001). It further enables organizations to gather high-quality 
information about their partners, which creates mutual awareness (Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1996). 
By reducing contracting costs caused by information asymmetries, quality functions as a 
complement to formal governance mechanisms (Ariño et al., 2001). Finally, relational quality 
encourages collaboration beyond the narrow scope of the agreement and provides a strong 
signal that parties are willing to invest further in the relationship, which contributes positively 
to the achievement of superior alliance performance (Krishnan et al., 2006). 
 
Opportunistic behavior inhibits the achievement of superior alliance performance for two 
main reasons. First, it suggests that parties are willing to sacrifice long-term value creation for 
short-term gains. Whereas relational quality promotes individual goals through a mutual 
concern about long-term benefits (Aulakh et al., 1996; Heide, 1994), opportunistic behavior 
accomplishes individual goals through deceitful behavior. For instance, a party might 
withhold critical information from its counterpart, impeding the latter partner’s ability to 
conduct its required operational activities. Opportunistic behavior also impedes the effective 
functioning of an ongoing alliance and hampers actions that may be essential for responding 
to changes in the competitive and economic environment (Wathne et al., 2000). It not only 
prevents parties from developing a mutual understanding, but also increases the contracting 
costs associated with information asymmetries. Furthermore, opportunistic behavior 
encourages partners to circumvent contractual provisions, which reduces flexibility, and 
provides strong signals that parties are unwilling to continue the relationship. Hence, 
opportunistic behavior constitutes a critical and persistent source of tension between the 
partners, destabilizing the alliance and thereby hampering alliance performance. 
 
Second, the presence of tensions as a result of opportunistic behavior requires parties to install 
and use additional coordination mechanisms to make the relationship work (Zaheer et al., 
1998). Such coordination mechanisms generally involve unforeseen expenditures, required to 
curb opportunistic behavior, that were not part of the initial alliance agreement (Gulati et al., 
1998; Lubatkin et al., 2001). These coordination mechanisms, such as conflict resolution and 
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monitoring mechanisms, are costly and direct parties’ attention away from long-term value 
creation. Moreover, installing additional coordination mechanisms undermines the exchange 
relationship (John, 1984), simply because these resources could have been deployed more 
productively for other purposes (Wathne et al., 2000). Furthermore, opportunistic behavior 
may force parties to renegotiate their initial contractual provisions (e.g., compensation), which 
could negatively affect the value creation potential of the alliance. A primary consequence of 
persistent opportunistic behavior is that the partner firms burden the alliance’s administration 
with structurally and procedurally complex safeguards, which result in additional and, more 
important, unforeseen expenditures. Hence, we hypothesize that the presence of opportunistic 
behavior negatively affects alliance performance.  
 
Empirical research has supported Hypothesis 4b, finding a positive relationship between 
relational quality and alliance performance (Ding, 1997; Inkpen & Birkinshaw, 1994; Kauser 
et al., 2004; Lane et al., 2001; Luo, 2002b; Zaheer et al., 1998). Kauser and Shaw (2004) 
investigated behavioral and structural factors of the success of international strategic alliances 
and found that high levels of commitment, trust, and communication related positively to 
alliance success (i.e., business performance and satisfaction), while the presence of conflict 
impeded good performance. Inkpen and Birkenshaw (1994) also found that the quality of the 
exchange relationship was an important factor in the parent’s assessment of joint venture 
performance; factors such as trust, cooperation, communication, integration, and openness 
directly or indirectly affected joint venture performance. With respect to Hypothesis 4c, other 
researchers focused on opportunistic behavior and found that such behavior inhibited alliance 
performance (Ariño et al., 1998; Dahlstrom et al., 1999; Deeds & Hill, 1999; Judge et al., 
2006). Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) revealed that in franchiser–franchisee exchange 
relationships, the presence of opportunistic behavior increased transaction costs, such as 
bargaining and monitoring costs. Judge and Dooley (2006) examined alliances in the U.S. 
healthcare industry and found that opportunistic behavior negatively related to alliance 
performance. In summary, theoretical and empirical work has supported the hypotheses that 
relational quality relates positively to alliance performance, and opportunistic behavior 
inhibits alliance performance.  
 
H4d and H4e: Firm Performance Imbalance 
The presence of relational quality should reduce the likelihood of firm performance 
imbalance, whereas opportunistic behavior should increase that likelihood. When the quality 
of the relationship is high, a firm does not need to fear its partner, because the relational 
norms signal that all partners are willing to maintain and continue the relationship (Ganesan, 
1994). If parties adopt a long-term relationship orientation, they are prepared to make short-
term sacrifices to realize long-term benefits (Dwyer et al., 1987). That is, because a high-
quality relationship exists, parties lack incentives to pursue their individual performance 
objectives at the expense of their counterparts. Hence, we hypothesize that relational quality 
relates negatively to firm performance imbalance. However, the presence of opportunistic 
behavior positively affects firm performance imbalance. When parties behave 
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opportunistically (i.e., deceitfully) and pursue individual performance objectives at the 
expense of long-term value creation, one partner likely will succeed in achieving its short-
term objectives at the expense of its counterpart. For example, that party may be able to 
exploit new external circumstances (Wathne et al., 2000), more easily shirk or free-ride due to 
the tacit nature of its resource contribution, and behave opportunistically without being 
detected due to the lack of monitoring mechanisms (Dahlstrom et al., 1999). Support from an 
empirical study of alliances indicated that a respondent’s perception of opportunistic behavior 
by its partner related negatively to the firm’s performance within the relationship (i.e., goal 
attainment and spill-over effects) (Parkhe 1993a). Hence, the presence of opportunistic 
behavior increases the likelihood of a firm performance imbalance. 
 
To summarize, when partner firms direct efforts toward building cooperative relational norms, 
they also work to establish a high-quality relationship. Consequently, parties have much to 
gain, in that relational quality encourages them to go beyond the narrow scope of the 
agreement and overcome obstacles and barriers that may hamper alliance performance. In 
contrast, when parties develop competitive relational norms and engage in opportunistic 
behavior, they have much to lose. Opportunistic behavior destabilizes the alliance and forces 
the parties to make unforeseen expenditures, which reduce the value creation potential of the 
alliance. Although parties may receive short-term benefits, their behavior reduces the 
likelihood of superior alliance performance. These insights are consistent with the 
conceptualization of the cooperation and competition trade-off, and hence, we hypothesize:  
 
H4: During the post-alliance formation stage, partner firms are confronted with the 
relational trade-off, such that: 
a. Relational quality and opportunistic behavior are negatively associated, 
b. Relational quality relates positively to alliance performance,  
c. Opportunistic behavior relates negatively to alliance performance,  
d. Relational quality relates negatively to firm performance imbalance, 
e. Opportunistic behavior relates positively to firm performance imbalance, and 
f. Alliance performance and firm performance imbalance are negatively associated. 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
Building on the conceptualization of a cooperation and competition trade-off, we have 
presented three types of cooperation and competition trade-offs in this chapter: (1) the 
compensation trade-off, (2) the learning trade-off, and (3) the relational trade-off. With 
respect to each, we discussed the value creation and value appropriation mechanism, sources 
of the mechanism, and manifestations of cooperation and competition. Subsequently, we 
presented three sets of six hypotheses, each of which represents a particular cooperation and 
competition trade-off. To conclude and clarify the differences among them, we compare the 
compensation, learning, and relational trade-offs; in Table 5.1, we offer a summary. 
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Drawing on the power, learning, and behavioral perspectives, we have identified three value 
creation and appropriation mechanisms: (1) bargaining power, (2) learning, and (3) relational 
norms. First, we argued that during the formation stage, the power relationship established 
between firms functions as a value creation and appropriation mechanism that directly affects 
parties’ decisions with respect to negotiation strategies. In conditions of equal levels of 
bargaining power, parties opt for conciliatory negotiation strategies, resulting in contract 
integrativeness. However, with a bargaining power imbalance, parties likely choose hostile 
negotiation strategies, resulting in compensation imbalance. Second, we argued that during 
the post-formation stage, learning potential functions as a value creation and appropriation 
mechanism that affects parties’ choice of learning strategy. With equal opportunities to learn, 
parties adopt integrative learning strategies that result in absorption integrativeness. However, 
with an imbalance, parties are more likely to choose distributive learning strategies, resulting 
in absorption imbalance. Third, we argued that during the post-formation stage, relational 
norms function as a value creation and value appropriation mechanism. Cooperative relational 
norms direct partner behavior toward building a high-quality relationship, whereas 
competitive relational norms guide those behaviors toward acting opportunistically. Although 
the power, learning, and relational perspectives focus on different phenomena, they 
commonly provide explanations for value creation and value appropriation in alliances.  
 
Table 5.1 Three Cooperation and Competition Trade-Offs 
 Compensation Trade-Off Learning Trade-Off Relational Trade-Off 
Perspective Power perspective Learning perspective Behavioral perspective 
Focus Formation stage, negotiation and 
formalization 
Post-formation stage, learning 
potential 
Post-formation stage, partner 
interactions 
Mechanism Bargaining power Learning  Relational norms 
Sources 
 
Exchange context 
Resources 
Negotiation tactics 
Absorptive capacity 
Alliance structure 
Nature of knowledge 
Partner firms’ history 
Partner firms’ current behavior 
Alliance structure 
Cooperation  Compensation integrativeness Absorption integrativeness Relational quality 
Competition 
 
Compensation Imbalance Absorption imbalance Opportunistic behavior 
Hypotheses 
 
H2a:  
Compensation integrativeness and 
compensation imbalance are 
negatively associated. 
 
H2b and h2c:  
Compensation integrativeness 
relates positively to alliance 
performance, whereas 
compensation imbalance relates 
negatively to alliance performance. 
 
H2d and h2e:  
Compensation integrativeness 
relates negatively to firm 
performance imbalance, whereas 
compensation imbalance relates 
positively. 
 
H2f:  
Alliance performance and firm 
performance imbalance are 
negatively associated. 
H3a:  
Absorption integrativeness and 
absorption imbalance are 
negatively associated. 
 
H3b and h3c:  
Absorption integrativeness relates 
positively to alliance performance, 
whereas absorption imbalance 
relates negatively to alliance 
performance. 
 
H3d and h3e:  
Absorption integrativeness relates 
negatively to firm performance 
imbalance, whereas absorption 
imbalance relates positively. 
 
 
H3f:  
Alliance performance and firm 
performance imbalance are 
negatively associated. 
H4a: 
Relational quality and opportunistic 
behavior are negatively associated.
 
 
H4b and h4c:  
Relational quality relates positively 
to alliance performance, whereas 
opportunistic behavior relates 
negatively to alliance performance. 
 
 
H4d and h4e:  
Relational quality relates negatively 
to firm performance imbalance, 
whereas opportunistic behavior 
relates positively. 
 
 
H4f:  
Alliance performance and firm 
performance imbalance are 
negatively associated. 
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The three value creation and appropriation mechanisms also possess different characteristics. 
For example, bargaining power comes into play during the alliance formation stage, as parties 
negotiate about the alliance’s compensation structure, whereas learning and relational norms 
become critical after the alliance has formed. In addition, the use of bargaining power pertains 
to parties’ formalized compensation, which suggests that rewards and contributions are ex-
ante specifiable. For instance, profits, intellectual property, and brand names can be valued 
and specified in a contract. In contrast, learning pertains to knowledge, which is difficult to 
specify, value, or formalize ex-ante. Only as the alliance unfolds does it become clear whether 
parties can assess and acquire knowledge through the relationship and how such learning 
affects alliance performance and firm performance. As the alliance develops, parties also 
build relational norms that guide their behavior toward either cooperation or competition. A 
high-quality relationship may cause parties to decide to invest more resources, but they also 
may engage in free-riding and shirking behavior to extract additional benefits. Whereas 
bargaining power is critical during alliance formation, learning and relational norms become 
important during the post-formation stage, in different ways; that is, relational norms pertain 
to partner firms’ behavior, and learning relates to parties’ potential to absorb knowledge. 
 
Finally, despite these differences, each cooperation and competition trade-off shares a 
fundamental logic. Consistent with the conceptualization of the cooperation and competition 
trade-off, we postulate that value creation and appropriation mechanisms manifest themselves 
as cooperation and competition at the alliance level. In turn, we hypothesize that cooperation 
and competition directly influence alliance performance and firm performance through the 
relationship; we also expect a negative association between alliance performance (i.e., created 
value) and firm performance imbalance (i.e., difference in appropriated value). In the next 
chapter, we present the methodology we have used to test the hypotheses. 
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Chapter 6 Methodology 
In this chapter, we present the methodology. Specifically, we collected data by administering 
Web-based questionnaires across a sample of alliance managers responsible for a contractual 
alliance. Because this type of cross-sectional alliance research poses specific challenges 
(Kumar et al., 1993; Parkhe, 1993b), the research design reflects a trade-off between 
methodological rigor and feasibility. On the one hand, the choices with respect to methods 
and techniques attempt to reduce the likelihood of biases and errors, such as common method 
bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) and non-response bias (Armstrong & 
Overton, 1977); on the other hand, the decisions aimed at facilitating data collection and 
analysis. To inform our decisions and to increase methodological rigor and secure the 
feasibility of the empirical study, we followed available guidelines with respect to the survey 
and questionnaire design (Bagozzi, 1994; Dillman, 2000; Furrer & Sudharshan, 2001).  
 
In Section 6.1, we elaborate on the procedure used for the pretest and discuss several 
precautions taken to increase the validity and response rate of the empirical study. In Section 
6.2, we describe the data collection procedure and elaborate on several measures used to 
reduce sampling biases and errors. In Section 6.3, we provide arguments for why we use 
aggregate measures and, subsequently, introduce operational definitions of the main 
constructs. In Section 6.4, we explain why we decided to test Hypothesis 1 with partial least 
squares estimation and Hypotheses 2–4 with covariance analysis. We conclude with a 
summary of the research design decisions in Section 6.5.  
 
6.1 Pretest 
We conducted a pretest of the questionnaire and survey design for four reasons. First, we used 
the pretest to examine the face validity of the proposed theoretical models. Second, the pretest 
enabled us to assess the questionnaire design’s quality and the face and content validity of the 
operational definitions. Third, we conducted the pretest to assess the psychometric properties 
of the measures and scales. Fourth, we used the pretest to explore the ease with which we 
could collect data from alliance managers.  
 
Before conducting a cross-sectional empirical study, it is important to assess the face validity 
of the theoretical model to reduce any concerns about omitted variable bias (Bagozzi, 1994). 
Omitted variable bias occurs when an important antecedent of a dependent variable does not 
appear in the theoretical model. To reduce these concerns, we conducted a thorough review of 
the literature and conducted interviews (Dillman, 2000). We used a preliminary version of the 
theoretical model to conduct a series of semi-structured interviews with 25 managers 
responsible for contractual alliances (see Appendix 3).30 Initial interviews (i.e., 4) served to 
probe and test ideas, and subsequent interviews focused on research questions 1 and 2. That 
is, we conducted 12 interviews to comprehend the relationship between alliance structure and 
                                                 
30 We acknowledge Sander Degens, Marcel aan den Boom, and Emiel van Alphen for their research assistance. 
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alliance processes and nine interviews to explore the trade-off between cooperation and 
competition within alliances. The empirical results supported the proposed theoretical model, 
but also suggested some minor adjustments, such as refining the argumentation, incorporating 
new insights, and adding control variables. 
 
To assess the quality of the questionnaire design and the face and content validity of the 
operational definitions, we conducted eight additional interviews with alliance managers. 
Results indicated that the draft questionnaire could be interpreted equivocally; therefore, 
several questions needed to be modified, as managers perceived them as unclear. To address 
these issues, we first simplified the questionnaire structure by grouping questions into three 
sections: (1) alliance formation and negotiation, (2) alliance operations and alliance 
performance, and (3) general questions. We added and clarified the introductory texts before 
each section and the individual question. We also used different colors for each section to 
separate the sections visually. To address issues with operational definitions, we added 
framing questions before the questions of interest (Dillman, 2000). That is, for each set of 
related questions, we first asked questions to activate an informant’s memory. For instance, 
resource complementarity appears first, so the formative indicators ask about the type and 
amount of specific resources contributed by each partner (e.g., financial resources and human 
resources), followed by a set of reflective questions used for hypotheses testing. Finally, 
informants indicated that the information required was very sensitive in nature. Therefore, we 
decided to modify and eliminate items identified as being too sensitive.  
 
We conducted another pretest to assess the psychometric properties of the measures and 
scales. We distributed the final questionnaire to 12 alliance managers and then contacted each 
manager by telephone to obtain feedback about questionnaire quality and response time. The 
informants indicated that the questionnaire was clear, to the point, and easy to respond to and 
that it took them no more than 25 minutes to complete. Hence, no substantial modifications 
were deemed necessary to the questionnaire design and operational definitions. Preliminary 
construct validity assessments revealed no concerns with regard to proceeding with data 
collection. The data from these 12 informants were incorporated into the main sample.  
 
Finally, the pretests showed that alliance managers are difficult to identify within a firm, 
because their job titles and the definition of what an alliance is vary across firms. In addition, 
some informants indicated that the recent upsurge in alliance research has lead to fatigue in 
complying with requests to participate in research projects. Consequently, we anticipated that 
data collection would be inhibited by informants’ disinclination to participate. To overcome 
this data collection barrier, we developed a twofold strategy for data collection.  
 
6.2 Data Collection 
We decided to collect data by administering Web-based questionnaires across a sample frame 
of alliance managers responsible for a contractual alliance. More specifically, we approached 
alliance managers in the form of six benchmark studies and a large sample survey (i.e., cross-
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sectional) across firms, industries, and countries. This twofold data collection procedure may 
raise concerns with respect to methodological rigor. Therefore, we elaborate on the 
precautions we took to reduce concerns with respect to (1) sampling strategy, (2) data 
collection procedure, (3) one-sided key informants, and (4) missing values. 
 
Sampling Strategy 
The sampling strategy is best described as a non-probability sampling strategy, which 
combines convenience with judgment sampling and may prompt concerns about coverage and 
sampling error (Bagozzi, 1994). Coverage error results if every unit in the survey population 
lacks a known, non-zero chance of being included in the sample, and sampling error occurs 
when researchers collect data from only a subset, rather than all, of the members of the 
sample frame (Dillman, 2000). Convenience sampling means that members of the sample 
frame are easy to identify and approach, whereas judgment sampling implies that the 
researcher uses his or her judgment to select or deselect potential informants from the sample 
frame. The use of the non-probability sampling strategy means that the data may be subject to 
coverage and sampling errors, because not all potential informants had an equal opportunity 
to participate in the research project. That is, for various reasons, including e-mail delivery 
failure, informants who were no longer employed by the firm, and outdated public sources, 
the data may be biased with respect to this type of error.  
 
To reduce concerns about the convenience sampling strategy, we decided to focus on 
particular industries and countries. Previous alliance studies have shown that (contractual) 
alliances are prolific in particular industries. Thus, we focused on the ICT (Duysters et al., 
1999; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Hagedoorn et al., 1994), pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology (Mitsuhashi, 2003; Hagedoorn, & Van Kranenburg, 2003; Hagedoorn et al 
2006; Powell, Koput, & SmithDoerr, 1996; Silverman & Baum, 2002), manufacturing and 
production (Hennart, Kim, & Zeng, 1998; Yan et al., 2001), and service (Sampson, 2004b) 
sectors. To increase the likelihood that an informant had the opportunity to participate in the 
project, we conducted extensive searches across public sources to construct a list of potential 
firms. We also actively approached firms to obtain the information about potential 
respondents. Second, we focused on two geographical areas, Europe and the United States. 
Research indicated that a country’s market and industry characteristics influence firms’ use of 
alliances (De Man, 2005; Steensma, Marino, & Weaver, 2000; Scheer et al., 2003). De Man 
(2005) found that U.S.-based firms applied more alliance management techniques than 
European firms. The convenience sampling strategy has two important implications. First, we 
must control for industry and country effects (see §6.3). Second, the findings should be 
considered conservative, because the data may contain some “noise.” However, the sampling 
strategy enables us to test the validity of the hypotheses across contexts (Bacharach, 1989). 
 
To reduce concerns about contaminated data further, we ensured that the only those 
contractual alliances assessed by informants were consistent with the scope of the research 
(see §1.5). Hence, we asked informants to read four screening questions carefully before 
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participating in the project. The first screening question asked them to select a contractual 
alliance in which no equity was involved. This question aimed to decrease the likelihood that 
other types of alliances, such as JVs, licenses, or franchises, appeared in the final data set. The 
second question pertained to partner firm objectives and asked informants to select an alliance 
with multiple objectives. With the third question, we asked them to select an alliance with a 
long-term orientation and thereby attempted to steer them away from transactional-based 
relationships (Dwyer et al., 1987). Finally, to reduce cognitive strains (Podsakoff et al., 2003), 
we asked informants to select an operational alliance for which the alliance contract had been 
signed within the past five years. Together, the four screening questions should result in the 
exclusion of informants who cannot provide the requested information.  
 
The sampling strategy also may raise concerns about non-response bias; therefore, we took 
several ex-ante precautions to reduce this likelihood (Miller & Smith, 1983). With respect to 
data collection, we sent prenotification e-mails, offered to provide more details, guaranteed 
confidentiality and anonymity, sent reminders, and conducted a telephone follow-up 
procedure. We designed a questionnaire that was easily accessible and understandable by 
potential informants, as confirmed by the pretest (see §6.1). For instance, we kept 
introductions short, and questions appealed to informants’ expertise about the alliance. We 
clearly described the type of alliance under investigation, which should stimulate qualified 
informants to respond and dissuade inappropriate informants from participating. These ex-
ante measures should reduce the likelihood of non-response error. However, in contrast to 
coverage and sampling error, it is possible to diagnose the presence of non-response bias. 
Therefore, we conducted two ex-post statistical tests: (1) a comparison of early and late 
respondents (Armstrong et al., 1977) and (2) a comparison of respondents and non-
respondents (Miller et al., 1983). We present these results in Section 7.2. 
 
Data Collection Procedure 
We used a twofold data collection strategy: (1) benchmarking and (2) public sources. First, 
we approached multinational firms with the aid of the Association of Strategic Alliance 
Professionals (ASAP).31 At its annual 2005 conference, ASAP allowed us to approach a small 
number of firms, and six firms responded positively. For each firm, we identified a champion 
who agreed to support the research project. The champions were closely involved in one or 
more alliances and occupied a key position within the firm. The contact persons agreed to 
approach potential informants, which provided assessments of several alliances per firm. To 
stimulate participation, we offered a benchmark report. Overall, firms participating in the 
benchmark study identified 43 informants, 27 of whom returned a questionnaire after two 
reminder e-mails (response rate = 62.8%).  
 
In addition to the benchmark procedure, we constructed a sample frame using public sources, 
such as company Web sites, branch associations, and rankings of firms published in business 
                                                 
31 A global association designed to create and disseminate alliance know-how among practitioners, consultants, 
and academics. Support was provided by enabling conference attendance and announcements on their Web site. 
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magazines. We carefully examined the initial sample frame and eliminated any double entries, 
firms with incomplete contact details, and or companies in the wrong industry. The final 
sample frame consisted of 1,108 informants with complete information, including the 
informant’s first name, surname, company name, e-mail address, and telephone number. We 
approached these informants through a Web survey procedure that consisted of five 
consecutive phases (see Dillman, 2000; Furrer & Sudharshan, 2001). First, we sent potential 
informants a prenotification e-mail introducing the project, which should positively influence 
informants’ inclination to participate in the research project (Dillman, 2000). Second, we sent 
a second e-mail in which we elaborated on the project aims, discussed the need for the 
informant’s expertise, emphasized the benefits (i.e., results), and attached a link to the Web 
site containing the online questionnaire (if requested, informants received a hard-copy 
questionnaire through regular mail). Emphasizing an informant’s expertise creates a positive 
attitude toward the research project, and promising a report with the results provides an extra 
stimulus to participate (Dillman, 2000). Third, the follow-up procedure consisted of two 
reminder e-mails (i.e., phases 3 and 4) and a follow-up telephone call (i.e., phase 5). The 
telephone call not only increased response rates, but also enabled us to collect additional data 
about non-respondents (see §7.2). In summary, of the 1,108 informants approached, 150 
participated in the survey (response rate = 13.5%).  
 
Although the data collection procedure was carefully planned and executed, three factors 
caused the response rates to be lower than initially expected. First, building on the insights 
gained through the pretest, we anticipated that firms participating in the benchmark study 
would have assessed more alliances on average. However, time constraints and the lack of 
champion support led to lower response rates in some firms. Second, a negative side effect of 
using a Web-based questionnaire is that some e-mails could not be delivered to potential 
informants. In some instances, we received notification that the e-mail was simply 
undeliverable; in other situations, the informant notified us that he or she switched jobs, or the 
firm communicated that the informant was not longer employed. Third, despite efforts to 
reduce the appearance of asking for sensitive information, follow-up telephone calls revealed 
that several informants felt that their participation to the project would require them to 
disclose sensitive information. Consequently, these informants declined participation. The 
two-stage data collection procedure resulted in 177 returned questionnaires. However, the net 
sample consists of 151 cases, as we needed to eliminate responses provided by one-sided key 
informants or that were missing too many values.  
 
One-Sided Key Informants 
Consistent with previous alliance research (Heide et al., 1990; Heide & Miner, 1992; Lambe 
et al., 2002; Parkhe, 1993a; Saxton, 1997), we decided to use one-sided key informants 
(Campbell, 1955),32 which means that we collected data from one side of the dyadic 
relationship: the focal firm (Van Bruggen, Kacker, & Nieuwlaat, 2005; Yan et al., 2001). 
                                                 
32 We use the term “informants” instead of respondents, because informants provide information about structural 
relationships, whereas respondents provide assessments of social-psychological information (Seidler, 1974). 
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Within each focal firm, we approached one person and asked him or her to provide the 
requested information (Kumar et al., 1993). The use of one-sided key informants in alliance 
research has several advantages, including increased response rates, fewer resources, and 
relatively faster and easier data collection (Seidler, 1974). However, one-sided key informants 
also may produce erroneous data as a result of selection and perceptual biases (Kumar et al., 
1993). For instance, an informant may not be qualified to report on the alliance under 
investigation, because he or she is not knowledgeable about every aspect. To reduce concerns 
about response biases due to the use of one-sided key informants, we examined whether the 
key informant was knowledgeable about (1) the alliance under investigation and (2) the 
partner firm.  
 
First, we added a question to assess the informant’s knowledge about the alliance (Geringer, 
1998; Jap, 1999; Jap et al., 2003; Lambe et al., 2002). The question was measured with a 
seven-point Likert scale, with a cut-off value of 3, such that a lower score indicates the 
informant has less than the required knowledge about the alliance. Post-hoc analyses showed 
that only 3 informants did not meet this key informant criterion; they were eliminated from 
further analysis. The average score across the net sample is 6.3, which is sufficient according 
to past alliance research, which reported scores of 5.6 (Jap, 1999; Jap et al., 2003) and 6.5 
(Lambe et al., 2002). Hence, this finding provides support for the assumption that the 
informants used for data analysis are knowledgeable about the selected alliances. 
 
Second, response biases may arise when one-sided reports are used to evaluate aspects of a 
dyadic relationship (Menon, Bickart, Sudman, & Blair, 1995). The use of proxy reports 
suggests that the researcher assumes the informant is knowledgeable about the partner firm 
(Buchanan, 1992). Particularly in alliances, this assumption might be questioned, because 
partner firms could have hidden agendas, withhold critical information, or perceive critical 
events differently (see e.g., Ariño et al., 1998). Despite these concerns, past empirical studies 
showed that focal firm and partner firm responses tend to be positively and significantly 
correlated (Berthon et al., 2003; Cullen et al., 1995; Fryxell et al., 2002: Heide & John, 1992). 
For instance, Heide and John (1992) found significant correlations between buyer and 
supplier responses, ranging from .26 to .64 (p < .05), and Fryxell, Dooley, and Vryza (2002) 
found correlations as high as .77 and .84 (p < .05) in performance assessments reported by 
joint venture general managers and parent firm representatives.  
 
Researchers also showed that if discussion and participation within the relationship increases, 
the likelihood that the findings obtained through self-reports and proxy reports are 
representative also increases (Menon et al., 1995). To address concerns about whether a key 
informant was qualified to report on its partner firm, we added a question evaluating the 
frequency of contact between the informant and the counterpart (Menon et al., 1995). The 
item was measured on a seven-point Likert scale, and a score lower than 3 would indicate the 
informant has less than moderate contact with the partner firm. Post-hoc analysis showed that 
only 5 informants reported a score below 3; we excluded them from the analysis. The average 
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score ( x  = 6.17, SD = 1.13) indicates that the sample informants have frequent interactions 
with partners. Therefore, we conclude that the remaining informants are knowledgeable about 
their partner firms and qualified to respond to the questions on their counterpart’s behalf. 
 
Missing Value Analysis 
Missing data results from multiple causes, such as data entry errors, refusal by an informant to 
provide data, or data loss. The impact of missing data is detrimental not only because of its 
potential (hidden) biases but also as a result of its practical impact on the sample size 
available for data analysis. Although we could use only data from completed questionnaires, 
this approach is undesirable because of the substantial loss of information it causes (Little & 
Rubin, 1987). Hence, the alternative preferred procedure identifies the missing data pattern 
and then determines an appropriate imputation technique (Lemieux & McAlister, 2005).  
 
We conducted a missing value analysis and found that 18 cases contained more than 10% 
missing values. We decided to exclude these informants from further data analysis. Several 
alliance managers provided contact details to receive the study’s results, so we were able to 
conduct follow-up contacts, from which we determined that managers had concerns about the 
sensitivity of the requested information, were not knowledgeable about specific questions, or 
thought that the questionnaire was too long. We decided to use the SPSS (version 15) 
“Expectation Maximization” (EM) algorithm to impute missing data in the predictor and 
criterion variables (Little et al., 1987), as tests showed that the missing data pattern depicted a 
missing at random situation. That is, no underlying process lends biases to the observed data, 
which makes it acceptable to apply a remedy to complete the missing data. To check the 
equivalence of the sample with imputed values (n = 151) against the sample with completed 
questionnaires (n = 138), we conducted t-tests for the equivalence of means with respect to 
each manifest indicator. The results of these tests were non-significant, which suggests no 
significant difference between the two groups. Hence, we conclude that the data pose limited 
concerns for artifactual biases, which we may have created by imputing missing values.  
 
Summary 
Overall, we approached 1,151 informants through a dual data collection strategy (see Table 
6.1 for the response analysis). Together, the benchmark strategy (27) and the survey 
procedure (150) resulted in 177 returned questionnaires. Imposing key informant and proxy 
report criteria reduced the sample size to 169. We also decided to exclude 18 informants from 
further data analysis because of the substantial amount of missing data (i.e., > 10%) and used 
an EM logarithm to impute missing data with respect to the other cases. The net sample for 
the data analysis therefore consists of 151 cases, indicating a modest response rate of 13.1%.  
 
When compared with past alliance research using a cross-sectional survey design to obtain 
data, a net sample of 151 cases is relatively good. For instance, previous alliance studies using 
cross-sectional data reported sample sizes of 34 equity and 45 contractual alliances (Ariño, 
2003), 75 alliances (Glaister & Buckley, 1998b), 137 alliances (Chen, 2004), 138 JVs 
136 
(Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma, Tihanyi, 2004), 114 international alliances (Kauser et al., 2004), 
145 alliances (Lambe et al., 2002), 78 IJVs (Lane et al., 2001), and 98 alliances (Saxton, 
1997). Nonetheless, as the net sample size is moderate, we are somewhat limited in the choice 
of data analysis techniques (see §6.4) and the use of control variables (see §8.1 and §9.1). 
 
Table 6.1 Response Analysis  
 Benchmark Survey Total 
Sample Frame  43  1108  1151 
Non-response 
- unknown reason 
- undeliverable 
- reason provided 
 
 
 0 
 0 
 16 
 
 16 
 
 
 816 
 106 
 36 
  
 958 
 
 910 
 106 
 52 
 
 1068 
 
Questionnaires returned  27 (62.8%)  150 (13.5%)  177 (14.4%) 
    
Key informant criterion (<3)  0  3  3 
Proxy report criterion (<3)  0  5  5 
Missing value (> 10%)  0  18  18 
    
Net sample  27(62.8%)  131 (11.8%)  151 (13.1 %) 
 
6.3 Operational Definitions 
We designed the questionnaire to obtain focal firm and partner firm data (see Appendix 4), 
but we formulated the hypotheses at the alliance level (see §1.5). Therefore, we need to 
transform firm-level scores into alliance-level scores. Although aggregated measures are 
commonly used in alliance research (Van Bruggen et al., 2005; Gundlach et al., 1995; Kumar, 
Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1998; Ross, Anderson, & Weitz, 1997; Yan et al., 2001), their use is 
not without concern (Edwards, 2001a; Peter, Churchill, & Brown, 1993). Thus, before we 
present the operational definitions, we present a procedure we developed aimed at reducing 
the risk of construct validity problems associated with aggregate measures.  
 
Aggregate Measures 
The use of aggregate measures to test hypotheses has fueled a heated debate among scholars 
(Edwards, 1993, 1995, 2001a; Edwards & Parry, 1993; Lord, 1958; Peter et al., 1993; Tisak & 
Smith, 1994b, 1994a; Zuckerman, Gagne, Nafshi, Knee, & Kieffer, 2002). Aggregate 
measures surfaced under different labels within management research, such as difference 
(Edwards, 2001a), disconfirmation (Peter et al., 1993), discrepancy (Smith & Tisak, 1993), fit 
(Drazin et al., 1985), and congruence (Edwards, 1993) scores. The gist of the conversation 
focused on the conditions in which various types of conceptualizations and data analysis 
techniques are appropriate (Edwards, 2001a; Spreng & Page, 2003).  
 
On the one hand, scholars advocated the use of disaggregated scores if the research objective 
is to develop an in-depth understanding of the relationships between two individual 
components and a dependent variable (Edwards et al., 1993). On the other hand, researchers 
argued that aggregate scores could be considered an appropriate alternative if a holistic 
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approach is adopted (Donovan & Hafsteinsson, 2006; Tisak et al., 1994b). The aim thus is to 
examine a more complex theoretical model that extends beyond the disaggregated relationship 
between components and a dependent variable. Hypotheses 1–4 pertain to a set of 
relationships between variables, which together provide an explanation at the alliance level. 
That is, the aim of this study is not to understand relationships between various firm-level 
variables but to provide explanations about alliance performance at the alliance level (see 
Chapter 1). Within the context of this study, the use of aggregate measures is appropriate. 
Next, we discuss (1) why we used a subjective approach with respect to data collection, (2) 
why we use a difference score approach with respect to data analysis, and (3) how we 
compute the aggregate measures.  
 
Data Collection: Subjective Approach 
With respect to data collection and aggregate measures, a subjective approach implies that 
two components (i.e., focal firm and partner firm indicators) get measured separately, but a 
comparison between the two components is made by the same informant (Kristof-Brown, 
Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005). If we contrast the subjective approach with a direct approach, 
in which an informant makes a direct comparison between two components (Peter et al., 
1993), the subjective approach has several advantages. First, it reduces concerns about 
response biases, because it does not assume that an informant is capable of comparing and 
aggregating two components into a single score (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). Because 
mentally comparing two components may invoke cognitive processes other than the simple 
comparisons presumed, the provided score should not be considered a proxy for the 
conception that the difference score is intended to capture (Edwards, 2001a). Second, because 
the subjective approach does not produce mentally aggregated data, a researcher gains an 
understanding of the exact nature of the relationship between the two components. Though 
the direct approach reduces questionnaire length (i.e., fewer questions), an understanding of 
the relationship between the components may be more critical.  
 
Compared with an objective approach, which is similar to the subjective approach except that 
information is collected from multiple informants (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005), the subjective 
approach has one major advantage: sample size. For alliance research, collecting data on two 
sides of the relationship is difficult. Only a few empirical studies of buyer–supplier 
relationships adopted the objective approach (Anderson et al., 1990; Ganesan, 1994), but they 
suffered from relatively small sample sizes. To ease data collection, researchers often used 
one focal buyer and multiple suppliers (see e.g., Buchanan, 1992). The observation that 
dyadic data collection is a cumbersome endeavor also is supported by the findings we 
obtained during the pretest interviews. For instance, alliance managers reported a 
disinclination to approach their partner with a request to participate in a research project. An 
objective approach has a significant advantage, in that artifactual biases, such as a consistency 
bias, are absent because the research uses different sources (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). We 
argue that these concerns do not outweigh the benefits of a relatively larger sample size. 
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Data Analysis: Aggregate Measures 
With regard to the data analysis, several alternative techniques are available if data are 
collected on each component. Researchers can use each component independently in the data 
analysis. For instance, polynominal regression avoids collapsing two components into a single 
score that captures the differences (Edwards et al., 1993). Instead, each component and its 
associated higher-order terms are included as predictors. Because the two components and the 
dependent variable are all included separately, relationships can be depicted on three-
dimensional surface plots (Kim & Hsieh, 2003). The use of polynominal regression thus 
overcomes issues pertaining to conceptual ambiguity, discarded information, insensitivity to 
the source of differences, and overly restrictive constraints (Edwards et al., 1993). The results 
also often depict more complicated relationships than are determinable with alternative 
approaches, in which researchers have used aggregates scores (Edwards, 2001a).  
 
Nonetheless, we decided to use aggregate scores rather than individual components for two 
reasons. First, though aggregated scores have been called conceptually ambiguous, because 
they can confound the effects of their component variables (Peter et al., 1993), we argue that 
the aggregate measures used in this research actually present meaningful conceptualizations 
(Tisak et al., 1994b). That is, the use of aggregate measures is consistent with the nature of the 
hypotheses they test (Donovan et al., 2006). The hypotheses focus on performance in an 
alliance context, and the independent variables involve alliance-level constructs. It is precisely 
the discrepancy or congruence between the partner firms, not simply each partner firms’ 
score, in which we are interested. Therefore, as it is not the objective to examine fine-grained 
the relationships between firm-level variables, we adopt an alliance-level approach. 
 
Second, though polynominal regression might overcome some conceptual and methodological 
criticism of aggregate scores, this estimation imposes constraints on the data that require 
larger sample sizes. When testing the hypotheses with polynominal regression, large samples 
are needed to provide adequate statistical power because the analyses include both interaction 
and higher-order effects (Edwards, 2001a). Despite the one-sided data collection procedure, 
the sample size here is well below the sample sizes used by Edwards (1993, p. 1584) to 
demonstrate the use of polynominal regression (i.e., ranging from 617 to 625). In summary, 
for conceptual and methodological considerations, the use of aggregate measures is 
acceptable and appropriate in this study. 
 
Aggregate Measures: Computation 
Multiple computation techniques can calculate aggregate scores, including summated, 
algebraic difference, absolute difference, squared difference, residual-difference scores, and 
profile similarity index (for an overview, see Edwards, 2001a; Zuckerman et al., 2002). 
Consistent with the hypotheses, we use two types of aggregate measures. The first is a 
summated score, obtained by summing a focal firm and partner firm indicator. Summated 
scores can be used without substantial problems, as previous alliance research used this type 
of measures for dependence (see e.g., Van Bruggen et al., 2005; Kumar, Scheer & Steenkamp, 
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1998) and alliance performance (see e.g., Yan et al., 2001). For example, when they examined 
the relationship between interdependence and punitive capability in marketing channel 
relationships, Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1998) computed total dependence as the sum 
of dealer and supplier dependence scores.  
 
The second type of aggregated measure we use is an absolute difference score. A difference 
score involves subtracting one measure from another to create a measure of a distinct 
construct (Peter et al., 1993). Because the focus is on the magnitude, rather than the 
directionality, of the difference, we compute the difference score by taking the absolute value 
of the difference (Casciaro et al., 2005; Edwards, 2001a). This approach previously has been 
used in alliance research to explain consequences of the differences between partner firms 
(Van Bruggen et al., 2005; Child et al., 2003; Child et al., 1999; Mjoen et al., 1997; 
Ramaseshan et al., 1998). For instance, Van Bruggen, Kacker, and Nieuwlaat (2005) 
computed relative distributor and customer dependence as the absolute value of the difference 
between the distributor and customer dependence scores and thereby examined the 
moderating impact of relative dependence on the relationship between a distributor’s channel 
performance and customers’ perception of relational quality. In contrast to a summated score, 
a difference score raises concerns about construct validity (Edwards, 2001a). 
 
We took several ex-ante precautions to reduce concerns about possible biases resulting from 
the use of difference scores (Peter et al., 1993; Smith et al., 1993). We asked pretest 
informants whether they could provide the requested information about their partner firms. 
The interview results indicated that the informants did not experience any problems (see 
§6.1). To ease cognitive strains, we designed a questionnaire that enabled informants to 
contrast the focal firm’s scores with partner firm scores visually (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & 
Berry, 1994). In each section of the questionnaire, we emphasized that informants should 
discriminate between the focal firm and the partner firm in their responses.  
 
We also decided to conduct two ex-post assessments to determine whether using aggregate 
measures is appropriate: examination of the construct validity of the (1) firm-level constructs 
(i.e., components) and (2) difference scores (i.e., aggregate measure). First, with regard to the 
individual components, we examine convergent validity, discriminant validity, and reliability, 
because components should meet conventional construct validity standards (Peter et al., 
1993). With respect to the difference score measures, we examine reliability and discriminant 
validity; to proceed with hypotheses testing, we must assess whether the components are 
conceptually and empirically distinct from the aggregate construct (Edwards, 2001a). More 
specifically, we examine difference score reliability according to the procedure presented by 
Peter, Churchill and Brown (1993 p. 655), which demands that difference score reliability 
achieves a score greater than .700 (see Box 6.1). We assess discriminant validity by 
examining the correlations between firm-level variables and the aggregate construct (i.e., 
difference score), according to which high correlations indicate poor discriminant validity 
(Peter et al., 1993). We present the results of the analyses in Section 7.4.  
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Box 6.1 Difference Score Reliability 
A difference score is usually less reliable than its component scores and, therefore, it is important to 
assess difference score reliability. The reliability of a difference score requires a value greater than
.700. The formula depicted below enables computation of difference score reliability: 
 
 
 
 
 
σ1
2 = variance component 1 
σ2
2 = variance component 2 
r11 = reliability component 1 
r22 = reliability component 2 
r12 = correlation between component 1 and component 2 
 
Source: Peter et al. (1993)
 
Operational Definitions 
The primary objective of the operationalization phase is to develop measures and scales that 
represent the constructs under investigation. To achieve this objective, we follow guidelines 
in the literature (Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 2005; Peter, 1981). First, we examine previous alliance 
research and identified constructs with similar operational definitions. We only adopt 
measures and scales that demonstrated sufficient psychometric properties and, where 
necessary, adapt them to the context of the study. Second, we use multi-item measures and 
scales to reduce concerns about measurement error (Bagozzi et al., 1991). Third, we scrutinize 
each item and ensure that questions were unambiguously and clearly formulated (Dillman, 
2000). Fourth, we use mirror-image indicators to ease the informant’s assessment of the focal 
firm’s and partner firm’s constructs (Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1998). Fifth, we use the 
guidelines for appropriately employing formative and reflective measures (see Box 6.2). We 
present the operational definitions next (see Appendix 4 for the questionnaire). 
 
Alliance Performance and Firm Performance Imbalance 
Although performance measures, such as financial indicators (Jap, 1999), patent indices 
(Sampson, 2004b), and termination (Park et al., 1996), can be used to measure alliance 
performance, it is difficult to track the benefits of alliances objectively (Gulati, 1998; Kumar 
et al., 1993). For instance, corporate reports, which are publicly available, may not reflect the 
benefits of an alliance, and alliances may dissolve because parties either achieved their 
objectives or did not. In addition, many alliances hope to accomplish multiple objectives, and 
different measures capture long-term effects differently. Therefore, we decided to measure the 
performance of each alliance with perception indicators, which is not uncommon in alliance 
performance research (Anderson, 1990; Ariño, 2003; Geringer et al., 1991; Saxton, 1997). 
Although subjective measures may raise concerns about cognitive biases (Olk, 2002), the 
usage of one key informant (Campbell, 1955; Kumar et al., 1993), and construct validity 
issues (Ariño, 2003; López-Navarro et al., 2002), we argue that this subjective approach 
enables us to capture alliance performance adequately. To reduce these concerns, we took 
several precautions, as discussed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2.  
   
σ1
2r11 + σ22r22 
σ1
2 + σ2
2
r D ifference  = 
 - 2r 12 σ1σ2 
 - 2r 12 σ1σ2 
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Consistent with the conceptualization of alliance performance (see §1.1), we operationalize it 
as the degree to which both parties achieve their objectives, whether intentional or emergent. 
Firm performance imbalance is operationalized as the absolute difference between the degree 
to which the parties achieved their objectives. More specifically, we use focal firm and 
partner indicators to compute the two aggregate dependent variables at the alliance level. We 
capture performance through four indicators: two reflective indicators capturing the 
achievement of emergent objectives; one reflective indicator capturing the achievement of 
intentional objectives; and an aggregate indicator, computed as the average score of five 
formative indicators that capture the achievement of intentional objectives. After assessing the 
construct validity of the firm-level measures (see §7.4), we use the four indicators to compute 
alliance performance and firm performance imbalance.  
 
We focus on three performance dimensions—financial, learning, and strategic—identified as 
the main rationales for entering alliances (Child et al., 2003; Ding, 1997; Kale et al., 2002; 
Kogut, 1988b). As discussed, we measure the first dimension (financial) with two reflective 
indicators (i.e., 7-point Likert scale) that refer to the extent to which each partner previously 
“has been satisfied with the financial benefits it attained through the alliance” and “has 
viewed the alliance as a profitable investment.” In addition, a third indicator is a product term 
of two items that capture the importance of a partner’s financial objectives and the 
achievement of its financial objectives (Blankenburg Holm et al., 1999; Ding, 1997; Jap, 
1999). Furthermore, we measure the importance and achievement of the five formative 
indicators pertaining to objectives as “revenues,” “decrease in investments,” “profits,” 
“improving operating efficiency,” and “return on investment” (Anderson, 1990; Büchel et al., 
2001; Jap et al., 2003; Lambe et al., 2002). We use the average score across product terms for 
the data analysis. The aggregate measures for the data analysis are computed with the 
procedure described previously and labeled financial performance and financial performance 
imbalance. 
 
The learning performance dimension is operationalized with three items pertaining to the 
extent to which a partner previously “has been satisfied with the knowledge it gained through 
the alliance” and “has learned important new knowledge through the alliance,” as well as the 
product term between two indicators that assess the importance of learning objectives and the 
achievement of learning objectives (Beamish et al., 2003; Kale et al., 2000; Simonin, 1999). 
Furthermore, five formative learning indicators are operationalized according to the 
importance and achievement of the following objectives: “knowledge of production 
processes,” “marketing know-how,” “managerial techniques,” “technological know-how,” 
and “product development know-how” (Büchel et al., 2001; Lane et al., 1998; Lane et al., 
2001; Steensma & Lyles, 2000) and used to compute a fourth indicator (firm-level). That is, 
we use the average score across the product terms for the data analysis. The aggregate 
measures for data analysis are computed according to the procedure described previously and 
labeled learning performance and learning performance imbalance. 
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Finally, the third dimension, strategic performance, is measured with three items capturing the 
extent to which a partner “has gained a strategic advantage over its competitors” and “has 
been satisfied with the strategic benefits it attained through the alliance,” as well as a product 
term of two items assessing the importance and achievement of strategic benefits (Child et al., 
2003; Kauser et al., 2004; Parkhe, 1993a). Again, we include five formative items to examine 
the importance and achievement of objectives pertaining to “new business opportunities,” 
“increase in market share,” “enhancing reputation,” “enhancing competitive position,” and 
“risk reduction” (Anderson, 1990; Aulakh et al., 1996; Büchel et al., 2001; Jap, 2001b). We 
use the average score across product terms for the data analysis (firm-level). The aggregate 
measures are computed with the procedure described previously and labeled strategic 
performance and strategic performance imbalance. 
 
Box 6.2 Formative and Reflective Measurement 
Construct validity pertains to the degree of correspondence between constructs and their measures 
and is a necessary condition for theory development and testing. Observed measures can be treated 
as reflective or formative, and their misspecification can lead to inaccurate conclusions about the 
structural relationships between constructs. A measurement model with reflective indicators means 
changes in the underlying construct should cause changes in the indicators. In contrast, a formative 
measurement model indicates that changes in the measures should cause changes in the latent 
variable. This difference in the direction of causality between indicators and constructs has several 
consequences. First, reflective measures are expected to be intercorrelated, which renders an 
internal consistency perspective appropriate, whereas no reason for interitem correlations exists with 
formative measures. Second, dropping an indicator from a reflective measurement model does not 
alter the meaning of the latent construct, whereas dropping an item could alter the meaning of the 
latent construct in a formative model. Third, measurement error is considered at the item level with 
respect to reflective measurement models but at the construct level for formative ones. The 
difference between using reflective and formative indicators has several Implications. First, proper 
specification of the measurement model is necessary before researchers can assign meaning to any 
analysis of the structural model. Second, operational definitions should be scrutinized in terms of 
their nature to prevent misspecification. For instance, a researcher should consider the direction of 
causality between constructs and indicators, the interchangeability of indicators, covariation among 
the indicators, and the nomological net to make a specification decision. Third, with respect to 
hypotheses testing, some estimation techniques that enable the use of latent variables are more 
appropriate for formative measurement models than are others.  
 
Sources: Bagozzi (1994); Bollen & Lennox (1991); Diamantopoulos (1999); Diamantopoulos & 
Winklhofer (2001); Edwards & Bagozzi (2000); Fornell & Bookstein (1982); Jarvis, MacKenzie, & 
Podsakoff (2003) 
 
Implications for this Study 
The difference between using reflective and formative indicators has four implications for this study: 
1. We used formative indicators as framing questions. To activate an informants’ memory with 
respect to a topic, we first asked formative questions, followed by the reflective questions that we 
used for the data analysis (see §6.1).  
2. We used reflective indicators to measure firm-level constructs, which renders an internal 
consistency approach appropriate. Consequently, the first-order constructs are reflective in 
nature and should be assessed on their construct validity accordingly (see §6.4).  
3. With respect to the second-order constructs, the first, structural coherence represents a 
formative latent variable, whereas the second, relational adaptability represents a reflective latent 
variable. Therefore, different criteria apply to assess construct validity (see §6.4).  
4. With respect to hypotheses testing (see §6.4), Hypothesis 1 represents a hierarchical component 
model, appropriately tested with partial least squares estimation. In contrast, Hypotheses 2–4 are 
more suited to testing with covariance analysis 
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Partner Fit 
Partner fit is the compatibility of the partners at the alliance formation stage (Douma et al., 
2000), measured by four 7-point Likert scale items. We use previous alliance research on 
partner fit to develop the items (Bucklin et al., 1993; Harrigan, 1988; Jap et al., 2003; Kale et 
al., 2000; Lane et al., 2001; Saxton, 1997). Specifically, partner fit entails the extent to which 
“the management styles and philosophies of the partners were compatible,” “the 
organizational cultures were compatible,” “the goals of the partners within the alliance were 
aligned,” and “the partner firm’s operations were compatible.”  
 
Resource Complementarity 
Resource complementarity is the extent to which combining partner firms’ resources at the 
alliance formation stage may result in synergetic outcomes (Jap, 1999; Lambe et al., 2002; 
Sarkar, et al., 2001). It is measured by four 7-point Likert scale items: the extent to which “the 
partners used each other’s resources to attain goals beyond individual reach,” “both partners 
had complementary strengths that were beneficial to one another,” “resources brought into the 
alliance by each party were very valuable to the alliance,” and “both partners provided 
resources that enabled them to achieve mutual objectives.”  
 
Compensation Integrativeness and Compensation Imbalance 
Compensation integrativeness is measured as the sum of each party’s satisfaction with its 
anticipated compensation through the alliance, whereas compensation imbalance is the 
absolute difference between parties’ satisfaction with their anticipated compensation. We 
compute these alliance-level scores with focal firm and partner firm scores. Thus, a party’s 
satisfaction is measured by seven 7-point Likert scale items, which we develop by creating an 
item pool based on bargaining, negotiation, and compensation literature (Blodgett, 1991b; 
Contractor et al., 2000; Hennart et al., 2005; Lax et al., 1986; Mendi, 2005; Thompson, 1990). 
We discussed these newly developed items with alliance managers to ensure their face and 
content validity. The definitive questions asked about an informant’s perceptions, while 
thinking of the contractual clauses, of the extent to which “the total expenditures to the 
alliance were below the company’s initial expectations,” “it [the company] was satisfied with 
the degree to which the alliance enabled it to recover its investments,” “it was satisfied with 
the benefits it would obtain through the alliance,” “it was satisfied with the valuation of its 
total contribution to the alliance,” “the sum of benefits was above the company’s original 
expectations,” and “it was pleased with the gains it would receive through the alliance.” 
 
Shared Decision-Making and Decision-Making Imbalance 
Shared decision-making is the sum of the extent to which each party acquired formal 
authority over alliance activities, whereas decision-making imbalance is the absolute 
difference between each party’s formal authority obtained over alliance activities. We 
compute these alliance level scores with focal firm and partner firm scores and we use 
previous alliance research to develop these items (Child et al., 2003; Glaister et al., 2003; 
Johnson et al., 1996; Steensma & Lyles, 2000; Subramani et al., 2003). That is, decision-
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making uses two 7-point Likert scale items and is measured by the extent to which a partner 
“acquired control over overall decision-making within this alliance” and “could exercise 
substantial influence on decision to be made within this alliance.” 
 
Total Non-Recoverable Investments and Non-Recoverable Investment Imbalance 
The aggregate measure total non-recoverable investments equals the sum of each party’s 
specialized expenditures committed to the alliance, whereas non-recoverable investment 
imbalance is operationalized with the absolute difference between their commitments. We 
compute these alliance-level scores with focal firm and partner firm scores, such that 
commitment to make non-recoverable investments is measured by three 7-point Likert scale 
items. Previous operational definitions pertaining to “relationship specific investments” 
(Berthon et al., 2003; Subramaniam & Venkatraman, 2001), “bilateral idiosyncratic 
investments” (Jap, 2001b; Jap et al., 2003), and “transaction specific investments” (Buvik et 
al., 2002; Ganesan, 1994) guide the development of these items, and the questions ask about 
an informant’s perception of the extent to which a partner during the alliance formation stage 
“agreed to invest a great deal into this specific alliance,” “agreed to make investments tailored 
to this alliance,” and “agreed to make substantial unique investments in this alliance.” 
 
Structural Coherence 
Structural coherence represents a second-order construct that consists of eight formative first-
order constructs: partner fit, resource complementarity, compensation integrativeness, 
compensation imbalance, shared decision-making, decision-making imbalance, total non-
recoverable investments, and non-recoverable investment imbalance. Together, the eight first-
order constructs capture the extent to which the initial alliance structure constitutes a coherent 
constellation of mutually supportive structural safeguards.  
 
Absorption Integrativeness and Absorption Asymmetry 
Absorption integrativeness is measured as the sum of each party’s ability to assess and 
acquire knowledge through the alliance, whereas absorption imbalance is the absolute 
difference between each party’s capacity to assess and acquire knowledge. We compute the 
alliance-level scores with focal firm and partner firm scores. Specifically, a party’s capacity to 
assess and acquire knowledge is measured by six 7-point Likert scale items based on 
interviews and prior definitions (Chen, 2004; Dyer et al., 1998; Hamel, 1991; Kumar & Nti, 
1998; Lane et al., 1998; Lane et al., 2001). Each partner’s ability to assess and acquire 
knowledge during the post-formation stage is measured by the extent to which “a party could 
decide on the usefulness of knowledge made available through the alliance,” “a party could 
assess the extent to which new knowledge was valuable,” “a party could determine whether 
new knowledge from the alliance was of high quality,” “a party saw the connection between 
knowledge acquired via the alliance and known knowledge,” “new knowledge from the 
alliance was easily integrated into the existing knowledge base,” and “knowledge made 
available through the alliance matched the existing knowledge base.”  
Learning Capabilities 
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Learning capabilities refer to the extent to which the partners have developed routines that 
support knowledge and information exchange in the alliance. We use past alliance research 
(Doz, 1996; Dyer et al., 1998; Simonin, 1999) to develop three reflective 7-point Likert scale 
items: since the signing of the alliance contract, the relationship has been characterized by 
“the development of routines that have enabled mutual learning,” “the implementation of 
procedures that have enabled mutual learning,” and “policies that facilitate mutual learning.” 
 
Relational Quality 
Relational quality is operationalized as the manifestation of cooperative partner firm 
interactions, indicated by trust, commitment, and respect (Ariño et al., 2001). We use previous 
alliance research on relational quality to develop the items (Aulakh et al., 1996; Cullen et al., 
2000; Kale et al., 2000; Zaheer et al., 1995) and therefore capture it with three questions: 
since the signing of the alliance contract, the relationship has been characterized by “mutual 
trust between the partners,” “mutual respect between the partners,” and “mutual commitment 
between the partners.”  
 
Opportunistic Behavior 
Opportunistic behavior is difficult to measure directly because informants tend to offer 
socially desirable responses (Wathne et al., 2000). Therefore, we introduce a management 
costs variable as a proxy for opportunistic behavior, as opportunistic behavior forces parties to 
make unforeseen coordination expenditures (Dahlstrom et al., 1999; Wathne et al., 2000). 
Although an increase in ex-post coordination costs may shift a negative behavioral spiral 
toward a positive one (Ariño et al., 1998), installing costly monitoring mechanisms burdens 
the alliance. Hence, in line with prior alliance research (Dekker, 2004; Parkhe, 1993a) we 
operationalize management costs as the extent to which parties spent additional resources on: 
“assuring that both partners have fulfilled their contractual obligations,” “monitoring both 
partner firms’ behavior,” and “coordinating the alliance.” 
 
Relational Adaptability 
Relational adaptability represents a second-order construct that consists of five reflective first-
order constructs: absorption integrativeness, absorption imbalance, learning capabilities, 
relational quality, and opportunistic behavior. Together, the first-order constructs capture the 
extent to which the partners were willing and able to make modifications to the ongoing 
relationship without changing the initial alliance structure.  
 
Control Variables 
Although we sought to develop a parsimonious model of alliance performance, we also 
wanted to control for factors identified in existing alliance research as influential for alliance 
performance. We therefore distinguish among (1) environmental conditions, (2) firm factors, 
and (3) alliance properties. First, alliance researchers argued that environmental conditions 
influence alliance performance (Jap, 1999; Koza et al., 1998; Lee et al., 2006). Therefore, we 
control for the extent to which the alliance was surrounded by environmental uncertainty 
146 
(0 = no uncertainty, 1 = uncertainty). In addition, we include a dummy variable to capture the 
degree to which the alliance had been affected by changes in the partners firm’s strategies 
(0 = no impact, 1 = impact). We expect that environmental uncertainty and shifts in partner 
firm’s strategy will destabilize an alliance, which will negatively influence alliance 
performance (Ganesan, 1994; Meschi, 2005).  
 
Firm factors, or the characteristics of each partner firm, exist independent of the alliance. We 
control for whether informants perceived their partners as competitors (0 = no competitors, 
1 = competitors), because alliance researchers argued that an alliance between competitors is 
subject to additional tensions that negatively affect alliance performance (Bengtsson et al., 
2000; Park et al., 1997). We also control for various firm differences, including industry, firm 
size, and experience with alliances. We use two open-ended questions to capture each party’s 
industry and create a dummy variable (0 = dissimilar industry, 1 = similar industry). We use 
two dichotomous control variables for firm size (0 = dissimilar revenues, 1 = similar 
revenues) and parties’ experience with alliances (0 = unequal experience, 1 = equal 
experience). We expect negative relationships with alliance performance; previous alliance 
research showed that differences between firms with respect to size, industry, and experience 
negatively affect alliance performance (Dussauge et al., 2000; Hennart, 1988; Lambe et al., 
2002; Miles et al., 1999; Park et al., 1997). We also ask informants to indicate whether the 
partners had joined in an alliance prior to the one selected (0 = no previous relationships, 
1 = previous relationships), because the presence of previous relationship eases the formation 
and management of a new alliance (Gulati, 1995a; Zollo et al., 2002). 
 
Because we collected data across countries and industries, we must control for country and 
industry effects. We ask informants to provide us with the country in which their firm 
(or business unit) operated, and for data analysis purposes, we create a dummy variable 
(0 = outside Europe, 1 = European country). We also ask informants to provide their firm’s 
main industry and create three dummy variables that we use to control for operations in the 
ICT industry (0 = other industries, 1 = ICT industry), service industry (0 = other industries, 
1 = service industry), and pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry (0 = other industries, 
1 = pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry). 
 
Alliance properties refer to the characteristics of a particular exchange relationship. We 
control for whether the alliance scope was international or domestic by including a dummy 
variable (0 = domestic, 1 = cross-border). According to existing research, cross-border 
alliances are subject to lower levels of alliance performance (Reuer & Ariño, 2002). We also 
control for whether parties fulfilled their contractual obligations (0 = not fulfilled, 
1= fulfilled), because we expect that fulfilling contractual obligations positively relates to 
alliance performance. Older alliances are more likely to experience higher performance levels, 
so we control for the duration of the alliance, measured in years (Lambe et al., 2002). 
Previous research suggested that the number of alliance activities adversely affects 
performance, so we control for alliance complexity (Reuer & Zollo, 2005), measured 
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according to six possible activities: research and development, purchasing, production, 
marketing and sales, and distribution. Informants indicated which activities were part of the 
alliance, and we create a dummy variable such that fewer than three alliance activities depict 
low complexity (0) and three and more activities indicate high complexity (1). Finally, the 
scope of the alliance compensation structure is measured by nine compensation mechanisms: 
sharing of profits, sharing of revenues, royalties, transfer-pricing, lump-sum fee, buy-back of 
manufactured products, sharing of intellectual property, retaining own revenue and profit, and 
cost sharing (Aulakh, 2001; Contractor et al., 2000; Hennart et al., 2005). Informants 
indicated which mechanisms were part of compensation structure; we use a simple count 
measure to capture the scope (1 = low, 9 = high). We expect a positive relationship, as hybrid 
compensation fosters alliance performance (Contractor et al., 2000; Mendi, 2005). 
 
6.4 Data Analysis 
We use structural equation modeling to test the hypotheses, though we employ a different 
technique to test Hypothesis 1 than that we use for testing Hypotheses 2–4. Hypothesis 1 
testing relies on a causal modeling technique called partial least squares (PLS) regression, 
whereas that for Hypotheses 2–4 involves covariance analysis (CVA).  
 
Partial Least Squares and Covariance Analysis 
Structural modeling techniques, such as PLS and CVA, provide researchers with an advantage 
when it comes to (Chin, 1998; Fornell et al., 1982) (1) modeling relationships among multiple 
independent and dependent variables, (2) using unobservable latent variables, (3) modeling 
measurement errors for observed variables, (4) simultaneously examining a measurement and 
a structural model, and (5) statistically testing a priori the substantive theoretical and 
measurement assumptions with empirical data. Such techniques add a degree of precision to 
theorizing, as they require clear conceptualizations, operational definitions, and functional 
relationships (Bagozzi, 1981). They also permit a more complete representation of complex 
theories and are flexible with regard to the interplay between theory and data (Chin, 1998).  
 
Here, we explain why PLS is an appropriate technique to test Hypothesis 1, whereas CVA is 
more suited to testing Hypotheses 2–4 (see Box 6.3). First, CVA aims to test theory, whereas 
PLS is oriented more toward theory development and predictive applications (Barclay et al., 
1995). CVA techniques estimate model parameters to reproduce the covariance matrix of the 
measures and incorporate overall goodness-of-fit measures to determine how well the 
hypothesized model fits the data. In contrast, PLS tries to explain variance and is primarily 
intended for a causal-predictive analysis in situations of high complexity but low theoretical 
information (Chin, 1998). Thus, PLS is recommended for research models that focus on 
theory building and in this sense can be viewed as a precursor of CVA with a focus on 
confirmatory analysis (Barclay et al., 1995). In this study, predictive power is more critical 
with regard to Hypothesis 1, but parameter precision is required for Hypotheses 2–4, meaning 
we require CVA for the latter testing but need PLS to test Hypothesis 1. 
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Box 6.3 Two Types of Structural Equation Modeling 
Partial least squares (PLS) is a causal modeling approach that at its core constitutes an iterative 
combination of principal components analysis that relates measures to constructs and path analysis 
that permits the construction of a system of constructs (Löhmoller, 1988; Wold, 1982). Hypothesizing 
regarding relationships between measures and constructs and between constructs and other 
constructs must be guided by theory (i.e., a priori specified). To estimate parameters representing 
path and measurement relationships, researchers use ordinary least squares (OLS). Hence, OLS 
assumptions regarding uncorrelated errors in regression carry over to the PLS context. In contrast 
with covariance analysis, PLS does not assume multivariate normality, and the consideration of the 
underlying distribution of the data becomes an issue when testing the statistical significance of the 
parameters (Barclay, Thompson, & Higgins, 1995). Therefore, PLS is appropriate in settings with 
small sample sizes and complex causal models (Chin, 1998). Covariance analysis (CVA) is a 
causal modeling approach that gained popularity with the LISREL program, developed by Jöreskog 
(1973). Typically using a maximum likelihood (ML) function, CVA-based modeling attempts to 
minimize the difference between the sample covariances and those predicted by the theoretical 
model (Chin, 1998). The parameters estimated by this procedure attempt to reproduce the 
covariance matrix of the observed measures, with the underlying assumptions that observed 
variables follow a specific multivariate distribution (i.e., normality) and that observations are 
independent of one another. Because of these properties, CVA is most appropriate in settings with 
large sample sizes and parsimonious theoretical models.  
 
Despite these differences, the decision to use CVA or PLS is neither arbitrary nor straightforward. 
Both estimation techniques apply to the same class of models—structural equations with 
unobservable variables and measurement error—but they have different objectives and structures 
(Chin, 1998; Fornell & Bookstein, 1982; Fornell & Cha, 1994). More specifically: 
• CVA is more appropriate with theory testing, whereas PLS is more appropriate for theory 
development. 
• CVA offers statistical precision in the context of stringent assumptions, whereas PLS trades 
parameter efficiency for prediction accuracy, simplicity, and fewer assumptions. 
• CVA attempts to account for observed covariances, whereas PLS aims to explain the variances 
of variables, whether observed or unobserved. 
• CVA combines variance and measurement errors into a single estimate and adjusts for 
attenuation, whereas PLS separates out “irrelevant” variance from the structural portion of the 
model. 
• CVA requires relatively large samples for accurate estimation and relatively few variables; PLS is 
applicable to small samples in estimation and appears to converge quickly even for large models 
with many variables and constructs.  
 
Second, PLS has been developed to handle a combination of formative and reflective multi-
item measures (Wold, 1982; Tenenhaus, Vinzi, Chatelin, & Lauro, 2005) and provides an 
appropriate technique for estimating second-order models (Löhmoller, 1988; Wold, 1982). 
Hypothesis 1 represents a hierarchical component model (i.e., second-order constructs), and 
the structural model with respect to Hypothesis 1 contains a formative and a reflective 
second-order construct. This type of model is best estimated and tested with PLS estimation 
(Chin & Gopal, 1995). Because Hypotheses 2–4 represent partially recursive models with 
only first-order factors, they are better suited to CVA testing (Kline, 1998). Third, CVA is 
poorly suited to deal with small data sets and complex theoretical models, whereas PLS 
makes minimal demands on sample size and thus is especially appropriate for testing complex 
theoretical models with relatively smaller samples (Chin, 1998). The complexity of 
Hypothesis 1 and the sample size demands PLS testing. In contrast, CVA functions better for 
Hypotheses 2–4, because the theoretical model is parsimonious, and they meet CVA sample 
size requirements. In summary, with regard to Hypothesis 1, PLS is the most appropriate 
technique, whereas for Hypotheses 2–4, CVA is more appropriate. 
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Hypothesis 1 
The statistical model we used to test Hypothesis 1 is a hierarchical component model 
(Löhmoller, 1988; Wold, 1982) with a combination of one formative (structural coherence) 
and one reflective (relational adaptability) second-order construct. Each second-order factor 
represents a superordinate construct that connects the first-order predictors with other 
constructs in the model (Edwards, 2001b; Jarvis et al., 2003). The proposed hierarchical 
component model can be estimated following the procedure suggested by Hulland (1999): (1) 
assess the measurement model and (2) test the structural model. We used SmartPLS 2.0 to 
conduct the PLS analysis (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005).  
 
Measurement Model 
We assess the adequacy of hierarchical component model by examining the construct validity 
of the first-order factors and the second-order constructs. All first-order constructs in the 
model represent multi-item measures with reflective indicators. In accordance with PLS 
guidelines (Barclay et al., 1995; Chin, 1998; Hulland, 1999), we assess construct validity by 
examining individual item reliability, internal consistency, and discriminant validity before 
we conclude sufficient psychometric properties exist.33  
 
We assess individual item reliability by examining the loadings of the measures on their 
respective first-order constructs (Hulland, 1999). Loadings above .707 are desired to accept 
the indicators, because they indicate more shared variance between the construct and its 
measures than error variance (Barclay et al., 1995). Because loadings are correlations, more 
than 50% of the variance in the observed variable must be due to the construct. We accept 
item loadings greater than .600, as some constructs were newly developed or adapted to the 
context of this study (Chin, 1998). 
 
To examine the internal consistency of each first-order construct, we use the internal 
consistency measure developed by Fornell and Larcker (1981), which is similar to Cronbach’s 
alpha, except that Cronbach’s alpha is based on the a priori presumption that each indicator of 
a construct contributes equally. Fornell and Larcker (1981) argued that their measure is 
superior to Cronbach’s alpha because it uses the loadings estimated within the causal model. 
The interpretation of the value obtained is similar, and we adopt the guidelines offered by 
Nunnally (1978), namely, that a construct achieves sufficient reliability when the measure’s 
value is greater than .700 (Hulland, 1999).  
 
To complete the assessment of the first-order constructs, we assess discriminant validity, 
which indicates the extent to which a construct differs from other constructs (Barclay et al., 
1995). In a PLS analysis, one criterion for concluding adequate discriminant validity is that a 
construct should share more variance with its measures than it shares with other constructs in 
a model. Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggested using the square root of the average variance 
                                                 
33 PLS terminology deviates from CVA terminology with respect to construct validity. For instance, PLS 
loadings are called “individual item reliability” and scale reliability is often referred to as “internal consistency.”  
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extracted; to confirm sufficient discriminant validity, the value should be greater than the 
correlations between the latent constructs. Another criterion states that no indicator should 
load more highly on another construct than it does on the intended construct (Hulland, 1999). 
 
The proposed hierarchical component model contains two second-order constructs: (1) 
structural coherence and (2) relational adaptability. Structural coherence is a second-order 
construct with formative first-order constructs, whereas relational adaptability represents a 
second-order construct with reflective first-order constructs. To assess second-order 
constructs, we must view the first-order constructs as indicators of the second-order construct, 
which means that the first-order constructs should possess sufficient psychometric properties 
themselves (Bollen et al., 1991; Jarvis et al., 2003). 
 
The second-order construct structural coherence consists of eight formative first-order 
constructs: compensation integrativeness, compensation imbalance, shared decision-making, 
decision-making imbalance, total non-recoverable investments, non-recoverable investment 
imbalance, partner fit, and resource complementarity. Because we use formative indicators, 
we must be explicit about the conceptual scope of the latent variable (Diamantopoulos et al., 
2001; Jarvis et al., 2003). In Section 3.1, we conceptualized structural coherence and 
explained its conceptual boundaries. In addition to these conceptual considerations, we use 
statistical tests to evaluate the formative first-order constructs (Diamantopoulos et al., 2001). 
To assess the psychometric properties of a second-order model, we use the weights produced 
by the PLS estimation (Chin et al., 1995), which can be interpreted as regression coefficients, 
suggesting we can examine the direction, magnitude, and significance of the regression 
coefficient (Chin, 1998). The nature of a formative measurement model renders an internal 
consistency perspective inappropriate to determine the reliability of the indicators (Bollen et 
al., 1991). Therefore, we adopt an alternative procedure to validate the second-order construct 
(Diamantopoulos et al., 2001). Previous alliance research supported the hypothesis that 
interdependency between parties positively influences alliance formation conditions (Pfeffer 
et al., 1978). Therefore, we expect that a total dependence measure (i.e., the sum of focal firm 
and partner firm dependency) should correlate positively with structural coherence.  
 
The other second-order construct, relational adaptability, consists of five reflective first-order 
constructs indicators: relational quality, opportunistic behavior, absorption integrativeness, 
absorption imbalance, and learning capabilities. Because relational adaptability consists of 
reflective indicators, we examine individual item reliability (i.e., loadings) to assess the 
convergent validity. The loadings should be higher than the cut-off value of .600, because 
relational adaptability is a newly developed construct (Chin, 1998). 
 
Structural Model 
Hypothesis 1 represents a mediation model. To confirm mediation, Baron and Kenny (Baron 
et al., 1986 p. 1177) require three conditions. First, when regressing the dependent variable on 
an independent variable, the estimated path coefficient should be significant. Second, when 
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mediating variables enter the model, the direct path coefficient between independent and 
dependent variables should decrease in size and preferably become insignificant. Third, both 
path coefficients between the independent variable and the mediating variable and between 
the mediating variable and the dependent variable should be significant. Although Baron and 
Kenny’s procedure was developed for use with OLS, we use it with PLS estimation, which 
overcomes an important critique, namely, that measurement error in the mediating variables 
creates parameter estimation biases (Shaver, 2005). The PLS estimation enables us to use 
multiple-item variables for the main constructs, including the mediation variables, which in 
turn reduces concerns about the impact of measurement error.  
 
We also conduct three assessments to recognize the mediation effect: (1) R2 change, (2) Sobel 
test, and (3) multicollinearity diagnostics. First, when estimating a structural model with PLS, 
we do not attempt to minimize residual item covariance, so there is no summary statistic to 
measure the overall fit of the models (Chin, 1998). Because PLS works to minimize error in 
all endogenous constructs, we used the R2 values for the dependent variables and the sign and 
significance of path coefficients to assess the degree to which this objective was accomplished 
(Hulland, 1999). The R2 should be higher than 10% to enable a meaningful interpretation 
(Falk & Miller, 1992). We also examine the R2 change (Lambe et al., 2002) by comparing a 
baseline model that includes only control variables with a model that features structural 
coherence. Subsequently, we compare this second model with a third model that also 
integrates the relational adaptability construct. An assessment of the R2 changes (e.g., 
magnitude, significance) enables us to understand the mediation effect better. Second, another 
critique of Baron and Kenny’s (1996) procedure applies to PLS estimation (i.e., SmartPLS 
2.0). The procedure conducts no statistical test of the size and magnitude of the indirect effect. 
To overcome this critique, Baron and Kenny (1986) recommended a Sobel test; we reanalyze 
the structural model with a SPSS macro especially developed to generate estimates for 
indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The Sobel mediation test estimates the effect and 
significance of direct and indirect relationships with a bootstrapping procedure (1000 
bootstrap runs). Because the SPSS macro requires single scores as input, we use the latent 
scores produced by PLS. An advantage of the SPSS macro, compared with other programs 
that offer a Sobel test, is that it enables us to enter control variables. Third, in any type of 
mediation model, a correlation should exist between an independent and a mediation variable, 
and once both variables are included in the statistical test, multicollinearity is present. We use 
collinearity diagnostics to examine the impact of multicollinearity. First, we use the variance 
inflation factor, which should be below the cut-off value of 3 (Cohen, 1988). Second, we 
examine the condition index, which should be below the cut-off value of 30 (Cohen, 1988). 
 
Additional Issues 
We address five additional issues that apply to all PLS models: (1) sample size, (2) control 
variables, (3) estimation second-order model, (4) bootstrapping, and (5) OLS assumptions. 
First, PLS makes minimal demands on sample size (Chin, 1998), because it contains few 
assumptions about the data distribution. The minimum sample size required equals ten times 
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the number of indicators for the most complex formative construct or the largest number of 
antecedent constructs leading to an endogenous construct as predictors in an OLS regression 
(Barclay et al., 1995). In the proposed model, the second-order structural coherence construct 
is affected by eight formative first-order constructs, which suggests a minimal sample size of 
80 cases. The net sample consists of 151 respondents, well beyond the cut-off value. Second, 
most control variables (e.g., environmental uncertainty and alliance complexity) represent 
dummy variables. Although PLS estimation is a latent variable technique, it can handle such 
manifest variables. To estimate the PLS model with manifest variables, irrespective of 
whether the variable was measured with a nominal or interval scale, a latent variable with one 
indicator should be created (Wold, 1982).  
 
Third, to enable estimation of a hierarchical component model with PLS, we adopt the 
“repeated indicator approach” (Löhmoller, 1988; Wold, 1982). This “reuse” of indicators 
means that we load the indicators of the first-order constructs on each respective first-order 
construct and its associated second-order construct. This procedure enables PLS to estimate 
the measurement and structural model simultaneously, but the reuse of indicators has not 
impact on parameter estimations (Wold, 1982).  
 
Fourth, to examine the significance of the measurement and structural model parameter 
estimations, we use a bootstrapping method with replacement and 1000 draws of the original 
sample (Chin, 1998; Hulland, 1999). To confirm sufficient psychometric properties of the 
parameter estimations, individual item reliability (i.e., loadings) and path coefficients should 
be significant (p < .05).  
 
Fifth and finally, with respect to estimation of the structural model, PLS uses OLS estimation 
(Wold, 1982), so we consider whether the OLS assumptions are violated by assessing the 
univariate normality of the indicators with kurtosis and skewness statistics. In addition, we 
examine homoscedasticity and conduct a residual analysis for each PLS estimation by 
inspecting scatterplots (i.e., standardized predictors against standardized residuals) and a 
normal probability graphs (Cohen, 1988). In Section 8.1, we present the results. 
 
Hypotheses 2–4 
The statistical models representing Hypotheses 2–4 consist of two independent, first-order 
constructs with direct relationships to two dependent, first-order constructs. The relationships 
between the two independent variables and the two dependent variables are specified as 
correlates. By not hypothesizing a direct effect between the two endogenous variables, but by 
adding a correlate between the errors of the endogenous variables we can consider the 
structural model partially recursive (Kline, 1998 p. 106), which eases data analysis.. As we 
have argued, CVA is an appropriate technique to estimate this type of model and we use 
Amos 7.0, a software package with maximum likelihood estimation, to test the hypotheses 
(Arbuckle, 1997). To examine the results, we assess the (1) goodness-of-fit indices, (2) 
measurement model, and (3) structural model (Fornell et al., 1981). 
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Goodness-of-Fit 
To assess the significance and explanatory power of the overall model, we must consider both 
measurement and theory (Fornell et al., 1981). Researchers have proposed a variety of 
goodness-of-fit measures to examine the correspondence between the actual or observed input 
covariance/correlation matrixes and the predicted model (Kline, 1998). If a proposed model 
achieves acceptable fit, regardless of the criteria applied, the test has simply confirmed that 
model is acceptable, not that it is absolutely correct (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). 
We use six goodness-of-fit measures: (1) chi-square ratio, (2) normed chi-square ratio, (3) 
standardized root mean residual (SRMR), (4) goodness-of-fit index (GFI), (5) normed fit 
index (NFI), and (6) comparative fit index (CFI).  
  
The chi-square statistic compares the goodness of fit between the covariance matrix for the 
observed data and that derived from a theoretically specified model (Fornell et al., 1981). To 
provide a satisfactory representation of the data, the model’s chi-square must be non-
significant. Specifically, if the probability of obtaining a chi-square greater than the observed 
chi-square is less than .10, the hypothesized model is rejected (Fornell et al., 1981). If the 
probability is greater than the critical value, the research may conclude that the data fit the 
hypothesized structure. The second statistic, the normed chi-square (Joreskog, 1969), adjusts 
the chi-square for the degrees of freedom to assess the extent to which the theoretical model 
fits with the observed data. Models with a normed chi-square value of less than 2.0 or 3.0 
possess acceptable goodness of fit (Carmines & McIver, 1981). For the third measure 
(Browne & Cudeck, 1993), a SRMR value below .050 indicates a good fit, whereas a score 
below .080 indicates an acceptable model fit. Finally, we report a set of three goodness-of-fit 
measures: GFI (Jöreskog & Sorebom, 1989), NFI (Bentler & Bonnet, 1980), and CFI 
(Bentler, 1990). With respect to GFI and NFI, the statistic must be higher than .900; for CFI, 
it should be greater than .950. Only at these levels can we conclude acceptable fit between the 
data and the model and proceed to interpreting the measurement and structural model.  
 
Measurement Model 
Before interpreting the structural model, we must conclude that the measurement model has a 
satisfactory level of psychometric properties (Fornell et al., 1981), which we do by examining 
the error variances, correlations, factor loadings, and standard errors (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). 
Negative error variances should be absent, as should those not significantly different from 0. 
Correlations cannot be greater than 1 or too close to 1, factor loadings cannot be too small 
(<.500) or too large (>.950), and standard errors should not be too large (Bagozzi et al., 1991; 
Bagozzi et al., 1988). In addition, convergent validity exists if the average variance extracted 
(AVE) with respect to a latent variable is greater than .500 (Fornell et al., 1981). For 
reliability assessments using Cronbach’s alpha, the reliability values should be greater than 
.700 (Nunnally, 1978). As we noted previously, in CVA, adequate discriminant validity 
requires that a construct should share more variance with its own measures than with other 
constructs in a model, the AVE square root is greater than the correlations between the latent 
constructs, and no indicator loads higher on another construct than on the intended one 
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(Bollen et al., 1991 Fornell and Larcker 1981). We also use a chi-square difference test to 
compare a baseline model with a more restricted model in which the correlation between the 
two constructs under examination is constrained to equal 1.0 (Jöreskog, 1971). A significantly 
higher chi-square in the latter indicates a non-perfect correlation, in support of discriminant 
validity (Bagozzi & Phillips, 1982).  
 
Structural Model 
The primary objective of a study that uses CVA is to support the specified path model, so the 
measurements become essentially subservient to this aim. Assessing the structural model 
involves examining the direction, magnitude, and significance of the path coefficients 
(Bagozzi, 1981; Fornell et al., 1981). As we interpret standardized paths, the parameter 
estimates should be significant and at least .20 (ideally greater than .30) to be considered 
meaningful. In addition, we examine the R2 of the endogenous variables, which should be 
higher than 10% to enable meaningful interpretation (Falk et al., 1992). 
 
Additional Issues 
We must address three additional issues: (1) sample size, (2) model identification, and (3) 
multivariate normality. First, CVA analysis requires large samples to reduce the likelihood of 
instable statistical results (Fornell et al., 1981). We follow recommendations in CVA 
literature (see e.g., Kline, 1998) and adopt a 10:1 ratio. For each parameter in the statistical 
model, we need 10 subjects (i.e., cases). Second, we must identify measurement and structural 
model (McDonald & Ho, 2002) to make it mathematically possible to derive unique estimates 
of each parameter (Kline, 1998). Pragmatically, this identification means that the number of 
observations (i.e., variances and covariances among observed variables) is greater than the 
number of parameters to be estimated. With respect to the Hypotheses 2–4, this condition 
holds, so we can conclude that the models are identified. Third, CVA estimation assumes the 
data are characterized by univariate and multivariate normality (McDonald et al., 2002). We 
evaluate univariate normality with kurtosis and skewness statistics; the values should be less 
than 3.0 (Cohen, 1988). We assess multivariate normality with Mardi’s coefficient (Mardia, 
1970, 1975), but even if we violated the assumption of multivariate normality, the problems 
would be relatively minimal, because we used a maximum likelihood estimation (Byrne, 
2001; West, Finch, & Curran, 1995), which results in a robust chi-square statistic, measures 
of model fit (i.e., CFI), and robust standard errors. These results appear in Section 9.1. 
 
6.5 Summary 
Table 6.2 presents a summary of the decisions with respect to the research design. First, we 
described our pretests to assess the face validity of Hypotheses 1–4, the quality of the 
questionnaire design, and the quality of operational definitions, as well as to determine 
alliance managers’ willingness to participate in the research project. Second, we discussed the 
advantages and concerns associated with the data collection procedure. Using a twofold data 
collection strategy, we administered Web-based surveys to alliance managers through a 
benchmark and a survey. To reduce the likelihood of data contamination, we applied both a 
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key-informant criterion and a proxy report criterion and conducted missing value analysis. 
Third, we discussed the advantages and potential disadvantages of aggregate measures, and 
then elaborated on the precautions we took to increase the construct validity of the firm- and 
alliance-level constructs. Fourth, we explained why we used PLS analysis to test Hypothesis 1 
but CVA to test Hypotheses 2–4. In addition, we addressed the issues typical for each 
structural equation modeling technique. In summary, we pose that the research design 
represents a balance between methodological rigor and feasibility.  
 
Table 6.2 Research Design Decisions 
 Focus Procedure References 
Pretest - Hypotheses 1 to 4 
- Questionnaire design 
- Operational definitions 
- Feasibility  
Assess face validity of preliminary models. Assess the 
questionnaire design’s quality and face and content 
validity of operational definitions. Assess willingness of 
alliance managers to participate in research project.  
Bagozzi, 1994; 
Dillman, 2000 
Data Collection    
Informants - Selection criteria 
 
 
 
- Key informant criterion 
 
 
- Proxy report criterion 
State objective and criteria to participate in research 
project: contractual alliance, multiple objectives, 
established no longer than 5 years ago.  
 
One 7-point Likert scale items capturing informant’s 
knowledge about alliance. If score is lower than 3, the 
informant is excluded  
One 7-point Likert scale item capturing frequency of 
contact between partners. If score is lower than 3, the 
informant is excluded 
Bagozzi, 1994; 
Dillman, 2000 
 
 
Kumar et al., 1993; 
Lambe et al., 2002 
 
Menon & 
Varadarajan, 1995 
Missing Value 
Analysis 
 
- Listwise deletion  
- Sensitivity analysis  
- Imputation 
Cases with more than 10% missing values are 
excluded. Assess nature of missing data and impute 
missing data with EM logarithm with external predictor 
(SPSS 15.0) 
Lemieux & McAlister, 
2005; Little & Rubin, 
1987 
 
Operational Definitions   
Firm-level 
constructs 
 
- Reliability 
- Convergent validity 
- Discriminant validity  
 
Assess Cronbach’s alpha for each construct. Value 
should be larger than .700. Conduct exploratory factor 
analysis and assess components, loadings (>.600) 
and cross-loadings (< .400) 
Bagozzi et al., 1991; 
Nunnally, 1978; Peter, 
1981 
Aggregate 
measures 
 
- Summated scores 
- Difference scores 
The summated score is the summation of the focal 
firm and partner firm. The difference score is the 
absolute difference between focal firm and partner 
firm. Examine reliability, convergent, and discriminant 
validity of components and difference score measures 
Edwards, 1993; Peter, 
1981; Ross et al., 
1997  
Hypothesis 1     
PLS 
 
Hierarchical component 
model 
Estimate a second-order model with SmartPLS 2.0. 
Significance of parameter estimations is assessed 
through bootstrapping procedure 
Löhmoller, 1988; 
Ringle et al., 2005; 
Wold, 1982 
Measurement 
Model 
First-order constructs  
- Reliability  
- Convergent validity 
- Discriminant validity 
Assess internal consistency. Value should be above 
.700. Assess item loadings on their respective first-
order constructs. Values should above .707. Assess 
average variance extracted (AVE). The square root of 
the AVE should be higher than pair-wise correlations 
Barclay et al., 1995; 
Chin, 1998; Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981; 
Hulland, 1999 
 Second-order construct  
(formative) 
- Loadings (weights)  
- External validity 
 
Assess construct validity of each first-order constructs. 
Asses collinearity among indicators, weights (i.e., 
regressions coefficients), and correlations with “total 
interdependence” and second-order factor. 
Chin & Gopal, 1995; 
Diamantopoulos et 
al., 2001, 
Diamantopoulos, 
1999; Jarvis et al., 
2003 
 Second-order construct  
(reflective) 
- Convergent validity 
Assess construct validity of each first-order constructs. 
Assess loadings and reliability. 
Chin, 1998 
Structural 
Model  
Structural paths Assess regressions coefficients (standardized) on 
magnitude, direction and significance 
Chin, 1998; Hulland, 
1999 
Mediation  
 
- Baron and Kenny (1986) 
- R2 change 
- Sobel test 
- Multi-collinearity 
Apply Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure, 
complemented with an assessment of the R2 change, 
a Sobel test of the indirect effects, and an assessment 
of impact of multi-collinearity.  
Preacher & Hayes, 
2004; Baron & Kenny, 
1986; Shaver, 2005 
156 
Table 6.2 Research Design Decisions (Continued) 
 Focus Procedure References 
Hypotheses 2–4    
CVA Partially recursive model Estimate measurement and structural model with AMOS 
7.0 (maximum likelihood).  
Arbuckle, 1997; 
Kline, 1998 
Measurement 
Model 
First-order constructs 
- Reliability  
- Convergent validity 
- Discriminant validity 
 
Assess reliability (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha) for each 
construct. Value should be above .700. Assess item 
loadings on their respective first-order constructs; values 
should above .700. Assess average variance extracted; 
square root should be higher than the correlations 
between the first-order constructs 
Bagozzi, 1981; 
Fornell & Larcker, 
1981 
Overall Fit Goodness-of-fit Assess goodness-of-fit indices: chi-square, normed chi-
square, SRMR, CFI, NFI, and GFI 
see Kline, 1998 for 
an overview 
Structural 
Model 
Structural paths Assess regression coefficients on magnitude, direction 
and significance. Standardized coefficients should have 
value above .2 and ideally above .3 to enable 
meaningful interpretation 
Bagozzi, 1981; 
Fornell & Larcker, 
1981; Bollen & 
Lennox, 1991 
 
Before, we proceed to the empirical results pertaining to Hypothesis 1 (Chapter 8) and 
Hypotheses 2–4 (Chapter 9), we must conduct several tests to assess the quality of the data. In 
Chapter 7, we provide a detailed description of sample characteristics, as well as the results 
with respect to non-response analysis and common method bias. Subsequently, we also report 
the results of our assessment with respect to the use of difference scores.  
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Chapter 7 Data Analysis: Quality Assessment 
Chapter 7 functions as a bridge between the preceding Chapters 2 through 6, in which we 
presented the hypotheses and elaborated on the research design, and Chapters 8 and 9, in 
which we present the results of the empirical research.34 In this chapter, we discuss the results 
of four assessments that we conducted to evaluate the quality of our data. First, we examined 
sample descriptives and thereby concluded that our data correspond with the research scope. 
Second, we assessed non-response bias and common method bias, which can affect parameter 
estimations negatively. The results indicated limited concerns. Third, to facilitate hypotheses 
testing, we transformed firm-level scores into alliance-level scores. However, this procedure 
is not without concerns, so we evaluated its appropriateness and found no serious problems. 
Together, the results of these assessments suggest that we have collected a valid sample, that 
the data pose limited non-response bias and common method bias concerns, and that our firm- 
and alliance-level assessments possess the desired psychometric properties. Hence, the quality 
of our data is good, and we can proceed with hypotheses testing. 
 
We organize this chapter as follows. In Section 7.1, we present a summary of sample 
descriptives. In Section 7.2, we provide the results of a non-response analysis, and in Section 
7.3, we describe the findings of the diagnosis of common method bias. Subsequently, in 
Section 7.4, we present the results of the assessments pertaining to the construct validity at the 
firm level and the computation of aggregate measures. We end the chapter with some 
conclusions in Section 7.5.  
 
7.1 Sample Descriptives 
In this section, we provide a background understanding of the sample (see Table 7.1). In our 
sample of 151 cases, the average alliance foundation date is June 2001, which means that that 
an “average” alliance has been in operation for four years. Ninety-nine of the contractual 
alliances were formed by parties established in two different countries (66%), and 52 alliances 
were characterized by informants as domestic alliances (34%). With respect to functional 
focus, marketing and sales (107) and research and development (61) represented the most 
often indicated areas, whereas distribution (44), production (26), and purchasing (16) were 
less frequently listed. Informants used a variety of instruments to organize the alliance’s 
compensation structure; for example, 64 respondents answered that each party retained its 
own revenues and profits. Informants also indicated that they used compensation instruments, 
such as cost sharing (53), revenue sharing (43), intellectual property sharing (40), and profit 
sharing (36). Royalties (29), lump-sum fees (27), transfer pricing (27), and buy-back of 
products (5) were less often used by partner firms as compensation instruments.  
 
Consistent with the data collection procedure (see §6.2), two geographical areas dominated 
the sample. Specifically, 78 informants answered that their firm was established in the 
                                                 
34 Readers interested in the results are advised to skip Chapter 7 and immediately continue reading in Chapters 8 
and 9; this chapter primarily deals with necessary technicalities. 
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European continent (52%), 51 stated that their firm operated from North America (34%), and 
22 informants mentioned other regions, such as Australia and South America (14%). With 
respect to industry, 43 informants indicated that their firm operated in the information, 
communication, and technology sector (29%); the other listed industries included services 
(13%), pharmaceutical and biotechnology (9%), consumer products (9%), production and 
manufacturing (8%), logistics, transport, and airlines (7%), telecommunications (6%), and 
other industries (19%). On average, an informant’s firm employed 11,573 people. 
 
Table 7.1 Sample Descriptives 
Alliance Foundation Year 
 
2001 (average alliance) 
International orientation 52 Domestic alliances 
99 Cross-border alliances 
 
 
Functional focus 107 Marketing and sales 
61 Research and development 
44 Distribution 
 
26 Production  
16 Purchasing 
 
Compensation structure 64 Own revenue and profit 
53 Cost sharing 
43 Sharing of revenues 
40 Sharing of IP 
36 Sharing of profits 
 
29 Royalties 
27 Lump-sum fee  
27 Transfer-pricing 
5 Buy-back of products 
Firm  Firm Size of focal firm 
 
11, 573 employees (average firm)  
 Home country of focal firm  
 
78 Europe 
51 US / Canada / Mexico 
9 China / India / Australia 
13 Other countries 
 
 
Industry of focal firm 43 ICT 
20 Services (financial / consulting) 
14 Pharmaceutical / bio-technology 
13 Consumer products 
 
12 Production / manufacturing 
11 Logistics / transport / airlines 
9 Telecommunication 
29 Other industries 
Informant Job experience  5.05 years (average informant)  
Alliance involvement 3.24 years (average informant) 
 Job Title 
 
48 Top management team 
28 Alliance manager 
17 Business development  
11 VP alliances 
17 Marketing / purchase 
24 Management (general) 
10 Other
Note: n = 151. 
 
We also asked informants to provide us with their job titles. The content analysis revealed that 
the job titles of 56 informants explicitly referred to alliances, such as alliance manager, 
partnership manager, or vice president–alliances. In addition, 48 respondents were part of the 
top management team of their firm, with job titles such as CEO, CFO, director, or managing 
director, and 47 reported titles related to purchasing and marketing activities or management 
in general. On average, informants had been employed in their current jobs for 5.05 years and 
involved in the alliance for an average of 3.24 years. These averages support the observation 
that the informants were qualified to participate in the research project (see §6.2). 
 
Together, these descriptives support our conclusion that we have gathered a sample that 
corresponds with the scope of the research (see §1.5). An alliance in our sample is organized 
by a contract without equity involvement, is characterized by multiple objectives and the use 
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of various compensation instruments, and has been operational long enough to enable parties 
to achieve their performance objectives. In addition, firms operate from different countries 
and within different industries. Targeted informants are knowledgeable about their firms, have 
been involved in the alliance for a substantial amount of time, and occupy a top managerial or 
alliance-related position. However, though the sample demographics meet our requirements, 
we still must assess non-response bias (see §7.2) and common method bias (see §7.3) to 
determine the degree to which the data may be contaminated.  
 
7.2 Non-response Bias 
The presence of non-response bias affects parameter estimations negatively (i.e., hypothesis 
testing), as its presence suggests that within a sample, one group of informants is 
disproportionately represented compared with the broader population. Non-response error 
occurs when a proper sampling unit is not included in a sample (Dillman, 2000). For instance, 
this type of error might occur if informants are difficult to locate due to incorrect e-mail 
addresses or when informants refuse to participate in the research project. To reduce concerns 
about non-response error, we took ex-ante precautions with respect to the data collection and 
questionnaire design (see §6.2). We also present the results of two assessments we conducted 
to examine the degree to which the data may be subject to non-response bias.  
 
Ex-post Diagnosis: Early and Late Respondents 
Following the guidelines of Armstrong and Overton (1977), we compared early and late 
respondents. This extrapolation method is based on the concept that respondents who respond 
late are similar to non-respondents. We classified informants as late responders if they 
participated in the research project only after the final e-mail reminder or follow-up telephone 
call. We compared the two groups with respect to all individual questionnaire items. Our 
analysis revealed no significant differences between the two groups except for two indicators: 
the degree to which a partner firm “has been satisfied with the knowledge it gained through 
the alliance ( x  = 4.98 versus x  = 5.42, p < .05) and the degree to which a partner firm 
“gained a strategic advantage over its competitors” ( x  = 4.82 versus x  = 5.41, p < .05). 
Together, these findings suggested limited concerns about non-response bias. 
 
Table 7.2 Non-response Analysis 
 Early 
Respondentsa 
Late 
Respondents   Respondentsb 
Non- 
Respondents  
 Mean SDc Mean SD t-value  Mean SD Mean SD t-value
Alliance foundation 2001.18 5.14 2002.15 3.42  -1.331  2000.62 4.46 2000.47 5.74  -1.067 
Financial performance 4.63 1.75 4.68 1.46  .007  4.49 1.69 4.85 1.20  1.425 
Learning performance 4.85 1.35 4.87 1.50  -.083  4.54 1.67 4.76 1.03  .699 
Strategic performance 5.41 1.15 5.28 1.32  .666  4.01 1.69 4.88 1.28  3.596 
Years involvement 3.15 2.17 3.36 2.72  -.495  5.05 5.3 6.11 5.30  1.182 
Firm size 15,355 34,782 6,878 15,483  1.853  11,573 28,101 24,490 52,164  1.373 
a Early Respondents: n = 83; Late Respondents: n = 68. 
b Respondents: n = 151 ; Non-respondents: n = 32. 
c SD = standard devation 
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Ex-post Diagnosis: Respondents and Non-respondents 
To better understand the impact of non-response bias and as a follow-up to the early versus 
late respondent assessment, we conducted another ex-post statistical test to evaluate the 
presence of non-response bias. We compared the informants in the net sample with a group of 
non-respondents (Miller et al., 1983) by collecting data among non-respondents through a 
follow-up telephone call in which we asked them about six questionnaire items. Initially, we 
used this opportunity to ask alliance managers to participate in the research project (see §6.2). 
However, if an informant declined to participate, we immediately asked him or her to provide 
answers to six questions; 32 alliance managers complied with our request. To increase the 
validity of our assessment, we captured firm, alliance, and informant characteristics by asking 
questions about the alliance’s foundation year, the degree to which the focal firm achieved its 
financial, learning, and strategic objectives, firm size measured as the number of full-time 
employees, and the number of years the informant has been involved in the alliance. We 
conducted t-tests to assess whether differences between respondents and non-respondents 
existed (see Table 7.2). We used the net samples of 151 informants and 32 non-responding 
informants to conduct the analysis. The findings indicated limited concerns of non-response 
bias. With respect to the six questions, the null hypothesis that the means are equal could not 
be rejected, which suggested that respondents and non-respondents did not significantly 
differ. One exception pertained to strategic performance ( x  = 4.01 versus x  = 4.88, p < .05), 
for which non-respondents reported higher levels of strategic performance than did 
respondents. We cannot think of any reason for this difference, so we conclude the risk of 
non-response bias still is limited. The two tests together point in the same direction; therefore, 
we concluded that no serious concerns for a non-response bias were present in the data. 
 
7.3 Common Method Bias 
Common method biases refer to variance attributable to the measurement method rather than 
the construct of interest (Bagozzi, Li, & Phillips, 1991). Its presence poses a problem, because 
it constitutes one of the main sources of measurement error. Common method biases have 
various sources, originating from common rater effects, item characteristics effects, item 
context effects, and measurement context effects (Podsakoff et al., 2003). For instance, 
common rater effects refer to any artifactual covariance between the predictor and the 
criterion variable that result because the informant providing the measure of these variables is 
the same. Informants may be inclined to maintain a consistent line of response or provide 
responses that present the person in a favorable light (i.e., social desirability bias). To address 
common method bias ex-ante, we followed the guidelines available in the literature for 
questionnaire design (Lindell & Whitney, 2001; Podsakoff et al., 2003). Furthermore, we also 
conducted three statistical tests to assess the presence of common method bias in our data. 
 
We set out to design a questionnaire aiming at reducing the risk of common method bias. That 
is, we developed a questionnaire with psychological separation of independent and dependent 
variables, introductory texts, framing questions, and visual aids (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, because miscomprehension is a primary source of biases (Podsakoff et al., 
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2003), we aimed at reducing ambiguity by avoiding double-barreled questions, vague 
concepts, and complex syntax. Although we decided to use similar scale endpoints (1–7), we 
employed various scale labels, including “not important–very important,” “not at all–to a 
large extent,” and “strongly disagree–strongly agree”. Consequently, the questionnaire design 
reduces the risk of common method bias, as it eliminates the saliency of any contextually 
provided retrieval cues, reduces the informant’s motivation and ability to use previous 
answers, and makes previous responses less salient, available, or relevant.  
 
Noting the cross-sectional nature of our research, we conduct three ex-post statistical tests to 
diagnose the impact of common method bias. First, we conducted Harman’s one-factor test 
(Harman, 1965; Podsakoff et al., 2003), which consists of loading all observed variables into 
an exploratory factor analysis and examining the unrotated factor solution to determine the 
number of factors that are necessary to account for the variance in the variables. Common 
method bias exists if a single factor emerges from the factor analysis or one general factor 
accounts for the majority of the covariance among the measure. When we conducted the one-
factor test, we found limited concerns about common method bias, as 17 components 
(eigenvalues > 1) emerged that explained 72.87% of the variance. Although the first 
component explains 20.60%, which is relatively high, its factor loadings possess positive and 
negative signs, indicating limited concerns for common method bias.  
 
As Harman’s one-factor test is not without concerns due to its “diagnostic” nature (Podsakoff 
et al., 2003), we decided to further examine common method bias, through means of 
covariance analysis (CVA). That is, we examined the presence of common method bias only 
with respect to Hypotheses 2–4 and conducted two statistical tests, which avoid the need to 
identify and measure the specific factor responsible for the method effects while comparing 
two models. With respect to the first CVA test, we compared two models. In a first model, we 
loaded all relevant indicators onto one latent “common method bias” factor (CMB). The 
second model corresponds to the a priori specified hypothesis and we loaded the indicators 
onto their respective latent constructs. A relatively poor goodness-of-fit index related to the 
first CMB model compared with the full model supports the absence of common method bias. 
With respect to the compensation trade-off (Hypothesis 2), the CVA produced a Chi-square of 
122.014 (d.f. = 71, p < .05), a confirmatory fit index (CFI) of .950, and a standardized root 
mean residual (SRMR) of .057, with financial performance and financial performance 
imbalance as the dependent variables. In contrast, the CMB model with all indicators loading 
on one CMB factor resulted in a Chi-square of 568.178 (d.f. = 77), a CFI of .521, and a 
SRMR of .063, implying limited concerns for common method bias. Other results pertaining 
to Hypotheses 3 and 4 also suggest limited concerns, in that the CMB models consistently 
have lower goodness-of-fit indices than the theoretical specified models. 
 
With respect to the second CVA test, we also examined common method bias with a 
procedure that controls for the effects of an unmeasured latent method factor (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). In the first model, all indicators load on their respective latent constructs, whereas in 
162 
the second model, all relevant indicators also load on a latent CMB factor. If the results are 
not due to method effects, adding a CMB factor to an a priori specified model cannot 
significantly improve the fit compared with a model that contains only the main latent 
variables. Furthermore, the factor loadings must continue to be significant in the method and 
the specified model (Podsakoff et al., 2003). We conducted this test for each cooperation and 
competition trade-off, using the three performance dimensions. For instance, in testing 
Hypothesis 2 (compensation trade-off) with financial performance and financial performance 
imbalance as the dependent variables, the CVA produced the following statistics from the 
model with the CMB factor included: Chi-square of 82.692 (d.f. = 57, p < .05), CFI of .975, 
and SRMR of .056. These indices suggest some concern for common method bias, because 
the fit indices improve compared with the a priori model. However, the sign, magnitude, and 
direction of the parameter estimations did not change substantially, and all factor loadings 
remained significant. Therefore, the influence of common method bias appears limited. These 
findings are illustrative for all other models pertaining to Hypotheses 2–4. 
 
Our assessment of the three common method bias tests indicates that though the data pose 
some concerns with respect to common method bias, it is not likely that such bias 
substantially affects the parameter estimations. The results further indicate that the informants 
differentiated among the variables and that the results obtained through the data analysis are 
indicative of the true relationships among those variables. As an important implication, we 
may test our models (i.e., Hypotheses 1–4) without controlling for common method bias. 
 
7.4 Aggregate Measures 
To avoid a mixture of the levels of analysis, which can create biases in the parameter 
estimations, we decided to formulate Hypotheses 1–4 at the alliance level. But to collect the 
data, we designed a questionnaire that captured information at the firm level (i.e., focal and 
partner firm). Consequently, to enable hypotheses testing, we must transform the firm-level 
scores into alliance-level scores (see §6.3). We therefore used raw data to compute the 
summated scores and absolute difference scores, but the use of aggregate measures is not 
without concerns. Researchers have raised various questions about the construct validity of 
difference scores (Edwards, 2001a; Peter et al., 1993). Extant literature has demanded that 
before using difference scores, researchers must examine the construct validity of both the 
firm-level constructs (i.e., components) and the difference scores (i.e., aggregate measure); 
drawing on these requirements, we developed a procedure to assess the appropriateness of 
using difference scores (see §6.3).  
 
Construct Validity: Firm-level Constructs 
To assess the construct validity of the firm-level constructs, we distinguished between 
independent and dependent variables. First, we used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with 
Oblimin rotation to examine the convergent and discriminant validity of four firm-level 
variables: compensation, decision-making, non-recoverable investments, and absorption (see 
Table 7.3). Second, we used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA, AMOS 7.0) to assess the 
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convergent and discriminant validity of the three dependent variables: financial, learning, and 
strategic performance. We examined the reliability of each independent and dependent 
variable with Cronbach’s alpha. 
 
Independent Variables 
With respect to the focal firm, the compensation variable (i.e., satisfaction with anticipated 
benefits) was captured with five indicators that provided factor loadings of -.862, -.891, -.867, 
-.779, and -.730 (see Table 7.3). Preliminary analysis indicated the need to eliminate two 
items whose loadings fell below the cut-off value of .700 and that cross-loaded with other 
components. Decision-making (i.e., obtained decision-making rights) was measured with two 
items with loadings of .951 and .739, indicating acceptable convergent validity. We captured 
the non-recoverable investments variable (i.e., commitment to make tailored expenditures) 
with three indicators. The factor loadings were sufficient, with values of .818, .858, and .889. 
Absorption (i.e., ability to assess and acquire knowledge) was measured with six indicators, 
but the preliminary factor analysis indicated that one item loaded poorly. Consequently, we 
removed this item from further analysis. The remaining five items indicated loadings of .794, 
.855, .853, .836, and .796, in support of good convergent validity.  
 
With respect to discriminant validity, we examined the eigenvalue and the percentage of 
variance explained. We extracted four components with an eigenvalue above the critical value 
of 1 (after rotation). The eigenvalues ranged from 2.42 to 4.62, and the explained variance 
ranged from 5.58% to 36.24%. Finally, we used Cronbach’s alpha to assess the variables’ 
internal consistency; the results indicated acceptable reliabilities with values of .885 
(compensation), .727 (decision-making), .842 (non-recoverable investments), and .890 
(absorption). Therefore, the four extracted components of the focal firm variables possessed 
the desired convergent and discriminant validity and high reliabilities.  
 
With respect to the partner firm variables, we found a similar data structure (Table 7.3). The 
variable compensation was initially measured by seven indicators, but we removed two items 
with loadings below the cut-off value of .700. The remaining five indicators attained desirable 
loadings of .866, .895, .835, .864, and .742. The two items that captured decision-making 
possess loadings of .861 and .868, indicating good convergent validity. We captured the non-
recoverable investments variable with three indicators, and the factor loadings were good 
(.876, .840, and .810). Absorption was operationalized with six indicators, but because the 
analysis revealed that one item loaded poorly, we removed it from further analysis. The 
remaining five items achieved loadings of .718, .814, .755, .765, and .761, which suggest 
good convergent validity.  
 
We examined discriminant validity with the eigenvalue statistic and the percentage of 
variance explained. Four components were extracted with eigenvalues above the cut-off value 
of 1 (after rotation), ranging from 2.67 to 4.74. The explained variance ranged from 7.18% to 
40.12%, which suggests discriminant validity. Finally, reliability was acceptable with values 
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of .901 (compensation), .782 (decision-making), .839 (non-recoverable investments), and .850 
(absorption). In summary, the partner firm variables possessed good convergent and 
discriminant validity, and the desired reliability.  
 
Table 7.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis: Independent Variables, Firm-level 
  Focal Firm   Partner Firm 
Firm-level 
Constructs 
Items (short version) Loadings
(EV / % of Var.) α  
 
 
Loadings 
(EV / % of Var.) 
 
α 
Compensation  C1 Satisfied with total contribution 
C2 Satisfied with obtained benefits  
C3 Satisfaction with resource valuation 
C4 Pleased with gains 
C5 Recover investments 
 
(C6 Sum of benefits above expectations) 
(C7 Total expenditures below expectations) 
-.862 
-.891 
-.867 
-.779 
-.730 
(4.624 / 13.23%) 
.885  .866 
.895 
.835 
.864 
.742 
(4.744 / 40.12%) 
.901
Decision-making DM1 Control overall decision-making 
DM2 Substantial influence on decision-making 
 
.954 
.739 
(2.419 / 5.58%) 
.727  .861 
.868 
(2.663 / 7.18%) 
.782
Non-recoverable 
investments 
TI1 Invest great deal in this specific alliance 
TI2 Make investments tailored to alliance 
TI3 Make substantial unique investments 
 
.818 
.858 
.889 
(3.047 / 17.75%) 
.842  .876 
.840 
.810 
(3.468 / 11.87%) 
.839
Absorption A1 Decide on usefulness of knowledge  
A2 Saw connections between knowledge  
A3 Asses valuable of knowledge 
A4 Determine quality of knowledge  
A5 Easily integrate new knowledge 
 
(A6 Match existing knowledge base) 
.794 
.855 
.853 
.836 
.796 
(4.195 / 36.24%) 
.890  .718 
.814 
.755 
.765 
.761 
(3.952 / 13.17%) 
.850
Notes: n = 151. Items between parentheses were not used for further data analysis. Oblimin rotation (cross-loadings < .3); 
EV = eigenvalue (after rotation); % of Var. = % of explained variance; α  = Cronbach’s alpha. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Consistent with the operational definition of performance (see §6.3), we used three 
performance dimensions to test the hypotheses: financial, learning, and strategic. We have 
argued that each performance dimension is conceptually distinct from the others, but we also 
must assess the degree to which the performance dimensions are empirically distinct before 
we can proceed with the computation of aggregate measures. To assess convergent and 
discriminant validity, we used CVA and conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
using AMOS 7.0. The advantage of CFA over EFA is that this technique enabled us to assess 
the relationships (at indicator level) between the performance dimensions explicitly. Finally, 
we used Cronbach’s alpha to assess reliability. Before we present our findings, we briefly 
discuss the goodness-of-fit indices.  
 
Each performance model possessed acceptable fit with the data (see Table 7.4). The normed 
Chi-square statistics, with the exception of model FF2 (i.e., focal firm learning), are above the 
critical value of 3.0 (Carmines et al., 1981), and all other goodness-of-fit indices suggest good 
fit between the measurement models and the data. For instance, the goodness-of-fit index 
(GFI) and normed fit index (NFI) values ranged from .918 (model PF3) to .984 (model FF2), 
above the cut-off value of .900 (Bentler et al., 1980). The CFI statistics were higher than the 
critical value of .950, with one exception (i.e., model PF3; CFI = .922). Furthermore, the 
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SRMR values were below the cut-off value of .500 (Browne et al., 1993), again with the 
exception of model PF3 (SRMR = .052). Despite minor concerns with respect to model PF3, 
we may conclude that the data fit with the specified models. Hence, we can proceed with an 
examination of the measurement models.  
 
We captured financial performance with four indicators, and the findings indicated that 
standardized loadings ranged between .919 and .601 for the focal firm and between .965 and 
.646 for the partner firm. Learning performance and strategic performance were measured 
with four indicators, and the loadings ranged from .553 to .845 (focal) and from .486 to 877 
(partner firm). All indicators loaded significantly on their intended latent constructs 
(z-values > 5.449, p < .05). With the exception of one indicator (i.e., AP3 learning objectives), 
the findings indicated good convergent validity (Bagozzi et al., 1988). We decided to retain 
AP3 because its reliability was good, and it enabled us to maintain consistency. Reliability of 
the three performance dimensions was high, with Cronbach’s alphas of .853 (financial, focal 
firm) .864 (financial, partner firm), .827 (learning, focal firm), .768 (learning, partner firm), 
.811 (strategic, focal firm), and .879 (strategic, partner firm). We therefore concluded that the 
three performance dimensions have convergent validity and reliability.  
 
Table 7.4 Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Dependent Variables, Firm-level 
  Focal Firm   Partner Firm 
 Items (short version) Loadings α  Loadings α 
  Model FF1   Model PF1  
   s.e. z-value    s.e. z-value  
Financial  AP1 Profitable 
AP2 Financial Benefits 
AP3 Financial objectives  
AP4 Financial goals 
 .919
 .811
 .744
 .601
 
.077 
.447 
.659 
 
11.815
10.542
7.935
.853   .965 
 .777 
 .735 
 .646 
 
.065 
.462 
.573 
 
11.909
10.945
9.090
.864 
 χ2 (d.f.)
Normed χ2
GFI
NFI
CFI
SRMR
9.100 
4.550
 .970
 .969
 .975
 .039
(2, p  < 05)    14.801 
 7.400 
 .953 
 .954 
 .959 
 .048 
(2, p < .05)   
  Model FF2   Model PF1  
Learning AP1 Knowledge learned 
AP2 Learning benefits 
AP3 Learning objectives 
AP4 Learning goals 
 .842
 .830
 .553
 .733
 
.122 
.846 
.991 
 
10.339
6.699
9.283
.827   .803 
 .819 
 .486 
 .576 
 
.146 
.913 
1.068 
8.007
5.449
6.472
.768 
 χ2 (d.f.)
Normed χ2
GFI
NFI
CFI
SRMR 
5.405 
2.702
 .984
 .977
 .985
 .027
(2, p > .05)    6.245 
3.123 
 .980 
 .963 
 .974 
 .042 
(2, p < .05)   
  Model FF3   Model PF1  
Strategic AP1 Strategic advantage 
AP2 Strategic benefits 
AP3 Strategic objectives 
AP4 Strategic goals 
 .845
 .732
 .649
 .651
 
.104 
.730 
.866 
 
8.447
7.574
7.592
.842   .777 
 .877 
 .712 
 .836 
 
.098 
.735 
.846 
11.030
8.853
10.598
.879 
 χ2 (d.f.)
Normed χ2
GFI
NFI
CFI
SRMR 
9.344 
4.672
 .970
 .954
 .963
 .041
(2, p < .05)    27.965 
13.983 
 .919 
 .918 
 .922 
 .052 
(2, p < .05)   
Notes: n = 151. FF = focal firm; PF = partner firm; s.e. = standard error; α = Cronbach’s alpha. 
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To examine discriminant validity, we compared a baseline model without constraints with a 
model in which we constrained the covariance between two constructs (i.e., two performance 
dimensions) to a value of 1.0 (see §6.4). The findings indicated discriminant validity between 
the performance dimensions, because the baseline models fit better with the data than did the 
constrained models (i.e., Chi-square difference test). For instance, with respect to focal firm 
performance, the basic financial knowledge model (∆ χ2 = 12.226, p < .05) and basic financial 
strategic model (∆ χ2 = 41.792, p < .05) possessed significantly better fit than did the parallel 
constrained model. The knowledge strategic model also possessed better fit, though only at a 
10% probability level (∆ χ2 = 2.783, p < .10). With respect to the partner firm, the basic 
financial knowledge model (∆ χ2 = 18.767, p < .05) and the basic financial strategic model 
(∆ χ2 = 82.009, p < .05) possessed significantly better fit than did the constrained model, 
though the knowledge strategic model did not (∆ χ2 = 0.33, p > .05). Together, these findings 
suggest that respondents discriminated financial performance from learning and strategic 
performance, but some concerns may exist with respect to the discriminant validity between 
learning and strategic performance. Despite these minor concerns, we contend that the firm-
level variables possess sufficient psychometric properties to proceed with the computation of 
aggregate measures. In addition, the risk of bias in the parameter estimations declined, 
because we test the hypotheses with only one performance dimension at a time.  
 
Construct Validity: Difference Score Measures 
The results of the EFA and CFA indicated that the variables, captured at the firm-level, 
possess the desired psychometric properties. Consequently, we can proceed with the 
computation of the aggregate scores, which we computed as described in the procedures in 
Section 6.3. Briefly, we first calculated an aggregated score using the sum of the focal and 
partner firm scores, then computed an absolute difference score by taking the absolute value 
of the sum of the difference between the valid focal firm and partner firm indicators. To 
overcome concerns pertaining to the use of difference scores (Edwards, 2001a), such as 
discriminant validity and reliability, we conducted three assessments to examine: (1) 
correlations between the firm-level variables, (2) correlations between the firm-level variables 
and the difference score measures, and (3) difference score reliability (Peter et al., 1993).  
 
Consistent with the operational definitions presented in Section 6.3, we used the firm-level 
variables of compensation, decision-making, non-recoverable investments, and absorption to 
compute four difference score measures: compensation imbalance, decision-making 
imbalance, non-recoverable investment imbalance, and absorption imbalance. The pairwise 
correlations between the firm-level variables were moderate (see Table 7.5). Compensation–
firm and compensation–partner (r = .560, p < .05), decision-making–firm and decision-
making–partner (r = .560, p < .05), non-recoverable investments–firm and non-recoverable 
investments–partner (r = .630, p < .05), and absorption–firm and absorption–partner (r = .541, 
p < .05) were all positively and significantly associated. These moderate correlations suggest 
discriminant validity between the components, because correlations greater than .700 indicate 
poor discriminant validity (Ping, 2004).  
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Table 7.5 Correlations and Difference Score Reliability: Independent Measures 
 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Compensation – firm 
2 Compensation – partner .560***    
3 Difference score -.343*** -.282*** .758***    
4 Investments – firm .198*** .468*** -.022***    
5 Investments – partner .236*** .409*** -.199*** .630***    
6 Difference score -.138*** -.082*** .319*** .107*** -.218*** .569***    
7 Decision-making – firm .224*** .370*** -.001*** .553*** .471*** .019***    
8 Decision-making – partner .145*** .335*** -.131*** .482*** .455*** -.041*** .560***    
9 Difference score -.210*** -.050*** .249***-.065*** -.274*** .343*** -.031*** .101*** .381***  
10 Absorption – firm .431*** .365*** -.240*** .191*** .217*** -.035*** .154*** .121*** -.139***  
11 Absorption – partner .211*** .422*** -.083*** .319*** .367*** -.014*** .276*** .288*** -.054*** .541*** 
12 Difference score -.305*** -.089*** .331***-.047*** -.191*** .195*** -.117*** -.103*** .250*** -.217*** -.314*** .726
       
 Mean 4.943 5.119 .654 4.661 4.233 0.932 4.467 4.620 c.801 5.012 4.906 .850
 Standard deviation 1.096 1.041 .859 1.445 1.482 1.026 1.452 1.452 1.162 1.251 1.087 .859
Notes: n = 151. Computation based on raw data with valid items. The diagonal shows the difference score reliability. 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Table 7.5 also reports the correlations between the firm-level variables and their respective 
difference score measures. The correlations ranged from -.343 (i.e., compensation–firm and 
compensation imbalance) to .107 (i.e., non-recoverable investment–firm and non-recoverable 
investment imbalance), which supports discriminant validity. In Table 7.5, we report the 
difference score reliabilities on the diagonal of the correlation matrix.35 These reliabilities 
with respect to compensation, absorption, and non-recoverable investments were moderate 
(i.e., .758, .726, and .569), whereas the difference score reliability with respect to decision-
making imbalance was .381, well below the critical value of .700 (Nunnally, 1978). One 
explanation for this low reliability could note that we captured decision-making with only two 
items, which renders an internal consistency perspective inappropriate (Peterson, 1994). We 
decided to eliminate decision-making imbalance from further hypotheses testing.  
 
Table 7.6 Correlations and Difference Score Reliability: Dependent Measures 
 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Financial – firm    
2 Financial – partner .608***   
3 Financial performance imbalance .146*** -.050*** .644***   
4 Learning – firm .357*** .235*** -.040***   
5 Learning – partner .236*** .366*** -.005*** .538***   
6 Learning performance imbalance .133*** .107*** .298*** -.024*** .016*** .572***  
7 Strategic – firm .517*** .286*** .139*** .572*** .437*** .119***  
8 Strategic – partner .373*** .592*** .046*** .444*** .643*** .012*** .556*** 
9 Strategic performance imbalance -.041*** -.180*** .539*** -.188*** -.225*** .470*** .010*** -.264*** .662
    
 Mean 14.825 14.459 3.872 14.215 13.875 4.404 17.896 16.740 4.181 
 Standard deviation 05.446 06.076 3.802 05.509 04.908 3.479 05.202 05.817 3.823 
Notes: n = 151. Computation based on raw data with valid items. The diagonal shows the difference score reliability. 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
                                                 
35 See Section 6.3 for the procedure to calculate the difference score reliability. 
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In Table 7.6, we report pairwise correlations between firm-level components and the 
computed difference score measures. Correlations between the firm-level components of less 
than .700 indicate discriminant validity (Ping, 2004). All correlations were below this cut-off 
value, with values of .608 (financial), .538 (learning), and .556 (strategic). In addition, the 
correlations between the firm-level components and the difference score measures were low, 
ranging from -.264 to .146, which suggests discriminant validity. Finally, the difference score 
reliabilities were moderate: .644 (financial performance imbalance), .572 (learning 
performance imbalance), and .662 (strategic performance imbalance). Hence, we conclude 
that the psychometric properties are sufficient to proceed with the data analysis. 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we assessed the quality of the sample and prepared the data for analysis. We 
examined sample descriptives, including alliance characteristics (e.g., alliance objective, 
compensation structure), firm characteristics (e.g., country, industry), and informant 
characteristics (i.e., job title, working experience), and concluded that the data fit with the 
scope of the research. In addition, we conducted a non-response analysis and a common 
method bias analysis. The results of multiple statistical tests indicated limited concerns for 
such biases and errors. Finally, we prepared the data for analysis by examining the construct 
validity of firm-level variables and assessing the appropriateness of using difference scores. In 
general, the results indicated acceptable psychometric properties, with some minor issues. We 
removed decision-making imbalance from further analysis, because it possessed poor 
difference score reliability. In summary, these results suggest it is appropriate to proceed with 
the data analysis. In Chapter 8, we present the empirical findings with respect to Hypothesis 
1, and in Chapter 9, we present the empirical findings with respect to Hypotheses 2–4.  
 
   169 
Chapter 8 Structure, Process, and Alliance Performance 
Empirical Findings 
In this chapter, we present the empirical results with respect to Hypothesis 1, which states that 
the relationship between structural coherence and alliance performance is partially mediated 
by relational adaptability. Structural coherence refers to the degree to which the initial 
alliance structure constitutes a constellation of mutually supportive structural safeguards, 
whereas relational adaptability pertains to parties’ willingness and ability to make 
modifications to an ongoing relationship. Drawing on the structure and process perspectives, 
we have argued that incorporating structural coherence and relational adaptability into one 
theoretical model increases its explanatory power with respect to alliance performance, 
because the alignment of structure and process explanations more completely describes the 
complexity of alliances than either the structure or the process perspective alone. We used 
partial least squares (PLS) analysis to test Hypothesis 1. Within our sample of contractual 
alliances, we found a direct relationship between structural coherence and financial 
performance. In addition, with respect to learning performance, the results indicate an indirect 
relationship mediated by relational adaptability; with respect to strategic performance, our 
results provide support for a partially mediated relationship. In other words, theoretical 
explanations are constrained to specific performance dimensions, providing strong support for 
a reconciliation of the structure and process perspectives. 
 
We organize this chapter as follows. In Section 8.1, we elaborate on model specification 
issues, such as control variables and outliers. In Section 8.2, we present the results of the PLS 
analysis of Hypothesis 1. We end the chapter in Section 8.3 with conclusions.  
 
8.1 Model Specification 
The statistical model we used to test Hypothesis 1 is a hierarchical component model 
(Löhmoller, 1988; Wold, 1982) with a combination of one formative (i.e., structural 
coherence) and one reflective (i.e., relational adaptability) second-order construct. Each 
second-order factor represents a superordinate construct that connects first-order predictors 
with other constructs in the model (Edwards, 2001b; Jarvis et al., 2003). We used SmartPLS 
2.0 to conduct the PLS analysis (Ringle et al., 2005), because PLS is an appropriate technique 
to test this type of model (see §6.4). Furthermore, consistent with the operational definition of 
alliance performance (see §6.3), we estimated three models using financial, learning, and 
strategic performance as the dependent variables. That is, we tested three separate 
measurement and structural models; the cross-sectional nature of the empirical research 
inhibits more complex models that specify relationships among the alliance performance 
dimensions.36 Before we present the empirical findings, we elaborate on three model 
specification issues that apply to all three statistical models: (1) control variables, (2) ordinary 
least squares assumptions, and (3) outliers.  
                                                 
36 In Section 10.2, we elaborate on the relationships among financial, learning, and strategic performance. 
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The objective of the research is to build a parsimonious theoretical model while controlling 
for exogenous and endogenous factors to the alliance. However, due to the moderate sample 
size (i.e., 151), it was inappropriate to incorporate all control variables simultaneously into the 
PLS analysis (see §6.3). To deal with this restriction, we used three criteria to select control 
variables. First, based on preliminary PLS analysis, we decided to include only controls that 
revealed a significant relationship with relational adaptability or one of the performance 
dimensions. Results indicate that the controls associated with competitors, international 
status, alliance complexity, and the fulfillment of contractual obligations have significant 
relationships (p < .05). Second, when two variables are highly correlated, they can be 
considered substitutes. We found five pairwise correlations with values higher than .200: 
environmental uncertainty and alliance duration (r = .215, p < .05), past relationships between 
partner firms and similar experience (r = .224, p < .05), partner firms as competitors and 
operating in a similar industry (r = .244, p < .05), partner firms operating in the ICT sector 
and an international alliance (r = .209, p < .05), and partner firms operating in the ICT sector 
and operating in a similar industry (r = .266, p, < .05). Nonetheless, due to these moderate 
associations, we concluded that substitution is not an appropriate alternative. Finally, from a 
theoretical perspective, the controls should together capture environmental, interfirm, and 
alliance characteristics. Therefore, we decided to include environmental uncertainty, partner 
firms’ prior experience with alliances, and alliance duration as additional control variables.37  
 
To estimate the parameter coefficient with respect to the structural model, PLS estimation 
uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Wold, 1982). With respect to each model, we 
examined whether OLS assumptions were violated by considering the univariate normality of 
the indicators. The results indicate no kurtosis or skewness concerns. We also examined 
homoscedasticity, and the results indicate limited concerns, in that the largest to smallest 
conditional variance is smaller than 10 (Cohen, 1988). Finally, we conducted a residual 
analysis and inspected a scatterplot (i.e., standardized predictors vs. standardized residuals) 
and a normal probability graph. The results indicate no serious concerns with respect to each 
model. Hence, it is appropriate to interpret the result produced by PLS analysis.  
 
Due to the moderate sample size, outliers may have a substantial impact on parameter 
estimation (Cohen, 1988) and should be discarded. To examine the possible presence of 
outliers, we inspected scatter diagrams of the relationships among the main constructs. 
Inspection of the scatterplots indicates that four cases qualified as outliers, an indication 
supported by an assessment of Cook’s distance, because the four cases achieved scores 
between .400 and .500. Although Cook’s distance is considered unusually large if it exceeds 
1.0 (Cohen, 1988), we decided to eliminate these four cases for two reasons. First, inspection 
of the Cook’s distance measure revealed that they had exceptional large scores compared with 
the other cases’ scores. Second, additional PLS analysis showed that these cases substantially 
affected parameter estimations. Hence, we reduced the net sample from 151 to 147.  
                                                 
37 We excluded the following controls: changes in partner’s strategy, firm size similarity, industry similarity, 
previous relationships, focal firms’ industry, focal firm’s country, and scope of the compensation structure. 
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8.2 Hypothesis 1: The Mediation Hypothesis  
Hypothesis 1 states that the relationship between structural coherence and alliance 
performance is mediated by relational adaptability. We have argued that to achieve superior 
alliance performance, partner firms must design an alliance structure that consists of mutually 
supportive structural safeguards. Yet as the alliance unfolds, partner firms must invest time 
and resources to build relational adaptability, which fosters their willingness and ability to 
make modifications to an ongoing relationship. Our multidimensional approach to alliance 
performance provided us with an opportunity to test Hypothesis 1 with different dependent 
variables: financial, learning, and strategic performance. In contrast to ex-ante expectations, 
the empirical findings indicate that structural coherence and relational adaptability 
differentially relate to the three performance dimensions. More specifically, the relationship 
between structural coherence and alliance performance is not (i.e., financial), is fully (i.e., 
learning), or is partially (i.e., strategic) mediated by relational adaptability. Next, we present 
our results, consistent with the procedure described in Section 6.4: (1) measurement model, 
(2) structural model, and (3) additional analysis to assess mediation effect.  
 
Measurement Models 
An examination of a PLS measurement model is required to assess the psychometric 
properties of the constructs (Barclay et al., 1995; Chin, 1998; Hulland, 1999). Therefore, we 
evaluated the construct validity by examining individual item reliability, internal consistency, 
and discriminant validity. An examination of the three measurement models indicated that the 
findings across the models are similar. Therefore, instead of discussing each measurement 
model separately, we present the results together in three tables (Tables 8.1–8.3) and only 
discuss our findings with respect to financial performance. Consistent with the procedure 
described in Section 6.4, we distinguish between first-order and second-order constructs.  
 
Measurement Model: First-Order Constructs 
In Table 8.1, we report the results with respect to the seven first-order constructs forming 
structural coherence.38 We measured compensation integrativeness, or the degree to which 
firms formalized a compensation structure that maximizes the value creation potential of an 
alliance, with five indicators. The PLS analysis produced significant and high loadings; the 
smallest loading of .744 is well beyond the critical value of .707 (Chin, 1998). Compensation 
imbalance, or the asymmetry between each party’s anticipated benefits as formalized in the 
alliance contract, was operationalized with five items, and loadings range from .761 to .836, 
which indicates acceptable convergent validity. The construct of shared decision-making, or 
both parties’ formalized formal authority over alliance activities, was measured by two 
indicators, and again, the loadings are sufficiently high (i.e., .898 and .896). We captured total 
non-recoverable investments, or both parties’ formalized commitment to make specialized, 
tailored, and difficult to redeploy expenditures, with three indicators. The loadings are above 
                                                 
38 We operationalized structural coherence with eight formative first-order constructs (see §6.3). However, 
decision-making imbalance possessed poor difference score reliability and was therefore excluded (see §7.4).  
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.863, which indicates good convergent validity. Non-recoverable investment imbalance, or the 
asymmetry between parties’ commitment to make tailored expenditures, was captured with 
three indicators with significant loadings above .777. Partner fit, the extent to which interfirm 
characteristics are compatible, and resource complementarity, the extent to which the joint use 
of distinct sets of resources yields a higher total return than the sum of returns earned if each 
set were used independently, both possesses good convergent validity. Factor loadings are 
significant and above .721. One item pertaining to partner fit was eliminated, as it loaded 
poorly. The first-order constructs’ reliabilities are acceptable, with composite reliabilities 
ranging from .927 to .845 and Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .900 to 724, well beyond the 
cut-off value of .700 (Nunnally, 1978).  
 
Table 8.1 PLS Measurement Model: Structural Coherence 
 Financial 
Performance 
 Learning 
Performance 
 Strategic 
Performance 
   
 β L. t  β L. t  β L. t  CR. α 
Structural Coherence                
Compensation Integrativeness .478  14.481  .450  13.964  .470  14.352  .927 .900 
CI1: (C1f + C1p)  .743 13.149   .742 13.068   .742 12.770    
CI2: (C2f + C2p)  .888 41.419   .889 40.745   .889 43.779    
CI3: (C3f + C3p)  .898 43.636   .898 45.304   .898 47.037    
CI4: (C4f + C4p)  .855 27.242   .856 27.802   .855 27.875    
CI5: (C5f + C5p)  .840 29.164   .840 29.140   .841 29.786    
Compensation Imbalance -.212  4.555  -.222  4.485  -.210 4.564  .887 .840 
CI1: √(abs(C1f - C1p))  .777 16.730   .777 16.826.   .776 17.985    
CI2: √(abs(C2f - C2p))  .761 13.265   .761 13.759   .761 13.374    
CI3: √(abs(C3f - C3p))  .836 20.426   .836 21.672   .836 22.458    
CI4: √(abs(C4f - C4p))  .768 11.780   .769 13.186   .768 12.484    
CI5: √(abs(C5f – C5p))  .761 14.363   .761 15.839   .761 14.795    
Shared Decision-making .124  6.730  .131  6.213  .126  6.367  .892 .757 
SDM1: (DM1f + DM1p)   .898 34.974   .898 35.131   .898 37.767    
SDM2: (DM2f + DM2p)  .896 25.778   .896 24.482   .896 26.146    
Total N. Investments .222  9.819  .228  9.073  .224  9.624  .910 .852 
TNI1: (NI1f + NI1p)  .867 25.694   .867 26.369   .867 27.052    
TNI2: (NI2f + NI2p)  .863 24.880   .862 25.746   .863 24.201    
TNI3: (NI3f + NI3p)  .905 53.878   .906 50.983   .905 50.560    
N. Investment Imbalance -.066  1.895  -.056  1.641  -.056  1.703  .845 .724 
NII1: √(abs(NI1f – NI1p))  .813 4.207   .811 4.013   .814 4.200    
NII2: √(abs(NI2f – NI2p))  .777 3.567   .779 3.692   .779 3.535    
NII3: √(abs(NI3f – NI3p))  .818 3.893   .818 4.182   .814 3.942    
Partner Fit .183  6.554  .197  7.292  .185  6.407  .880 .795 
PF1  .895 23.505   .895 36.698   .895 25.967    
PF2   .903 25.310   .904 39.909   .905 25.084    
PF3  .721 10.710   .718 11.290   .720 11.501    
Resource Complementarity .251  7.682  .261  7.464  .261  8.375  .888 .831 
RC1  .789 12.777  .789 13.064   .789 13.287    
RC2  .754 15.135   .755 14.890   .756 16.156   
RC3  .856 22.852   .857 21.088  .856 22.877   
RC4  .856 26.935   .856 28.817  .856 25.874  
Notes: n = 147. Structural coherence is a formative second-order construct, so β is interpreted as a regression coefficient. 
Β = standardized regression coefficient; L. = loading (individual item reliability); t = t-value (bootstrapping 1000 samples); 
CR. = composite reliability; α = Cronbach’s alpha. The procedure used to compute aggregate measures is described in 
Section 6.3.  
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In Table 8.2, we present the results of the PLS measurement models with respect to relational 
adaptability. We measured absorption integrativeness, or the combination of both parties’ 
abilities to assess and acquire knowledge, with five indicators, which all possess desirable 
factor loadings (i.e., .858, .877, .881, .686, and .814). Although one loading is below the cut-
off value of .707, it is acceptable with PLS estimation because the other four loadings are well 
above the critical value (Chin, 1998). The variable absorption imbalance, or the asymmetry 
between each party’s ability to assess and acquire knowledge, was measured with five 
indicators. The individual item reliabilities are sufficient, ranging from .661 to .740. Two 
loadings are below the cut-off value of .707, but again, these values are acceptable because 
the other three loadings are sufficiently high. The variable relational quality, which indicates 
the extent to which partner firms feel comfortable, are willing to rely on trust in dealing with 
another, and are committed to the relationship, possesses acceptable convergent validity, and 
all three items have loadings above .828. We captured learning capabilities, or the extent to 
which the partner firms have created a regular and repeatable pattern of routines that support 
knowledge and information transfer, with three indicators whose high loadings are .818, .906, 
and .864. The reliability of the latent variables is acceptable, with composite reliability scores 
ranging from .915 to .898 and Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .882 to .748. 
 
Table 8.2 PLS Measurement Model: Relational Adaptability 
 Financial 
Performance 
 Learning 
Performance 
 Strategic 
Performance 
   
 β L. t  β L. t  β L. t  CR. α 
Relational Adaptability                
Absorption Effectiveness .836  27.500  .842  29.581  .840  28.314  .915 .882 
AE1: (A1f + A1 p)  .858 34.846   .858 35.574   .858 34.354    
AE2: (A2f + A2 p)  .877 36.996   .877 37.655   .877 38.277    
AE3: (A3f + A3 p)  .881 43.591   .881 40.310   .881 41.266    
AE4: (A4f + A4 p)  .686 8.883   .687 9.165   .686 8.663    
AE5: (A5f + A5 p)  .814 23.238   .814 22.998   .814 22.954    
 -.616  8.525  -.609  8.216  -.610  7.799  .830 .748 
Absorption Imbalance  .740 17.345   .741 16.029   .740 16.152    
AI1: √(abs(A1 firm - A1p))  .661 8.480   .660 8.324   .661 8.083    
AI2: √(abs(A2 firm - A2p))  .722 12.618   .721 12.326   .722 11.660    
AI3: √(abs(A3 firm - A3p))  .676 8.833   .674 8.372   .676 8.571    
AI4: √(abs(A4 firm - A4p))  .712 12.195   .713 12.566   .712 11.685    
Relational Quality .674  11.903  .673  11.638  .674  11.662  .907 .846 
RQ1  .912 50.131   .912 47.452   .912 49.297    
RQ2  .880 27.298   .880 27.783   .880 29.261    
RQ3  .828 18.100   .828 16.268   .828 17.063    
Learning Capability .693  14.114  .692  13.785  .692  13.824  .898 .828 
LC1  .818 23.220   .819 22.452   .818 22.572   
LC2  .906 40.839   .906 39.493   .906 38.419   
LC3  .864 34.389   .864 32.881   .864 31.680   
Notes: n = 147. Relational adaptability is a reflective second-order construct, so β is interpreted as a factor loading. 
β = standardized regression coefficient; L. = loading (individual item reliability); t = t-value (bootstrapping 1000 samples); 
CR. = composite reliability; α = Cronbach’s alpha. The procedure used to compute aggregate measures is described in 
Section 6.3.  
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The dependent variable, financial performance, reveals good psychometric properties (see 
Table 8.3). The variable was measured by four indicators that possess loadings of .915, .840, 
.822, and .738. Learning performance was also captured with four indicators with acceptable 
loadings of .885, .846, .699, and .789. Strategic performance possesses convergent validity; 
its loadings are .847, .807, .750, and .828. In addition, the reliability of the three performance 
dimensions is high, with composite reliabilities of .899 (financial performance), .876 
(learning performance), and .883 (strategic performance). In summary, each performance 
dimension possesses sufficient convergent validity and reliability.  
 
Table 8.3 PLS Measurement Model: Alliance Performance 
 Financial Performance Learning Performance Strategic Performance 
 L. t   CR. α L. t   CR. α L. t   CR. α 
Alliance Performance    .899 .851   .876 .801   .883 .823 
AP1    .915 54.546   .885 37.601   .847 35.471   
AP2   .840 22.789   .846 34.809   .807 23.780   
AP3   .822 25.181   .699 13.508   .750 13.912   
AP4   .738 12.485   .789 19.315   .828 27.171   
Notes: n =147; L. = loading (i.e., individual item reliability); t = t-value (bootstrapping 1000 samples); CR. = composite reliability; 
α = Cronbach’s alpha. 
 
We assessed the discriminant validity by comparing the square root of the average variance 
extracted (AVE) with the correlations between the first-order constructs (see §6.4). 
Discriminant validity exists, because the AVE is higher than any of the first-order correlations 
(Fornell et al., 1981). With respect to the three models, the results suggest acceptable 
discriminant validity (see Table 8.4). The highest correlation between the independent 
variables and between the independent variables and financial, learning, or strategic 
performance occurs between shared decision-making and total non-recoverable investments 
(r = .626, p < .05). In contrast, the AVE scores range from .703 (absorption imbalance) to 
.897 (shared decision-making), higher than the any of the correlations between the first-order 
constructs, including financial, learning, and strategic performance. In summary, in addition 
to convergent validity and reliability, the first-order constructs possess discriminant validity. 
 
The pairwise correlations between the three performance dimensions are moderate to high 
(see Table 8.4). Financial performance and learning performance correlate moderately 
(r = .392, p < .05), and the correlations between financial performance and strategic 
performance (r = .520, p < .05) and learning performance and strategic performance (r = .720, 
p < .05) are relatively high. These findings suggest concerns for discriminant validity. To 
overcome the problems associated with a lack of discriminant validity (e.g., estimation 
biases), we decided to estimate separate models (see §8.1). This procedure is appropriate, in 
that each performance dimension possesses acceptable convergent validity and reliability. In 
addition, subsequent analysis revealed criterion validity, because the independent factors and 
control variables differently associate with each performance dimension. 
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Table 8.4 Descriptives and Correlations: First-Order Constructs 
 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Compensation 
Integrativeness 
-.847   
2 Compensation 
Imbalance 
-.324*** .781  
3 Shared 
Decision-making 
-.321*** -.036*** .897  
4 Total Non-recoverable 
Investments 
-.408*** -.114*** .626*** .878  
5 Non-recoverable 
Investment Imbalance 
-.123*** .301*** .007*** -.062*** .803  
6 Partner 
Fit 
-.283*** -.183*** .101*** .177*** -.152*** .844  
7 Resource 
Complementarity 
-.445*** -.155*** .394*** .400*** .034*** .198*** .815  
8 Absorption 
Integrativeness 
-.441*** -.164*** .254*** .342*** -.030*** .301*** .332*** .826  
9 Absorption 
Imbalance 
-. 248*** .354*** -.137*** -.127*** .189*** -.240*** -.106*** -.329*** .703  
10 Relational 
Quality 
-.399*** -.287*** .135*** .159*** -.235*** .482*** .232*** .363*** -.291*** .815  
11 Learning 
Capabilities 
-.320*** -.229*** .422*** .472*** -.165*** .348*** .175*** .403*** -.279*** .355*** .863   
12 Financial 
Performance 
-.412*** -.051*** .141*** .280*** -.106*** .280*** .252*** .206*** -.163*** .338*** .303*** .831  
13 Learning 
Performance 
-.303*** -.189*** .207** .229*** -.083*** .393*** .298*** .520*** -.298*** .484*** .449*** .392*** .799  
14 Strategic 
Performance 
-.485*** -.166*** .180*** .255*** -.071*** .301*** .360*** .508*** -.268*** .476*** .476*** .520*** .720*** .809 
                
 Mean 10.072 0.627 9.109 8.844 0.912 4.344 5.629 9.928 0.856 5.337 4.292 29.539 28.043 35.048 
 Standard Deviation 01.873 0.812 2.545 2.668 1.026 1.472 1.056 2.042 0.856 1.244 1.340 10.027 09.153 09.192 
Notes: n = 147. Computations are based on raw data with valid items (i.e., average). The diagonal shows the square root of the 
AVE for each construct. With respect to the independent variables, we only report AVE scores with respect to the financial 
performance model. The results are similar to the learning and strategic performance models, so our interpretation does not 
change across the three measurement models. 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Measurement Model: Second-Order Constructs 
The proposed hierarchical component model contains two second-order constructs: (1) 
structural coherence and (2) relational adaptability. Structural coherence is a second-order 
construct with seven formative first-order constructs, whereas relational adaptability 
represents a second-order construct with five reflective first-order constructs. To assess the 
construct validity of the second-order constructs, we must view the first-order constructs as 
indicators of the second-order construct. Therefore, the first-order constructs should possess 
sufficient psychometric properties themselves (Bollen et al., 1991; Jarvis et al., 2003), which 
exists in our study (see the previous section). Because the PLS measurement model 
estimations with respect to financial performance, learning performance, and strategic 
performance are similar to one another (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2), we do not discuss these 
results extensively but report results pertaining to the financial performance model only. 
 
To assess the psychometric properties of the second-order structural coherence factor, we 
examined the weights produced by PLS estimation (see Table 8.1).39 Structural coherence was 
captured with formative first-order factors, so the weights produced by PLS should be 
                                                 
39 The moderate correlations between the formative first-order construct (see Table 8.4) may raise concerns with 
respect to multicollinearity (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001). To examine the impact of multicollinearity, 
we regressed structural coherence and financial performance directly on the seven formative first-order 
constructs. The results indicated no concerns.  
176 
interpreted as standardized regression coefficients (Chin, 1998). We defined structural 
coherence as the degree to which the initial alliance structure constitutes a constellation of 
mutually supportive structural safeguards (Dussauge et al., 1995; Miller, 1986). 
Compensation integrativeness positively and significantly relates to structural coherence 
(β = .478, p < .05, t = 14.481), whereas compensation imbalance negatively and significantly 
relates to it (β = -.212, p < .05, t = 4.555). Shared decision-making positively and 
significantly contributes to the second-order construct (β = .124, p < .05, t = 6.730), and total 
non-recoverable investments positively and significantly relates to structural coherence 
(β = .222, p < .05, t = 9.819). Partner fit and resource complementarity positively and 
significantly relate to structural coherence (β = .183, p < .05, t = 6.554 and β = .251, p < .05, 
t = 7.682). Finally, non-recoverable investment imbalance relates negatively to structural 
coherence (β = -.066), though it is not significant (p > .05, t = 1.895). Together, these findings 
support the observation that structural coherence possesses good construct validity.  
 
In addition, consistent with the procedure described in Section 6.4, we examined the 
relationship between structural coherence and a measure that is not part of the theoretical 
model: total interdependence. Total dependence was captured as the average of four items 
pertaining to the focal firm’s and the partner firm’s dependence on each other (e.g., resource 
need, availability of alternatives). Drawing on a resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer et 
al., 1978), we hypothesized a positive relationship between structural coherence and total 
interdependence. The findings indicate a positive correlation of .287 (p < .05), in support of 
the construct validity of structural coherence.  
 
Relational adaptability refers to the parties’ willingness and ability to make modifications to 
the ongoing relationship, without changing the initial alliance structure (Aulakh et al., 2002; 
Doz, 1996; Hallen et al., 1991). Relational adaptability was captured with five reflective first-
order constructs; therefore, the weights produced by PLS estimation must be interpreted as 
factor loadings (Chin, 1998). The findings indicate that absorption integrativeness positively 
and significantly loads on relational adaptability (β = .836, p < .05, t = 27.500), whereas 
absorption asymmetry negatively loads on the second-order construct (β  = -.616, p < .05, 
t = 8.525). The first-order relational quality and learning capability factors positively and 
significantly loaded on relational adaptability (β = .674, p < .05, t = 11.903, and β = .693, 
p < .05, 14.114). The reliability of relational adaptability is acceptable, with a composite 
reliability score of .692. The initial model also contained the first-order opportunistic behavior 
factor (see §6.3). Although the four indicators that capture this variable possessed good 
psychometric properties, we decided to remove it from further data analysis, because 
opportunistic behavior loaded poorly on relational adaptability (β < .400, p < .05), well below 
the cut-off value of .707 (Chin, 1998). To conclude, the first- and second-order measurement 
models possess good psychometric properties, and therefore, we can proceed with an 
interpretation of the structural models.  
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Structural Model: Financial Performance 
Hypothesis 1 states that relational adaptability partially mediates the relationship between 
structural coherence and alliance performance. With respect to financial performance, the 
findings indicate that firms designing an alliance with an initial structure that consists of 
mutually supportive structural safeguards experience a higher level of financial performance; 
however, we find no support for a positive association between relational adaptability and 
financial performance. Therefore, we must reject Hypothesis 1. Together, these findings 
suggest that structural coherence reduces the risk of exchange hazards, which enables parties 
to focus on fulfilling their contractual obligations. The findings provide support for the 
structural perspective’s main proposition that an adequate alliance structure reduces the risk 
of exchange hazards, which fosters alliance performance. We adopt a three-step procedure to 
examine the results: (1) examination of the pairwise correlations, (2) examination of the 
structural model, and (3) additional analyses to better understand the mediation effect.  
 
Correlation Matrix 
Table 8.5 reports the pairwise correlations between the second-order constructs of structural 
coherence, relational adaptability, and financial performance and the control variables. The 
results indicate that structural coherence and financial performance are positively and 
significantly associated (r = .489, p < .05), and structural coherence positively and 
significantly associates with relational adaptability (r = .625, p < .05). In turn, relational 
adaptability positively and significantly relates to financial performance (r = .406, p < .05). 
With respect to the control variables, alliance complexity relates positively and significantly 
to structural coherence (r = .205, p < .05) and financial performance (r = .168, p < .05), as 
does fulfillment of contractual obligations (r = .205, p < .05, and r = .304, p < .05). Finally, 
relational adaptability relates negatively and significantly to several control variables, 
including competitors (r = -.199, p < .05) and international alliance (r = -.189, p < .05). These 
findings provide tentative support for Hypothesis 1. However, additional PLS analysis and 
subsequent tests to assess the mediation effect are required to ensure a thorough test.  
 
Table 8.5 Hypothesis 1: Correlations Financial Performance Model 
 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Structural Coherence          
2 Relational Adaptability .625***   
3 Financial Performance .489*** .406***   
4 Environmental Uncertainty -.013*** -.147*** -.027***   
5 Competitors -.104*** -.199*** -.040*** .137***   
6 Experience with Alliances .043*** .126*** .036*** -.015*** -.064***   
7 International Alliance -.101*** -.189*** -.112*** .113*** .045*** -.020***  
8 Alliance Complexity .205*** .080*** .168*** -.016*** .092*** .112*** .107***  
9 Alliance Duration .050*** .020*** .109*** .215*** .130*** .096*** .033*** -.062***
10 Fulfillment contractual obligations .202*** .143*** .304*** -.187*** .140*** .064*** -.108*** .010*** .021***
Notes: n = 147, Computation is based on latent variable scores produced by PLS estimation. We conducted PLS analysis using 
standardized scores. Therefore, we do not report descriptives (i.e.,    = 0 and SD = 1). 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
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Structural Model 
With respect to financial performance, the empirical findings provide no support for 
Hypothesis 1 (see Figure 8.1). Results instead indicate that structural coherence positively and 
directly relates to financial performance (β = .308, p < .05, t = 2.584)40 and positively and 
significantly relates to relational adaptability (β = .604, p < .05, t = 8.770). In contrast to the 
pairwise correlation, in the full model, relational adaptability is not significantly related to 
financial performance (β = .166, p > .05, t = 1.416), which suggests that structural coherence 
eliminates the positive impact of relational adaptability. The R2 of financial performance is 
.318, whereas the R2 of relational adaptability is .445, which indicates substantial explanatory 
power (Falk et al., 1992). Together, these findings suggest that relational adaptability does not 
mediate the relationship between structural coherence and financial performance.  
 
Figure 8.1 Results Hypothesis 1: Financial Performance 
 
Notes: n =147.  
ns not significant; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
With respect to the control variables, only fulfillment of contractual obligations positively and 
significantly relates to financial performance (β = .223, p < .05, t = 2.755). The other six 
controls—uncertainty (β = .033, p > .05, t = .490), competitors (β = -.035, p > .05, t = .451), 
experience (β = -.036, p > .05, t = .476), international (β = -.043, p > .05, t = .577), alliance 
                                                 
40 We report t-values, resulting from the bootstrapping procedure (see §6.4).  
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complexity (β = .107, p > .05, t = 1.515), and duration (β = .094, p > .05, t = 1.412)—are not 
significantly related. We also control for relational adaptability, but the findings indicate no 
significant relationships: uncertainty (β = -.116, p > .05, t = 1.774), competitors (β = -.109, 
p > .05, t = 1.580), experience (β = .091 p > .05, t = 1.474), international (β = -.105, p > .05, 
t = 1.608), alliance complexity (β = -.033, p > .05, t = .580), duration (β = .022, p > .05, 
t = .386), and fulfillment of contractual obligations (β = -.003, p > .05, t = .046). These 
findings suggest that fulfillment of contractual obligations is also a driver of financial 
performance.  
 
Additional Tests 
Because testing for a mediation effect is not without its own concerns (Baron et al., 1986; 
Shaver, 2005), we conducted three additional analyses of Hypothesis 1: (1) R2 change, (2) 
Sobel test, and (3) multicollinearity diagnostics (see §6.4). First, we examined the change in 
R2 when we complemented a baseline model with only control variables (see Table 8.6, model 
1), with structural coherence (model 2), and with relational adaptability (model 3). The 
baseline model with control variables has two significant relationships: alliance complexity 
(β = .198, p < .05) and fulfillment of contractual obligations (β = .313, p < .05). Together, the 
control variables explain .157 of the variance (adj. R2 = .114). In model 2, we added structural 
coherence as an explanatory variable. The direct effect of the alliance complexity control 
variable thereafter becomes insignificant (β = .102, p > .05), whereas fulfillment of 
contractual obligations remains significantly related (β = .222, p < .05). Structural coherence 
positively and significantly affects financial performance (β = .408, p < .05). By adding 
structural coherence, we increase the explained variance from .157 to .303, which is a 
significant change (Δ F = 28.855, p <.05). In addition to structural coherence and the control 
variables, we added relational adaptability as explanatory variable in model 3. The findings 
indicate that the direct effect on financial performance is not significant (β = .166, p > .05), 
but structural coherence relates positively (β = .308, p < .05). The increase in explained 
variance (.015) is insignificant (Δ F = 3.080, p > .05). However, fulfillment of contractual 
obligations remains positively and significantly related to financial performance (β = .223, 
p < .05). These findings support our initial observation that relational adaptability does not 
mediate the relationship between structural coherence and financial performance.  
 
The Sobel test and multicollinearity assessment also support the initial findings. Consistent 
with the procedure described in Section 6.4, we conducted a Sobel test with respect to the 
magnitude and significance of the indirect effect while incorporating the control variables 
(Preacher et al., 2004). The findings support our interpretation of the results achieved through 
PLS estimation. The indirect effect from structural coherence through relational adaptability 
is insignificant, with an effect of .100 (bias-corrected confidence interval: -.022–.273). 
Finally, because we estimate a mediation model, we must examine the impact of 
multicollinearity (Baron et al., 1986). The collinearity diagnosis shows no severe problems, 
because the largest variance inflation factor is well below the critical value of 3 (1.800), and 
the condition index score is 2.407, well below the cut-off value of 30 (Hair et al., 1998). 
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Table 8.6 Hypothesis 1: R2 Change Financial Performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Control Variables β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. 
 Uncertainty .035*** (.082) .014*** (.075) .033*** (.076) 
 Competitors -.120*** (.081) -.051*** (.075) -.033*** (.075) 
 Experience -.027*** (.079) -.020*** (.072) -.036*** (.072) 
 International -.103*** (.079) -.061*** (.073) -.043*** (.073) 
 Alliance complexity .198*** (.080) .102*** (.075) .107*** (.074) 
 Duration .129*** (.081) .098*** (.074) .094*** (.074) 
 Fulfillment contract .313*** (.081) .222*** (.076) .223*** (.075) 
Structural Coherence   .408*** (.076) .308*** (.095) 
Relational Adaptability    .166*** (.095) 
R2 .157***  .303***  .318***  
Adj. R2 .114***  .262***  .273***  
Δ R2    .146***  .015***  
F 3.694***  7.487***  7.098***  
Δ F   28.855***  3.080***  
Notes: n = 147. β = standardized coefficients; s.e. = standard error. 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Conclusions 
With respect to financial performance, two findings are noteworthy. First, the relationship 
between structural coherence and financial performance is not mediated by relational 
adaptability, and therefore, we must reject Hypothesis 1. More specifically, within our sample 
of contractual alliances, firms that designed an initial alliance structure with mutually 
supportive structural safeguards also experienced higher levels of financial performance. In 
addition, the findings indicate that firms that established an alliance characterized by 
structural coherence were better able to build relational adaptability. However, with respect to 
ex-post conduct, partner firms benefited more from fulfilling contractual obligations than 
from investing time and resources to build relational adaptability. Together, the findings 
provide support for the structural perspective’s main proposition that an adequate alliance 
structure reduces the risk of exchange hazards, which in turn foster financial performance. 
 
Second, partner firms have different options available for designing and managing an alliance. 
In particular, compensation integrativeness, total non-recoverable investments, and resource 
complementarity constitute relatively important structural safeguards. In contrast, 
compensation imbalance contributes negatively to an alliance’s structural coherence, and 
though the impact of shared decision-making and partner fit is positive, it is relatively 
moderate. The impact of non-recoverable investment imbalance on structural coherence is 
negligible. Furthermore, the findings suggest that absorption integrativeness, relational 
quality, and learning capabilities improve relational adaptability, whereas absorption 
imbalance hampers parties’ willingness and ability to make necessary adaptations. Thus, 
parties may pursue different trajectories to develop relational adaptability. Nonetheless, the 
findings suggest that to achieve superior financial performance, firms generally should direct 
their attention to the alliance formation stage, because ex-post investments in relational 
adaptability may not contribute effectively to the realization of long-term financial benefits. 
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Structural Model: Learning Performance 
With respect to learning performance, firms building alliances with relational adaptability 
experience higher levels of learning performance; however, the findings also indicate that 
parties can achieve their learning objectives without necessarily falling back on the alliance 
structure (i.e., no direct relationship). Therefore, we must reject Hypothesis 1. These findings 
further suggest that partner firms that developed a willingness and ability to overcome inertial 
forces are more likely to realize their learning objectives than are alliances without relational 
adaptability. We find support for a positive association between structural coherence and 
relational adaptability, which suggests that alliance design functions as an imprint for post-
formation processes. Together, these findings support the process perspectives’ main 
proposition that to realize objectives, partner firms should develop ex-post relational and 
learning process to reduce the impact of inertia. Next, we discuss the findings in depth.  
 
Correlation Matrix 
Table 8.7 reports the correlations between the second-order structural coherence, relational 
adaptability, and learning performance constructs and the control variables. Structural 
coherence and learning performance are positively and significantly associated (r = .481, 
p < .05), and structural coherence positively and significantly associates with relational 
adaptability (r = .625, p < .05). Relational adaptability positively and significantly relates to 
learning performance (r = .708, p < .05). Of the control variables, alliance complexity relates 
positively and significantly to structural coherence (r = .205, p < .05), as well as to fulfillment 
of contractual obligations (r = .205, p < .05). Finally, learning performance relates negatively 
and significantly to the control variables competitors (r = -.266, p < .05) and international 
(r = -.212, p < .05). These findings provide tentative support for Hypothesis 1. However, 
additional PLS analysis and subsequent tests must assess the mediation effect.  
 
Table 8.7 Hypothesis 1: Correlations Learning Performance Model 
 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Structural Coherence          
2 Relational Adaptability .625***   
3 Learning Performance .481*** .708***   
4 Environmental Uncertainty -.012*** -.147*** -.098***   
5 Competitors -.103*** -.199*** -.266*** .137***   
6 Experience with Alliances .039*** .126*** .025*** -.015*** -.064***   
7 International Alliance -.098*** -.190*** -.212*** .113*** .045*** -.020***  
8 Alliance Complexity .205*** .079*** .106*** -.016*** .092*** .112*** .107*** 
9 Alliance Duration .046*** .021*** .074*** .215*** .130*** .096*** .033*** -.062***
10 Fulfillment contractual obligations .197*** .143*** .009*** -.187*** .140*** .064*** -.108*** .010*** .021***
Notes: n = 147. Computation is based on latent variable scores produced by PLS estimation. We conducted PLS analysis using 
standardized scores. Therefore, we do not report descriptives (i.e.,    = 0 and SD = 1).  
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Structural Model 
With respect to learning performance, the empirical findings provide no support for 
Hypothesis 1 (see Figure 8.2). Whereas we find no support for mediation with respect to 
x
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financial performance, with respect to learning performance, the findings indicate that 
relational adaptability fully mediates the relationship between structural coherence and 
learning performance. That is, in contrast to the pairwise correlation, the results indicate that 
in the full model, structural coherence is not significantly related to learning performance 
(β = .057, p > .05, t = .695), but structural coherence is positively and significantly related to 
relational adaptability (β = .604, p < .05, t = 9.026). Relational adaptability also positively 
and significantly relates to learning performance (β = .637, p < .05, t = 7.872). The R2 of 
learning performance is .551, whereas that of relational adaptability is .445, suggesting 
substantial explanatory power (Falk et al., 1992). The findings indicate that to achieve 
learning objectives, parties must allocate resources to develop relational adaptability. 
 
Figure 8.2 Results Hypothesis 1: Learning Performance 
 
Notes: n =147.  
ns not significant; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
With respect to the control variables, the fact that partner firms are competitors negatively and 
significantly associates with learning performance (β = -.141, p < .05, t = 2.202). The other 
six controls—uncertainty (β = -.009, p > .05, t = .150), experience (β = -.083, p > .05, 
t = 1.352), international (β = -.101, p > .05, t = 1.777), alliance complexity (β = .084, p > .05, 
t = 1.463), duration (β = .096, p > .05, t = 1.633), and fulfillment of contractual obligations 
(β = -.084, p > .05, t = 1.273)—have no significant impact. We also control for relational 
adaptability, but the findings indicate no significant relationships: uncertainty (β = -.117, 
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p > .05, t = 1.763), competitors (β = -.110, p > .05, t = 1.623), experience (β = .093, p > .05, 
t = 1.536), international (β = -.107, p > .05, t = 1.598), alliance complexity (β = -.034, 
p > .05, t = .590), duration (β = . 21, p > .26, t = .461), and fulfillment of contractual 
obligations (β = .089, p > .05, t = -.000). In summary, when competing partner firms engage 
in an alliance with learning objectives, developing relational adaptability is insufficient to 
overcome the perils associated with competitor-based alliances (Brandenberger et al., 1996).  
 
Additional Tests 
We conducted additional tests, supporting the finding of full mediation. We examined the 
change in R2 when we complemented a baseline model with control variables (Table 8.8, 
model 4), with structural coherence (model 5), and with relational adaptability (model 6). The 
baseline model reveals three significant relationships: partner firms being competitors 
(β = -.285, p < .05), international alliance (β = -.214, p < .05), and alliance complexity 
(β = .166, p < .05). These controls explain .155 of the variance (adj. R2 = .112). In model 5, 
we added structural coherence as an explanatory variable; it positively and significantly 
affects learning performance (β = .442, p < .05). The direct effect of the control variables 
international (β = -.169, p > .05) and alliance complexity (β = .062, p > .05) becomes 
insignificant, but the control competitors remains negatively and significantly related 
(β = -.211, p < .05). The explained variance increases significantly from .155 to .326 
(Δ F = 8.351, p < .05). With respect to model 6, in which we add relational adaptability, the 
findings indicate that the direct effect on learning performance of relational adaptability is 
significant (β = .637, p < .05), whereas the effect of structural coherence becomes 
insignificant (β = .057, p < .05). The increase in explained variance (.225) is substantial and 
significant (Δ F = 68.665, p < .05). 
 
Table 8.8 Hypothesis 1: R2 Change Learning Performance 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Control Variables β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. 
 Uncertainty -.061*** (.083) -.084*** (.074) -.009*** (.061) 
 Competitors -.285*** (.081) -.211*** (.074) -.141*** (.061) 
 Experience -.031*** (.079) -.023*** (.071) -.082*** (.059) 
 International -.214*** (.079) -.169*** (.072) -.101*** (.059) 
 Alliance complexity .166*** (.080) .062*** (.074) .084*** (.060) 
 Duration .144*** (.081) .112*** (.073) .096*** (.060) 
 Fulfillment contract .011*** (.081) -.084*** (.075) -.084*** (.061) 
Structural Coherence  .442*** (.074) .057*** (.077) 
Relational Adaptability    .637*** (.077) 
R2 .155***  .326***  .551***  
Adj. R2 .112***  .287***  .522***  
Δ R2   .155***  .225***  
F 3.633***  8.351***  18.693***  
Δ F    35.135***  68.665***  
Notes: n = 147. β = standardized coefficients; s.e. = standard error. 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
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To assess the magnitude and significance of the indirect effect, we also conducted a Sobel test 
(Baron et al., 1986). The findings support our interpretation of the results we achieved 
through PLS estimation, in that the indirect effect from structural coherence through relational 
adaptability to learning performance is significant, with a magnitude of .385 (bias-corrected 
confidence interval: .253–.549). Finally, the multicollinearity diagnosis shows no severe 
problems. The largest variance inflation factor is well below the cut-off value of 3 (1.807), 
and the condition index score is below the cut-off value of 30 (2.407). Together, these 
findings support the initial finding that relational adaptability mediates the relationship 
between structural coherence and learning performance. 
 
Conclusions 
With respect to learning performance, two findings are particularly noteworthy. First, the 
empirical findings indicate that relational adaptability fosters learning performance. Within 
our sample of contractual alliances, parties achieve higher levels of learning performance if 
they are willing and able to make adaptations to the ongoing relationship, without necessarily 
resorting to changes in the initial alliance structure. Relational adaptability overcomes inertial 
forces, and therefore, parties are better able to respond adequately to internal and external 
forces that may destabilize the alliance. These findings also suggest that to achieve higher 
levels of learning performance, firms in an ongoing relationship should direct their efforts 
toward developing post-formation processes, because these ex-post investments are critical to 
realizing learning objectives. If partner firms are competitors, their relationship negatively 
affects the realization of their learning objectives, even if they have developed relational 
adaptability. Together, these findings imply that we must reject Hypothesis 1; in contrast to 
our expectations (i.e., partial mediation), we find support for full mediation. 
 
Second, the findings do not suggest that structural coherence is not important. Although 
structural coherence does not directly affect learning performance, it functions as an 
architecture that enables parties to build highly flexible relationships. If partner firms design 
an alliance with a high level of structural coherence, it positively contributes to their relational 
adaptability. Compared with financial performance, initial alliance design is important, yet for 
a different reason: Rather than directly affecting learning performance, structural coherence 
fosters the development of post-formation processes. However, structural coherence is not 
sufficient, and other factors, that are not part of this research, may influence relational 
adaptability. Together, these findings provide support for the process perspective’s main 
proposition that partner firms should develop post-formation processes, which enable them to 
reduce the negative consequences of inertial forces for learning performance. 
 
Structural Model: Strategic Performance 
With respect to strategic performance, we find support for Hypothesis 1. The results suggest 
that for our sample of contractual alliances partner, firms that design their relationship with a 
high level of structural coherence also experience a high level of strategic performance. In 
contrast, firms that build alliances with relational adaptability appear to experience a high 
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level of strategic performance. The findings suggest that structural coherence functions as an 
architecture that supports the development of post-formation processes. Thus, partner firms 
that can reduce the risk of exchange hazards and have developed a willingness and ability to 
overcome inertial forces likely realize their strategic objectives. Together, these findings 
suggest that we need to reconcile explanations pertaining to the structure and process 
perspectives to understand strategic performance. 
 
Correlation Matrix 
Table 8.9 reports the pairwise correlations between the second-order constructs of structural 
coherence, relational adaptability, and strategic performance and the control variables. The 
results indicate that structural coherence and strategic performance are positively and 
significantly associated (r = .559, p < .05), and structural coherence positively and 
significantly associates with relational adaptability (r = .624, p < .05). Relational adaptability 
positively and significantly relates to strategic performance (r = .625, p < .05). Of the control 
variables, alliance complexity relates positively and significantly to structural coherence 
(r = .203, p < .05), as does fulfillment of contractual obligations (r = .199, p < .05). Relational 
adaptability relates negatively and significantly to competitors (r = -.199, p < .05) and 
international alliance (r = -.189, p < .05). Finally, competitors associates negatively (r = -.183, 
p < .05) and fulfillment of contractual obligations relates positively (r = .192, p < .05) to 
strategic performance. These findings provide tentative support for Hypothesis 1. However, 
we require additional PLS analysis and tests to assess the mediation effects thoroughly.  
 
Table 8.9 Hypothesis 1: Correlations Strategic Performance Model 
 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Structural Coherence          
2 Relational Adaptability .624***   
3 Strategic Performance .559*** .625***   
4 Environmental Uncertainty -.012*** -.147*** -.081***   
5 Competitors -.104*** -.199*** -.183*** .137***   
6 Experience with Alliances .040*** .126*** .058*** -.015*** -.064***   
7 International Alliance -.098*** -.189*** -.125*** .113*** .045*** -.020***  
8 Alliance Complexity .203*** .079*** .154*** -.016*** .092*** .112*** .107*** 
9 Alliance Duration .049*** .021*** .049*** .215*** .130*** .096*** .033*** -.062***
10 Fulfillment contractual obligations .199*** .144*** .192*** -.187*** .140*** .064*** -.108*** .010*** .021***
Notes: n = 147. Computation is based on latent variable scores produced by PLS estimation. We conducted PLS analysis using 
standardized scores. Therefore, we do not report descriptives (i.e.,     = 0 and SD = 1).  
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Structural Model 
With respect to strategic performance, the empirical findings support for Hypothesis 1 (see 
Figure 8.3) and suggest that relational adaptability partially mediates the relationship between 
structural coherence and strategic performance. Specifically, structural coherence positively 
and directly relates to financial performance (β = .234, p < .05, t = 2.286) and positively and 
significantly relates to relational adaptability (β = .603, p < .05, t = 8.609). Moreover, 
relational adaptability is significantly related to strategic performance (β = .439, p > .05, 
x
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t = 4.440). The R2 of strategic performance is .458, and that of relational adaptability is .445, 
which suggests substantial explanatory power (Falk et al., 1992). Thus, to realize strategic 
objectives, partner firms must focus on both alliance structure and post-formation processes. 
 
Figure 8.3 Results Hypothesis 1: Strategic Performance 
 
Notes: n =147.  
ns not significant; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
With respect to the control variables, uncertainty (β = .012, p > .05, t = .170), competitors 
(β = -.102, p > .05, t = 1.423), experience (β = -.034, p > .05, t = .512), international 
(β = -.017, p > .05, t = .268), alliance complexity (β = .088, p > .05, t = 1.424), duration 
(β = .047, p > .05, t = .963), and fulfillment of contractual obligations (β = .098, p > .05, 
t = .963) are not significantly related. When we control for relational adaptability, the 
findings indicate no significant relationships: uncertainty (β = -.117, p > .05, t = 1.818), 
competitors (β = -.109, p > .05, t = 1.532), experience (β = .092, p > .05, t = 1.430), 
international (β = -.108, p > .05, t = 1.598), alliance complexity (β = -.033, p > .05, t = .579), 
duration (β = . 021, p > .05, t = .401), and fulfillment of contractual obligations (β = .-.001, 
p < .05, t = .011). Thus, within our sample of contractual alliances, adequate alliance design 
complemented by relational adaptability reduces the impact of other exogenous and 
endogenous factors.  
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Additional Tests 
We examined the change in R2 when we complemented a baseline model with only control 
variables (Table 8.10, model 7), with structural coherence (model 8), and with relational 
adaptability (model 9). The baseline model with control variables has three significant 
relationships with strategic performance: competitors (β = -.235, p < .05), alliance complexity 
(β = .191, p < .05), and fulfillment of contractual obligations (β = .207, p < .05). Together, 
these control variables explain .132 of the variance (adj. R2 = .088). In model 7, which adds 
structural coherence as an explanatory variable, structural coherence positively and 
significantly influences financial performance (β = .499, p < .05), and explained variance 
increases significantly from .132 to .351 (Δ F = 46.479, p < .05). The direct effect of the 
control variables alliance complexity (β = .074, p > .05) and fulfillment of contractual 
obligations (β = .097, p > .05) become insignificant, whereas competitors remains negatively 
and significantly related (β = -.150, p < .05). In model 9, we add relational adaptability as an 
explanatory variable. The direct effect on strategic performance of relational adaptability is 
positive and significant (β = .439, p < .05); the direct effect of structural coherence decreases 
but remains positive and significant (β = .234,). The increase in explained variance (.107) is 
substantial and significant (Δ F = 27.069, p < .05). We also conducted a Sobel test with 
respect to the magnitude and significance of the indirect effect while incorporating the control 
variables (Preacher et al., 2004). The findings support the results achieved through PLS 
estimation; the indirect effect through relational adaptability is significant, with a coefficient 
of .265 (bias-corrected confidence interval: .125–.418). The collinearity diagnosis reveals no 
severe problems. The largest variance inflation factor is below the cut-off value of 3 (1.801), 
and the condition index score, with a value of 2.403, is below the cut-off value of 30 as well 
(Cohen, 1988). These analyses support the result that relational adaptability mediates, though 
only partially, the relationship between structural coherence and strategic performance. 
 
Table 8.10 Hypothesis 1: R2 Change Strategic Performance 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Control Variables β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. 
 Uncertainty -.014*** (.084) -.040*** (.073) -.040*** (.067) 
 Competitors -.235*** (.082) -.150*** (.072) -.150*** (.067) 
 Experience -.003*** (.079) .007*** (.070) .007*** (.065) 
 International -.114*** (.081) -.064*** (.070) -.064*** (.065) 
 Alliance complexity .191*** (.080) .074*** (.072) .074*** (.066) 
 Duration .094*** (.082) .057*** (.072) .057*** (.066) 
 Fulfillment contract .207*** (.082) .097*** (.073) .097*** (.067) 
      
Structural Coherence   .499*** (.073) .234*** (.084) 
Relational Adaptability    .439*** (.084) 
      
R2 .132***  .351***  .458***  
Adj. R2 .088***  .313***  .422***  
Δ R2   .219***  .107***  
F 3.021***  9.318***  12.885***  
Δ F    46.479***  27.069***  
Notes: n = 147. β = standardized coefficients; s.e. = standard error. 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
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Conclusions 
With respect to strategic performance, two findings are particularly noteworthy. First, the 
empirical findings indicate that both structural coherence and relational adaptability foster 
strategic performance. That is, within our sample of contractual alliances, higher levels of 
strategic performance result if parties are willing and able to make adaptations to their 
ongoing relationship and have designed an alliance with mutual supportive structural 
safeguards. These findings suggest that partner firms need to balance their efforts between 
designing an adequate alliance structure and developing post-formation processes, because 
both are critical to realizing their strategic objectives. In addition, structural coherence 
functions as an architecture that enables parties to build a highly flexible relationship. 
Restated, relational adaptability fully mediates the relationship between structural coherence 
and strategic performance, in full support of Hypothesis 1.  
 
Second, the findings are quite different with respect to each performance dimension. For 
financial performance, we find that structural coherence is critical to realize objectives; for 
learning performance, the findings suggest relational adaptability is important; and with 
respect to strategic performance, the results indicate that a combination of structural 
coherence and relational adaptability best supports performance objectives. Taken together, 
these findings imply that, consistent with the theoretical model, a reconciliation of the 
structure and process perspectives increases explanatory power. 
 
8.3 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have presented the empirical results with respect to Hypothesis 1, which 
states that the relationship between structural coherence and alliance performance is partially 
mediated by relational adaptability. Drawing on the structure and process perspectives, we 
have argued that incorporating structural coherence and relational adaptability into one 
theoretical model increases the explanatory power with respect to alliance performance, 
because the alignment of structure and process explanations more completely describes the 
complexity of alliances than either perspective alone. We used PLS analysis to test 
Hypothesis 1, and the empirical findings provide substantial support for the reconciliation of 
the structure and process perspectives. Building on our findings, we next elaborate on four 
conclusions with respect to (1) the control variables, (2) designing and managing alliances, (3) 
performance dimensions, and (4) the structure and process perspectives.  
 
First, with respect to the control variables, we find that adequate alliance design and 
management can overcome most problems associated with various environmental (i.e., 
uncertainty), interfirm (i.e., competitors), and alliance (i.e., international) characteristics. For 
instance, focusing on environmental dynamics, we hypothesized that environmental 
uncertainty negatively affects alliance performance (Jap, 1999; Lee et al., 2006), yet the 
findings indicate that environmental uncertainty is not negatively associated with alliance 
performance. Consistent with prior alliance research, the findings also suggest that alliances 
between competitors (Bengtsson et al., 2000; Park et al., 1997) and international alliances 
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(Barkema et al., 1997; Reuer & Ariño, 2002) are subject to additional tensions and ex-post 
problems. Yet the impact of destabilizing interfirm characteristics declines once we add 
structural coherence and relational adaptability to the model; thus, it appears firms can largely 
overcome the problems associated with competitors (except with respect to learning 
performance) and international partners. Furthermore, the findings indicate that prior 
experience with alliances has no impact on alliance performance, consistent with research by 
Zollo, Reuer, and Singh (2002). However, in contrast to their findings, the results also 
indicate that previous experience with a partner does not foster alliance performance. With 
respect to alliance characteristics, the results indicate that only fulfillment of contractual 
obligations has a positive effect on financial performance, which implies that alliance 
contracts function as an important coordination and enforcement mechanism.  
 
Second, consistent with our expectations, the findings suggest that partner firms have 
different options available for designing and managing their alliances. More specifically, with 
respect to the second-order structural coherence construct, which entails the degree to which 
an initial alliance structure constitutes a constellation of mutually supportive structural 
safeguards, we find that compensation integrativeness, resource complementarity, and total 
non-recoverable investments constitute three important structural safeguards, whereas partner 
fit and shared decision-making are relatively less important. Compensation imbalance also 
undermines an alliance’s structural coherence, and the impact of non-recoverable investment 
imbalance is negligible. With respect to relational adaptability, the results indicate that 
absorption integrativeness, relational quality, and learning capabilities foster relational 
adaptability, whereas absorption imbalance inhibits parties’ willingness and ability to make 
modifications. Surprisingly, we needed to eliminate opportunistic behavior from the model, 
because the results indicated it did not relate to relational adaptability. Nonetheless, together, 
the findings suggest that firms have multiple instruments available to them to design and 
manage their relationships efficiency and effectively.  
 
Third, the mediating effect of relational adaptability between structural coherence and alliance 
performance is conditional on the performance dimension considered (see Table 8.11). That 
is, we fail to find support for Hypothesis 1 with respect to financial performance. The initial 
positive association between structural coherence and financial performance remained 
positive and significant when we added relational adaptability as a mediating variable, and the 
absence of a significant indirect effect between relational adaptability and financial 
performance was supported by additional tests. Similarly, we must reject Hypothesis 1 when 
we focus on learning performance. An initial positive correlation between structural 
coherence and learning performance became insignificant when we added relational 
adaptability as a mediating variable. Structural coherence positively related to relational 
adaptability, and in turn, relational adaptability positively and significantly related to learning 
performance. In contrast, the empirical findings provide strong support for Hypothesis 1 with 
respect to strategic performance. An initial significant and positive association between 
structural coherence and strategic performance decreased in magnitude but remained 
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significant when we controlled for relational adaptability. Structural coherence positively 
related to relational adaptability, which itself positively affected strategic performance. 
Together, these findings have important theoretical and managerial implications. Namely, 
theoretical explanations put forward by advocates of the structure and process perspectives 
remain constrained to specific performance dimensions. From a managerial perspective, 
depending on the alliance objectives, partner firms should allocate their resources differently. 
We elaborate on these theoretical and managerial implications in Chapter 10. 
 
Table 8.11 Hypothesis 1: Summary of the Results 
Model 
1 
IVÆD 
2 
IVÆ M 
3a 
MÆD 
3b 
IVÆD 
4 
Sobel test 
 
Implication 
Financial Performance 
SCÆ RA Æ FP 
Yes Yes No Yes No No mediation  
Reject H1 
Learning Performance 
SCÆ RA Æ LP 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Full mediation 
Reject H1 
Strategic Performance 
SCÆ RA Æ SP 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial mediation 
Support H1 
Notes: SC = structural coherence; RA = relational adaptability; FP = financial performance; LP = learning performance; SP = 
strategic performance. The procedure to assess partial mediation is based on Baron and Kenny’s (1986) guidelines: (1) 
Significant relationship between independent and dependent variable; (2) Significant relationship between independent and 
mediation variable; (3a) Significant relationship between mediation and dependent variable; (3b) The effect of the independent 
on the dependent variable should become smaller but remain significant compared with condition 1 when controlling for the 
mediator to conclude partial mediation; and (4) Sobel test indicates the significance and magnitude of the indirect effect. 
 
Fourth, combining the results of our empirical study, we derive an important theoretical 
contribution. A comprehensive explanation of alliance performance depends on a 
reconciliation of the structure and process perspectives. Alliance researchers drawing on a 
structure perspective argued that decisions with respect to alliance structure directly determine 
alliance performance (Hennart, 1988; Williamson, 1985). Consistent with this logic, we find 
that as the level of structural coherence increases, the risk of exchange hazards diminishes, 
and the likelihood of superior alliance performance increases. Proponents of the process 
perspective argued that post-formation processes are critical to achieve superior alliance 
performance (Doz, 1996; Ring et al., 1994; De Rond et al., 2004; Salk, 2005; Zajac et al., 
1993). Building on this logic, we discover that alliance processes are critical drivers of 
alliance performance and view alliances as purposeful entities that can learn and adapt to 
changing circumstances to improve their performance. Adaptability is critical to superior 
alliance performance, because this ex-post flexibility can overcome the limitations and inertial 
forces associated with an alliance structure. The results thereby provide substantial support for 
both perspectives: Superior financial performance associates with alliance structure, superior 
learning performance relies on post-formation processes, and superior strategic performance 
requires both alliance structure and post-formation processes. Moreover, the findings suggest 
that researchers who have examined alliance performance by drawing on either the structure 
or the process perspectives may have produced limited and biased explanations. In Chapter 
10, we elaborate on the theoretical and managerial implications of these findings.  
   191 
Chapter 9 Cooperation and Competition Trade-Off 
Empirical Findings 
This chapter presents empirical results with respect to Hypotheses 2–4, which represent three 
cooperation and competition trade-offs: compensation, learning, and relational We have 
argued that during the alliance formation stage, partners use bargaining power to resolve a 
compensation trade-off (Hypothesis 2). To test this trade-off, we developed six hypotheses 
that relate compensation integrativeness, compensation imbalance, alliance performance, and 
firm performance imbalance. In addition, we postulated that during the post-formation stage, 
firms must resolve the learning trade-off to achieve their objectives. To test Hypothesis 3, we 
developed another set of six hypotheses entailing the relationships among absorption 
integrativeness, absorption imbalance, alliance performance, and firm performance 
imbalance. Finally, we argued that relational norms guide parties’ behavior toward 
cooperation and competition. To test what we call the relational trade-off (Hypothesis 4), we 
introduced six hypotheses relating relational quality, opportunistic behavior, alliance 
performance, and firm performance imbalance. The empirical findings provide partial support 
for the compensation and learning trade-off but not for the relational trade-off. Unexpectedly, 
the findings also indicate that the impact of a trade-off solution is conditional on the 
performance dimension considered.  
 
We organize this chapter as follows. In Section 9.1, we elaborate on model specification 
issues, such as control variables and outliers. In Section 9.2, we present the results with 
respect to the compensation trade-off (Hypothesis 2). In Section 9.3, we discuss the findings 
with respect to the learning trade-off (Hypothesis 3), and in Section 9.4, we present the results 
with respect to the relational trade-off (Hypothesis 4). We end the chapter with conclusions in 
Section 9.5. 
 
9.1 Model Specification 
The statistical models representing Hypotheses 2–4 consist of two independent, latent 
constructs with direct relationships to two dependent, latent constructs. In addition, the 
relationships between the two independent variables and the two dependent variables are 
specified as correlates. By not hypothesizing a directional effect between the two dependent 
variables, we can consider the structural model as partially recursive (Kline, 1998). As we 
have argued previously, covariance analysis (CVA) is an appropriate technique to estimate 
this type of model (see §6.4). We used Amos 7.0, a software package with maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation, to test the hypotheses (Arbuckle, 1997). Furthermore, consistent 
with the operational definition of performance (see §6.3), we distinguished among financial, 
learning, and strategic performance dimensions. Consequently, with respect to each 
cooperation and competition trade-off, we estimated three statistical models, resulting in nine 
tests overall. Before presenting our findings, we elaborate on three model specification issues 
as they apply to all nine tests: (1) sample size, (2) outliers, and (3) CVA assumptions.  
192 
First, due to the moderate sample size (i.e., 151 cases), we decided to reduce the number of 
indicators per latent variable to obtain a minimum ratio of more than ten cases per indicator 
(see §6.4). To achieve this objective, we eliminated indicators with the lowest standardized 
loadings on their intended constructs while maintaining a minimum threshold of three 
indicators per latent variable. Consequently, alliance performance and firm performance 
imbalance were captured with three indicators (originally four), and compensation 
integrativeness, compensation imbalance, absorption integrativeness, and absorption 
imbalance were each captured with four indicators (originally five). We did not reduce the 
number of indicators of relational quality and opportunistic behavior, which originally were 
captured with three indicators. Sample size limitations forced us to omit control variables 
from the CVA; we estimated the nine models without controlling for environmental, 
interfirm, or alliance characteristics. Thus, the findings should be interpreted with caution.41  
 
Second, due to the moderate sample size, outliers could have a substantial impact on the 
parameter estimation. To examine the possible presence of outliers, we inspected scatter 
diagrams of the relationships between the indicators. In addition, we conducted residual 
analysis with respect to each estimated model and used Mahalobnis’s distance to identify 
outliers. We decided to eliminate seven cases with exceptional high Mahalobnis scores (>45), 
resulting in a usable sample consisting of 144 cases. To better understand the impact of this 
sample size reduction, we also tested Hypotheses 2–4 with the subsamples. More specifically, 
we conducted a test of each statistical model with a sample in which we only removed outliers 
pertaining to the model examined. In general, these findings were consistent with the results 
presented next, suggesting that are findings are relatively robust. 
 
Third, consistent with the procedure described in Section 6.4, we assessed univariate 
descriptives, normality assumptions, error loadings, and error variances (Bagozzi et al., 1988). 
The findings indicated limited concerns. With respect to all exogenous and endogenous 
indicators, kurtosis and skewness values were below the critical threshold (Cohen, 1988), 
which reduced concerns about violating the univariate normality assumption. With respect to 
violating the multivariate normality assumption, an assessment of Mardia’s coefficient for 
each estimated model raised some concerns (> 20), but we reduced the impact of possible 
biases by using ML estimation (Byrne, 2001; West et al., 1995), which resulted in robust Chi-
square estimates, goodness-of-fit indices, and standard errors (see §6.4). With respect to the 
nine models, no negative error variances were found, and the error variances significantly 
differed from zero, which indicated appropriate models with only two exceptions. Despite 
these minor concerns, we decided that we could proceed with hypotheses testing. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 The findings with respect to construct validity and hypotheses testing do not deviate or conflict with the results 
we found with respect to Hypothesis 1, suggesting that it is appropriate to interpret our findings. 
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9.2 Hypothesis 2: The Compensation Trade-Off 
Drawing on the power perspective (Blau, 1964; Cook et al., 1978; Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer et 
al., 1978), we argued that firms confront a compensation trade-off during the alliance 
formation stage (see §5.1). We hypothesized that compensation integrativeness and 
compensation imbalance affect parties’ ability to realize and appropriate value through the 
relationship. We defined compensation integrativeness as the combination of parties’ 
anticipated benefits, agreed on in an alliance contract, regardless of whether the anticipated 
compensations are balanced or imbalanced. A high level of compensation integrativeness 
means firms have formalized a compensation structure that maximizes the value creation 
potential of the alliance. A compensation imbalance refers to the asymmetry between each 
party’s anticipated benefits; in accordance with the contractual provisions, one party can 
expect to extract more rewards than its counterpart. As hypothesized, the empirical findings 
indicate that firms are confronted with a trade-off between compensation integrativeness and 
compensation imbalance. However, in contrast to our expectations, the trade-off solution 
adopted by firms differently associates with financial, learning, and strategic performance.  
 
We present the results according to the three-stage procedure described in Section 6.4. First, 
we elaborate on the goodness-of-fit indices to evaluate the degree to which the data fit the 
theoretical models. Second, we report findings with respect to the measurement models. 
Third, we present the results pertaining to the structural model.42 We conclude this section 
with a brief discussion of the findings.  
 
Goodness of Fit 
To assess the significance and explanatory power of a statistical model, we must consider 
both measurement and theory (Fornell et al., 1981). Researchers have proposed a variety of 
goodness-of-fit measures to examine the correspondence between the actual or observed input 
covariance/correlation matrixes and the predicted model (Kline, 1998). In Table 9.3, we 
report the results with respect to the goodness-of-fit indices used in this dissertation (see 
§6.4). An evaluation of model 1 (i.e., financial) using the Chi-square statistic indicates that the 
data fit poorly fit, because the Chi-square statistic is significant (χ2 = 122.014, d.f. = 71, 
p < .05). However, the Chi-square statistic often suggests a rejection of models. Another 
statistic of how well the data fit is the normed Chi-square, for which a value of less than 3.0 
indicates desired fit (Carmines et al., 1981). As the value of this statistic is 1.719, it suggests 
good fit between the data and the model. An examination of other goodness-of-fit indices also 
indicates the acceptable fit between the model 1 and the data. For instance, values of .891 
(GFI), .891 (NFI), and .950 (CFI) indicate moderate fit (Bentler, 1990; Bentler et al., 1980; 
Jöreskog et al., 1989). Furthermore, the SRMR is acceptable with a value of .057 (Browne et 
al., 1993). Together, these findings provide sufficient support to proceed with an assessment 
of the measurement and structural models. 
                                                 
42 We discuss the results of the goodness-of-fit tests, measurement model, and structural model in depth with 
respect to the compensation trade-off. However, for the sake of parsimony, we present only the key-findings 
with respect to the learning trade-off (see §9.2) and the relational trade-off (see §9.3). 
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For the performance dimensions, both learning and strategic, we found further support to 
continue with data analysis. To assess the fit of model 2 (i.e., learning), we examined the 
goodness-of-fit indices, which suggested a moderate fit between the theoretical model and the 
data (see Table 9.3). The Chi-square statistic again is significant (χ2 = 123.152 d.f. = 71, 
p <.05), suggesting poor fit, but the normed Chi-square value indicates a good fit with a value 
of 1.735, well below the cut-off value of 3.0. Other indices provide support for a moderate fit; 
the values pertaining to the GFI (.889), NFI (.880), CFI (.944), and SRMR (.066) are just 
below their critical values. With respect to strategic performance (see Table 9.3, model 3), the 
goodness-of-fit indices indicate a good fit between the theoretical model and the data. 
Although we obtained an insignificant Chi-square of 99.332 (d.f. = 71), the normed Chi-
square with a value of 1.399 is good, and the other indices support a good fit between data 
and the specified model, with values of .914 (GFI), .905 (NFI), and .970 (CFI). The value of 
the SRMR is .052, also indicating good fit. In summary, the goodness-of-fit indices provide 
sufficient support to proceed with an assessment of the measurement and structural models.  
 
Measurement Models 
Before interpreting the structural model, we must conclude that the measurement model 
possesses a satisfactory level of psychometric properties (Fornell et al., 1981) by examining 
the error variances, correlations, factor loadings, and standard errors (Bagozzi et al., 1988). 
Table 9.1 reports the factor loadings, standard errors, and z-statistics with respect to models 1 
(i.e., financial), 2 (i.e., learning), and 3 (i.e., strategic). With respect to the exogenous 
variables, compensation integrativeness and compensation imbalance, the results indicate 
good convergent validity across the three models. With respect to model 1, the standardized 
factor loadings pertaining to compensation integrativeness are high, with values between .909 
and .800, and compensation imbalance, captured with four indicators, reveals acceptable 
loadings with values between .825 and .681. All indicators load significantly on their intended 
latent constructs (i.e., z-values > 7.126, p < .05). With respect to model 2, we found similar 
results for compensation integrativeness and compensation imbalance. All indicators load 
significantly on the latent constructs (z-values > 7.101, p < .05), and the factor loadings range 
from .685 to .913. Finally, for model 3, the results also indicate acceptable convergent validity 
with significant loadings ranging from .684 to .915 (z-values > 7.091, p < .05). 
 
The convergent validity of the dependent variables is good. Financial performance was 
operationalized with three indicators that capture the degree to which partner firms achieved 
their financial objectives, and the standardized loadings are acceptable with values of .949, 
.781, and .636. Financial performance imbalance, or the difference between the degree to 
which partner firms achieved their individual objectives, also was operationalized with three 
indicators. The loadings of .790, .795, and .574 indicate convergent validity. Learning 
performance possesses convergent validity, with factor loadings of .848, .810, and .666, and 
learning performance imbalance has loadings of .684, .782, and .521 (z-values > 4.882, 
p < .05). Strategic performance, captured with three indicators, has sufficiently high loadings 
with values of .794, .878, and .733. Strategic performance imbalance was operationalized 
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with three indicators, and loadings are acceptable with values of .559, .752, and .635. All 
indicators load significantly on the latent constructs (z-values > 4.884, p < .05). Although 
some concerns may exist with respect to factor loadings below .600, we decided to retain 
these indicators, as additional analysis (see Chapter 8) indicate the measures possess construct 
validity and all latent variables have sufficiently high reliabilities and discriminant validity.  
 
Table 9.1 CVA Measurement Model: Compensation Trade-Off 
 Model 1 
Financial 
 Model 2 
Learning 
 Model 3 
Strategic 
Compensation Integrativeness L. s.e. z-value  L. s.e. z-value   L. s.e. z-value
 CI1: (C1 firm + C1 partner) .876    .880    .876   
 CI2: (C2 firm + C2 partner) .909 .069 15.128  .913 .068 15.350  .915 .068 15.347
 CI3: (C3 firm + C3 partner) .835 .073 13.037  .833 .073 13.057  .830 .073 12.933
 CI4: (C4 firm + C4 partner) .800 .082 12.086  .792 .082 11.951  .795 .082 12.003
Compensation Asymmetry          
 CA1: √(abs(C1 firm - C1 partner)) .681   .685    .688  
 CA2: √(abs(C2 firm - C2 partner)) .825 .152 8.176  .832 .154 8.909  .829 .152 8.141
 CA3: √(abs(C3 firm - C3 partner)) .763 .147 7.767  .752 .146 7.639  .757 .146 7.704
 CA4: √(abs(C4 firm - C4 partner)) .687 .146 7.126  .687 .146 7.101  .684 .145 7.091
Alliance Performance          
 AP1    .949   .848    .794  
 AP2 .781 .084 9,787  .810 .136 8.909  .878 .115 9.971
 AP3 .636 .099 7.890  .666 .157 7.753  .733 .136 8.837
Firm Performance Imbalance          
 FPI1 .790   .684    .559  
 FPI2 .795 .132 7.563  .782 .229 5.220  .752 .255 4.931
 FPI3 .574 .042 6.150  .521 .061 4.882  .635 .078 4.884
Notes: n = 144. Standardized coefficients; s.e. = standard error; L. = factor loading; Coefficients of leading indicator were set to 
1.0 to establish the scale for the construct. See Chapter 7 for details of the computation of the aggregate measures. 
 
Table 9.2 reports the Cronbach’s alphas of each latent variable. Reliability values are good, 
with most scores above the cut-off value of .700 (Nunnally, 1978). The reliability scores are 
as follows: .913 (compensation integrativeness), .826 (compensation imbalance), .815 
(financial performance), .709 (financial performance imbalance), .794 (learning performance), 
.650 (learning performance imbalance), .831 (strategic performance), and .611 (strategic 
performance imbalance). Although two reliability scores are not particularly high, we decided 
to maintain them because their convergent and discriminant validity is good.  
 
We assessed discriminant validity by comparing the square root of the average variance 
extracted (AVE) with the correlations between the constructs (Fornell et al., 1981). The AVE 
should be higher than the correlations between the latent constructs (see §6.4). For model 1, 
the AVE values are .856 (compensation integrativeness), .742 (compensation imbalance), 
.799 (financial performance), and .727 (financial performance imbalance), higher than any of 
the pairwise correlations reported in Table 9.2 (-.380 < r < .480). We obtained similar results 
with respect to models 2 and 3; the AVE values of .606 (learning performance), .502 (learning 
performance imbalance), .804 (strategic performance), and .631 (strategic performance 
imbalance) are higher than the correlations between the constructs used in model 2 
(-.380 < r < .355) or model 3 (-.380 < r < .472). To examine discriminant validity further, we 
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also compared a baseline model without constraints to a model in which we constrained the 
covariance between two constructs to a value of 1.0 (see §6.4). The findings indicated 
discriminant validity between the main constructs, as the baseline models fit the data better 
than did the constrained models (i.e., Chi-square difference test).43 Together, the results 
indicated that the latent variables possess convergent validity, reliability, and discriminant 
validity. Hence, we can proceed with an investigation of the structural models. 
 
Table 9.2 Hypotheses 2–4: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Compensation integrativeness .913***           
2 Compensation imbalance -.380*** 826***           
3 Absorption integrativeness .486*** -.162*** .896***         
4 Absorption imbalance -.247*** .297*** -.341*** .688***        
5 Relational quality .394*** -.318*** .374*** -.129*** .864***   
6 Opportunistic behavior .038*** -.028*** .112*** -.036*** .041*** .661***     
7 Financial performance .467*** -.109*** .242*** -.060*** .419*** .075*** .815***   
8 Financial performance imbalance -.147*** .480*** -.026*** .238*** -.270*** .046*** -.071*** .709***  
9 Learning performance .366*** -.170*** .566*** -.234*** .553*** .046*** .318*** -.058*** .794***
10 Learning performance imbalance -.172*** .270*** -.050*** .317*** -.149*** .094*** .000*** .444*** -.186*** .650***
11 Strategic performance .472*** -.186*** .447*** -.122*** .615*** .091*** .563*** -.105*** .605*** -.118*** .831***
12 Strategic performance imbalance -.189*** .298*** -.110*** .317*** -.170*** .035*** -.053*** .570*** -.182*** .542*** -.216*** .611
 Mean 10.238 .4470 9.953 .566 5.317 4.306 23.263 1.0842 21.689 1.179 26.236 1.184
 Standard Deviation 01.943 0.519 2.173 .482 1.300 1.320 08.878 0.897 07.902 0.863 08.365 0.816
Notes: n = 144. Computations based on raw data with valid items (i.e., average). The diagonal shows the Cronbach’s alpha. 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Structural Model 
Correlation Matrix 
Table 9.2 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the latent variables 
used for Hypotheses 2–4. With respect to Hypothesis 2, the results indicate that compensation 
integrativeness and compensation imbalance are negatively and significantly associated 
(r = -.380, p < .05). In addition, compensation integrativeness positively and significantly 
relates to financial performance (r = .467, p < .05), learning performance (r = .366, p < .05), 
and strategic performance (r = .472, p < .05), though it negatively and significantly relates to 
learning performance imbalance (r = -.172, p < .05) and strategic performance imbalance 
(r = -.189, p < .05). However, compensation integrativeness is not significantly related to 
financial performance imbalance (r = -.147, p > .05). Compensation imbalance positively and 
significantly relates to financial performance imbalance (r = .480, p < .05), learning 
performance imbalance (r = .270, p < .05), and strategic performance imbalance (r = .298, 
p < .05). We found significant and negative associations between compensation imbalance 
and learning performance (r = -.170, p < .05) and strategic performance (r = -.186, p < .05), 
though not with financial performance (r = -.109, p > .05). Together, these pairwise 
correlations provide tentative support for the compensation trade-off. However, to gain a 
better understanding of the hypothesized relationships (i.e., Hypotheses 2a–2f), we next 
present findings obtained through estimations of the structural models.  
                                                 
43 We decided not to report the results, as we estimated and examined 18 models. 
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Model 1: Financial 
The estimates produced through ML estimation for model 1 provide no support for 
Hypothesis 244 (see Table 9.3). The association between compensation integrativeness and 
compensation imbalance is significant and negative (r = -.417, p < .05), in support of 
Hypothesis 2a, and the results also provide support for Hypotheses 2b and 2e, because 
compensation integrativeness positively and significantly relates to financial performance (β = 
.515, p < .05), and compensation imbalance positively and significantly relates to financial 
performance imbalance (β = .624, p < .05). However, the findings provide no significant 
support for the hypothesized negative relationships between compensation integrativeness and 
financial performance imbalance (β = .099, p > .05) or compensation imbalance and financial 
performance (β = .119, p > .05). In addition, financial performance and financial performance 
imbalance are not significantly associated (r = -.115, p > .05). Hence, we must reject 
Hypotheses 2c, 2d, and 2f. For financial performance, the R2 is .228, and for financial 
performance imbalance, it is .348, which suggests moderate explanatory power (Falk et al., 
1992). Together, these findings indicate that an alliance’s initial compensation structure 
functions as a value creation and appropriation mechanism, directly influencing the 
achievement of financial outcomes. However, the findings provide no support for the 
cooperation and competition trade-off, in that financial performance and financial 
performance imbalance are not significantly related.  
 
Model 2: Learning 
With respect to model 2 (i.e., learning), we found partial support for Hypothesis 2 (see Table 
9.3). An assessment of the estimates indicates that the covariance between compensation 
integrativeness and compensation imbalance is significant and negative (r = -.415, p < .05), in 
support of Hypothesis 2a. The results also support Hypotheses 2b and 2e, because 
compensation integrativeness positively and significantly relates to learning performance 
(β = .404, p < .05), and compensation imbalance positively and significantly relates to 
learning performance imbalance (β = .275, p < .05). In addition, learning performance and 
learning performance imbalance are negatively and significantly related (r = -205, p < .10), in 
support of Hypothesis 2f. However, the findings provide no significant support for the 
hypothesized negative relationships between compensation integrativeness and learning 
performance imbalance (β = -.068, p > .05) or compensation imbalance and learning 
performance (β = -.030, p > .05). Thus, we reject Hypotheses 2c and 2d. The R2 for learning 
performance is .179; that for firm performance balance is .089, which suggests limited 
explanatory power (Falk et al., 1992). Thus, according to the findings, an alliance’s initial 
compensation structure does not function as an important value creation and appropriation 
mechanism with respect to learning outcomes. 
 
                                                 
44 We hypothesized that compensation integrativeness and compensation imbalance are negatively associated 
(H2a), compensation integrativeness positively relates to alliance performance (H2b), compensation imbalance 
negatively relates to alliance performance (H2c), compensation integrativeness negatively relates to firm 
performance imbalance (H2d), compensation imbalance positively relates to firm performance imbalance (H2e), 
and alliance performance and firm performance imbalance are negatively associated (H2f). 
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Table 9.3 The Compensation Trade-Off (H2): CVA Structural Model 
 Model 1 
Financial 
Model 2 
Learning 
Model 3 
Strategic 
 β s.e. z-value β s.e. z-value β s.e. z-value 
H2a: CI ÅÆ CA (-) -.417*** .087 -.3804 -.415*** .088 -.3.799 -.416*** .088 -3.802 
H2b: CI  Æ AP (+) .515*** .139 5.382 .404*** .091 3.918 .519*** .105 5.048 
H2c: CA Æ  AP (-) .119*** .616 1.224 -.030*** .397 -.292 -.018*** .434 -.182 
H2d: CI Æ  FPI (-) .099*** .030 1.012 -.068*** .027 -.608 -.162*** .024 -1.440 
H2e: CA Æ  FPI (+) .624*** .166 4.973 .275*** .130 2.237 .324*** .118 2.826 
H2f: AP ÅÆ FPI (-) -.115*** .120 -1.041 -.205†** .074 -1.776 -.289*** .074 -2.278 
Squared Multiple Correlation 
Alliance Performance
Firm Performance Imbalance
 
 .228 
 .348 
 
 .179 
 .089 
 
 .262 
 .175 
χ2 (d.f.) 122.014 (71) p < .05 123.152 (71) p < .05  099.332 (71) p < .05 
Normed χ2  1.719  1.735  1.399 
GFI  .891  .889  .914 
NFI  .891  .880  .905 
CFI  .950  .944  .970 
SRMR   .057  .066  .052 
Notes: n = 144. Standardized coefficients; β = beta coefficient; s.e. = standard error; CI = compensation integrativeness; 
CA = compensation asymmetry; AP = alliance performance; FPI = firm performance imbalance. 
† ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Model 3: Strategic 
The model 3 results of the ML estimation provide partial support for Hypothesis 2 (see Table 
9.3). As predicted in Hypothesis 2a, the association between compensation integrativeness 
and compensation imbalance is significant and negative (r = -.416, p < .05), and as 
anticipated in Hypotheses 2b and 2e, compensation integrativeness positively and 
significantly relates to strategic performance (β = .519, p < .05), and compensation imbalance 
positively and significantly relates to strategic performance imbalance (β = .324, p < .05). In 
addition, strategic performance and strategic performance imbalance are negatively and 
significantly related (r = -.289, p < .05), in support of Hypothesis 2f. However, the findings 
provide no support for the hypothesized negative relationships between compensation 
integrativeness and strategic performance imbalance (β = -.162, p > .05) or compensation 
imbalance and strategic performance (β = -.018, p > .05), leading us to reject Hypotheses 2c 
and 2d. The R2 for strategic performance is .262, and the R2 for strategic performance balance 
is .175, which suggests moderate explanatory power. Compared with model 1 (i.e., financial), 
these findings indicate that the initial compensation structure functions as a critical value 
creation and appropriation mechanism that directly influences partner firms’ achievement of 
strategic performance. However, in contrast to the financial model, we found support for a 
strong trade-off, such that when firms can realize a high level of strategic performance, the 
alliance is characterized by smaller differences between individual strategic outcomes. 
 
Conclusions 
Figure 9.1 graphically represents a summary of the findings with respect to Hypothesis 2, the 
compensation trade-off. One important finding pertains to the negative relationship we found 
between compensation integrativeness and compensation imbalance. Firms confront a trade-
off between cooperation and competition during the alliance formation stage. Within our 
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sample of contractual alliances, firms adopted different trade-off solutions, ranging from a 
compensation structure characterized by a high value creation potential to one characterized 
by an asymmetrical distribution of anticipated rewards. Thus, firms that seek a mutually 
beneficial trade-off solution are less likely to increase their share of anticipated rewards at the 
expense of their counterparts, and an alliance’s compensation structure functions as an 
important value creation and appropriation mechanism. 
 
Figure 9.1 Results Hypothesis 2: The Compensation Trade-Off 
 
Notes: n = 144. Financial / learning / strategic; Endogenous variables correlation is estimated by correlation among error terms. 
ns not significant; † p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Another surprising finding pertains to the magnitude of the effect of compensation 
integrativeness and compensation imbalance on the dependent variables, which is conditional 
on the performance dimension. When we compare the findings from the financial, learning, 
and strategic models, we observe the following: Compensation integrativeness has a relatively 
strong influence on financial and strategic performance, but its impact on learning 
performance is moderate. Therefore, compensation integrativeness appears to function as a 
value creation mechanism, except with respect to learning outcomes. Furthermore, 
compensation imbalance seems to have a relatively strong influence on financial performance 
imbalance, but its impact on learning and strategic performance imbalance is weak and 
moderate, respectively. Therefore, compensation imbalance may function as a value 
appropriation mechanism but only with respect to financial performance.  
 
Regarding the association between alliance performance and firm performance imbalance, we 
expected to find negative relationships, and consistent with the hypotheses, we found that 
learning performance and learning performance imbalance, as well as strategic performance 
and strategic performance imbalance, are negatively associated, which suggests a strong 
trade-off. That is, in alliances in which partner firms realize their learning objectives, 
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performance differences are less likely to be created. Similarly, alliances with a high level of 
strategic performance are less likely to be characterized by large differences between 
individual strategic performances. In contrast, we found support for a moderate trade-off with 
regard to financial outcomes, which means that the realization of financial outcomes is not 
related to their actual appropriation.  
 
We derive several implications from these findings. An alliance’s initial compensation 
structure affects the degree to which partner firms can achieve their financial objectives. 
However, compensation structure also has a negligible affect on learning outcomes, which 
implies that other factors probably influence the degree to which parties are able to create and 
appropriate learning benefits. In contrast, the findings suggest that an alliance’s compensation 
structure directly influences strategic outcomes. Therefore, with respect to the compensation 
trade-off, partner firms need to find a delicate balance between cooperation and competition 
to realize their financial and strategic objectives. Together, these findings support the power 
perspective and the proposition that to advance understanding of performance in an alliance 
context, we must examine value creation and value appropriation mechanisms 
simultaneously. In Section 9.5, we discuss the implications of these findings further.  
 
9.3 Hypothesis 3 The Learning Trade-Off 
Drawing on the learning perspective (Hamel, 1991; Holmqvist, 2003; Kumar & Nti, 1998; 
Lubatkin et al., 2001), we proposed that as the alliance unfolds, partners confront a learning 
trade-off (see §5.2). That is, learning constitutes an ex-post value creation and appropriation 
mechanism. To capture the degree to which an alliance is characterized by learning potential 
and learning barriers, we introduced absorption integrativeness and absorption imbalance. We 
defined absorption integrativeness as the combination of each party’s ability to assess and 
acquire the knowledge to which it is exposed throughout the alliance, regardless of whether 
the parties’ abilities are balanced or imbalanced. We defined absorption imbalance as the 
asymmetry between parties’ ability to assess and acquire knowledge. The empirical findings 
suggest that parties build relationships characterized by a trade-off between absorption 
integrativeness and absorption imbalance. However, the trade-off solution adopted by firms 
associates differentially with financial, learning, and strategic outcomes. Consistent with the 
operational definition of performance, we made a distinction among the financial, learning, 
and strategic performance dimensions. Consequently, we estimated three separate statistical 
models for Hypothesis 3 (i.e., models 4–6). For sake of parsimony, we discuss only the key 
findings pertaining to the goodness-of-fit indices and the measurement model. In Appendix 5, 
we report the detailed findings with respect to the measurement models.  
 
Goodness of Fit and Measurement Model 
With respect to Hypothesis 3, the goodness-of-fit indices have values above their critical 
values (see Table 9.4). For instance, the Chi-square statistic is insignificant with respect to the 
strategic (χ2 = 84.757, d.f. = 71, p > .10) and the learning (χ2 = 88.236, d.f. = 71, p < .10) 
model. An evaluation using the normed Chi-square statistic also indicates that the data fit with 
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the specified models; the scores range from 1.194 (model 6) to 1.313 (model 4), well below 
the critical value of 3.0. Other goodness-of-fit indices also indicate acceptable fit. For 
instance, the CFI with respect to each model is well above the desired value of .950, with 
scores of .971 (model 4), .977 (model 5), and .982 (model 6). Together, these findings suggest 
that we can proceed with an assessment of the measurement models. 
 
Statistical models 4–6 all possess good psychometric properties. For instance, for the 
exogenous variables, the findings indicate good convergent validity with standardized factor 
loadings ranging from .542 to .885. Consistent with the findings discussed in Section 9.2, the 
dependent variables have acceptable convergent validity, with loadings ranging from .564 to 
.959 (financial), .520 to .853 (learning), and .562 to .881 (strategic). In addition, reliabilities 
are high: .896 (absorption integrativeness) and .611 (strategic performance imbalance).  
 
Discriminant validity also is demonstrated; the findings indicate that the square root of the 
AVE is well above the pairwise correlations (see Table 9.2). For instance, with respect to 
model 4, the AVE values are .831 (absorption integrativeness), .573 (absorption imbalance), 
.791 (financial performance), and .726 (financial performance imbalance), all higher than any 
of the correlations between the four variables (-.341 < r < .242). Similar results emerge with 
respect to models 5 and 6, as the AVE values of .779 (learning performance), .675 (learning 
performance imbalance), .804 (strategic performance), and .652 (strategic performance 
imbalance) are higher than the correlations between the constructs used to estimate model 5 
(-.341 < r < .566) and model 6 (-.341 < r < .447). In summary, with respect to models 4–6, the 
data fit the statistical model, and the measures possess construct validity.  
 
Structural Model 
Correlation Matrix 
Table 9.2 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations between the latent 
variables. The results indicate that absorption integrativeness and absorption imbalance are 
negatively and significantly associated (r = -.341, p < .05). In addition, absorption 
integrativeness positively and significantly relates to financial performance (r = .242, p < .05), 
learning performance (r = .566, p < .05), and strategic performance (r = .447, p < .05). 
However, in contrast to our expectations, absorption integrativeness is not negatively and 
significantly related to financial performance imbalance (r = -.026, p > .05), learning 
performance imbalance (r = -.050, p > .05), or strategic performance imbalance (r = -.122, 
p > .05). Absorption imbalance positively and significantly relates to financial performance 
imbalance (r = .238, p < .05), learning performance imbalance (r = .317, p < .05), and 
strategic performance imbalance (r = .317, p < .05), but no significant relationship was found 
between absorption imbalance and financial performance (r = -.060, p > .05) and strategic 
performance (r = -.122, p > .05), though we find a significant and negative association 
between absorption imbalance and learning performance (r = -.234, p < .05). Together, these 
pairwise correlations provide tentative support for Hypothesis 3 (i.e., Hypotheses 3a–3f). 
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Model 4: Financial 
With respect to model 4 (i.e., financial), the estimates produced through ML estimation 
provide insufficient support for Hypothesis 345 (see Table 9.4). Specifically, the association 
between absorption integrativeness and absorption imbalance is significant and negative 
(r = -.433, p < .05), in support of Hypothesis 3a; absorption integrativeness positively and 
significantly relates to financial performance (β = .250, p < .05), in support of Hypothesis 3b; 
and absorption imbalance positively and significantly relates to financial performance 
imbalance (β = .389, p < .05), in support of Hypothesis 3e. However, the findings provide no 
support for the hypothesized negative relationships among absorption integrativeness and 
financial performance imbalance (β = .140, p > .05) or absorption imbalance and alliance 
performance (β = .081, p > .05). In addition, alliance performance and financial performance 
imbalance are not significantly related (r = -.125, p > .05). Thus, we must reject Hypotheses 
3c, 3d, and 3f. For financial performance, the R2 is .052, and for financial performance 
imbalance, it is .124, which suggests limited explanatory power (Falk et al., 1992). Together, 
these findings suggest that ex-post learning has a negligible influence on the degree to which 
firms realize their financial objectives.  
 
Model 5: Learning 
We found partial support for Hypothesis 3, the learning trade-off, when we tested model 5 
(see Table 9.4). An examination of the estimates indicates that the covariance between 
absorption integrativeness and absorption imbalance is significant and negative (r = -.444, 
p < .05), in support of Hypothesis 3a. The results also support Hypotheses 3b and 3e, because 
absorption integrativeness positively and significantly relates to learning performance 
(β = .647, p < .05), and absorption imbalance positively and significantly relates to learning 
performance imbalance (β = .487, p < .05). Learning performance and learning performance 
imbalance are significantly, negatively related (r = -.294, p < .05), in support of Hypothesis 
3f. However, the findings provide no support for the expected negative relationships between 
absorption integrativeness and learning performance imbalance (β = .147, p > .05) and 
absorption imbalance and learning performance (β = -.030, p > .05). Thus, we reject 
Hypotheses 3c and 3d. With respect to learning performance, the R2 is .437, and for learning 
performance imbalance, the R2 is .195, which suggests substantial explanatory power. 
Together, these findings indicate that learning functions as a value creation and appropriation 
mechanism, directly influencing firms’ achievement of learning objectives. In addition, the 
findings provide support for the cooperation and competition trade-off, because learning 
performance and learning performance imbalance are negatively and significantly related. 
 
 
                                                 
45 We hypothesized that absorption integrativeness and absorption imbalance are negatively associated (H3a), 
absorption integrativeness positively relates to alliance performance (H3b), absorption imbalance negatively 
relates to alliance performance (H3c), absorption integrativeness negatively relates to firm performance 
imbalance (H3d), absorption imbalance positively relates to firm performance imbalance (H3e), and alliance 
performance and firm performance imbalance are negatively associated (H3f). 
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Model 6: Strategic 
The results for model 6 (i.e., strategic) provide partial support for Hypothesis 3 (Table 9.4). 
The association between absorption integrativeness and absorption imbalance is significant 
and negative (r = -.436, p < .05), in support of Hypothesis 3a. Hypotheses 3b and 3e also 
receive support; absorption integrativeness positively and significantly relates to strategic 
performance (β = .528, p < .05), and absorption imbalance positively and significantly relates 
to strategic performance imbalance (β = .477, p < .05). In addition, strategic performance and 
strategic performance imbalance are negatively and significantly related (r = -.446, p < .05), 
in support of Hypothesis 3f. However, the findings provide no support for the expected 
negative relationships between absorption integrativeness and strategic performance 
imbalance (β = .045, p > .05) and absorption imbalance and strategic performance (β = .126, 
p > .05), which leads us to reject Hypotheses 3c and 3d. The R2 for strategic performance is 
.211, and that for strategic performance imbalance is .237, which suggests moderate 
explanatory power (Falk et al., 1992). In summary, the findings suggest that learning 
functions as a value creation and value appropriation mechanism, either enabling or inhibiting 
partner firms from achieving their strategic objectives.  
 
Table 9.4 The Learning Trade-Off (H3): CVA Structural Model 
 Model 4 
Financial 
Model 5 
Learning 
Model 6 
Strategic 
 β s.e. z-value β s.e. z-value β s.e. z-value 
H3a: AI ÅÆ AA (-) -.433*** .108 -.3.532 -.444*** .110 -3.633 -.436*** .107 -3.552 
H3b: AI Æ AP (+) .250*** .146 2.375 .647*** .085 6.046 .528*** .107 4.759 
H3c: AA Æ AP (-) .081*** .721 .685 -.030*** .352 -.285 .126*** .488 1.089 
H3d: AI Æ FPI (-) .140*** .033 1.225 .147*** .026 1.253 .045*** .024 .378 
H3e: AA Æ FPI (+) .389*** .177 2.787 .487*** .146 3.096 .477*** .144 2.956 
H3f: AP ÅÆ FPI (-) -.125*** .145 -.1.217 -.294*** .059 -2.225 -.446*** .084 -3.090 
Squared Multiple Correlation 
Alliance Performance 
Firm Performance Imbalance 
 
 .052 
 .124 
 
 .437 
 .195 
 
 .211 
 .237 
χ2 (d.f.) 093.235 (71) p < .05 088.236 (71) p < .10 084.757 (71) p > .10 
Normed χ2  1.313  1.243  1.194 
GFI  .918  .924  .925 
NFI  .891  .897  .900 
CFI  .971  .977  .982 
SRMR   .063  .060  .063 
Notes: n = 144. Standardized coefficients. β = beta coefficient; s.e. = standard error; AI = absorption integrativeness; 
AA = absorption imbalance; AP = alliance performance; FPI = firm performance imbalance.  
† ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Conclusions 
The findings provide partial support for Hypothesis 3. Figure 9.2 graphically represents a 
summary of the empirical findings. One important finding pertains to the negative 
relationship we find between absorption integrativeness and absorption imbalance. The results 
suggest that firms indeed confront a trade-off between cooperation and competition as the 
alliance unfolds. More specifically, within our sample of contractual alliances, firms adopted 
different trade-off solutions, ranging from a learning condition characterized by high value 
creation potential to conditions characterized by an imbalance in the learning opportunities 
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between the partners. That is, partner firms that established mutual openness did not 
simultaneously create conditions that allowed for asymmetrical learning. Inversely, the 
findings suggest that if one partner exploits opportunities to create a learning advantage at the 
expense of its counterpart, the value creation potential of the alliance is immediately reduced.  
 
Figure 9.2 Results Hypothesis 3: The Learning Trade-Off 
 
Notes: n = 144. Financial / learning / strategic; Endogenous variables correlation is estimated by correlation among error terms. 
ns not significant; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Another surprising finding pertains to the magnitude of the effect of absorption 
integrativeness and absorption imbalance on the dependent variables, which is conditional on 
the performance dimension. When we compare the findings for the financial, learning, and 
strategic models, we observe the following: The trade-off between absorption integrativeness 
and absorption imbalance has a minimal impact on financial outcomes, but absorption 
integrativeness strongly influences learning and strategic performance. These findings suggest 
that absorption integrativeness functions as a value creation mechanism but only with respect 
to partner firms’ learning and strategic objectives. Furthermore, the findings suggest that 
absorption imbalance directly influences learning and strategic performance imbalance. That 
is, when partners develop an alliance in which one party is better able to exploit a learning 
advantage, that partner also likely appropriates more learning and strategic benefits than its 
counterpart. This finding suggests that learning also functions as an appropriation mechanism. 
Regarding the association between alliance performance and firm performance imbalance, we 
found similar results compared with Hypothesis 2. More specifically, we found support for a 
strong trade-off with respect to learning and strategic outcomes. In addition, financial 
outcomes can best be depicted as a moderate trade-off. Together, these findings suggest that 
the relationship between realized value and appropriated value is conditional on the 
performance dimension.  
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We derive several implications from these findings. Learning processes directly affect the 
degree to which partner firms are able to achieve their learning and strategic objectives. 
However, the findings also indicate that learning has a negligible affect on financial 
outcomes, and hence, other factors likely influence the degree to which parties are able to 
create and appropriate financial benefits (e.g., bargaining power). Therefore, with respect to 
the learning trade-off, partner firms need to find a balance between cooperation and 
competition to realize learning and strategic objectives. These findings support the learning 
perspective, as well as the proposition that to advance understanding of performance in an 
alliance context, value creation and value appropriation mechanisms must be examined 
simultaneously. In Section 9.5, we discuss the implications of these findings further.  
 
9.4 Hypothesis 4: The Relational Trade-Off 
Drawing on the behavioral perspective (Aulakh et al., 1996; Cullen et al., 2000; Gouldner, 
1960; Uzzi, 1996) we proposed that during the alliance post-formation stage, parties confront 
a relational trade-off (see §5.3). Specifically, we argued that relational norms constitute a 
value creation and appropriation mechanism that guides parties’ behavior toward cooperation 
or competition. We also asserted that partner interactions guided by relational norms may 
develop into two types of patterns. On the one hand, partner firms could build a relationship 
with a long-term orientation, characterized by cooperative behavior. On the other hand, they 
might develop an alliance with a short-term focus characterized by competition. Cooperation 
is manifested through relational quality, which we defined as the extent to which partner firms 
feel comfortable, rely on trust when dealing with each other, and are committed to making the 
relationship work. In contrast, we contended that, according to the behavioral perspective, 
competition in alliances involves opportunistic behavior, which we defined as a party’s active 
intention to increase its relationship benefits in ways that are explicitly or implicitly 
prohibited within the relationship. In contrast to our expectations, the empirical findings 
indicated that firms do not confront a trade-off between relational quality and opportunistic 
behavior. However, relational quality fulfills an important double function: It fosters learning 
and strategic performance while also reducing financial performance imbalance. Consistent 
with the operational definition of performance, we distinguished among financial, learning, 
and strategic performance dimensions, then estimated three separate statistical models with 
respect to Hypothesis 4 (i.e., models 7–9). For the sake of parsimony, we discuss only the key 
findings with respect to the goodness-of-fit indices and the measurement model. In Appendix 
5, we report the detailed findings pertaining to the measurement models. 
  
Goodness of Fit and Measurement Model 
With respect to Hypothesis 4, the goodness-of-fit indices reveal values above their critical 
levels (Table 9.5). For instance, despite the significant Chi-square statistics, an evaluation 
using the normed Chi-square statistic indicates that the data fit the specified models; scores 
range from 1.462 (model 8) to 1.594 (model 9), well below the critical value of 3.0. Other 
goodness-of-fit indices also indicate acceptable fit. The CFI for each model is above the 
critical value of .950, with scores of .961 (model 7), .963 (model 8), and .954 (model 6).  
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Each model also possesses good psychometric properties (see Appendix 5). The findings 
related to the exogenous variables, relational quality and opportunistic behavior, indicate good 
convergent validity, with standardized factor loadings ranging from .941 to .567. Consistent 
with the findings discussed in Sections 9.2 and 9.3, the dependent variables also achieve 
acceptable convergent validity with loadings ranging from .560 to .931 (financial), .495 to 
.907 (learning), and .539 to .882 (strategic). In addition, reliabilities are high—.896 
(absorption integrativeness) and .611 (strategic performance imbalance)—and the reliability is 
good—.611 (strategic performance imbalance) to .864 (relational quality). Although some 
factor loadings and reliability scores are below the critical values, we decided to retain them 
as additional analysis indicated no concerns for estimation biases (see Chapter 8). The 
findings also indicate discriminant validity; the square root of the AVE is well above the 
pairwise correlations (see Table 9.2). For instance, with respect to model 7, the AVE values 
are .836 (relational quality), .655 (opportunistic behavior), .799 (financial performance), and 
.726 (financial performance imbalance), higher than any of the correlations between the four 
variables (-.270 < r < .419). Similar results were obtained from models 8 and 9, in that the 
AVE values of .778 (learning performance), .684 (learning performance imbalance), .804 
(strategic performance), and .657 (strategic performance imbalance) were higher than the 
correlations between the constructs used to estimate model 7 (-.234 < r < .553) or model 9 
(-.170 < r < .615). These findings were supported by additional tests, in which we compared a 
baseline model without constraints to a model in which we constrained the covariance 
between two constructs to a value of 1.0 (see §6.4).46 In summary, for models 7–9, the data fit 
well, and the measures possess construct validity, suggesting that we can proceed with an 
examination of the structural models.  
 
Structural Model 
Correlation matrix 
Table 9.2 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations between the latent 
variables. The results indicated that relational quality and opportunistic behavior are not 
significantly associated (r = .041, p > .05). However, relational quality positively and 
significantly relates to financial performance (r = .419, p < .05), learning performance 
(r = .553, p < .05), and strategic performance (r = .615, p < .05) and negatively and 
significantly associates with financial performance imbalance (r = -.270, p < .05) and strategic 
performance imbalance (r = -.170, p < .05). We find no significant relationship of relational 
quality with learning performance imbalance (r = -.149, p > .05), nor opportunistic behavior 
and financial performance (r = .075 p > .05), financial performance imbalance (r = .046, 
p > .05), learning performance (r = .046, p > .05), learning performance imbalance (r = .094, 
p > .05), strategic performance (r = .091, p > .05), or strategic performance imbalance 
(r = -.009, p > .05). Together, these findings provide no support for the relational trade-off, 
but to reject Hypothesis 4 we must examine the structural models in-depth. 
 
                                                 
46 Results are not reported. 
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Model 7: Financial 
The estimates of model 7 produced through ML estimation provide no support for Hypothesis 
4 (see Table 9.7), because the association between relational quality and opportunistic 
behavior is not significant (r = .020, p > .05). The results provide support for Hypotheses 4b 
and 4d, in that relational quality positively and significantly relates to financial performance 
(β = .457, p < .05) and negatively and significantly relates to financial performance imbalance 
(β = -.303, p < .05), they provide no support for the expected positive relationship between 
opportunistic behavior and financial performance imbalance (β = .095, p > .05) or the 
negative relationship between opportunistic behavior and alliance performance (β = .125, 
p > .05). Consistent with prior findings, financial performance and financial performance 
imbalance are also not significantly related (r = .034, p > .05). Together, these findings 
provide no support for Hypotheses 4c, 4e, and 4f. Finally, with respect to financial 
performance, the R2 is .100, whereas for financial performance imbalance, the R2 is .227, 
which suggests moderate explanatory power. Relational quality thus appears to fulfill an 
important function with respect to value appropriation, such that its presence reduces the 
differences between individual financial performance derived through the alliance. 
 
Model 8: Learning 
In testing model 8 (i.e., learning), we again found no support for Hypothesis 4. The 
relationship between relational quality and opportunistic behavior is not significant (r = .015, 
p > .05), which rejects Hypothesis 4a. However, the results indicate support for Hypotheses 
4b and 4d, in that relational quality positively and significantly relates to learning 
performance (β = .661, p < .05) and negatively and significantly relates to learning 
performance imbalance (β = -.180, p < .10). However, the findings provide no support for the 
expected positive relationship between opportunistic behavior and learning performance 
imbalance (β = .191, p > .05) or the negative relationship between opportunistic behavior and 
alliance performance (β = .001, p > .05). Learning performance and learning performance 
imbalance are negatively and significantly related at the 10% level (r = -.206, p < .10). Thus, 
we reject Hypotheses 4c and 4e but find moderate support for Hypothesis 4f. The R2 of 
learning performance is .461; the R2 of learning performance imbalance is .050. In contrast 
with model 7, relational quality appears to function as an important value creation 
mechanism, directly associated with learning performance.  
 
Model 9: Strategic 
The results of the ML estimation for model 9 provide no support for Hypothesis 4 (Table 9.5). 
The relationship between relational quality and opportunistic behavior is not significant 
(r = .013, p > .05), so we reject Hypothesis 4a. However, we find support for Hypotheses 4b 
and 4d; relational quality positively and significantly relates to learning performance 
(β = .671, p < .05), and it negatively and significantly relates to learning performance 
imbalance (β = -.277, p < .05). The findings provide no support for the expected positive 
relationship between opportunistic behavior and learning performance imbalance (β = .079, 
p > .05) or the negative relationship between opportunistic behavior and alliance performance 
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(β = .108, p > .05), which means we must reject Hypotheses 4c and 4e. Yet learning 
performance and learning performance imbalance are negatively and significantly related 
(r = -.273, p < .05), in support of Hypotheses 4f. The R2 for strategic performance is .447, and 
that for strategic performance imbalance is .090. Similar to the results of model 8, these 
findings suggest that relational quality functions as an important value creation mechanism.  
 
Table 9.5 The Relational Trade-Off (H4): CVA Structural Model 
 Model 7 
Financial 
Model 8 
Learning 
Model 9 
Strategic 
 β s.e. z-value β s.e. z-value β s.e. z-value 
H4a: RQ ÅÆ OP (-) .020*** .165 .186 .015*** .167 .682 .013*** .160 .122 
H4b: RQ Æ AP (+) .457*** .161 5.270 .661*** .102 7.538 .671*** .124 7.209 
H4c: OB Æ AP (-) .125*** .242 1.253 .001*** .137 .016 .108*** .157 .879 
H4d: RQ Æ FPI (-) -.303*** .039 -.3.080 -.180†** .027 -1.805 -.277*** .030 -2.508 
H4e: OB Æ FPI (+) .095*** .058 .850 .191*** .041 1.613 .079*** .042 .917 
H4f: AP ÅÆ FPI (-) .034*** .130 .326 -.206†** .054 -1.741 -.273*** .064 -2.110 
Squared Multiple Correlation 
Alliance Performance
Firm Performance Imbalance
 
 .100 
 .227 
 
 .461 
 .050 
 
 .457 
 .090 
χ2 (d.f.) 72.401 (48) p < .05 070.168 (48) p < .05 76.523 (48) p < .05 
Normed χ2  1.508  1.462  1.594 
GFI  .922  .925  .924 
NFI  .895  .894  .889 
CFI  .961  .963  .954 
SRMR   .066  .067  .068 
Notes: n = 144. Standardized coefficients. β = beta coefficient; s.e. = standard error; RQ = relational quality; OB = opportunistic 
behavior; AP = alliance performance; FPI = firm performance imbalance. 
† ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Conclusions 
Figure 9.3 graphically depicts a summary of the empirical findings. The data provide no 
support for Hypothesis 4, the relational trade-off. Irrespective of the performance dimensions, 
firms do not trade off relational quality with opportunistic behavior, and building a high-
quality relationship does not necessarily induce additional management costs (i.e., proxy 
measure). Nonetheless, we find substantial support for the behavioral perspective, in that 
relational quality functions as a value creation and value appropriation mechanism. However, 
the impact of relational quality on alliance and firm performance is conditional on the 
performance dimension. That is, not only does relational quality foster learning and strategic 
performance, but a high-quality relationship also attenuates the differences between firms’ 
financial performance. Relational quality appears to attenuate the risk that one party will 
appropriate financial benefits at the expense of its counterpart. However, unlike other value 
creation mechanisms (e.g., compensation structure), it does not contribute to financial 
performance substantially. Rather, relational quality fosters learning and strategic 
performance, but as the relationship with learning and strategic performance imbalance is 
negligible, building relational quality does not offer a fruitful strategy for reducing the 
differences in individual firms’ learning and strategic performance. Thus, conditional on the 
performance objective, a high-quality relationship can serve multiple purposes. 
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Figure 9.3 Results Hypothesis 4: The Relational Trade-Off 
 
Notes: n = 144. Financial / learning / strategic; Endogenous variables correlation is estimated by correlation among error terms. 
ns not significant; † p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
9.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we presented the empirical results with respect to Hypotheses 2–4, which 
stated that firms confront three types of cooperation and competition trade-offs: 
compensation, learning, and relational. Drawing on the conceptualization of a trade-off, we 
argued that in an alliance context, the relationships between value creation and value 
appropriation can best be depicted as a cooperation and competition trade-off. In particular, 
we argued that during the alliance formation stage, partners use their bargaining power to 
resolve a compensation trade-off (Hypothesis 2). We also postulated that during the post-
formation stage, firms must resolve the learning trade-off to achieve their objectives 
(Hypothesis 3) and that relational norms guide parties’ behavior toward cooperation and 
competition (Hypothesis 4). To provide a test of the three cooperation and competition trade-
offs, we introduced six hypotheses relating cooperation, competition, alliance performance, 
and firm performance imbalance. Consistent with the operational definition of performance, 
we distinguished among financial, learning, and strategic outcomes. Consequently, with 
respect to each cooperation and competition trade-off, we estimated three models and 
undertook nine tests overall. The empirical findings provide partial support for Hypotheses 2 
and 3 but no support for Hypothesis 4. Table 9.6 provides a summary. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Drawing on the power perspective, we argued that firms face a compensation trade-off during 
the alliance formation stage (see §5.1), then hypothesized that compensation integrativeness 
and compensation imbalance may affect their ability to realize and appropriate value through 
a relationship. The findings indicate that firms confront such a trade-off between cooperation 
and competition during the alliance formation stage and, according to our sample of 
.46*** / .66*** / .67*** 
 
 
 
 
 
-.30*** 
-.180†* 
-.28***
-.03ns 
-.21† 
-.27*** 
 .02ns 
 .02ns 
 .01ns 
Relational 
Quality 
Opportunistic 
Behavior 
Alliance 
Performance 
Firm 
Performance 
Imbalance 
.13ns 
 .00ns 
 .11ns 
.10ns / .19ns / .08ns 
Alliance Performance Firm Performance Imbalance  
Model 1 Financial: R2 = .10 Financial: R2 = .23  
Model 2 Learning: R2 = .46 Learning: R2 = .05  
Model 3 Strategic: R2 = .46  Strategic: R2 = .09 
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contractual alliances, adopt a variety of trade-off solutions. Surprisingly, the findings indicate 
that the impact of compensation integrativeness and compensation imbalance on the 
dependent variables is conditional on the performance dimension considered. That is, 
compensation integrativeness fosters financial and strategic performance, and compensation 
imbalance positively influences financial and strategic performance imbalance. When parties 
direct their efforts toward cooperation during the alliance formation stage, it appears to 
contribute to the ex-post realization of their financial and strategic objectives. In addition, the 
findings indicate that ex-ante competition regarding anticipated outcomes influences the ex-
post distribution of financial and strategic benefits, such that a firm that has been able to 
exploit a bargaining power advantage during its alliance negotiations is also likely to 
appropriate more financial and strategic rewards than its counterpart. However, because the 
relationship between an alliance’s compensation structure and learning outcomes is 
negligible, we must conclude that the initial compensation structure functions as a value 
creation and appropriation mechanism, but its impact is limited just to financial and strategic 
outcomes. More specifically, exercising bargaining power at the expense of a counterpart 
directly reduces the value creation potential of the alliance, but a firm also can exploit a 
bargaining power advantage to a certain degree during the formation stage without 
jeopardizing its long-term financial objectives, because the ex-post creation of financial 
outcomes does not affect the distribution of financial outcomes.  
 
Hypothesis 3 
Drawing on the learning perspective, we proposed that as the alliance unfolds, partners face a 
learning trade-off (see §5.2). We also hypothesized that absorption integrativeness and 
absorption imbalance affect these parties’ ability to realize and appropriate value through the 
relationship. The findings indicate that firms confront a trade-off between cooperation and 
competition during the post-formation stage, because in our sample of contractual alliances, 
firms adopted trade-off solutions ranging from absorption integrativeness to absorption 
imbalance. Surprisingly, the findings also indicate that the impact of compensation 
integrativeness and compensation imbalance on the dependent variables is conditional on the 
performance dimension considered. An alliance’s initial compensation structure functions as a 
value creation and appropriation mechanism affecting financial and strategic outcomes, but 
the trade-off between absorption integrativeness and absorption imbalance directly influences 
learning and strategic outcomes. Therefore, absorption integrativeness fosters learning and 
strategic performance, and absorption imbalance positively influences learning and strategic 
performance imbalance, according to the findings. Together, these influences suggest that 
when parties direct their efforts toward cooperation, they can realize their learning and 
strategic objectives. In addition, ex-post competition appears to influence the appropriation of 
learning and strategic outcomes, but not financial outcomes. That is, openness between 
partner firms contributes to value creation, whereas alliances characterized by asymmetrical 
learning are more likely to experience disproportional appropriations of learning and strategic 
benefits. 
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Hypothesis 4 
Finally, drawing on the behavioral perspective, we proposed that during the alliance post-
formation stage, parties confront a relational trade-off (see §5.3), so relational norms 
constitute a value creation and appropriation mechanism that guides their behavior toward 
either cooperation or competition (Aulakh et al., 1996; Cullen et al., 2000; Kauser et al., 2004; 
Uzzi, 1996). The findings suggest that relational quality and opportunistic behavior are not 
negatively associated; unfortunately, our proxy of opportunistic behavior (i.e., management 
costs) did not significantly relate to either relational quality or the performance dimensions.47 
Consequently, we did not find any support for a relational trade-off. Yet the findings also 
indicate that relational quality fulfills a double role in contractual alliances. When we focused 
solely on financial performance, we found that relational quality functions as a mechanism 
that prevents disproportional appropriation, such that if partner firms develop relational 
quality, the differences between individual financial performance derived through the alliance 
decrease. Although relational quality attenuates learning and strategic performance 
imbalances, it has a much stronger impact on learning and strategic performance at the 
alliance level. Therefore, relational quality seems to function as a value creation mechanism 
that stimulates partner firms to cooperate in their efforts to achieve learning and strategic 
objectives. Restated, building a high-quality relationship fulfills multiple functions; relational 
quality fosters value creation but also reduces value appropriation differences. 
 
Table 9.6 Hypotheses 2–4: Summary of the Results 
Hypothesis (model) Fit R2       Implication 
H2: Compensation Trade-off   H2aa H2b H2c H2d H2e H2f  
Financial performance (1) Yes M – M Yes Yes No No Yes No No support H2  
Learning performance (2) Yes L – L Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Partial support H2  
Strategic performance (3) Yes M – L Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Partial support H2  
          
H3: Learning Trade-off   H3a H3b H3c H3d H3e H3f  
Financial performance (4) Yes L – L Yes Yes No No Yes No No support H3  
Learning performance (5) Yes H – L Yes Yes No No Yes Yesb Partial support H3  
Strategic performance (6) Yes M – M Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Partial support H3  
          
H4: Relational Trade-off   H4a H4b H4c H4d H4e H4f  
Financial performance (7) Yes L – M No Yes No Yes No No No support H4  
Learning performance (8) Yes H – L No Yes No Yes2 No Yesb No support H4 
Strategic performance (9) Yes H – L No Yes No Yes No Yes No support H4 
Notes: Fit = goodness-of-fit indices; E.P. = explanatory power (alliance performance – firm performance imbalance). H = high 
(R2 > .40), M = moderate (.20 < R2 < .40), and L = low (R2 < .20). 
a a. Cooperation and competition are negatively associated. 
b. Cooperation positively relates to alliance performance. 
c. Competition negatively relates to alliance performance.  
d. Cooperation negatively relates to firm performance imbalance. 
e. Competition positively relates to firm performance imbalance. 
f. Alliance performance and firm performance imbalance are negatively associated. 
b 10% probability level. 
                                                 
47 We discuss the limitations of the research, and thus the measurement issues, in greater depth in Section 10.3. 
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To conclude, depicting cooperation and competition within contractual alliances as a trade-off 
has resulted in findings that contribute to a better understanding of performance in an alliance 
context. We expected to find negative associations between resource categories, positive and 
negative relationships between resource categories and performance objectives, and negative 
associations between alliance performance and firm performance imbalance. As we have 
discussed in this chapter, the findings provide partial support for the conceptualization of the 
cooperation and competition trade-off in an alliance context. For instance, with respect to 
resource decisions, we found that firms must resolve the trade-off with respect to their 
anticipated compensation during the formation stage. We also found that firms are confronted 
with a learning trade-off as the alliance unfolds. Focusing on performance objectives, we 
unexpectedly found support for just a moderate trade-off with respect to financial outcomes, 
whereas learning and strategic outcomes represent a strong trade-off. Together, these findings 
suggest that within contractual alliances, parties must consider various cooperation and 
competition trade-offs at the different stages of alliance development. Moreover, decisions 
with respect to value creation and appropriation mechanisms should be made as the firms 
consider their performance objectives. In Chapter 10, we discuss the theoretical and 
managerial implications of the findings. 
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Chapter 10 Reflection and Discussion 
We started this dissertation by arguing that despite the unprecedented increase in alliance 
activity, strong anecdotal and empirical evidence indicates that alliance performance has 
remained weak. Firms entering alliances face considerable challenges from external 
dynamics, including changing market conditions, industry dynamics, and new technological 
developments, as well as internal dynamics, such as strategic shifts, opportunistic behavior, or 
failures to comply with contract obligations. To achieve superior performance, firms need to 
overcome these challenges by efficiently and effectively structuring and managing their 
relationships. Furthermore, firms need to resolve the difficulties surrounding joint value 
creation and overcome problems associated with appropriating their share of realized value. 
Therefore, the main aim of this dissertation has been to develop and test a theoretical model of 
performance in a strategic alliance context. With our research, we have made two substantial 
contributions. First, we developed, tested, and found empirical support for a hypothesis that 
reconciled the structure and process perspectives. Second, while drawing on the power, 
learning, and behavioral perspectives, we show that the simultaneous examination of the 
relationships among cooperation, competition, alliance performance and firm performance 
provides a more complete explanation of performance in contractual alliances. Thus, 
compared with previous alliance research, the findings extend and verify existing theoretical 
insights, but we also have produced several surprising insights.  
 
This chapter presents the conclusions of the dissertation, organized as follows. In Section 
10.1, we present the dissertation’s findings. In Section 10.2, we discuss key findings and 
elaborate on several theoretical implications, whereas in Section 10.3, we present managerial 
implications. Limitations and directions for further research are discussed in Section 10.4, and 
we end the dissertation with concluding remarks in Section 10.5.  
 
10.1 Findings 
The objective was to provide a coherent set of explanations with respect to alliance 
performance while adopting a theoretically rich approach. Building on existing theoretical and 
empirical insights, we developed a research framework (see Figure 10.1) and identified two 
research questions that enabled us to achieve this objective. With respect to the first 
question—what is the relationship among alliance structure, alliance processes, and alliance 
performance?—we set out to develop and test a theoretical model specifying the relationships 
among structural coherence, relational adaptability, and alliance performance. To provide an 
answer to the second research question—what is the relationship among cooperation, 
competition, alliance performance, and firm performance derived through an alliance?—we 
developed a typology of trade-off types and argued that value creation and appropriation 
within strategic alliances represent a specific type of trade-off, that is, a cooperation and 
competition trade-off. Before we present and discuss the findings with respect to each 
research question (i.e., horizontal arrows in Figure 10.1), we briefly elaborate on the findings 
with respect to the alliance development stages (i.e., vertical arrows in Figure 10.1).  
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Figure 10.1 Research Framework and Contributions 
 
 
 
Alliance Stages 
In Chapter 1, we positioned the two research questions against the background of three 
alliance development stages: alliance formation, alliance management, and alliance evaluation 
(Brouthers et al., 1997; Das et al., 2002; Niederkofler, 1991). Building on the definition of 
structural coherence as the degree to which the initial alliance structure constitutes a 
constellation of mutually supportive structural safeguards, we argued that the purpose of 
structural safeguards is to provide, at minimum cost, the control that is necessary for parties to 
believe that engaging in the alliance will benefit them. Structural safeguards refer to 
formalized negotiation outcomes of decisions with respect to inter-firm characteristics 
resulting from partner selection, decision-making rights, non-recoverable investments, and 
compensation structure. The empirical results indicate that partner selection directly affects 
structural coherence through partner fit and resource complementarity. Sharing decision-
making rights and joint commitment to non-recoverable investments also positively contribute 
to structural coherence, whereas imbalanced decision-making and non-recoverable investment 
imbalance have a negligible impact. Furthermore, we find that firms use a variety of 
instruments, including retaining own profit, sharing costs and revenues, royalties, and lump-
sum payments, to organize their claims on future compensation. The findings also suggested 
that firms adopted different trade-off solutions with respect to their compensation structure. 
Thus, consistent with previous alliance research (Das et al., 2002; Doz, 1996; Dussauge et al., 
1995; Harrigan, 1988; Parkhe, 1993a), we observe that firms entering alliances make 
decisions with respect to various structural safeguards, which may or may not contribute to 
the strength of foundation conditions. 
During the formation stage, 
firms invest in structural 
safeguards to reduce the 
risk of exchange hazards. 
Firms also must resolve the 
compensation trade-off. The 
outcomes of firms’ decisions 
result in an alliance structure 
with lower or higher 
structural coherence. 
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Conditional on the performance 
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performance, and firm performances 
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theoretical models of performance in 
an alliance context should 
incorporate antecedents pertaining to 
all alliance developmental stages in 
their explanations. 
   215 
For the alliance management stage, the research provided support for prior work with a focus 
on post-formation processes (Demirbag et al., 2000; Hamel, 1991; Inkpen et al., 2006; Mohr 
et al., 1994). The findings indicate that post-formation processes fulfill an important function 
to overcome ex-post problems and tensions between partners. Building on the definition of 
relational adaptability, that is, parties’ willingness and ability to make modifications to the 
ongoing relationship without changing the initial alliance structure, we argued that firms 
investing time and resources to develop process safeguards are able to overcome inertial 
forces. The empirical findings indicate that parties that develop relational and learning 
processes foster relational adaptability. For instance, firms may decide to invest resources to 
develop a high-quality relationship characterized by trust, commitment, and mutual respect. 
Parties may also direct efforts toward knowledge transfer by developing learning capabilities 
or toward knowledge acquisition by developing absorption integrativeness. However, 
conditions stimulating a learning race hamper the development of relational adaptability. In 
sum, during the post-formation stage, firms may invest more or less in process safeguards, 
resulting in alliances with higher or lower relational adaptability.  
 
When we compare the findings with previous research on alliance performance (Ariño, 2003; 
Geringer et al., 1991; López-Navarro et al., 2002; Olk, 2002), we recognize two important 
contributions. First, with respect to alliance evaluation, distinguishing among multiple 
performance dimensions, such as financial, learning, and strategic, is necessary to develop a 
coherent set of explanations of the relationship among antecedents and alliance performance. 
For instance, decisions made during the formation stage are particularly relevant to realize 
financial outcomes, whereas post-formation processes are important with respect to learning 
and strategic outcomes. Second, the findings suggest that it is not only important to make a 
distinction between alliance performance and firm performance but that theoretical models 
also should incorporate both outcomes to provide a comprehensive explanation. Although 
firms enter alliances to achieve individual objectives, they will only achieve those objectives 
if they cooperate to achieve the objectives of their counterparts. Hence, researchers who 
theorize about performance in an alliance context should include the relationship between 
realized value and appropriated value into their models. Next, we present the findings 
pertaining to the research questions (i.e., horizontal arrows in Figure 10.1). 
 
Research Question 1: Alliance Structure and Alliance Process  
Drawing on the structure perspective, we argued that during the alliance formation stage, 
parties erect structural safeguards to secure their individual interests and protect the 
relationship against exchange hazards. Structural safeguards reduce the occurrence of 
exchange hazards; in turn, the absence of exchange hazards fosters alliance performance. That 
is, an alliance structure should align parties’ interests by creating an incentive structure that 
stimulates the creation of long-term gains through cooperation while also reducing the short-
term gains from competition. Within the context of contractual alliances, the findings provide 
support for the structure perspective’s basic propositions with respect to financial and 
strategic performance, but not with respect to learning performance (see Table 10.1).  
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Firms designing an alliance with an initial structure that consists of a constellation of mutually 
supportive structural safeguards experience higher levels of financial performance. Structural 
coherence reduces the risk of exchange hazards, which enables parties to focus on fulfilling 
their contractual obligations. Therefore, in the medium term, parties should be able to achieve 
their financial objectives even if they have not built relational adaptability. These findings 
imply that to achieve their financial objectives, firms can manage contractual alliances as 
discrete transactions, similar to a license or franchise relationship (Heide, 1994). 
 
Table 10.1 Research Question 1: Key Findings 
 
Research Question 1:  What is the relationship among alliance structure, alliance processes, and 
alliance performance? 
 
Theoretical Perspective Empirical Findings
Structure perspective 
- Structural coherence refers to the degree to 
which the initial alliance structure constitutes a 
constellation of mutually supportive structural 
safeguards, including governance form, 
contractual provisions, and inter-firm 
characteristics, 
- Structural coherence reduces the risk of 
exchange hazards, such as opportunistic 
behavior, appropriation and spill-over concerns, 
and goal conflicts, 
- The impact of structural coherence on alliance 
performance is conditional on the performance 
objectives. 
 
Process perspective 
- Relational adaptability refers to parties’ 
willingness and ability to make modifications to 
the ongoing relationship, without changing the 
initial alliance structure. 
- Relational adaptability reduces the risk of 
inertial forces and exchange hazards. 
- The influence of relational adaptability on 
alliance performance is conditional on the 
performance objectives. 
 
Integrative perspective 
- Reconciliation of the structure and process 
perspectives increases explanatory power with 
respect to alliance performance. 
- The mediating effect of relational adaptability on 
the relationship between structural coherence 
and alliance performance is conditional on the 
performance objectives. 
 
 
- Structural coherence directly influences financial 
performance and strategic performance. 
- Compensation integrativeness, resource 
complementarity, total non-recoverable investments, 
partner fit, and shared decision-making constitute 
structural safeguards. 
- Compensation imbalance undermines an alliance’s 
structural coherence; the influence of decision-
making imbalance and non-recoverable investment 
imbalance is negligible. 
 
 
 
 
 
- Relational adaptability directly influences learning and 
strategic performance. 
- Absorption integrativeness, relational quality, and 
learning capabilities constitute process safeguards. 
- Absorption imbalance undermines relational 
adaptability, whereas the influence of opportunistic 
behavior is negligible. 
 
 
 
 
- Structural coherence directly influences relational 
adaptability. 
- The influence of structural coherence on financial 
performance is not mediated by relational 
adaptability. 
- The influence of structural coherence on strategic 
performance is partially mediated by relational 
adaptability. 
- The influence of structural coherence on learning 
performance is mediated by relational adaptability. 
 
With respect to learning performance, the results support the process perspective. Building on 
the process perspective, we argued that during the alliance post-formation stage, parties may 
implement process safeguards to secure their individual interests (see §3.2). The purpose of 
process safeguards is to overcome inertial forces that hamper alliance performance. Similar to 
structural safeguards, process safeguards aim to direct the behavior of parties in the 
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relationship toward actions that will enable the parties to achieve individual interests while 
fostering collaboration as well. Confronted with the high probability that alliances evolve in 
ways that differ from initial expectations, parties need to build process safeguards so that they 
can efficiently and effectively implement modifications to the ongoing relationship. The 
empirical findings also indicate that relational adaptability fosters learning performance. 
Higher levels of learning performance occur if parties are willing and able to make 
adaptations to the ongoing relationship. Furthermore, when parties develop cooperative 
relational and learning processes, they reduce the risk of other ex-post exchange hazards. 
These findings do not suggest that structural coherence is not relevant. Although structural 
coherence does not directly affect learning performance, it still functions as an architecture 
that enables parties to build highly flexible relationships. This relationship between alliance 
structure and post-formation processes also pertains to strategic performance. The findings 
indicate that, on the one hand, structural coherence directly affects strategic performance, 
while on the other hand, parties achieve their strategic objectives by developing relational 
adaptability. Thus, to achieve their learning and strategic objectives, partner firms must seek a 
balance between ex-ante and ex-post investments, because the combination of initial 
conditions and post-formation processes drives performance. That is, neither the structure nor 
the process perspective alone can provide an adequate and coherent explanation. Whereas the 
structure perspective appears to be sufficient to understand financial performance, a 
reconciliation of the structure and process perspectives advances understanding of learning 
and strategic performance. We discuss these findings further in Section 10.2. 
 
Research Question 2: Cooperation and Competition 
The second research question focused on the relationships among cooperation, competition, 
alliance performance, and firm performance derived through the alliance. We proposed that 
this set of relationships could be depicted as a cooperation and competition trade-off 
(see §4.1). Within contractual alliances, firms are confronted with the need to seek a balance 
between cooperation and competition due to the scarcity of input resources. The choice to 
designate resources to a particular activity affects the amount of resources allocated to another 
activity, such that resource allocation to one activity comes at expense of the other. Within an 
alliance, firms may direct their efforts toward value-creation mechanisms at the expense of 
individual value appropriation. In addition, the direction and magnitude of the relationship 
between one resource category and a performance objective, A or B, can differ from the 
relationship between another resource category and performance objective A or B. We argued 
that firms forming and managing alliances confront a particularly strong type of trade-off, or a 
situation in which the partner firms confront not only resource scarcity but also a situation in 
which maximizing the level of individual firm performance, relative to counterparts, results in 
decreased performance at the alliance level. To better understand the nature of a cooperation 
and competition trade-off, we theorized about and tested three trade-offs: compensation, 
learning, and relational.  
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Compensation Trade-off 
Drawing on the power perspective (Blau, 1964; Cook et al., 1978; Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer et 
al., 1978), we hypothesized that firms face a compensation trade-off during the alliance 
formation stage (see §5.1). Firms’ use of bargaining power constitutes a value-creation and 
value-appropriation mechanism (Lax et al., 1986) that affects the design of the alliance’s 
compensation structure. Parties exercise bargaining power to maximize their compensation 
ex-ante, such as by extracting additional financial rewards (e.g., advance payment), obtaining 
access to intellectual property, and optimizing their resource contribution. To capture the 
variety of compensation instruments, we introduced two constructs: compensation 
integrativeness and compensation imbalance. Compensation integrativeness refers to the 
combination of parties’ anticipated benefits, such that a high level means that firms have 
formalized a compensation structure that maximizes the value-creation potential of the 
alliance. A compensation imbalance refers to the asymmetry between each party’s anticipated 
benefits and thus implies firms have formalized a compensation structure in which one party 
can expect to appropriate more rewards from the alliance than its counterpart. Consistent with 
the conceptualization of the cooperation and competition trade-off, we hypothesized that 
compensation integrativeness and compensation imbalance affect parties’ ability to realize 
and appropriate value through the relationship.  
 
Within our sample of contractual alliances, firms adopted different trade-off solutions, 
ranging from a compensation structure characterized by high value creation potential to one 
characterized by an asymmetrical distribution of anticipated rewards. Unexpectedly, with 
respect to financial performance, we found that even though firms seek a balance between 
compensation integrativeness and compensation imbalance, excessive ex-ante claims on 
anticipated financial benefits by one partner do not affect the creation of financial benefits at 
the alliance level. Moreover, a moderate trade-off, which we defined as a situation in which 
the achievement of two performance objectives is unrelated, exists. In contrast, with respect to 
learning and strategic outcomes, we found support for a strong trade-off. However, because 
an alliance’s compensation structure has an almost negligible influence on learning outcomes, 
factors other than compensation structure likely influence the degree to which parties can 
create and appropriate knowledge. The impact of compensation structure on strategic 
outcomes is substantial. A compensation imbalance enables one firm to obtain strategic 
benefits at the expense of its counterpart, whereas compensation integrativeness fosters 
strategic performance. In contrast to realizing financial outcomes, parties who jointly create 
strategic benefits also reduce the disproportional distribution of these strategic benefits.  
 
The findings with respect to the compensation trade-off provide support for the power 
perspective’s basic propositions (Blau, 1964; Cook, 1977; Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer et al., 
1978). When two firms A and B engage in an alliance, they establish a power relationship that 
influences the configuration and outcomes of the relationship, particularly according to the 
design of the compensation structure. In addition, if an actor A maintains bargaining power 
over an actor B, it is likely to use that power to pursue its individual objectives—if necessary 
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at the expense of actor B. However, we also found that these propositions are valid only when 
we focus on financial and strategic outcomes. Moreover, the findings refine prior alliance 
research that has drawn on the power perspective (Blankenburg Holm et al., 1999; Bucklin et 
al., 1993; Lavie, 2007; Ramaseshan et al., 1998) by demonstrating that manifestations of 
bargaining power use relate differentially to various performance dimensions. That is, 
bargaining power drives financial and strategic outcomes, but it is not an effective mechanism 
to create and appropriate learning outcomes. Finally, in contrast to prior alliance research 
(Blankenburg Holm et al., 1999; Buchanan, 1992; Bucklin et al., 1993; Lavie, 2007; 
Ramaseshan et al., 1998), we captured an outcome of bargaining power use rather than 
focusing on power itself. With this approach, we eliminated factors, such as the difference 
between actual and perceived power (Kim et al., 2005), that may distort the relationship 
between bargaining power and negotiation outcomes.  
 
Table 10.2 Research Question 2: Key Findings 
 
Research Question 2:  What is the relationship among cooperation, competition, alliance performance, 
and firm performance derived through an alliance? 
 
Theoretical Perspective Empirical Findings
Power perspective: 
- Bargaining power constitutes a value creation 
and appropriation mechanism, which firms use 
to design a compensation structure. 
- The impact of a compensation structure on 
alliance and firm performance is conditional on 
the performance objectives. 
- Financial objectives depict a moderate type of 
compensation trade-off, and strategic objectives 
depict a strong type compensation trade-off. 
 
Learning perspective 
- Ex-post learning processes constitute a value 
creation and appropriation mechanism, which 
fosters or hampers parties’ ability to assess and 
assimilate knowledge and information. 
- The impact of inter-organizational learning on 
alliance and firm performance is conditional on 
the performance objectives. 
- Learning objectives and strategic objectives 
depict a strong type learning trade-off.  
 
Behavioral perspective 
- Relational norms constitute a value creation and 
appropriation mechanism, which guides parties’ 
conduct toward cooperation and competition. 
- The impact of cooperative relational norms on 
and firm performance is conditional on the 
alliance performance objectives. 
- No support is found for a relational trade-off. 
 
- Compensation integrativeness and compensation 
imbalance are negatively associated. 
- Compensation integrativeness positively affects 
financial and strategic performance, but has a 
negligible affect on learning performance. 
- Compensation imbalance positively affects financial 
and strategic performance imbalance, but has a 
negligible affect on learning performance imbalance 
 
 
 
- Absorption integrativeness and absorption imbalance 
are negatively associated. 
- Absorption integrativeness positively affects learning 
and strategic performance, but has a negligible affect 
on financial performance 
- Absorption imbalance positively affects learning and 
strategic performance imbalance, but has a negligible 
affect on financial performance imbalance 
 
 
 
- Relational quality and opportunistic behavior are not 
associated. 
- Relational quality positively affects learning 
performance and strategic performance. 
- Relational quality reduces financial performance 
imbalance. 
 
Learning Trade-off 
Drawing on the learning perspective (Hamel, 1991; Larsson et al., 1998; Lubatkin et al., 
2001), we proposed that as the alliance unfolds, partners face a learning trade-off (see §5.2). 
We adopted the view that in complex alliances, parties need to assimilate newly created 
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knowledge or knowledge possessed by their partners to achieve their performance objectives 
(Lubatkin et al., 2001), irrespective of performance objectives. Consequently, learning 
constitutes an ex-post value creation (i.e., joint learning) and appropriation (i.e., individual 
learning) mechanism. To capture the extent to which an alliance is characterized by learning 
potential and learning barriers, we introduced two constructs: absorption integrativeness and 
absorption imbalance. Absorption integrativeness refers to each party’s ability to assess and 
acquire knowledge; a high level of absorption integrativeness indicates that parties have little 
difficulty assessing the relevance of new knowledge (Inkpen et al., 1998) or assimilating this 
knowledge (Inkpen, 2000). Absorption imbalance refers to the asymmetry between parties’ 
ability to assess and acquire knowledge. A high level of absorption imbalance indicates that 
one party possesses a learning advantage relative to its counterpart and that this party 
therefore can assess and acquire knowledge at a relatively faster pace than its counterpart.  
 
The results suggest that firms are confronted with a trade-off between absorption 
integrativeness and absorption imbalance. Within our sample of contractual alliances, firms 
adopted different trade-off solutions, ranging from learning conditions characterized by a high 
value creation potential to those characterized by an imbalance in learning opportunities. With 
respect to financial outcomes, we found support for a moderate trade-off, but when compared 
with the compensation trade-off, the impact of absorption integrativeness and imbalance on 
financial outcomes is negligible. In terms of learning and strategic outcomes, we found 
substantial support for a strong trade-off, such that absorption integrativeness and absorption 
imbalance are negatively associated, alliance performance and firm performance imbalance 
(i.e., learning and strategic) are negatively related, absorption integrativeness fosters learning 
and strategic performance, and absorption imbalance positively relates to learning and 
strategic performance imbalance. These findings suggest that to achieve learning and strategic 
outcomes, firms need to resolve the learning trade-off. Moreover, as parties jointly create 
learning and strategic benefits, they also reduce the likelihood of disproportional distribution.  
 
Taken together, these findings contribute to a better understanding of the learning perspective 
within the context of alliances. The findings provide support for the learning perspective’s 
basic propositions (Hamel, 1991; Larsson et al., 1998; Lubatkin et al., 2001). When two firms 
A and B engage in an alliance, they establish a learning relationship that influences the 
development and outcomes of the relationship. In addition, if an actor A has a learning 
advantage relative to actor B, it likely will use this learning advantage to pursue individual 
objectives, even at the expense of actor B. However, exploiting a learning advantage 
primarily affects a firm’s learning and strategic objectives. Furthermore, our research 
demonstrates that inter-organizational learning is not constrained to alliances with learning 
objectives, such as R&D alliances, but rather that firms that build cooperative learning 
processes also experience a higher level of strategic performance. An important implication of 
this finding applies to future research efforts aimed at examining inter-organizational learning 
processes; they may use, in addition to learning outcomes, other performance dimensions, 
such as financial and strategic (see §10.2). 
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To conclude, our research extends past alliance research on learning races (Hamel, 1991; 
Kumar & Nti, 1998; Larsson et al., 1998; Zeng et al., 2002). Drawing on the learning 
perspective, we have argued that firms may design and build an alliance that eliminates the 
conditions that may ignite a learning race between partners. Consistent with opponents of the 
learning race view (Grant et al., 2004; Zeng et al., 2002), we argued that partner firms’ 
absorptive capacities, decisions about alliance structures, and knowledge exchange affect their 
abilities to assess and assimilate knowledge through the relationship. More specifically, 
though firms may possess different levels of absorptive capacities, they also may design and 
manage an alliance such that each partner has an equal opportunity to learn (Hamel, 1991; 
Inkpen et al., 2006). The empirical results indicate that firms trade off the potential for mutual 
learning with individual learning advantages. On the one hand, firms designed and managed 
alliances in which they foster mutual learning, but on the other hand, other firms designed and 
managed alliances in which they established conditions that stimulated the emergence of a 
learning race. If the conditions for a learning race are present, partners often experience 
difficulties in achieving their learning objectives at the alliance level; however, a firm with a 
learning advantage can realize its learning objectives at the expense of its partner.  
 
Relational Trade-off 
Drawing on the behavioral perspective (Gouldner, 1960; Uzzi, 1996; Poppo et al., 2002), we 
proposed that during the alliance post-formation stage, parties confront a relational trade-off 
(see §5.3). Relational norms may constitute a value creation and appropriation mechanism 
that guides parties’ behavior toward cooperation or competition (Aulakh et al., 1996; Cullen 
et al., 2000; Kauser et al., 2004). Relational norms refer to expectations about future behavior, 
shared by partner firms (Heide & John, 1992). We also asserted that partner interactions may 
develop into two types of patterns: a relationship with a long-term orientation characterized 
by cooperative behavior or an alliance with a short-term focus characterized by competitive 
behavior. Cooperative relational norms foster relational quality, or the degree to which partner 
firms feel comfortable, are willing to rely on trust in dealing with each other, and are 
committed to make the relationship work. A high level of relational quality suggests that 
partner firms’ intentions focus on long-term value creation and a willingness to sacrifice 
short-term gains (Ariño et al., 2001). In contrast, competitive relational norms likely stimulate 
opportunistic behavior, which we defined as a party’s active intention to increase its benefits 
from the relationship in ways that are explicitly or implicitly prohibited within the 
relationship (Ping, 1993).  
 
Unexpectedly, the empirical findings provide no support for a relational trade-off; relational 
quality and opportunistic behavior are unrelated. One explanation may pertain to the use of a 
proxy measure for opportunistic behavior, on which we elaborate in Section 10.4. 
Nonetheless, we found several surprising results—for instance, relational quality positively 
affects financial performance, but it also reduces financial performance imbalance. We found 
similar results with respect to learning and strategic outcomes, though with different 
implications. Whereas relational quality attenuates learning and strategic performance 
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imbalances, it has a stronger impact on learning and strategic performance than financial 
performance at the alliance level. Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter (2000) found that building 
relational capital simultaneously fosters learning and protects a firm’s proprietary knowledge 
from unwanted transfer. This study’s findings extend this result by revealing also that 
relational quality fulfills multiple functions in an alliance and that its impact on alliance 
outcomes depends on the partner firms’ objectives. 
 
Although we did not find support for a relational trade-off, the findings support the behavioral 
perspective in several ways. First, the findings suggest that when two actors are engaged in a 
relationship, they may build cooperative relational norms, which influences the development 
and outcomes of the alliance. Second, the findings extend prior work on the behavioral 
perspective by demonstrating that building a high-quality relationship can fulfill multiple 
functions. For example, relational quality fosters value creation, but it also attenuates value 
appropriation differences. Further research should explore this double-edged role of relational 
quality in alliances (Kale et al., 2000). Third, the research deviates from past alliance research 
in proposing that opportunistic behavior should be viewed as an outcome rather than an 
assumption (see §3.3). We did not find relationships with the dependent variables, but 
additional research should examine the role of opportunistic behavior, as an appropriation 
mechanism, in strategic alliances (Furrer & Den Ouden, 2006; Jap et al., 2003; Madhok, 
2006; Ping, 1993). 
 
To conclude, the research on cooperation and competition contributes to an in-depth 
understanding of the relationships between value creation and appropriation mechanisms and 
their impact on alliance performance and firm performance derived through the relationship. 
We have shown that the (implicit) assumptions that have dominated alliance research are 
questionable (i.e., value creation and value appropriation are either positively or unrelated). 
Although we did not find support for all the hypotheses, our research indicates that to develop 
a theory about value creation and appropriation within an alliance context (Dyer et al., 1998; 
Lavie, 2007; Lubatkin et al., 2001) researchers should theorize about and test these 
assumptions. Moreover, further research could benefit from distinguishing clearly among and 
specifying the relationships of value creation mechanisms, value appropriation mechanisms, 
realized value, and appropriated value. Our research thus is among the first to theorize and 
test these complex relationships, and the empirical findings warrant further research. 
 
10.2 Discussion and Theoretical Implications 
This dissertation offers rich evidence regarding the contributions of alliance design and 
management considerations to performance in a strategic alliance context. It complements a 
traditional focus on the implications of the formation and post-formation stages with a 
comprehensive research framework that explicates relationships between structure and 
process and between value creation and appropriation. It advances research on alliances by 
juxtaposing three alliance performance dimensions and thereby revealing the need to design 
and manage alliances consistent with their desired performance objectives. As mentioned 
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previously, our research has produced various relevant findings that may warrant further 
attention. Nonetheless, we decided to focus the discussion here on two main contributions: 
(1) the importance of structure and process and (2) the distinction between value creation and 
appropriation. We also identified three topics that we believe require further examination: 
(3) performance dimensions, (4) trade-off theory, and (5) theoretical integration.  
 
Importance of Structure and Process 
Our first main contribution is to distinguish between alliance structure and post-formation 
processes to explain alliance performance. Prior research typically considered structure and 
process separate mechanisms or focused on different conceptualizations of them. The findings 
reveal that distinguishing yet incorporating structure and process into one coherent theoretical 
model increases explanatory power. More specifically, the findings demonstrate that alliance 
structure fosters financial and strategic performance at the alliance level, whereas post-
formation processes improve learning and strategic performance. These findings are 
surprising, given prior indications that have downplayed the role of post-formation processes 
or argued that structure is less important for realizing alliance objectives. For instance, 
Hennart (2006) argued that crafting an initial alliance structure is both easier and more crucial 
than the ex-post management of an alliance. In contrast, De Rond and Bouchikhi (2004) 
postulated that to understand alliance performance, it is necessary to develop a rich and 
detailed account of alliance development. Building on the findings, we conclude that these 
opposite views can be reconciled by means of considering multiple performance dimensions.  
 
We provide support for the structure perspective, as the findings indicate that alliance 
structure matters: Efficient alliance design fosters performance at the alliance level. 
Consequently, the findings support theories that draw on the structure perspective, such as 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985), the resource-based view (Das et al., 2000b), 
and game theory (Parkhe, 1993a). In terms of the transaction cost logic, the conceptualization 
of structural coherence associates with the conception of a quasi-hierarchy. To the extent that 
an initial alliance structure becomes more coherent, its nature grows similar to a unitary 
organizational entity. For example, parties may agree on hybrid compensation structures, 
share decision-making rights, or commit themselves to non-recoverable investments, which 
together create a set of reciprocal relationships between the parties that enable them to realize 
their objectives. With respect to the resource-based view, we found that the ex-ante alignment 
of complementary resources fosters value creation. Finally, we also produced some support 
for game theory insights, because we found that the nature of the payoff structure affects 
alliance development and performance. Consistent with the structure perspective’s 
predictions, we conclude that the initial alliance structure constitutes an important and 
necessary condition to realize alliance performance.  
 
Advocates of the process perspective also have stated that firms can reduce the risk of inertia 
by building cooperative post-formation processes. Learning and relational processes enable 
parties to repair initial design flaws without engaging in extensive contractual renegotiations. 
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Although developing ex-post processes requires substantial investments (Ariño et al., 2001), 
the findings suggest that these expenditures may be worthwhile because they foster alliance 
performance. In reference to prior work on inter-organizational learning (Holmqvist, 2003; 
Lubatkin et al., 2001), the findings suggest that decisions with respect to alliance design and 
management foster or inhibit partners’ ability to assess and exchange knowledge. That is, the 
degree to which partner firms can transfer knowledge and information relates to the 
realization of their objectives. Consistent with relational governance predictions (Gouldner, 
1960; Macneil, 1980), the findings suggest that relational quality stimulates parties’ 
willingness and ability to make adjustments, which in turn contributes to alliance 
performance. Consistent with the process perspective, post-formation processes constitute an 
important and necessary condition for realizing alliance performance.  
 
The observation that both alliance structure and alliance processes matter reverberates with 
conclusions from prior alliance research (Contractor, 2005). A finer grained examination of 
the findings also reveals that the results deviate from and extend past alliance research, in that 
we empirically demonstrate that (1) the initial alliance structure affects the development of 
post-formation processes and (2) the nature of the relationships among alliance structure, 
post-formation processes, and alliance performance depends on the performance dimension.  
 
Traditional explanations based on the structure perspective are valid only when we focus on 
financial performance. Within our sample of contractual alliances, firms that designed a 
contractual alliance resembling a quasi-hierarchy enjoyed higher levels of financial 
performance. This finding is supported by Dussauge and Garrette (1995), who found that 
semi-structured alliances enjoy better economic performance than do unstructured co-
production alliances. The implication is that to realize their financial objectives, firms should 
direct their efforts toward establishing a structurally coherent alliance rather than investing 
time and resources to build relational adaptability. Through careful partner selection, 
negotiation, and formalization, firms can design an alliance structure that enables them to deal 
with future contingencies. Moreover, to be financially successful, partner firms should 
implement structural safeguards that provide them with strong incentives to fulfill their 
contractual obligations. 
 
Consistent with findings by Doz (1996), we find that alliance structure affects the degree to 
which partner firms are able to develop post-formation processes. He noted that in failing 
alliances, parties were unable to overcome initial design flaws, whereas in successful 
alliances, parties made adaptations to the ongoing relationship. If we turn our focus to 
learning performance, the results indicate that alliance structure serves as an architecture for 
relational adaptability, which is essential to achieve learning objectives. These findings also 
correspond with results reported by Lane, Salk, and Lyles (2001), who found that learning 
performance benefits as a result of a combination of initial conditions (e.g., knowledge 
relatedness) and post-formation processes (i.e., flexibility). Consequently, partner firms must 
focus on alliance formation and post-formation decisions. Moreover, design decisions should 
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attempt to reduce tensions that may result when firms are competitors or operate in different 
countries, whereas relational and learning processes enable parties to overcome emerging 
problems. In successful learning relationships, the importance of structure becomes 
negligible, as firms have created openness, transparency, and a high-quality relationship.  
 
The interrelatedness of the structure and process perspectives becomes especially clear when 
we focus on strategic objectives. Consistent with prior alliance research, we find that to 
achieve their strategic objectives, partner firms must consider both alliance structure and post-
formation processes. For instance, Aulakh et al. (1996) found that monitoring mechanisms 
and relational norms determine trust and that higher levels of trust positively influence sales 
growth and market share relative to competitors in cross-border partnerships. Similar to 
realizing learning objectives, partner firms must consider both the formation and post-
formation stages when making decisions. However, unlike the situation with learning 
performance, the initial impact of alliance structure does not fade away. Within our sample of 
contractual alliances, we find that firms that designed structural coherent alliances realized 
strategic objectives through both an immediate and a delayed effect. Consequently, strategic 
objectives represent the most complex objectives to realize. In summary, whereas the 
structure perspective is sufficient to explain financial performance and the process perspective 
is sufficient to explain learning performance (without considering the antecedents of post-
formation processes), neither is sufficient to explain strategic performance by itself.  
 
Building on these findings, we argue that previous alliance research may require 
reassessments. For example, researchers who have investigated the relationships among 
structure, process, and alliance performance in isolation may have produced some spurious 
and partial findings. The validity of their findings depends on the performance dimension they 
used. Consider the study by Sampson (2004), who found that governance forms designed to 
match the predictions of transaction cost economics experience improved innovation 
performance compared with misaligned alliances. Specifically, she uncovered a direct 
relationship between alliance structure and learning performance. The findings suggest that 
efficient governance forms foster learning performance, but only if partner firms also develop 
relational adaptability. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) found that structural elements, such as basic 
knowledge similarity, less management formalization, research centralization, compensation 
practices, and research communities, positively relate to joint venture learning performance. It 
could be that the inclusion of alliance processes into their model would have led to different 
conclusions. In contrast, Dussauge and Garrette (1995) found that semi-structured alliances 
achieve better economic performance than unstructured co-production alliances, and 
according to the findings, incorporating relational adaptability would not have changed their 
findings, because alliance structure directly associates with financial outcomes. 
 
Extending this logic, our findings may contribute to a better understanding of why alliance 
research focusing on management control has produced inconclusive findings. For instance, 
though Yan and Gray (1994) attributed their conflicting results to a lack of theorizing and 
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mixed analysis levels, the findings instead indicate that different operational definitions of 
performance also may have produced these results, because they used an overall satisfaction 
measure and found a positive relationship between dominant control and firm performance. 
Ding (1997) found that dominant management control positively contributed to alliance 
performance when using financial and non-financial measures, but Child and Yan (2003) 
reported a positive relationship between shared control and performance when they captured 
performance with a mixture of financial, learning, and strategic indicators. One tentative 
interpretation of these findings is that dominant control fosters financial performance, as long 
as partners stick to the agreement. In contrast, shared control contributes to learning 
performance, because joint decision-making rights reduce information asymmetry. This 
interpretation also may affect other strands of alliance research. For instance, the debate 
surrounding whether contracts and relational variables (e.g., trust) are substitutes or 
complements may be clarified if we were to contrast performance measures. To test their 
hypotheses, Lui and Ngo (2004) captured performance with completion time and overall 
satisfaction, whereas Luo (2002a) operationalized it as sales level and return on investment. 
Thus, the use of different operational definitions of performance may have contributed to 
inconclusive findings within previous alliance literature. 
 
To conclude, our main contribution notes that the effectiveness of resource allocation 
decisions with respect to initial alliance structure and post-formation processes depends on the 
performance dimension. In functional-oriented alliances with one type of objective, these 
decisions are straightforward. When two partners both have financial objectives, they achieve 
them through careful alliance design; however, learning and strategic objectives require a 
balance between a focus on design and post-formation process. When partners have diverging 
or multiple objectives, resources allocation decisions become far more difficult. For example, 
a mixture of financial and learning objectives would require both structural coherence and 
relational adaptability. Future studies should propose and test models that incorporate 
structure and process variables and use multiple operational definitions of performance.  
 
Distinction between Value Creation and Value Appropriation 
Our second main contribution involves distinguishing between value creation and value 
appropriation mechanisms to explain performance in an alliance context. Prior research 
typically considered either one mechanism or the other and adopted either an alliance- or 
firm-level analysis. As an important consequence, most built on an implicit assumption: 
Value creation and value appropriation are not or are positively related. In contrast, we 
juxtaposed four constructs and thus avoided misspecifications and explicated the implicit 
assumptions that have guided prior research. The findings result in a better understanding of 
performance in an alliance context. That is, we demonstrate that value creation and value 
appropriation mechanisms are negatively associated; efforts to increase individual 
performance may come at a high cost, because these efforts damage alliance performance. 
Inversely, partner firms primarily investing in value creation may forsake the opportunity to 
extract benefits from the alliance, which would not jeopardize value creation. 
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Generalizing from our findings, we extend theoretical perspectives with a primary focus on 
value creation. For instance, we contribute to the relational view (Dyer et al., 1998)—with its 
focus on relation-specific assets, knowledge sharing, complementary resources, and effective 
governance—by highlighting how value creation mechanisms may function as appropriation 
mechanisms and that appropriation may adversely affect value creation. Dyer and Sing (1998) 
argued that knowledge sharing routines foster the creation of relational rents. However, in 
addition to support for their proposition, we find that an imbalance in knowledge sharing 
inhibits value creation. The relational view further states that self-enforcement contributes to 
value creation. The findings reveal that formal governance through compensation may 
undermine value creation, and informal governance through relational quality affects both 
value creation and appropriation. Therefore, when we compare our findings with propositions 
derived from the relational view, we conclude that a sole focus on value creation mechanisms 
to explain alliance performance leads to only partial insights.  
 
We also contribute to the resource-based view (RBV) by showing that “promising” value 
creation conditions do not necessarily result in equitable appropriation. Proponents of the 
RBV argued that the alignment of complementary resources fosters value creation (Das et al., 
2000b; Lambe et al., 2002), and we support this proposition by demonstrating that ex-ante 
alignment of complementary resources positively contributes to the strength of the initial 
design. However, the RBV has a crucial limitation, which we made explicit with our research: 
The RBV is not sufficiently clear with respect to value appropriation, in that RBV theorists 
simply assumed that rewards fall to the proprietor of the resources (Coff, 1999). The findings 
instead indicate that appropriation mechanisms, such as bargaining power, learning, and 
relational norms, affect the ex-post distribution of benefits. Moreover, conditional on their 
performance objectives, firms may use different appropriation mechanisms to reap the 
benefits created through synergetic resource alignment. Thus, though valuable resources 
constitute a source of bargaining power (Blodgett, 1991b), supplying them does not guarantee 
that their provider will reap the associated benefits. The resulting paradox—why would a firm 
supply valuable resources if it is not rewarded accordingly?—can be resolved easily by 
integrating appropriation mechanisms into a resource-based view of alliances.  
 
We also extend existing knowledge on value appropriation. For instance, we highlight that the 
excessive use of appropriation mechanisms by one party adversely affects joint value creation, 
in support of Contractor and Ra (2000), who demonstrated that contractual design affects 
post-formation behavior. They specifically postulated that the design of a compensation 
structure may stimulate cooperation or opportunistic behavior, which reverberates with the 
findings that compensation structure relates to financial and strategic outcomes. More 
important, the findings suggest that even though ex-ante claims on future benefits positively 
associate with ex-post appropriation, excessive appropriation also undermines the value 
creation conditions of an alliance. One stream of organizational learning research focused on 
the appropriation of learning benefits (Hamel, 1991; Larsson et al., 1998), mostly on the basis 
of the argument that the firm, if confronted with an opportunity, will exploit a learning 
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advantage. The findings provide support for this assertion, but they also indicate that firms 
can take precautions to rebalance asymmetrical learning advantages. Moreover, our findings 
suggest that the impact of these precautions extends beyond learning objectives, because ex-
post learning also associates with the realization of strategic objectives. Thus, we improved 
understanding of value appropriation in alliances by demonstrating that value appropriation 
affects value creation and the use of different appropriation mechanisms have different 
consequences for various types of performance.  
 
We empirically demonstrated that (1) making a distinction and specifying the relationships 
among value creation mechanisms, value appropriation mechanisms, alliance performance, 
and firm performance are necessary to advance theory development and (2) the effectiveness 
of resource allocation decisions with respect to cooperation and competition depend on the 
nature of the alliance objectives pursued by the partner firms. Moreover, allowing ourselves 
some interpretational leverage, we propose that firms may confront not only three cooperation 
and competition trade-offs but also one “meta” cooperation and competition trade-off. 
Drawing on prior research, we proposed and tested three types of cooperation and competition 
trade-offs during the formation and post-formation stages. Consistent with existing research 
on alliance design (Blodgett, 1991b; Hagedoorn et al., 2007), we focused on the alliance’s 
compensation structure; drawing on process-oriented research, we also addressed learning 
(Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 2000; Larsson et al., 1998) and relational (Ariño et al., 1998; Kale et 
al., 2000) aspects. Similarly, the majority of previous studies examined distinct value creation 
and appropriation decision-making situations in isolation. For instance, Hamel (1991) 
acknowledged bargaining power, but his analysis focused on learning. Blodgett (1991) 
examined bargaining power but did not address its relationship with learning. Tentatively, we 
postulate that resource allocation decisions made by firms during different development 
stages to resolve a cooperation and competition trade-off may then relate to other cooperation 
and competition decisions. For example, firms that want to maximize their financial 
performance through distributive negotiations during the formation stage may allow their 
counterparts to appropriate learning and strategic benefits as the alliance unfolds. 
Alternatively, a firm pursuing learning objectives may allow its counterpart to realize its 
strategic objectives in exchange for greater knowledge access. Framed within the setting of 
our research, to be successful, firms must seek a balance among the compensation, learning, 
and relational trade-offs.48 If such a meta–trade-off exists, resource allocation decisions within 
strategic alliances are far more complex than they have been depicted to date.  
 
Performance Dimensions 
Although the explicit aim of this study was not to examine the relationships among 
performance dimensions, the results indicate that with respect to theory development, 
                                                 
48 This assertion is supported by our qualitative work. Several senior alliance managers indicated that to be a 
successful alliance manager, one should have an in-depth “sense” of the temporal relationships between various 
value creation and appropriation mechanisms. In contrast, interview findings also indicated that less experienced 
alliance managers primarily focused on the short-term consequences of resource allocation decisions.  
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distinguishing among financial, learning, and strategic outcomes is relevant for understanding 
performance in an alliance context. That is, explanatory factors relate differentially to the 
three performance dimensions. Retrospectively, we argue that these results emerge because 
financial, learning, and strategic performance possess different characteristics (Büchel et al., 
2001; Kogut, 1988b). In Table 10.3, we summarize the differences and similarities among 
financial, learning, and strategic performance dimensions. 
 
Financial benefits refer to specific outcomes, such as profits, productivity, cost reductions, 
cash flows, and revenues. Financial benefits derived from an alliance are output oriented and 
contribute directly to a firm’s economic return on investment (Büchel et al., 2001; Hagedoorn 
et al., 1994). Because of their economic foundation, financial benefits are relatively easy to 
specify and valuate ex-ante compared with learning and strategic benefits. During the 
formation stage, firms often negotiate and formalize financial compensation (Blodgett, 
1991b), which means that parties need to fulfill their contractual obligations to achieve their 
financial objectives. In addition, their explicit nature means financial benefits have a short-
term time horizon (Büchel et al., 2001). Compared with learning and strategic compensation, 
firms likely can anticipate immediate financial returns better once the alliance is implemented. 
Together, these characteristics suggest that when they formalize financial compensation, firms 
will share the pie (e.g., joint profits) according to predetermined distribution rules (e.g., 
royalty fee). It also suggests that firms can appropriate financial rewards by either using 
bargaining power or behaving opportunistically.  
 
Table 10.3 Alliance Performance Dimensions 
 Financial Learning Strategic 
Characteristics - Easy to specify 
- Easy to valuate 
- Private good 
- Difficult to specify 
- Difficult to valuate 
- Public good 
- Difficult to specify  
- Difficult to valuate 
- Private and public good 
Examples - Profits, costs, revenues, 
return on investments, 
operating efficiency  
- Managerial know-how, 
technological know-how, 
market know-how, product 
development know-how 
- Strategic advantage, 
market share, business 
opportunities, competitive 
position, risk reduction 
Alliance development stage 
(ranked in order of importance) 
1. Formation stage 1. Post-formation stage 
2. Formation stage 
1. Formation stage 
2. Post-formation stage 
Value creation and 
appropriation mechanism 
- Bargaining power 
- Relational norms 
- Learning 
- Relational norms 
- Bargaining power 
- Learning 
- Relational norms 
Time horizon - Short-term - Medium-term - Long-term 
Association - Learning: moderate 
- Strategic: high 
- Financial: moderate 
- Strategic: high 
- Financial: high 
- Learning: high 
 
In contrast, learning refers to a situation in which realized knowledge creation and transfer 
become clear only as the alliance unfolds. Because of their medium- and long-term 
orientations (Büchel et al., 2001), learning outcomes are relatively more difficult to specify 
and valuate ex-ante (Contractor, 2001; Furrer, Sudharsan, & Thomas, 2001). An ex-ante 
assessment of the value of market, technological, and production know-how and managerial 
skills is cumbersome (Blodgett, 1991a). Moreover, knowledge can be a public good, so 
parties can appropriate knowledge and information without depleting the source during 
different stages of alliance development (Monge et al., 1998). It is difficult, if not impossible, 
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to determine the amount of knowledge creation, let alone formalize parties’ claims to this 
realized knowledge, and then distribute it according to a predetermined rule. This challenge 
may explain why post-formation processes are necessary to create and appropriate knowledge 
jointly. 
 
Strategic benefits represent the third type of benefits, which include strategic advantage, 
market power, market share, competitive advantage, and risk reduction. Strategic benefits are 
outcome oriented, but unlike financial benefits, they have a long-term orientation (Büchel et 
al., 2001). Similar to learning benefits, strategic benefits are more difficult to specify and 
value and are surrounded by uncertainty, because it takes time to achieve them. In turn, the 
creation and appropriation of strategic benefits depends on three mechanisms: bargaining 
power, learning, and relational norms. Firms may appropriate know-how from their partners 
to strengthen their core competences, but they also may behave opportunistically and 
withhold critical information to gain a strategic advantage over their counterparts. 
 
Drawing on the similarities and differences, we propose that within an alliance context, 
financial, learning, and strategic benefits are associated with one another. Short-term financial 
outcomes affect medium-term learning and then long-term strategic performance. The 
empirical findings provide some indirect support for these assertions (see §7.4), in that 
financial performance and learning performance are moderately associated, and strategic 
performance correlates highly with financial and learning performance. These findings may 
suggest that long-term strategic performance is driven by short-term financial performance 
and medium-term learning performance. In addition, financial success may foster inter-
organizational learning. Unfortunately, due to the cross-sectional nature of our study, we were 
unable to examine the relationships between the performance dimensions further. 
 
Nonetheless, these findings provide fruitful directions for further research. In line with past 
alliance research (Ariño, 2003; Büchel et al., 2001; Gray, 2001), researchers could theorize 
about and test the differences and similarities among the performance dimensions. By 
building on these distinctions, they might refine understanding of performance in an alliance 
context further. In achieving a good understanding of the interrelatedness of performance 
dimensions, subsequent research could explore the relationships between antecedents and 
performance dimensions. The findings of these future research efforts then might be 
compared with previous alliance research that focused on one performance dimension and 
with research that used multiple dimensions (see Olk, 2002 for a review).  
 
Trade-Off Theory 
Building on the conceptualization of a trade-off (see §4.1), we developed Hypotheses 2–4, 
which specify the relationships among cooperation, competition, alliance performance, and 
firm performance derived through the alliance. Drawing on the power, learning, and 
behavioral perspectives, we hypothesized that firms need to resolve three types of cooperation 
and competition trade-offs. More specifically, we expected to find negative associations 
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between resource categories, positive and negative relationships between resource categories 
and performance objectives, and negative associations between alliance performance and firm 
performance imbalance. As discussed previously, the findings provide partial support for the 
conceptualization of the cooperation and competition trade-off in an alliance context 
(see §10.1). However, the findings also suggest that different types of trade-off exist within 
and perhaps outside an alliance context.  
 
Confronted with a plethora of trade-off definitions, our research presented a first attempt to 
develop a coherent typology. We therefore advocate for an extended refinement of the 
preliminary conceptualization of a trade-off. Additional research could extend the 
conceptualization of trade-off types, develop guidelines for conceptual and empirical 
identification, and examine situations in which trade-offs are likely to occur. Moreover, we 
need a better understanding of why, how, and in what conditions firms can find an optimum 
trade-off solution. In addition, we need to test trade-off types across contexts, such as among 
networks, alliances, and firms, through in-depth case analysis as well as cross-sectional and 
longitudinal research. Together, these research efforts could answer the remaining questions 
and thereby contribute to a much needed theory of trade-offs. 
 
Once a theory of trade-offs is developed, it could be used to advance and complement existing 
theoretical perspectives. For example, a trade-off theory may contribute to a better 
understanding of the relationships between exploration and exploitation (see e.g., He et al., 
2004), firms’ profitability and market performance (see e.g., Armstrong et al., 2007), and 
value creation and value appropriation (see e.g., Coff, 1999) in contexts other than alliances. 
Considering exploration and exploitation strategies as a trade-off rather than a dilemma, for 
example, could result in different theoretical and managerial implications (He et al., 2004). In 
summary, advancing the conceptualization of a trade-off and developing a trade-off theory 
constitute substantial contributions to management research in general.  
 
Theoretical Integration 
Following suggestions in previous alliance research (Colombo, 2003; Kogut, 1988b; 
Nooteboom, 2004; Osborn et al., 1997; Zajac et al., 1993), we advocated and adopted a 
theoretically rich approach in which we drew on five distinct theoretical perspectives to 
develop the hypotheses. This theoretical approach resulted in substantial explanatory power 
and advanced knowledge of performance in an alliance context. For instance, we reconciled 
explanations put forward by advocates of the structure and process perspectives, and the 
empirical findings indicate neither perspective alone is sufficient to understand alliance 
performance. Drawing on the power, learning, and behavioral perspectives, our research also 
indicates that value creation and appropriation mechanisms differentially affect alliance 
performance and firm performance. Unfortunately, due to sample size restrictions, we were 
not able to test sophisticated models that aligned the compensation, learning, and relational 
trade-offs. Nonetheless, the findings in total suggest that theoretical integration is a fruitful 
avenue for future alliance research (see Box 10.1). 
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Looking at the hypotheses and empirical findings, we also see various opportunities for 
further capitalizing on theoretical integration. Although prior research has examined the 
relationships between structure and process (Carson et al., 2006; Das et al., 1998; Luo, 2002a; 
Macneil, 1978) and though we addressed the structure and process perspectives’ core logic, 
key variables, level of analysis, and assumptions, several topics could be explored further. We 
focused on the dyadic level, but structure and process explanations may pertain to the firm 
and network levels too. In addition, research could focus on more subtle differences than we 
were able to unravel, such as contractual provisions and firm behavior (see e.g., Contractor et 
al., 2000), inter-firm characteristics and learning (see e.g., Lane et al., 1998), or exchange 
hazards and inertia (see e.g., Ariño et al., 1998). Past alliance research acknowledged that 
efficiency, equity, and adaptability constitute important criteria that partner firms can use to 
assess an alliance’s performance (Ariño et al., 1998; Doz, 1996), but the relationship between 
parties’ willingness and ability to make modifications, their perceptions of realized outcomes, 
and the distribution fairness of these outcomes needs further elucidation (see e.g., Jap, 2001a). 
Integrating the structure and process perspectives is one way to explore these research 
directions. 
 
Box 10.1 Seven-Step Approach toward Theoretical Integration49 
To ease theoretical integration, researchers may adopt the approach we used to guide our decisions. 
First, they can develop a fundamental abstraction of the theories proposed to be integrated. For 
instance, in this study, we developed Hypothesis 1 by drawing on the logic underpinning the structure 
and process perspectives. Second, they may reinterpret the unit of analysis. In drawing on the 
process perspective, we shifted our unit of analysis from processes to the outcomes of these 
processes. Consequently, we were able to develop Hypothesis 1 and specify the relationships 
among variables pertaining to the structure and process perspectives. Third, researchers should be 
clear about supporting implicit and explicit assumptions. For instance, in Section 3.3, we discussed 
the differences and similarities between the assumptions underpinning the structure and process 
perspectives. Fourth, they can build a new theory around inter-connected points. We hypothesized 
about the relationships among structural safeguards, process safeguards and exchange hazards. 
Fifth, researchers should clarify the purpose and focus of their theoretical explanations. With respect 
to Hypothesis 1, the main aim was to explain alliance performance. Sixth, they may clarify the 
conditions in which a theoretical force dominates. For example, our research demonstrated that the 
appropriateness of structure and process explanations depends on the performance objective 
considered. Seventh, they may anticipate possible critics; we discussed critiques of the structure and 
process perspectives to argue that the perspectives are complementary instead of mutually 
exclusive. 
 
Example studies: Ghosh & John (1999); Madhok (2002); Oliver (1997); Ulrich & Barney (1984) 
 
Additional research may also seek to reconcile the power, learning, and behavioral 
perspectives to theorize on the “meta” cooperation and competition trade-off. Drawing on 
each theoretical perspective, we identified value creation and value appropriation 
mechanisms, and though we compared each mechanism, we did not integrate the power, 
learning, and behavioral perspectives because of our focus on exploring the impact of each 
mechanism independently (see §5.5). Nonetheless, theoretical integration may advance 
understanding of performance in an alliance context; previous alliance research already 
                                                 
49 We acknowledge Anoop Madhok for his constructive comments. 
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explored relationships between power and learning processes (Inkpen et al., 1997; Makhija et 
al., 1997), learning and relational processes (Kale et al., 2000; Lane et al., 1998), and power 
and relational processes (Yan et al., 2001). Hence, we recommend further research aimed at 
exploring the relationship between cooperation and competition should advance our findings 
by integrating them with prior research into a theoretical framework.  
 
Building on the literature reviews (see Chapters 2 and 4), we decided to embed the hypotheses 
within five theoretical perspectives: structure, process, power, learning, and behavioral. The 
findings are not limited to these theoretical perspectives, and incorporating other explanations 
may result in additional insights. For example, our research provides support for transaction 
cost economics theory, but our support is constrained to financial and strategic outcomes, so 
aligning transaction cost economics with a learning perspective could provide additional 
clarification of the relationships between alliance structure and inter-organizational learning 
(Nooteboom, 2004). The findings also provide support for an organizational justice 
perspective (Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1985). Drawing on this perspective, researchers could 
develop additional explanations that provide (better) support for the relationship between 
post-formation processes and alliance performance (see e.g., Luo, 2005), as well as for the 
relationship between alliance structure and alliance processes (see e.g., Ariño et al., 1998; 
Doz, 1996). Some additional insights might pertain to the relationship between compensation 
structure and relational processes (see e.g., Contractor et al., 2000), the relationship between 
decision-making and learning processes (see e.g., Makhija et al., 1997), or the impact of non-
recoverable investments on relational and learning processes (see e.g., Gulati et al., 1994; Jap 
et al., 2003; Subramani et al., 2003). To advance theory development, future conceptual and 
empirical research should extend our findings by integrating them with other theories. 
 
10.3 Managerial Implications 
Building on the results pertaining to research question 1—what is the relationship among 
alliance structure, alliance processes, and alliance performance?—we derive several 
managerial implications. Firms should carefully consider their alliance objectives before 
making decisions with respect to ex-ante and ex-post investments into an alliance (see Figure 
10.2). If their alliance objective is financially oriented, parties should invest their resources 
and time primarily during the alliance formation stage to implement structural safeguards that 
foster structural coherence.50 For instance, firms may use different compensation instruments, 
such as ex-ante and residual sharing, to build compensation integrativeness. In addition, firms 
could share decision-making rights, commit themselves to making non-recoverable 
investments, and select partners with high fit and synergetic resources. However, firms should 
refrain from designing an imbalanced compensation structure, which undermines structural 
coherence. Together, these investments in structural coherence outweigh ex-post investments 
designed to build relational adaptability, which cannot improve financial performance.  
                                                 
50 Firms are not likely to design an alliance with a low structural coherence intentionally, unless the alliance is 
formed for reasons such as legitimization or complying with government regulations.  
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With respect to learning performance, we derive different managerial implications. If the 
alliance objective is learning, parties should invest in process safeguards to build their 
relational adaptability. By directing their efforts toward developing relational and learning 
processes, parties increase their willingness and ability to make modifications to the ongoing 
relationship. In addition, firms may invest in structural coherence to foster relational 
adaptability. However, the results indicate that structural coherence in itself is not sufficient to 
maximize relational adaptability. Nonetheless, if an alliance structure design contains flaws, 
such as a compensation structure that does not provide incentives to collaborate, partners can 
use relational adaptability to overcome these mistakes. Building mutual trust may reduce the 
problems associated with ill-designed contracts (Luo, 2002a; Macneil, 1980). Hence, whereas 
investing in structural coherence is important to achieve financial objectives, investments in 
relational adaptability are critical for realizing learning objectives. 
 
Figure 10.2 Managerial Implications: Alliance Structure and Alliance Processes 
 
 
In contrast, if the alliance objective is strategic performance, parties should invest in structural 
safeguards to improve structural coherence and process safeguards to develop relational 
adaptability. By building relational adaptability, they can accelerate the impact of structural 
coherence, because an efficient alliance design directly influences strategic performance. If 
firms form an alliance with low structural coherence, developing the willingness and ability to 
make changes inhibits the impact of initial design flaws. Poor partner fit may directly hamper 
the achievement of strategic objectives, but ex-post learning processes attenuate the impact of 
poor partner fit on strategic performance. 
 
Cooperation and Competition 
Building on the results pertaining to research question 2—what is the relationship among 
cooperation, competition, alliance performance, and firm performance?—we derive the 
following managerial implications: Firms should consider their alliance objectives when 
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trying to resolve the compensation and learning trade-offs. Figure 10.3 graphically depicts six 
trade-off situations. With respect to the compensation trade-off, the findings suggest that an 
alliance manager who wants to increase financial benefits should direct his or her efforts 
toward bargaining power, then use this power to negotiate a compensation at the expense of 
its counterpart (see Figure 10.3A). However, because an increase in competition comes at the 
expense of cooperation, this manager should also anticipate lower financial performance at 
the alliance level. That is, the firm must find a balance between its individual and its 
counterpart’s objectives (i.e., an optimum). Similarly, a firm can improve its strategic 
performance by engaging in cooperative or competitive efforts (see Figure 10.3C), which 
suggests that with respect to strategic objectives, a firm should exploit a bargaining power 
advantage, but only up to a threshold. In contrast, when pursuing learning objectives, a firm 
should not direct its resources to resolving the compensation trade-off. Although engaging in 
efforts to cooperate can have a positive impact on learning performance, the consequences for 
individual learning performance are negligible. Thus, using bargaining power to negotiate an 
advantageous deal at the expense of the counterpart is not a particularly useful strategy for 
achieving learning objectives (see Figure 10.3B). Moreover, these competitive efforts may be 
detrimental to relational adaptability, which is a prerequisite for learning performance.  
 
Figure 10.3 Managerial Implications: Cooperation and Competition Trade-Off 
 
Notes: AP = alliance performance, FP = firm performance. 
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performance, the impact is negligible compared with that of the compensation trade-off. 
Resolving the learning trade-off, however, is critical for a firm that wants to achieve its 
learning objectives through the alliance (see Figure 10.3E). Directing efforts toward 
cooperation will contribute to learning at the alliance level, which enables the firm to 
appropriate a larger share of knowledge as the alliance unfolds. Efforts toward competition 
represent an alternative strategy for a firm to appropriate knowledge, but excessive 
(perceived) exploitation of the partner firm may ignite a learning race, which has detrimental 
consequences for knowledge creation and appropriation. A firm should search for an optimum 
between its own and its counterpart’s objectives. Similarly, for strategic performance, a firm 
should aim to achieve its objectives by finding a balance between cooperation and 
competition (see Figure 10.3F). When a party increases its competitive efforts, it attains 
higher individual strategic performance, but that benefit comes at an expense of cooperative 
efforts and reduces strategic performance at the alliance level. Therefore, a firm should 
always try to balance between its individual and its counterpart’s strategic objectives.  
 
Finally, because we find no support for the relational trade-off, we cannot derive implications 
to help alliance managers with respect to cooperation and competition. However, several 
managerial implications can be derived from our findings. As discussed in Section 10.2, 
relational quality fulfills two functions: (1) fostering alliance performance and (2) reducing 
firm performance differences. That is, a high-quality relationship reduces financial 
performance differences between firms, such that parties are less likely to behave 
opportunistically as the alliance unfolds. In addition, a high-quality relationship fosters 
learning and strategic performance, suggesting that relational quality removes barriers to joint 
knowledge creation and exchange and strategic value creation. Consequently, alliance 
managers should invest time and resources to build trust, commitment, and mutual respect, 
from the partner selection stage until the very moment partners decide to dissolve the alliance. 
 
10.4 Limitations and Further Research 
To delineate the scope of the research, we made several decisions about this dissertation’s 
theoretical and empirical boundaries (see §1.5). For instance, we focused on contractual 
alliances with a long-term orientation and multiple objectives. In addition, we adopted a 
dyadic perspective and drew on five theoretical perspectives to develop and test the 
hypotheses. Consequently, the results of our research are valid within this particular context; 
future theory development could benefit from a richer theoretical and empirical setting.  
 
The present study attends to contractual alliances with a long-term orientation and multiple 
objectives, so extending the research framework to the context of joint ventures, franchises, 
and license agreements might results in different findings. Joint ventures are distinct from 
contractual alliances in their governance form, because these equity arrangements establish a 
new organizational entity (Gulati et al., 1998). Sharing ownership contributes to an alliance’s 
structural coherence, may foster relational adaptability, and may affect parties’ decisions 
about the different cooperation and competition trade-offs, because a joint venture creates 
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additional reciprocal relationships between the partners (e.g., equity). In contrast, unlike 
contractual alliances, licenses and franchise relationships are similar to discrete market 
transactions (Dwyer et al., 1987), which means structural coherence may be more important 
for achieving financial performance objectives, and relational adaptability may become less 
relevant, because investments in the ongoing relationship do not outweigh future benefits. In 
addition, the need to resolve the compensation trade-off may become greater, but the impact 
of the learning trade-off may diminish. Restated, alliance research should aim to replicate our 
study using different governance forms to increase the validity of the theoretical models. 
 
In this study, we adopted a dyadic perspective and thereby somewhat neglected a 
conceptualization of firms as autonomous organizations that consist of individual employees. 
Our simplified view may discard relevant insights necessary to understand alliance 
performance. For instance, drawing on the power perspective, we argued that parties use 
bargaining power to design an alliance compensation structure. Thus, we theorized about a 
relationship between bargaining power and compensation structure at the dyadic level, but we 
did not extensively explore the relationships between perceived power and use of power (see 
e.g., Kim et al., 2005), bargaining power and negotiation strategies (see e.g., Rao et al., 1998), 
or individual bargaining power and the choice of compensation mechanisms (see e.g., 
Hagedoorn et al., 2007). With respect to the other theoretical perspectives, adopting a dyadic 
level of analysis may have led us to discard relevant insights. Adopting a dyadic perspective 
on learning ignores that firms may develop different learning strategies (Larsson et al., 1998) 
and that learning occurs between individuals (Soekijad & Andriessen, 2003). Hence, 
additional research should explore the relationships between individual persons, individual 
firm decisions, and dyadic outcomes (i.e., multilevel analysis).  
 
Another theoretical boundary pertains to the development of a medium-range theory of 
alliance performance. We focused on contractual alliances that had been operational for less 
than five years, which implies the alliances were in place long enough to enable the parties to 
achieve their objectives, but likely without major reorganizations of the relationship. 
Consequently, our findings may be limited to the initial operational phase of an alliance. As 
alliances age, external and internal dynamics probably affect the alliance structure, alliance 
processes, and, perhaps, the decisions parties make with respect to the cooperation and 
competition trade-offs. For example, parties’ relative bargaining power may shift as 
knowledge and information transfers occur (Inkpen et al., 1997), mutual transparency and 
receptivity with respect to learning may change due to external technology developments 
(Koza et al., 1998), and cooperative behavior may shift to competitive conduct as a result of 
shifts in corporate strategy (Ariño et al., 1998). Research to extend our medium-range theory 
to a long-range theory of alliance performance should incorporate explanations that recognize 
the dynamics of cooperation (Bell et al., 2006; Das et al., 2002; Koza et al., 1998).  
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Methodological Limitations 
Our research contributes to a better understanding of research design choices and alliance 
research (see Chapters 6 and 7); we assessed an informant’s knowledge about the alliance to 
address the use of key-informants (Campbell, 1955) and about the partner to address the use 
of one-sided data (Kumar et al., 1993). In addition, we conducted multiple tests to deal with 
common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003) and non-response bias (Armstrong et al., 1977). 
Finally, to address concerns surrounding the use of aggregate measures (Edwards, 2001a), we 
drew on existing literature and developed a procedure that enabled us to assess the appropriate 
use of difference scores within an alliance context. Although we resolve various 
methodological concerns typical to alliance research—and cross-sectional alliance research in 
particular—extensions of our work should address several other limitations.  
 
First, we used a cross-sectional design to assess our hypotheses, which means we did not 
account for inter-firm or time variations (Bowen & Wiersema, 1999). Therefore inferences 
from our data should be interpreted conservatively. Further research could adopt a 
longitudinal design to overcome these problems, as well as reduce concerns about common 
method biases (Podsakoff et al., 2003) and enable researchers to examine the relationships 
among financial, learning, and strategic performance (see §10.2).  
 
Second, we used a one-sided key informant approach to collect our data (Campbell, 1955), 
which enabled us to increase our sample size. We collected our data by targeting a single 
informant in each alliance and took several precautions to reduce the likelihood of biases, 
such as assessing the informant’s knowledge about the alliance and its partner. Gathering data 
from both sides of a relationship and contacting multiple respondents within each partner firm 
would have improved the quality of our data (Kumar et al., 1993). Dyadic data also could 
overcome some of the problems associated with the subjective approach we used in 
computing our aggregate measures (Kristof, 1996). However, dyadic data are clearly 
challenging to collect and likely would reduce the sample size to unacceptable levels.  
 
Third, despite extant efforts to increase sample size, the usable sample of 151 constrained the 
choices of statistical techniques. A larger sample would have enabled us to use more 
sophisticated estimation techniques and achieve a more in-depth understanding of the 
relationships. For instance, with a larger sample, we could have conducted a more 
sophisticated mediation analysis (Shaver, 2005), used polynomial regression analysis to 
examine the impact of the difference scores (Edwards et al., 1993), and added control 
variables to the covariance analysis to better understand the cooperation and competition 
trade-offs. Additional research should replicate and extend the findings by considering 
alternative data collection procedures, such as personal interviews, to increase sample size. 
 
Fourth, we adopted a convenient sampling strategy across industries and countries. Although 
we were very careful in the sample frame construction, we can only make conservative 
inferences. In contrast, a within-industry analysis might uncover more details that are difficult 
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or even impossible to detect with this study’s data. Obtaining more data within one country 
also may reduce the likelihood of distorting factors, such as institutional forces and 
managerial preferences (De Man, 2005; Scheer et al., 2003). To increase the validity of our 
inferences, further research could adopt a non-random sampling strategy within industries and 
countries. 
 
Fifth, though the measures possess acceptable psychometric properties, room for 
improvement exists. For instance, we conceptualized and operationalized structural coherence 
and relational adaptability as second-order constructs and took several precautions to ensure 
construct validity (see §6.3). Nonetheless, additional research should develop indicators that 
directly measure these second-order constructs to take into account any loss of information 
due to aggregation. In addition, we also developed new measures of firms’ anticipated 
compensation and potential to assess and absorb knowledge; future research may develop 
finer-grained measures. For instance, our operationalization of absorption captured a firm’s 
ability to assess and acquire knowledge, but it did not incorporate the degree to which a firm 
was able to exploit the newly acquired knowledge (Zahra et al., 2002). Finally, to reduce 
social desirability bias, we used a proxy measure for opportunistic behavior: ex-post 
management costs. This measure possessed construct validity, but it did not relate to the 
dependent variables. Therefore, further research should explore the nomological validity of 
this measure further.  
 
Sixth and finally, additional research could extend and improve the measures of alliance 
performance. Although all three performance dimensions possess acceptable convergent 
validity and reliability, with respect to learning and strategic performance, some concerns 
arose about discriminant validity. That is, using covariance analysis, we found that the 
performance dimensions, though conceptually distinct, partially overlap from an empirical 
perspective. Thus, we need better, and perhaps objective, measures of alliance performance to 
overcome these concerns. 
 
Further Research 
In addition to addressing the theoretical implications (see §10.2) and methodological 
limitations, several other topics could provide fruitful paths for additional research. First, 
researchers might examine in greater depth the antecedents and configuration of structural 
safeguards (i.e., structural coherence). For example, research questions could focus on the 
relationships between alliance negotiation and alliance structure (see e.g., Ganesan, 1993), 
interdependence and alliance structure (see e.g., Lee et al., 2003), or behavioral aspects and 
alliance structure (see e.g., Rao et al., 1998). Furthermore, we assumed that firms make 
decisions with respect to each structural safeguard independently, but researchers may 
question this explicit assumption and examine the relationships between structural safeguards 
by focusing on different configurations of structural safeguards and their antecedents and 
consequences (see e.g., Contractor et al., 2000; Hagedoorn et al., 2007). 
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Second, additional research should examine post-formation processes in more depth and 
explore the relationships between relational and learning processes. Prior empirical research 
adopted a process perspective (see e.g., Beamish et al., 2003; Brouthers et al., 2006; 
Demirbag et al., 2000), and a more fine-grained understanding would advance theory 
development. Research questions may focus on the relationships among relational 
adaptability, trust, commitment, opportunistic behavior, knowledge transfer, and knowledge 
acquisition. An illustrative study conducted by Gulati, Lawrence, and Puranam (2006) 
examined procurement modes in supplier–buyer relationships and found that performance 
differences across modes of procurement arise as a function of the match between adaptive 
capacity and the adaptation requirements associated with the exchange—not just the match 
between governance form and transaction hazards.  
 
Third, other factors related to the formation, management, and evaluation of alliances may 
affect the relationships specified by the theoretical models. Researchers have shown that firms 
with alliance capabilities achieve higher levels of performance compared with firms without 
alliance capabilities (Heimeriks et al., 2007; Den Ouden, Ziggers, & Duysters, 2005; Simonin, 
1997); research therefore should explore the impact of alliance capabilities on partner firms’ 
decisions about alliance structure, alliance processes, and value creation and appropriation. 
Prior research has also demonstrated that the dependence relationship between firms affects 
alliance formation and development (Kumar et al., 1995b; Pfeffer et al., 1978). Further 
research could explore the relationship between interdependence and parties’ solutions to the 
cooperation and competition trade-offs. Finally, as alliances unfold, parties may perceive a 
variety of problematic situations to which they need to respond (Furrer et al., 2006; Geyskens 
& Steenkamp, 2000; Ping, 1993). The selection and use of response strategies affects post-
formation processes and therefore relational adaptability, the learning trade-off, and the 
relational trade-off. Research should explore these relationships in far more depth.  
 
10.5 Concluding Remarks 
Despite a high failure rate, alliances are critical strategic tools in firms’ competitive arsenals. 
To achieve superior alliance performance, firms must overcome internal and external 
challenges by efficiently and effectively designing and managing their relationships. That is, 
firms need to resolve the difficulties that surround value creation, as well as overcome 
problems associated with appropriating their share of realized value. From a theoretical 
perspective, this dissertation sheds light on these difficulties by examining the relationships 
between alliance structure and alliance processes, in addition to their impact on alliance 
performance. In addition, we identified the cooperation and competition trade-offs that firms 
need to resolve, each with its own impact on value creation and appropriation. By providing 
an in-depth understanding of performance in an alliance context, the findings enable firms to 
manage their partnerships better. Such a thorough understanding of alliance formation, 
management, and evaluation is a prerequisite for the twenty-first century, when successful 
alliances are, and will continue to become even more, an integral part of any firm’s 
competitive advantage. 
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Appendix 1 Theoretical Perspectives 
Within the alliance literature, multiple theoretical perspectives have been used to explain 
alliance related phenomena, including:  
• agency theory (Aulakh, 2001; Reuer & Miller, 1997); 
• the behavioral perspective (Aulakh, Kotabe, & Sahay, 1996; Cullen et al., 2000; Ganesan, 
1994; Heide & John, 1992; Kauser & Shaw, 2004; Uzzi, 1996) 
• equity theory (Adams, 1965; Scheer, Kumar, & Steenkamp, 2003); 
• game theory (Gulati, Khanna, & Nohria, 1994; Parkhe, 1993a; Zeng & Chen, 2003); 
• institutional theory (Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997; Oxley, 1999); 
• organizational justice theory (Huppertz, Arenson, & Evans, 1978; Johnson, Korsgaard, & 
Sapienza, 2002; Kumar & Nti, 1998; Luo, 2005); 
• the organizational learning perspective (Hamel, 1991; Holmqvist, 2003; Kumar & Nti, 
1998; Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998; Lubatkin, Florin, & Lane, 2001); 
• political economy theory (Wood & Gray, 1991; De Wulf & Odekerken-Schröder, 2001); 
• relational governance theory (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Heide & John, 1992; Macneil, 
1980; Noordewier, John, & Nevin, 1990: Poppo & Zenger, 2002); 
• the resource-based view (Barney & Arikan, 2001; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Hitt, 
Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000); 
• the resource dependence perspective (Blankenburg Holm, Eriksson, & Johanson, 1999; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978); and 
• transaction cost economics (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Parkhe, 1993a). 
 
A review of all theoretical perspectives listed above is well beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. Moreover, other researchers have already presented reviews of these theoretical 
perspectives (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Child & Faulkner, 1998; Gray & Wood, 1991; 
Gulati, 1998; Oliver & Ebers, 1998; Wood et al., 1991; De Wulf et al., 2001). Nonetheless, 
we elaborate on five theoretical perspectives to which we refer frequently in the dissertation: 
equity and organizational justice theory, game theory, relational governance theory, the 
resource-based view, and transaction cost economics. We discuss each theory’s core 
proposition, strengths, and critiques and provide examples of alliance research. We do not 
discuss the structure perspective, the process perspective, the power perspective, the 
organizational learning perspective, or the behavioral perspective, as we elaborate on these 
perspectives elsewhere (see Chapters 2–5). 
 
Equity Theory and Organizational Justice Theory 
Advocates of equity theory (Adams, 1965) and organizational justice theory (Deutsch, 1985; 
Greenberg, 1987) argued that (in)equity, (in)justice, or (un)fairness affect the behavior of 
exchange partners. Equity theory (ET), originally a job motivation theory, acknowledges that 
variable factors affect employees’ assessments and perceptions of their relationship with their 
work and employers. ET is built on the belief that employees become de-motivated, both in 
relation to their job and their employer, if they feel as though their inputs are greater than the 
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outputs. Employees can be expected to respond to this imbalance is different ways, including 
demotivation, reduced effort, becoming disgruntled, or acting disruptive. A strength of equity 
theory is that it recognizes the inherent inequality between exchange partners (De Wulf et al., 
2001). Authors have criticized ET, as it does not take into account whether parties in a 
relationship are able and/or motivated to judge their respective input to output ratios. Equity 
theorists also have assumed that parties strive for equitable relationships in any situation (De 
Wulf et al., 2001). Organizational justice theory (OJT) has progressed since Adams (1965) 
introduced the concept of inequity in distributive situations. Researchers focused on the 
fairness of pay or outcomes in work settings, commonly referred to as distributive justice (see 
Deutsch 1985 for a review). Research efforts have recognized the need to consider other 
aspects of workplace justice, such as the fairness of the formal policies or procedures used for 
decision-making, which is referred to as procedural justice.  
 
In an alliance context (see e.g., Johnson et al., 2002; Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1998; 
Luo, 2005; Scheer et al., 2003) inequity exists when the perceived inputs and/or outcomes of 
one firm in an exchange relationship are inconsistent with the perceived inputs and/or 
outcomes of the partner firm (Huppertz et al., 1978). Perceived inequities lead exchange 
partners to feel under- or over-rewarded, affect behaviors in subsequent periods by 
encouraging these parties to change their inputs to the relationship, and result in suspicion and 
mistrust of the exchange partner (Ganesan, 1994). Equitable outcomes stimulate confidence 
that parties do not take advantage of each other and are concerned about each other’s welfare 
(Ganesan, 1994). For instance, Scheer, Kumar, and Steenkamp (2003) found that Dutch 
automobile dealers reacted adversely to positive and negative inequities in their relationships 
with their automobile suppliers. Luo (2005) found that alliance profitability is higher at high 
levels of shared perceptions of procedural justice, particularly higher than that prompted by 
asymmetrical perceptions. In summary, ET and OJT seek to understand the antecedents and 
consequences of deviations from the norm of distributive and procedural justice in exchange 
relationships. 
 
Game Theory 
The field of game theory (GT) came into being with the 1944 classic Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. GT has played and will 
continue to play an important role in the social sciences and is now used in many diverse 
academic fields. A branch of mathematical analysis, GT was developed to study decision-
making in conflict situations. Such situations exist when two or more decision makers who 
have different objectives act on the same system or share the same resources. GT provides a 
mathematical process for selecting an optimum strategy, that is, an optimum decision or a 
sequence of decisions in the face of an opponent who has a strategy of his or her own. Thus, 
GT is a theory of rational behavior for situations in which (1) two or more actors have 
available to them (2) a finite number of courses of action, each leading to (3) a well-defined 
outcome with gains and losses expressed in terms of numerical payoffs associated with each 
combination of courses of action and for each decision maker; the actors also have (4) perfect 
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knowledge of the rules of the game—that is, (1), (2) and (3)—but no knowledge about the 
opponents' moves and are (5) rational in the sense that they make decisions that optimize their 
individual gains. Child and Faulkner (1998) critiqued GT and argued that it does not include 
factors, such as the personalities of the players, their social ties, the communication between 
the players, norm-building, and institutional rules, that affect strategic decision-making. 
Moreover, Sebenius (1992) postulated that the assumption of hyperrationality (i.e., behavior 
motivated only by calculation) is too simplistic. 
 
In an alliance context, GT has been used to understand the relationships among alliance 
structure, alliance development, and outcomes (Parkhe, 1993a, 1993b), unilateral commitment 
and relational processes (Gulati et al., 1994), pay-off structure and cooperation (Song et al., 
2002; Zeng, 2003), the dynamics of cooperation (De Ridder, 2007), and learning and alliance 
development (Nti & Kumar, 2001). For instance, Zeng and Chen (2003) argued that structural 
and motivational changes in an alliance’s payoff structure directly affected parties’ inclination 
to cooperate. Parkhe (1993a) showed that the presence of game theoretic structure elements, 
such as behavioral transparency, long-term time horizons, and partner interactions, reduce the 
use of contractual safeguards. In summary, though scholars argued that GT assumptions 
deviate from reality, within an alliance context, researchers drawing on GT have produced 
several valuable and in some instances counterintuitive insights.  
 
Relational Governance Theory 
Relational governance theory (RGT) offers a valuable complement to classical contracting 
(Macneil, 1980), as it explicitly distinguishes intermediate types of exchange between discrete 
transactions and complete internalization of transactions (De Wulf et al., 2001). Whereas 
classical contract law relied primarily on the legal framework as a mechanism to plan 
exchanges, (re)negotiate contracts, and resolve contractual conflicts, RGT states that relying 
on legal mechanisms can be costly in terms of resources and time. Relational governance is a 
social institution that governs and guides parties to behave in a mutually beneficial manner 
based on a common understanding of relational norms (Macneil, 1980; Noordewier et al., 
1990; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Because unforeseen conditions may affect the relationship, 
relational norms are suggested as complementary enforcement mechanisms (see e.g., Dwyer, 
Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Heide et al., 1992). Relational norms refer to behaviors such as 
flexibility, joint problem solving, solidarity, the creation and use of power, and information 
exchange (Heide et al., 1992; Macneil, 1980). Parties engaging in exchanges based on implicit 
contracts are less in need of monitoring their exchange partners or building formal safeguards 
in the relationship. The strength of RGT is that it provides a conceptual framework that is able 
to capture the dimensions and dynamics that underlie the nature of exchange relationships, as 
well as the belief structures and activities that are necessary for successful exchange 
relationships (Nevin, 1995). Researchers have criticized RGT for failing to prescribe optimal 
types of governance to deal with specific characteristics of the exchange, as well as for its use 
for descriptive and conceptual purposes, and because researchers attempting to empirically 
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measure and assess the role of constructs, such as flexibility and solidarity, have achieved 
limited success (De Wulf et al., 2001).  
In an alliance context, researchers have drawn on RGT to examine, for instance, the 
relationships among trust and contracts (Lee & Cavusgil, 2006), interdependence, explicit and 
normative contracting (Heide et al., 1992), and relational norms and performance (Aulakh, 
Kotabe, & Sahay, 1996). For instance, Poppo and Zenger (2002) found that customized 
contracts complemented by relational governance resulted in higher levels of alliance 
performance. Luo (2002a) showed that contract completeness guided the course of operation, 
ex post cooperation overcame the limitations of contracts, and both independently and 
interactively drove alliance performance. In summary, proponents of RGT have asserted that 
relational mechanisms operate as self-enforcing safeguards that are effective and less costly 
than contractual governance. 
 
Resource-Based View (RBV) 
The resource-based view of the firm (RBV) has emerged as one of several important 
explanations of firm performance differences in the field of strategic management (Barney, 
1991; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984), and its main contribution is that it developed the idea 
that “a firm’s competitive position is defined by a bundle of unique resources and 
relationships” (Rumelt, 1984 p. 557). The core logics that distinguishes it from other strategic 
management theories are resource heterogeneity and resource immobility (Barney, 1991). The 
first assumption implies that competing firms may possess different bundles of resources and 
refers to those resource attributes: scarcity and non-substitutability. A firm’s resource is 
scarce when the demand for that resource is greater than its supply, whereas non-
substitutability refers to the unique nature of this resource in conceiving and implementing 
strategies compared with other resources. The immobility assumption implies that resource 
differences may persist and refers to inelastic supply. That is, a particular resource does not 
become available, though demand for that resource is high. Building on these assumptions, 
the main RBV proposition is that valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources 
foster a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). However, the RBV is not without 
critiques, as researchers have argued that the RBV is tautological (Priem & Butler, 2001; 
Silverman & Baum, 2002; Williamson, 1999), views value creation as endogenous (Priem et 
al., 2001), neglects to incorporate value appropriation (Coff, 1999), and is subject to 
measurement problems (Ray, Barney, & Muhanna, 2004), among other issues. 
 
With regard to alliances, a complete theory of the RBV and strategic alliances is lacking (Das 
& Teng, 2000). Nonetheless, researchers have drawn on the RBV to examine alliance-related 
phenomena (see Barney et al., 2001 for a review), including the role of resources in partner 
selection (Hitt et al., 2000; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1998), the formation of alliances 
(Eisenhardt et al., 1996), selection of governance form (Colombo, 2003), the management of 
alliance (Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002), and the performance of strategic alliances 
(Inkpen, 2001). For instance, Stuart (2000) found that younger and smaller firms without 
cutting-edge technologies formed alliances with larger firms with leading technologies. Hitt et 
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al. (2000) found that firm in emerging markets were more likely than those in developed 
markets to select partners based on financial assets, technical capabilities, intangible assets, 
and willingness to share expertise. In summary, the RBV contributes valuable insights to 
value creation within strategic alliances, but to become a coherent RBV of strategic alliances, 
substantial conceptual and empirical research is required. 
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
Building on the work by Coase (1937), Williamson (1975) developed the transaction cost 
economics (TCE) theory and examined the transaction cost advantages of two different 
governance forms: hierarchy and market exchange. At the core of TCE are the axioms that 
certain exchange characteristics give rise to transaction difficulties and that different 
governance mechanisms vary in their cost-minimizing properties. For instance, transactions 
with an uncertain outcome, that recur frequently, and that require substantial transaction 
investments (i.e., asset specificity) are more efficiently organized through a hierarchical 
governance form. Exchanges that are straightforward, non-repetitive, and that require few 
transaction-specific investments are more likely to be organized through market exchange. 
Thus, under conditions of asset specificity, opportunism, and uncertainty, transaction costs for 
market exchanges are greater than those of more long-term relational exchanges, implying 
that an increase in transaction costs is accompanied by a shift from external to internal 
governance. Restated, firms reduce transaction costs by selecting a governance mode that is 
optimal, given transaction properties. Researchers have criticized TCE (David & Han, 2004; 
Ghoshal & Moran, 1996), arguing that it puts too much emphasis on opportunistic behavior 
(Ghoshal et al., 1996), neglects the role of relational governance (Heide et al., 1992), fails to 
recognize the potential value generated by transaction-specific investments (Madhok & 
Tallman, 1998), represents a static approach that ignores issues pertaining to learning and 
innovation (Nooteboom, 2004), and does not take into account interdependencies between the 
parties in a relationship (De Wulf et al., 2001).  
 
To understand better the antecedents and consequences of governance form decisions, 
researchers argued that alliances should be considered a hybrid governance form on the 
“market–hierarchy” continuum (Borys & Jemison, 1989; Heide, 1994; Williamson, 1985). 
Therefore, TCE has been used to develop and test theories with respect to joint ventures 
(Hennart, 1988), alliance governance form decisions (Chen & Chen, 2003), appropriability 
hazards (Gulati et al., 1998; Oxley, 1997), transaction-specific investments (Buvik & Reve, 
2001; Judge & Dooley, 2006), and alliance outcomes (Barthelemy & Quelin, 2006; Sampson, 
2004b). For instance, Sampson (2004) found that governance forms designed to match the 
predictions of transaction cost economics experienced improved innovation performance 
compared with misaligned alliances. In summary, transaction cost economics explanations 
contribute to a better understanding of the relationships among antecedents and the 
implications of alliance structure. 
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Appendix 2 Definitions 
Construct Conceptual Definition References 
Absorption  
Integrativeness 
The combination of both parties’ ability to assess and 
acquire knowledge to which they are exposed through their 
relationship, regardless of whether parties’ capabilities are 
balanced or imbalanced 
Chen (2004); Dyer & Singh (1998); Lane & 
Lubatkin (1998); Zahra & George (2002) 
Absorption 
Imbalance 
The asymmetry between each party’s ability to assess and 
acquire knowledge to which it is exposed through the 
relationship 
Dyer & Singh (1998); Hamel (1991); Kumar & 
Nti (1998); Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, 
& Sparks (1998) 
Alliance 
Performance 
The degree of both partners’ accomplishment of intentional 
and emergent objectives, with respect to financial, learning, 
and strategic objectives 
Ariño (2003); Geringer & Hebert (1991); 
López-Navarro & Molina-Morales (2002) 
Compensation  
Integrativeness 
 
The combination of parties’ anticipated benefits as 
formalized in the alliance contract, regardless of whether 
parties’ anticipated compensations are balanced or 
imbalanced 
Blodgett (1991); Greenhalgh & Chapman 
(1998); Kersten (2001); Thompson (1990) 
Compensation 
Imbalance 
The asymmetry between each party’s anticipated benefits 
as formalized in the alliance contract 
(Blodgett (1991); Greenhalgh & Chapman 
(1998); Kersten (2001); Thompson (1990) 
Decision-making 
Imbalance 
The asymmetry between each party’s formal authority over 
alliance activities (i.e., decision-making rights) 
 
Bucklin & Sengupta (1993); Child & Yan 
(2003); Child & Yan (1999); Steensma & Lyles 
(2000) 
Firm 
Performance 
Imbalance 
The asymmetry between each party’s accomplishment of 
intentional and emergent objectives, with respect to 
financial, learning, and strategic objectives 
Child (2002); Child & Yan (2003) 
Learning 
Capabilities 
The extent to which the partner firms have created a 
regular and repeatable pattern of routines that support 
knowledge and information transfer 
Dyer & Nobeoka, (2000); Dyer et al. (1998); 
Hamel (1991) 
Non-recoverable 
Investment 
Imbalance 
The asymmetry between parties’ commitment to make 
specialized, tailored, and difficult to redeploy expenditures  
Buvik & Andersen (2002); Buvik & Reve 
(2001); Klein, Crawford, & Alchian (1978) 
Opportunistic 
behavior 
The extent to which parties seek to increase their benefits 
from the relationship in ways that are explicitly or implicitly 
prohibited within the relationship 
Maitland, Bryson, & Van de Ven (1985); Ping 
(1993); Wathne & Heide (2000); Williamson 
(1975, 1985) 
Partner Fit The extent to which interfirm characteristics, such as 
strategic, cultural, organizational, and operational features, 
are compatible at the formation stage 
Douma, Bilderbeek, Idenburg, & Looise 
(2000); Park & Ungson (1997); Sarkar, 
Echambadi, Cavusgil, & Aulakh (2001); 
Saxton (1997) 
Relational 
Quality  
The extent to which partner firms feel comfortable, are 
willing to rely on trust in dealing with another, and are 
committed to the relationship 
Ariño, De la Torre, & Ring (2001); Kumar, 
Scheer, & Steenkamp (1995b) 
 
Relational 
Adaptability 
Parties’ willingness and ability to make modifications to the 
ongoing relationship, without changing the initial alliance 
structure 
Aulakh & Madhok (2002); Doz (1996); Hallen, 
Johanson, & Seyedmohamed (1991); Heide & 
John (1992) 
Resource 
Complementarity 
 
The extent to which the joint use of distinct sets of 
resources yields a higher total return than the sum of 
returns that could be earned if each set of resources were 
used independently  
Chi (1994); Dyer & Singh (1998); Harrison, 
Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, (2001) 
Shared  
Decision-making 
Both parties’ formalized formal authority over alliance 
activities (i.e., decision-making rights), regardless of 
whether parties’ decision-making is balanced or 
imbalanced 
Cullen, Johnson, & Sakano (1995); Johnson, 
Cullen, & Sakano (1996); Subramani & 
Venkatraman (2003); Yan & Gray (2001) 
Structural 
Coherence 
The degree to which an initial alliance structure constitutes 
a constellation of mutually supportive structural safeguards, 
including governance form, contractual provisions, and 
inter-firm characteristics 
Dussauge & Garrette (1995); Miller (1986) 
 
Total Non-
recoverable 
Investments 
Both parties’ formalized commitment to make specialized, 
tailored, and difficult to redeploy expenditures, regardless 
of whether parties’ non-recoverable investments are 
balanced or imbalanced 
Buvik & Anderson (2001); Jap & Anderson, 
(2003); Subramaniam & Venkatraman (2001); 
Williamson (1985) 
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Appendix 3 Pre-test Participants 
Company Name Function 
BlueDome S. Gribnau Business Development Manager 
CGI B. Chomey Director Enterprise Alliances 
Cisco Systems A. Slager  
CRV F. de Graaf Business Development 
CRV A. Lindeboom Managing Director 
Dassault Systems J. Guillouet Business Development Alliances 
Draka Holding M. Bosman Investor Relations Manager 
Enraf T. Tielen Marketing & Business Development Director
Fortis F. Dausy Senior Vice President 
Getronics A. van Grinsven Cisco Alliance Manager 
Human Inference J. Jonker Alliance Project Manager 
Interpay D. van de Pol Manager New Business International 
KLM H. de Graauw Director Alliances 
Organon H. Theunissen Senior Director Research Alliances 
Philips H. Olde Bolhaar Senior Vice-President Alliance Office 
Pigture Group J. van Vugt Director 
Staffware F. Bussemaker Marketing and Alliance Manager 
Stork B. van Steen Director Merger and Acquisitions 
Stork Maintenance Management W. Moonen General Manager 
Terra Sports Technology M. Smit Commercial Director 
Unisys H. de Grooth Director Customer Focused Business 
 
• 12 interviewees indicated to remain anonymous. 
• Acknowledgement is given to Sander Degens, Marcel aan den Boom, and Emiel van 
Alphen for their research assistance.  
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Appendix 4 Questionnaire 
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Appendix 5 Hypotheses 3 and 4: CVA Measurement Models 
 
Measurement Model: Learning Trade-off 
 Model 4 
Financial 
 Model 5 
Learning 
Model 6 
Strategic 
Absorption Integrativeness L. s.e. z-value  L. s.e. z-value   L. s.e. z-value
AE1: (A1f + A1 p) .837    .832    .837   
AE2: (A2f + A2 p) .862 .087 12.356  .856 .088 12.244  .860 .087 12.358
AE3: (A3f + A3 p) .874 .090 12.574  .885 .090 12.813  .874 .090 12.625
AE4: (A4f + A4 p) .744 .098 10.031  .741 .099 9.959  .747 .098 10.108
Absorption Asymmetry          
AI1: √(abs(A1 firm - A1p)) .655   .674    .653  
AI2: √(abs(A2 firm - A2p)) .633 .179 5.257  .580 .164 5.101  .617 .175 5.271
AI3: √(abs(A3 firm - A3p)) .554 .168 4.865  .556 .161 4.958  .552 .167 4.910
AI4: √(abs(A4 firm - A4p)) .542 .168 4.791  .566 .163 5.020  .562 .168 4.971
Alliance Performance          
 AP1    .959   .802    .788  
 AP2 .772 .090 8.936  .853 .138 9.734  .881 .117 9.942
 AP3 .635 .102 7.508  .672 .163 7.944  .736 .138 8.839
Firm Performance Imbalance          
 FPI1 .798   .645    .562  
 FPI2 .792 .150 6.667  .825 .248 5.394  .738 .244 5.033
 FPI3 .564 .044 5.869  .520 .064 4.959  .646 .078 4.947
Notes: n = 144. Standardized coefficients; s.e. = standard error; L. = factor loading; Coefficients of leading indicator were set to 
1.0 to establish the scale for the construct. See Chapter 7 for details of the computation of the aggregate measures. 
 
Measurement Model: Relational Trade-off 
 Model 7 
Financial 
 Model 8 
Learning 
Model 9 
Strategic 
Relational Quality L. s.e. z-value  L. s.e. z-value   L. s.e. z-value
RQ1 .941    .940    .927   
RQ2 .817 .067 11.838  .830 .064 12.489  .825 .066 12.288
RQ3 .736 .075 10.305  .720 .075 10.187  .747 .075 10.650
Opportunistic Behavior          
OP1 .639   .645    .625  
OP2 .668 .244 4.286  .670 .242 4.292  .692 .262 4.231
OP3 .579 .209 4.346  .568 .204 4.338  .567 .209 4.343
Alliance Performance          
 AP1    .931   .855    .782  
 AP2 .792 .087 9.825  .798 .122 9.656  .882 .114 10.259
 AP3 .648 .101 8.035  .670 .150 8.107  .742 .138 8.937
Firm Performance Imbalance          
 FPI1 .792   .580    .539  
 FPI2 .801 .151 6.650  .907 .362 4.521  .806 .305 4.581
 FPI3 .560 .043 5.830  .495 .069 4.828  .595 .078 4.736
Notes: n = 144. Standardized coefficients; s.e. = standard error; L. = factor loading; Coefficients of leading indicator were set to 
1.0 to establish the scale for the construct. See Chapter 7 for details of the computation of the aggregate measures. 
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Afterword 
“The goals and motives that guide human action must be looked at in the light of all that we 
know and understand; their roots and growth, their essence, and above all their validity, must 
be critically examined with every intellectual resource that we have. […] Only barbarians are 
not curious about where they come from, how they came to be where they are, where they 
appear to be going, whether they wish to go there, and if so, why, and if not, why not.”51 
 
Although, it is beyond the scope of this afterword to discuss Isaiah Berlin’s quote in-depth, I 
would like to mention that it inspires me, as most of Isaiah Berlin’s work. It signals a purpose 
in life, and helps me to understand why I always have been curious, professionally as well as 
personally, to reflect on human action.  
 
Taking a professional perspective, the PhD trajectory provided me with multiple answers to 
an equal amount of intriguing questions. I started on what looked like a simple quest to 
explain alliance performance. To date, I have gained academic “know-what” and “know-how” 
about the design and execution of (quantitative) scientific research, the broader field of 
strategic management, and in particular about the phenomenon of strategic alliances. 
However, to further satisfy my desire for knowledge, I have examined response strategies to 
adverse situations, designed and conducted experimental research, reflected on the relevance 
of management research, studied qualitative research techniques, and explored science 
philosophy. To paraphrase Berlin’s words, I did not deplete my “intellectual resources” and I 
am looking forward to advance my professional career with a similar drive. Academically, my 
next objective is to improve the art of writing persuasively and convincingly about different 
intriguing topics, such as value creation and appropriation, circumplex structures, and 
corporate social responsibility alliances. Furthermore, I aim at disseminating the produced 
knowledge to various stakeholders within the management research system, including 
scholars, students, consultants, and practitioners.  
 
On a personal note, the PhD period offered me extant opportunities to explore and to reflect 
on human action; that is, my own actions within different settings. For instance, I actively 
participated in the academic community and I have developed a fair understanding of the 
implicit and explicit rules of engagement. In addition, I attended professional communities, 
interviewed managers, gave presentations at companies, and engaged in consultancy 
activities. These experiences made me again, and even more aware that practitioners play a 
different game. To bridge these worlds, which I belief is of great importance, one requires an 
in-depth understanding of human action, which can only be achieved by continuous 
reflection. To develop these reflective skills, I think that one should seek to engage with a 
plethora of persons and communities. Therefore, I always have searched for a mixture of 
                                                 
51 Berlin, I. 1997. The pursuit of ideal, in Hardy H. & Hausheer R (Eds). The proper study of mankind: An 
anthology of essays. New York, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux: 2. 
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work-related and non-work related interactions and today I conclude that this strategy has 
been worthwhile. Nightly conversations with colleague PhD’s, drinking beers with the co-
promoter, fierce debates with intimate friends, déjà vu’s with complete strangers, casual talks 
with clubbers, diners with family and friends, (a) romantic encounter(s), and the many co-
travelers along the way, not only fueled and fulfilled my desire to observe and reflect, but also 
forced me to consider my own behavior. It made me become a better academic. 
 
Retrospectively, the PhD period was a marvelous adventure, facilitated by numerous people 
allowing me to create my own experiences. At this point, I cannot order, rank, or list all the 
people I would like to thank. I am grateful to everyone I have met during this period, as each 
encounter encouraged me to continue my explorations. That said, I would like to acknowledge 
three persons in particular. Arnold, thanks for your continued support and creating the 
opportunity to begin the PhD. I look forward to reflect with you on this period, while enjoying 
a good glass of wine. John, I really enjoyed our conversations. You always had a gift to 
smoothen my disturbed mind; thanks. I am looking forward to develop new projects and to 
continue to learn from you. Olivier, thanks for your enormous support and comradeship. As 
writing more would only trigger an “Alice” like provocative response, I will not make an 
attempt. 
 
Taking your family for granted seems to be easy. Fortunately, though other persons may 
perceive it as unfortunately, the roller coaster ride I always tend to enjoy with my family 
enables me to appreciate life. Edward thanks for opening doors, whether physically or 
mentally. Somehow, you always trigger me to descend from the ivory tower and enjoy the 
wonders of life. Mom and Dad, you two keep still amazing me; the continuous willingness 
and ability to make sacrifices, allowing me to pursuit my dreams, has been beyond what any 
child can expect from its parents. I have been very lucky and I am deeply grateful. Thanks. 
 
Finally, as there is nothing more to write, let the journey continue… 
 
Brian 
Amsterdam, 2008 
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Dutch Summary / Nederlandse Samenvatting 
Een strategische alliantie betreft een vrijwillige, lange termijn, contractuele 
samenwerkingsrelatie tussen twee ondernemingen om individuele en gemeenschappelijke 
doelstellingen te realiseren door het combineren van middelen (o.a. kennis en geld). Het 
aangaan van strategische allianties stelt ondernemingen in staat om doelen te realiseren die 
anders moeilijk te verwezenlijken zijn. Neem bijvoorbeeld, de Japanse medicijnenfabrikant 
Takeda die de Noord-Amerikaanse markt wilde betreden met een diabetes medicijn. Door het 
aangaan van een strategische alliantie met de Amerikaanse branchegenoot Eli Lilly, kreeg 
Takeda eenvoudig toegang tot Eli Lilly’s distributienetwerk, terwijl Eli Lilly het 
productassortiment tegen lage kosten uitbreidde met een nieuw medicijn. Zulke voordelen van 
samenwerken hebben geleid tot een toename in het gebruik van allianties door 
ondernemingen, maar uit empirisch onderzoek blijkt dat allianties vaak voortijdig mislukken. 
Bijvoorbeeld, de zeer succesvolle alliantie tussen Disney en Pixar gericht op de productie en 
distributie van animatiefilms (o.a. Toy Story en Finding Nemo) werd niet voortgezet als 
gevolg van diverse conflicten (o.a over de verdeling van de opbrengsten).  
 
Tot op heden ontbreekt het in de alliantieliteratuur aan een theoretisch model dat eenduidige 
verklaringen geeft waarom bepaalde ondernemingen wel en andere ondernemingen niet de 
beoogde gemeenschappelijke en individuele doelstellingen realiseren. Het doel van dit 
onderzoek is een bijdrage te leveren aan het oplossen van deze lacune door het ontwikkelen 
en testen van een theoretisch model dat inzicht geeft in factoren die samenwerkingsprestaties 
beïnvloeden. Om dit doel te bereiken zijn twee onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd:  
 
(1) Wat is de relatie tussen alliantiestructuur (ex ante), alliantieprocessen (ex post) en de 
gemeenschappelijke samenwerkingsprestatie? 
 
(2) Wat is de relatie tussen het collaboratie−competitie spanningsveld en de 
gemeenschappelijk en individuele samenwerkingsprestaties? 
 
Alliantiestructuur, Alliantieprocessen en Samenwerkingsprestatie 
In de literatuur zijn er twee hoofdbenaderingen die verklaringen geven voor 
samenwerkingsprestaties: (1) de structuurbenadering en (2) de procesbenadering. De 
structuurbenadering stelt dat een efficiënte inrichting van een alliantie noodzakelijk is om de 
alliantiedoelen te realiseren. Een efficiënte structuur komt tot stand doordat 
samenwerkingspartners wederkerige relaties creëren als gevolg van keuzes met betrekking tot 
de alliantievorm, het alliantiecontract, en partner selectie. De mate waarin de alliantiestructuur 
efficiënt is ingericht wordt in dit onderzoek structurele coherentie genoemd. Ter illustratie, 
indien partners een alliantiecontract formaliseren waarin staat dat de verdeling van 
opbrengsten is geregeld door een mix van ex ante (bv. vooruitbetaling) en ex post (bv. 
winstdeling) afspraken, dan creëren zij een financieel wederkerige relatie. Het creëren van 
structurele coherentie is belangrijk, aangezien het de partners prikkels geeft om gezamenlijk 
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te werken aan het realiseren van de alliantiedoelstellingen. Dat wil zeggen, de aanwezigheid 
van wederkerige relaties reduceert de kans op opportunistisch gedrag en conflicten die het 
succes van de samenwerking ondermijnen. 
 
In de literatuur wordt ook een andere benadering genoemd, die vooral belang hecht aan het 
initiëren van alliantieprocessen. Deze procesbenadering stelt dat het adaptatievermogen van 
de partners bepalend is voor de samenwerkingsprestatie. Het adaptatievermogen van de 
partners is gedefinieerd als de mate waarin de partners bereid en bekwaam zijn om 
veranderingen door te voeren in de alliantie. Het adaptatievermogen neemt toe naarmate de 
samenwerkingspartners bouwen aan de kwaliteit van de relatie wat zich uit in vertrouwen, 
respect, en betrokkenheid. Vertrouwen in elkaar, bijvoorbeeld, fungeert als een signaal naar 
de partners toe dat men bereid is te handelen in het belang van de alliantie. Het 
adaptatievermogen wordt ook groter naarmate de partners leerprocessen initiëren gericht op 
het delen van kennis en informatie. Kennisdeling helpt partners bij het bepalen en 
implementeren van gewenste en noodzakelijke veranderingen. Het ontwikkelen van 
adaptatievermogen is belangrijk. Het voorkomt dat de samenwerkingspartners vast komen te 
zitten in een herhalend patroon van interacties en handelingen resulterend in een situatie van 
inertie. De aanwezigheid van inertie belemmert de partners in het behalen van de 
alliantiedoelen. 
 
Hypothese en Bevindingen 
Bouwend op de inzichten voortkomend uit de structuur- en proces benadering stelt hypothese 
1 dat de gemeenschappelijke samenwerkingsprestatie enerzijds direct en positief wordt 
beïnvloed door de coherentie van de alliantiestructuur, en anderzijds indirect via het 
adaptatievermogen van de partners. De hypothese is getoetst met drie verschillende dimensies 
van samenwerkingsprestatie: financiële doelen, leerdoelen, en strategische doelen. 
 
De resultaten van het survey onderzoek laten zien dat de financiële samenwerkingsprestatie 
positief en alleen direct wordt beïnvloed door structurele coherentie. Structurele coherentie 
heeft daarnaast een positief en direct effect op het adaptatievermogen van de partners. 
Adaptatievermogen associeert positief en direct met leerprestatie van de partners. Dit 
betekent, gegeven het effect van structurele coherentie op adaptatievermogen, dat de relatie 
tussen structurele coherentie en het realiseren van leerdoelen volledig gemedieerd wordt door 
adaptatievermogen. De realisatie van strategische doelen wordt enerzijds direct beïnvloed 
door structurele coherentie en anderzijds indirect via het adaptatievermogen van de partners. 
Deze bevindingen ondersteunen Hypothese 1 gedeeltelijk. 
 
Theoretische en Management Implicaties 
De theoretische implicatie is dat noch de alliantiestructuur noch de alliantieprocessen alleen 
een afdoende verklaring geven voor samenwerkingsprestaties. De verklaringen voortkomend 
uit de structuurbenadering blijken een beperkte geldigheid te hebben, want de 
alliantiestructuur is primair bepalend voor de realisatie van financiële en strategische doelen. 
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De verklaringen voorkomend uit de procesbenadering blijken vooral geldig te zijn in een 
situatie waarin het doel van de alliantie leren of strategisch van aard is. Een belangrijke 
management implicatie is, dat het succes van strategische allianties wordt bepaald door de 
mate waarin beslissingen met betrekking tot de inrichting van de alliantiestructuur en het 
initiëren van alliantieprocessen consistent zijn met de beoogde doelstellingen van de partners. 
 
De Spanning tussen Collaboratie en Competitie in Strategische Allianties 
De spanning tussen collaboratie en competitie in een strategische alliantie is een belangrijk 
maar onderbelicht thema in de alliantieliteratuur. Collaboratie verwijst naar de mate waarin 
partners samenwerken om de gemeenschappelijke doelen te realiseren (ook wel waardecreatie 
genoemd). Competitie heeft betrekking op de mate waarin partners concurreren om 
individuele doelstellingen te realiseren (ook wel waardeverdeling genoemd). Een overzicht 
van de alliantieliteratuur laat zien dat de vigerende theorieën en empirische onderzoeken zich 
voor het merendeel richten op deelaspecten van waardecreatie en waardeverdeling. 
Bijvoorbeeld, de “resource-based view” geeft een verklaring voor waardecreatie in allianties, 
omdat deze theorie zich richt op de synergetische effecten die ontstaan wanneer 
ondernemingen middelen combineren (bv. grondstoffen, producten en technologische kennis). 
De transactiekostentheorie geeft primair een verklaring voor waardeverdeling in allianties, 
omdat deze theorie zich richt op het minimaliseren van productie en transactiekosten van één 
partner. Een implicatie van deze observatie is dat een substantieel deel van het onderzoek is 
gebaseerd op de impliciete assumptie dat waardecreatie en waardeverdeling niet gerelateerd 
zijn.  
 
De tweede onderzoeksvraag richt zich op het expliciet maken van deze assumptie door de 
relaties tussen collaboratie, competitie, en gemeenschappelijk en individuele 
samenwerkingsprestatie te vervatten in een coherent theoretisch model: de collaboratie en 
competitie trade-off. De collaboratie en competitie trade-off stelt dat succesvolle allianties 
gekenmerkt worden door samenwerkingspartners die een balans vinden tussen waardecreatie 
en waardeverdeling en daardoor in staat zijn gemeenschappelijke en individuele 
doelstellingen te realiseren. Bijvoorbeeld, de zeer succesvolle alliantie tussen Philips en 
Douwe Egberts met betrekking tot de Senseo koffiemachine, wordt gekenmerkt door een set 
van financiële afspraken (o.a. royalties), die beide partijen prikkels geeft om samen te werken, 
maar ook beide partijen in staat stelt hun individuele financiële doelen te realiseren. De 
collaboratie en competitie trade-off is gebruikt om de hypothesen 2–4 te formuleren, die zich 
richten op de compensatie trade-off, de leer trade-off en de relationele trade-off. De hypothese 
2–4 zijn getoetst met drie dimensies van samenwerkingsprestatie – financieel, leren en 
strategisch – als afhankelijke variabele. 
 
Hypothesen en Bevindingen 
Hypothese 2, de compensatie trade-off, stelt dat de inrichting van de formele 
compensatiestructuur (de afspraak betreffende de verdeling van kosten en baten) direct van 
invloed is op enerzijds de gemeenschappelijke en anderzijds de individuele 
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samenwerkingsprestaties. De belangrijkste resultaten van het survey onderzoek tonen aan dat 
naarmate beide partners meer tevreden zijn over het te verwachten rendement dit een positief 
effect heeft op het behalen van gemeenschappelijke financiële en strategische doelen. Indien 
de compensatiestructuur één partner bevoordeelt (d.w.z. een onbalans in de verdeling van het 
verwachte rendement), dan leidt dat tot een uitkomst waarbij één van de 
samenwerkingspartners meer profijt heeft van de alliantie. Dat wil zeggen, deze partner haalt 
meer financiële en strategische voordelen uit de samenwerking dan haar partner. De 
bevindingen ondersteunen hypothese 2, echter alleen met betrekking tot financiële en 
strategische samenwerkingsprestaties.  
 
Hypothese 3, de leer trade-off, stelt dat het vermogen van de samenwerkingspartners om 
kennis te delen en te integreren in de eigen organisatie van invloed is op het behalen van 
gemeenschappelijke en individuele alliantiedoelen. Dit vermogen wordt in dit onderzoek 
absorptievermogen genoemd. De belangrijkste resultaten van het onderzoek tonen aan dat 
naarmate partners meer competent zijn om kennis te absorberen dit een positief effect heeft op 
het realiseren van gemeenschappelijke leerdoelen en strategische doelen. Indien één partner 
een leervoordeel heeft als gevolg van een groter absorptievermogen, dan leidt dat tot een 
uitkomst, waarbij één van de samenwerkingspartners meer voordeel ontleent aan de 
samenwerking. Deze partner is beter in staat is geweest de individuele leerdoelen en 
strategische doelen te realiseren. De bevindingen ondersteunen hypothese 3, echter alleen met 
betrekking tot de leerprestatie en de strategische samenwerkingsprestatie.  
 
Hypothese 4, de relationele trade-off, stelt dat de kwaliteit van de samenwerking van invloed 
is op het behalen van de gemeenschappelijke en individuele samenwerkingsprestaties. Een 
goede werkrelatie tussen de partners kenmerkt zich door vertrouwen, betrokkenheid en 
respect en een slechte werkrelatie wordt gekenmerkt door opportunistisch gedrag van de 
partners. De belangrijkste resultaten tonen aan dat naarmate de partners een goede werkrelatie 
hebben gebouwd, dit een positieve invloed heeft op het realiseren van de gemeenschappelijke 
leerdoelen en strategische doelen. Daarnaast blijkt dat een goede werkrelatie positief bijdraagt 
aan een meer evenredige verdeling van financiële opbrengsten tussen de partners. Ondanks 
deze interessante bevindingen, is er geen ondersteuning gevonden voor hypothese 4. 
 
Theoretische and Management Implicaties 
Een relevante theoretische implicatie is dat in bepaalde gevallen – die van de compensatie en 
leer trade-off – waardecreatie en waardeverdeling van invloed zijn op elkaar. Het onderzoek 
toont ook aan dat de compensatie trade-off, de leer trade-off, en de kwaliteit van de relatie een 
verschillend effect hebben op de gemeenschappelijke en individuele samenwerkingsprestaties. 
Kortom, de bevindingen geven (gedeeltelijke) ondersteuning voor de propositie dat 
samenwerkingspartners geconfronteerd worden met de collaboratie en competitie trade-off en 
dat de wijze waarop partners omgaan met de spanning tussen waardeverdeling en 
waardecreatie het succes van de strategische alliantie bepaalt. 
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Een implicatie voor alliantiemanagers is dat de consequenties van beslissingen die genomen 
worden tijdens het formeren en managen van de alliantie verder kunnen reiken dan initieel 
bedoeld is. Bijvoorbeeld, een partner kan proberen de individuele financiële doelstellingen op 
korte termijn te realiseren door een claim te leggen op toekomstige opbrengsten. Echter, een 
claim die ten laste komt van het verwachte rendement van de samenwerkingspartner 
ondermijnt de prikkel om gezamenlijk te gaan werken aan het behalen van de 
gemeenschappelijke financiële doelstellingen. Uiteindelijk heeft dit tot gevolg dat beide 
samenwerkingspartners een lager rendement zullen halen dan verwacht. In het onderzoek zijn 
drie vergelijkbare situaties gevonden, waarbij het behalen van individuele doelstellingen door 
een sterke focus op waardeverdeling een onverwacht negatief effect kan hebben voor de 
partners op lange termijn. De eerste situatie betreft de compensatie trade-off en het realiseren 
van strategische samenwerkingsprestaties; de tweede en derde situaties betreffen de leer trade-
off en het realiseren van leerprestaties en strategische doelen. 
 
Beperkingen en Toekomstig Onderzoek 
De data voor het empirisch onderzoek zijn verzameld door het uitzetten van een cross-
sectionele Web-survey onder managers verantwoordelijk voor een contractuele alliantie. 
Diverse maatregelen zijn genomen om de beperkingen behorend bij dit type onderzoek te 
voorkomen. Aandacht is daarbij onder meer uitgegaan naar het zorgvuldig benaderen van 
informanten, het bepalen van de geschiktheid van informanten voor deelname aan het 
onderzoek, het ontwerpen van een betrouwbare en valide vragenlijst, het voorkomen van 
“common method bias”, en het gebruiken van geschikte data analyse technieken. De genomen 
maatregelen en de resultaten van diverse post hoc analyses (o.a. non-response en common 
method bias) ondersteunen de observatie dat de resultaten van het onderzoek valide en 
betrouwbaar zijn. 
 
Desalniettemin, heeft het onderzoek een aantal beperkingen. Ten eerste, richt het onderzoek 
zich alleen op contractuele allianties, waardoor de bevindingen beperkt zijn tot dit type 
samenwerkingsverband. Toekomstig onderzoek zou zich kunnen richten op andere 
alliantievormen, zoals joint ventures, franchise relaties en licentie overeenkomsten. Ten 
tweede, in het onderzoek is gebruik gemaakt van informanten werkzaam bij één van de 
samenwerkingspartners. Het verzamelen van data onder beide samenwerkingspartners zou de 
validiteit en betrouwbaarheid van de bevindingen verhogen. Ten derde, hypothese 1 is 
getoetst met “partial least squares estimation” en de hypothesen 2–4 met covariantie analyse. 
Gegeven de onderzoeksvragen zijn deze technieken adequaat, maar een grotere steekproef 
had het gebruik van meer geavanceerde statistische technieken toegestaan. Dit had wellicht 
geresulteerd in meer genuanceerde bevindingen. Ten vierde, de constructvaliditeit en 
betrouwbaarheid van de latente variabelen was voldoende. Toch bestaat er ruimte om de 
psychometrische eigenschappen van een aantal constructen te verbeteren, waaronder de 
variabelen compensatie, absorptievermogen, en opportunisme. 
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In aanvulling op deze methodologische suggesties kan toekomstig onderzoek zich richten op 
het verder ontwikkelen en testen van het theoretische raamwerk. Bijvoorbeeld, een beter 
begrip is gewenst over de eigenschappen en antecedenten van structurele coherentie. 
Daarnaast is meer inzicht nodig in de wijze waarop samenwerkingspartners alliantieprocessen 
initiëren en hoe deze processen bijdragen aan het adaptatievermogen van de partners. Ook is 
meer onderzoek nodig dat zich richt op waardecreatie en waardeverdeling in strategische 
allianties. Het verder ontwikkelen en testen van de collaboratie en competitie trade-off kan 
daarbij fungeren als vertrekpunt. Bijvoorbeeld, een beter begrip van de werking (o.a. de 
bepaling van een optimum) van de compensatie trade-off en de leer trade-off, vormt een 
relevante bijdrage aan alliantieliteratuur. Ook zou onderzoek kunnen uitwijzen of succesvolle 
strategische allianties gekenmerkt worden door een balans tussen de verschillende 
waardecreatie- en waardeverdelingsmechanismen. Tenslotte, meer onderzoek is nodig naar de 
relatie tussen de drie verschillende dimensies van samenwerkingsprestatie: financieel, leren, 
en strategisch. Een belangrijke vraag daarbij is: realiseren samenwerkingspartners de 
alliantiedoelen volgens een bepaalde chronologische volgorde?  
 
Conclusies 
Het onderzoek heeft drie belangrijke bevindingen opgeleverd. Ten eerste, noch de 
alliantiestructuur noch de alliantieprocessen bieden voldoende voorwaarden voor het behalen 
van superieure samenwerkingsprestaties. Ten tweede, succesvolle strategische allianties 
worden gekenmerkt door samenwerkingspartners die in staat zijn een balans te vinden tussen 
collaboratie en competitie. Ten derde, beslissingen met betrekking tot de inrichting en het 
management van strategische allianties hebben een verschillend effect op de realisatie van 
financiële prestaties, leerprestaties, en strategische prestaties. De bevindingen zijn vastgelegd 
in een theoretisch gefundeerd raamwerk dat ondernemingen zal helpen bij het succesvol 
ondernemen in de 21e eeuw. Een tijdperk waarin strategische allianties een steeds belangrijker 
instrument zullen zijn voor het bereiken en behouden van concurrentievoordeel. 
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